Enforcing Global Strategies in Subsidiaries of Highly Decentralized Multinational Corporations. The Role of International Sales Managers by Schill, Richard Bruno
University of Bradford eThesis 
This thesis is hosted in Bradford Scholars – The University of Bradford Open Access 
repository. Visit the repository for full metadata or to contact the repository team 
© University of Bradford. This work is licenced for reuse under a Creative Commons 
Licence. 
ENFORCING GLOBAL STRATEGIES IN SUBSIDIARIES OF HIGHLY 
DECENTRALIZED MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
The Role of International Sales Managers 
Richard Bruno SCHILL 
submitted for the degree of  
Doctor of Business Administration 
School of Management 
University of Bradford 
2013
iAbstract 
Enforcing Global Strategies in Subsidiaries of Highly Decentralized 
Multinational Corporations 
Richard B. Schill 
Keywords: multinational corporations, subsidiaries, strategy implementation, decentralized 
organizations, international business studies, global sales management, global marketing 
management 
Resistance of subsidiaries of multinational corporations to global coordination 
efforts by their headquarters is an important contemporary research subject 
in the field of international business studies. This case study of sales and 
marketing organizations in five international subsidiaries of a highly 
divisionalized corporation illustrates how the capabilities and the willingness 
to adopt and pursue global strategies is strongly influenced by local 
situational and organizational factors. The defining business problem was 
different in each country organization, ranging from product related issues 
such as quick innovation cycles and price competition, to economic concerns 
like  emerging market dynamics and economic crisis, and other problems 
related to cultural dissimilarity. A large degree of divisionalization seems to 
dilute central leadership, as central managers compete for the attention and 
the resources of the subsidiaries and local managers behave like 
independent distributors, picking and choosing the most favorable offerings. 
In order to establish successful leadership in the absence of hierarchical 
control, intermediate central sales and marketing managers need to first of all 
internally coordinate their activities towards their local counterparts. Top 
management needs to establish legitimate authority of intermediate 
managers by clear definitions of international matrix roles and management 
procedures. Central sales and marketing managers need to have enough 
international field experience to be able to correctly assess the different local 
situations, advance their initiatives in a diplomatic way on all local hierarchy 
levels and to become overall credible and accepted partners for the local 
teams. Directly engaging in field activities with local customers and sales 
teams seems to help achieving these objectives and thus to contribute to the 
successful enforcement of global strategies. 
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1Chapter 1: Introduction 
This case study addresses a management challenge faced by one division of 
a divisionalized multinational corporation (MNC) in the life-sciences industry. 
Its intermediate central headquarters managers found difficulties in 
implementing defined global strategies in subsidiary sales and marketing 
organizations, in the absence of disciplinary control over their local 
counterparts. Specifically, local managers often resisted corporate strategic 
initiatives of focusing efforts and investments on certain strategic product 
groups, compromising the corporate strategic plan. As an example, two of 
the subsidiaries analyzed in this study persistently refused to focus on 
declared divisional core business areas, favoring other internationally less 
prioritized fields. Addressing these issues, this research was developed to 
make a contribution to the practice of management in highly divisionalized 
multinational corporations and thus to add to the current theoretical debate 
on managing MNCs. 
The specific problem for central managers in this case lies within the fact that 
the subsidiaries of this MNC are very autonomous in their decision making 
with respect to resource allocation to numerous divisions and strategic 
business units (SBUs). Their general managers report directly to central top 
managers, not at a divisional, let alone SBU level. The central divisional 
organizations thus need to find ways to implement their global strategies in 
spite of a potentially strategically uncoordinated planning, where the sum of 
country sales planning by each SBU is not aligned with the sales planning by 
product groups or SBUs performed by central managers (Figure 1). 
Highly divisionalized multi-national corporations (MNCs) face the dilemma of 
needing to be capable of pursuing global strategies and simultaneously 
remaining responsive to local needs and opportunities at the level of their 
country subsidiaries. While neither a pure organization according to countries 
or regions, nor a pure world-wide organization according to product groups or 
businesses can ensure both objectives, many corporations have organized in 
international matrices. Ideally this organization form equally balances the 
2global and local needs. In order to implement their sales plans, central 
managers need to find ways of establishing and maintaining central 
management control concerning the local country sales organizations in the 
absence of hierarchical power. The objective of this study is to analyze one 
division of an MNC with respect to this problem area and to identify 
successful reproducible strategies of central managers dealing with it. 
To guide this research, the principle research question was defined as:  
‘How can central divisional sales and marketing managers enforce global 
strategies in subsidiaries of highly decentralized multi-national corporations?’ 
Figure 1: Challenges in Strategic Alignment Due to Parallel Reporting Lines 
The research approach is an embedded case study, one division of an MNC 
being the principle case and the divisional sales and marketing organizations 
the embedded sub-units. The data collection comprises complementary 
interview and survey methods. The qualitative element is based on 32 semi-
structured interviews with central and local sales and marketing managers 
involved at different hierarchy levels. The quantitative data consists of two 
performance surveys of 141 local country sales and marketing organizations. 
central sales and marketing strategy by division / SBU local sales and marketing strategy by country organization
Divisional Board 1...n

General Manager / Division Manager Subsidiary 1...n
strategic 
alignment
Central SBU Manager 1...n

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
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This research is structured by the following sub-questions:  
How are situational and organizational influence factors specific to individual 
subsidiaries impacting on global sales and marketing strategy 
implementation? 
How are decentralization, delegation and the absence of disciplinary control 
influencing the implementation of global sales and marketing strategy? 
What are successful activities and tools to improve central control?  
How useful are performance surveys for the improvement of international 
sales force effectiveness? 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Underpinnings 
In order to develop a framework to answer the research questions, a 
literature review identifies different streams of theory and conceptualization 
that underpin the research area (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Streams of Literature Surrounding the Research Questions 
 
The theoretical development of globalization strategy emerged with the 
structure/strategy paradigm initiated by Alfred Chandler (1962). It has 
evolved in the late 20th century to address the strategies of multinational 
corporations in the context of globalized economies (Prahalad and Doz, 
1987, Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998). This has led to an ongoing discussion 
about the relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries (e.g. Hewett 
and Bearden, 2001), with authors both from the strategy and the marketing 
paradigms. The latter has also contributed to the area of interest by 
discussing the topic of local versus global marketing strategies. Another 
major stream of literature initiated by Ouchi (1979) is dealing with the forms 
and antecedents of management control. This theory has been adapted to 
the field of sales management (Anderson and Oliver, 1987) and more recent 
publications have been trying to understand sales management control in an 
international context (e.g. Piercy, 2011). An important aspect surrounding this 
Organizational 
Structure Management 
Control
Headquarters –
Subsidiary 
Relationships
Enforcing Global 
Sales and Marketing 
Strategies in 
Decentralized 
Subsidiaries of MNCs
Performance 
Measurement
Local vs. Global 
Marketing Strategy
International Sales 
Management
Cultural Aspects of 
International 
Business
 
5
topic area is performance measurement in sales (Zoltners et al., 2008) and in 
international subsidiaries (Schmid and Kretschmer, 2010). A further literature 
stream dominated by Hofstede (1983) deals with cultural aspects of 
international business. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section concerns 
organizational structure and control, the second is specifically focused on 
management control in an international context. In the third section we 
summarize the findings from the literature review and present the relevance 
for this research, including the development of a framework for the analysis 
of MNCs and their local sales and marketing organizations. 
 
2.1 Theories on Organizational Structure and Control 
2.1.1 The Evolution of the Multinational Corporation 
In his seminal study of the development of major American Enterprises from 
the 1880s to the 1950s, Alfred Chandler (1962) found that ‘a company’s 
strategy in time determined its structure and that the common denominator of 
structure and strategy has been the application of the enterprise’s resources 
to market demand.’ (Chandler, 1962: 383). He described how the four key 
growth strategies of volume expansion, geographic dispersion, vertical 
integration and product diversification have successively forced companies to 
‘reshape the channels of communication and authority…’ (Chandler, 1962: 
385). Volume expansion and vertical integration of marketing and supply 
channels have led to the creation of functional departments, lines of 
authority, the development of sophisticated administrative planning, 
coordination and telecommunication skills. Product diversification then first 
led to the emergence of separate autonomous divisions and eventually to the 
creation of general offices where executives, ‘…freed from all but the most 
essential entrepreneurial duties…’ (Chandler, 1962: 394), could decide 
whether new products could be integrated in existing divisions or required the 
creation of new ones. Buckley and Casson (1976) ‘date the ‘take-off’ of 
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MNEs (MNE = multinational  enterprise; we use this term synonymously to 
MNC) to just after the end of the Second World War.’ (Buckley and Casson, 
1976: 2). They found that very large MNCs were typically present in more 
than 20 countries and easily switched their foreign investments between 
international subsidiaries. The authors’ statistical analysis suggested that 
‘MNEs tend to predominate in industries which are highly concentrated and in 
which intensive use is made of managerial skills, marketing skills and R and 
D.’ (Buckley and Casson, 1976: 20). Explaining these findings, based on the 
hypotheses of Coase (1937), Buckley and Casson have formulated the 
theory of internalization, that they establish as the foundation of a general 
theory of the firm and the multinational enterprise (Buckley and Casson, 
2009: 1570). As opposed to neoclassical theory that assumes a technological 
determination of the size of the firm, the theory of internalization predicts that, 
due to information asymmetries vis-à-vis e.g. technology suppliers, 
entrepreneurs will prefer to organize intermediate inputs, e.g. the function of 
research and development, inside a firm as opposed to buying intermediate 
products or services from other external companies. They will continue doing 
so, as long as the cost of internalization is inferior to the external cost of 
purchasing the service.  
Calvet (1981) presents a classification of theories of the multinational firm 
and direct foreign investment. They identify 4 classes of theories following 
the market imperfections paradigm, sorted ‘roughly in the order of increasing 
need for control over foreign operations.’ (Calvet, 1981: 44). ‘Market 
disequilibrium hypotheses’, particularly the ‘Hymer-Kindleberger (HK) theory’ 
(Buckley and Casson, 1976: 67-72, according to Hymer, 1960 and 
Kindleberger, 1969), see direct foreign investment as a force balancing 
differences in currency, labor cost, technological innovation and return on 
capital assets in segmented geographical markets, assuming that it will come 
to an end when equilibrium is once again reached. ‘Government imposed 
distortions’ are any positive or negative investments incentives by foreign or 
host governments such as any policies concerning taxes, prices, wages, 
labor migration, trade barriers, anti-trust laws, etc.. ‘Market structure 
imperfections’ refers to imperfect competition where companies can engage 
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in activities that influence price levels for example by exploiting domestically 
developed differentiation abroad, taking matured domestic products overseas 
or by imitating competitors pursuing such strategies in oligopolistic markets. 
Finally ‘market failure imperfections’ describe conditions of market failure, 
where classical technical assumptions about perfect markets no longer hold. 
Economies of scale and technological and managerial knowledge are 
examples of such imperfections. Calvet further identifies the theories of 
appropriability, of internalization, of diversification, of transaction cost and of 
property rights as essential elements of the theory of international business. 
In their longitudinal study of the internationalization process of ten 
pharmaceutical and scientific instrument companies, Buckley and Chapman 
(1997) found that internationalization can occur on an MNC level, a divisional 
level or at a SBU or individual manager level.  MNCs thus can simultaneously 
pursue several internationlization strategies that are potentially unconcerted 
or even conflicting.  
Building on Chandler’s research, Galbraith and Kazanjian (1986) found that 
in the 1970s, while the different industries were becoming more and more 
globalized, divisionalized MNCs needed to pursue strategies of increasing 
diversity. They argued that the matrix organization was the appropriate 
answer to this complex challenge. They held that in global competition, 
world-wide cash-flow needed to be managed, instead of local profit-centers 
as ‘The global competitor is one who cross-subsidizes countries in the fight 
for market-share’ (Galbraith and Kazanjian, 1986: 43). This required a 
presence in all major international markets in order to be able to attack and 
retaliate to competitive attacks on a global basis and an international 
coordination across profit centers, namely matrix organizations. The historical 
reasoning behind local profit centers had been the need for locally adapted 
products, a notion that is more and more disappearing in favor of world-
products. A pure, world-wide product oriented organization on the other hand 
has shown to be inflexible in dealing with local country institutions and 
regulations, where the relationships and knowledge of local managers is 
crucial to success.  
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Concerning the international structure of MNCs, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) 
identify 4 principle structures which they label ‘multinational’, ‘global’, 
‘international’ and ‘transnational’. In their 1992 survey of 131 top managers 
Leong and Tan found that 40% of respondents thought their companies 
represented the multinational form and 20% respectively for each of the other 
forms, and their study essentially confirmed the control mechanisms 
predicted by Bartlett and Ghoshal for each of these forms (Leong and Tan, 
1992). The multinational form is structured for national responsiveness with 
independent national subsidiaries that are allowed to operate with substantial 
strategic freedom and organizational autonomy in order to be responsive to 
national market differences. Global companies on the other hand are 
designed to serve uniform world-markets with a maximum of global efficiency 
with centralized strategic and operational decision-making. International 
companies are based on ‘transferring and adapting the parent’s knowledge 
or expertise to foreign markets’ (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998: 17). They 
represent a middle way between the two first forms. According to Bartlett 
(1993) and Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998), major companies such as Procter & 
Gamble, Ericsson, Philips, Unilever and NEC, recognized in the nineteen-
eighties, that the organizational dilemma of needing to be globally efficient, 
nationally responsive and capable of continuous learning at the same time 
could not be resolved by structural reorganization. It rather needed to be 
addressed by improving organizational capabilities concerning 
administration, communication and interpersonal relationships in order to 
build strategic and organizational flexibility, a managerial mentality that the 
authors called ‘transnational’ (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998: 36-37). Instead of 
centralizing or decentralizing, the transnational corporation makes selective 
decisions in integrated international networks.  
 
2.1.2 Organizational Structures of MNCs 
‘Classic’ Organizational Structures 
Mintzberg (1979) has proposed 4 elements of organizational structuring. 
Concerning mechanisms of coordination, the author distinguishes direct 
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supervision, meaning direct orders from a superior to coordinate activities, 
mutual adjustment, meaning coordination of employees by means of informal 
communication and standardization of work processes and skills. Another 
structural element are the design parameters. They include job 
specialization, behavior formalization (procedures, policies, job descriptions), 
training and indoctrination, unit grouping by functions or markets, unit size 
(control span), action planning, performance control systems, liaison devices 
for informal coordination of units (integrating managers, teams, task forces, 
and matrix structures), vertical (downward delegation) and horizontal 
(delegation to other people than line managers) decentralization. The 
organization parts exert different forces on the structure, each trying to 
maximize their own control and independence: the strategic apex (top 
management) is pushing for centralization and direct supervision, the middle 
line (line managers) for autonomy of their (sub-)units in the sense of 
divisionalization, the operating core (manufacturing workforce) for skills 
specialization and horizontal delegation, the techno-structure (planning and 
controlling functions) for standardization (‘because the design of standards is 
it’s raison d’être’; Mintzberg, 1979: 327) and the support staff (support 
functions) favor vertical and horizontal delegation. Age, size, the technical 
system, the environment and power (e.g. external control of the organization) 
are contingency factors for the organization form (Mintzberg, 1979).  
According to these elements, Mintzberg has developed a typology of 5 basic 
configurations of organizational structure. The ‘Simple Structure’ is typically 
seen in small, young organizations and dynamic environments, and marked 
by simple structures based on high centralization and direct supervision by 
the strategic apex. The ‘Machine Bureaucracy’, that often prevails in large, 
old organizations and simple and stable environments, is essentially 
managed by a centralized techno-structure with highly specialized and 
standardized jobs. For ‘Professional Bureaucracies’ the environment is also 
typically stable, but complex, the jobs are also specialized, but much less 
formalized and the organization is marked by vertical and horizontal 
decentralization. Very large, mature organizations that are working in highly 
diversified markets develop the ‘Divisionalized Form’ in which vertically 
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empowered  market -based  units are managed by standardization of outputs 
and elaborate performance control systems. ‘Adhocracies’ are found in 
complex and dynamic environments. They are marked by decentralized 
vertical or horizontal function- and market-based matrix structures and 
frequent use of liaison devices. 
The Matrix Organization 
Galbraith and Kazanjian (1986) see local customers and competition, local 
responsiveness, adaptation and manufacturing as well as low R&D cost as 
features of the geographic organization and inversely global customers and 
competition, global integration, universal products and world-scale factories 
as well as high R&D cost as features of a pure organization by businesses. 
The matrix organization is seen as balancing the pros and cons of the two. 
Instead of going to ‘full’ matrix programs, companies can also introduce 
‘integrating functions’, namely global product managers, or use matrices only 
for certain product groups and different organization forms for others. Also, 
these authors make a strong point, that matrix organizations need time to 
evolve, as a specific matrix-culture is needed for successful implementation.  
 
2.1.3 Organizational Dilemmas of MNCs 
Specific Problems of Matrix Organization Structures 
Davis and Lawrence (1978) have studied a number of well-known MNCs, 
such as General Electric, Shell Oil, Texas Instruments, as they moved to 
matrix organizations in the 70s.  
They define the matrix by the presence of certain roles: ‘Every matrix 
contains three unique and typical roles; the top manager who heads up and 
balances the dual chains of command, the matrix bosses (functional, product, 
or area), who share sub-ordinates, and the managers who report to two 
different matrix bosses’ (Davis and Lawrence, 1978: 134). Reasons to 
choose the matrix organization  form  are seen in the need to respond 
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simultaneously to market and technological needs, substantial need for 
information processing due to uncertainties and financial and human 
resources constraints. While Davis and Lawrence identify advantages for this 
form in a better reactivity to changing technological and market requirements 
as well as facilitation for middle-managers to reach ‘trade-off decisions from a 
general management perspective’ (Davis and Lawrence, 1978: 132).  
They also found ‘nine different pathologies to which they are particularly 
vulnerable’ (Davis and Lawrence, 1978: 131), which they named ‘anarchy’, 
‘power struggles’, ‘groupitis’, ‘collapse during economic crunch’, ‘sinking to 
lower levels’, ‘excessive overhead’, ‘navel gazing’, ‘layering’ and ‘decision 
strangulation’. With ‘anarchy’ a situation is described where the matrix is 
‘latent’ in the sense that there is no codified agreement on the relationships 
between the horizontal and vertical matrix-managers, leading to difficulties in 
coordination. ‘Power struggles’ lie within the nature of the matrix, as all matrix 
managers, while obliged to find a solution with their counterparts are also 
required to defend the interests of their departments. The obligation to 
compromise at the same time can lead to ‘groupitis’, meaning the tendency 
that all decisions be made by groups rather than by individuals. As many 
problem areas are only understood in sufficient depth by specialized group 
members, others are forced to get involved in areas beyond their typical 
competencies, taking their time without being able to contribute. ‘Collapse 
during economic crunch’ describes the situation when in a period of 
economic downturn the top-management requires quick and decisive counter 
measures and reinstates full authority of the line managers and thus destroys 
the matrix culture. As doubling of responsibilities lies within the very nature of 
the matrix, fears of ‘excessive overhead’ are predetermined, in particular 
when top managers are trying to fill all the theoretical boxes of the matrix with 
individuals. As a solution it is proposed to give multiple responsibilities to 
matrix managers. Other dangers for the matrix are uncontrolled layering or 
sinking to lower levels, e.g. ‘…the product managers never relinquish their 
complete control, and the matrix fails to take hold at the corporate level’ 
(Davis and Lawrence, 1978: 138) while at the same time the product / 
function balance might work efficiently in the regional organizations. Or the 
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matrix ‘metastasizes’ and the relationships within the organization become 
overly complicated at lower levels, the organization then also might become 
so preoccupied with internal coordination, that it loses sight of its market 
oriented objectives, a situation that Davis and Lawrence call ‘navel gazing’. 
‘Decision strangulation’, the incapability of reaching quick and decisive 
decisions, occurs when all decisions are separately discussed with two 
different superiors, or when the shared boss of two managers is several 
hierarchy steps above them, leading to a complicated conflict resolution 
process involving all the intermediate hierarchical positions. This is 
particularly difficult with managers with a directive unilateral management 
style. 
In order to avoid such shortcomings, Davis and Lawrence on the one hand 
advise that the tasks and responsibilities of all matrix-members should be 
very explicit, and on the other hand the members need to be trained to 
understand that the principle of sharing power also requires sharing the same 
larger perspective and that they should practice friendly, but not destructive 
competition. The principle of team-work should be applied ‘as often as 
necessary and as little as possible’ (Davis and Lawrence, 1978: 136). 
Goold and Campbell (2003) find that many companies keep struggling with 
the complexities of matrix management to a point where some leading 
companies such as Shell or ABB are stating that it is no longer appropriate 
for them. The authors have identified lack of clarity in the role definitions of 
managers in matrix organizations as a major cause for organizational 
problems resulting from such designs. More specifically they name 
identification of the broad area of responsibility, the intended reporting 
relationship to upper levels of management, the intended horizontal 
relationships with other units in the company and the main accountabilities as 
important areas of clarification (Goold and Campbell, 2003: 353). Particularly 
the definition of lateral relationships is seen as critical, whereby relationship 
functions of ‘mutual interest’, ‘pressure groups’, ‘service providers’, ‘resource 
owners’ and ‘teams’ are distinguished. Pressure groups e.g. are defined by a 
situation, where a principal is required to listen to and support the cause of 
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such a group, however he has the ultimate decision making power on how to 
implement the recommendations of this group. 
Specific Problems of Multinational Organization Structures 
Prahalad and Doz highlight the importance of resource allocation in MNCs, 
as they attribute the ‘competitive posture’ of a business to the resource 
allocation decisions made by its subunits over time (Prahalad and Doz, 1987: 
2). They point out the conflict between local and global orientation in this 
context. In a pure global product strategy with product managers having the 
sole responsibility for resource allocation, local adaptability would suffer. A 
pure regional organization on the other hand wouldn’t allow for the 
development of a global strategy. Prahalad and Doz find that in many cases 
companies are trying to resolve this dilemma with reorganizations. The 
authors do not believe that such attempts can be successful as they think 
that the only solution can lie in the mind-set of the managers who are 
‘expected to reflect global and local perspectives’ (Prahalad and Doz, 1987: 
179). Prahalad and Hamel (1985) find that global strategy involves cross-
subsidizing of certain geographic regions with funds gained in other regions. 
Within regions on the other hand there might be a need for cross-subsidizing 
one strategic business unit with funds gained from another. In this context 
they point out that neither a strong strategic business organization nor a 
strong regional organization may be advantageous for global resource 
allocation (Prahalad and Hamel, 1985: 147). 
Doz et al. (1986) point out the difficult administrative challenge of 
management: ‘…the structuring of the company’s internal decision-making 
process to allow the organization to sense, interpret, and respond to 
tensions, and the resolution of the often contradictory demands for global 
competitiveness and national responsiveness.’ (Doz et al., 1986: 63). They 
point out the cost savings of concentrating global manufacturing as well as 
the advantages of retaining competitive advantage in product and process 
technologies. On the other hand national responsiveness will often require 
dilution of global consistency. ‘Because of the inherent conflict between 
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national and global views, management cannot limit commitments to those 
projects agreed upon by both subsidiary managers and product division 
headquarters executives.’ (Doz et al., 1986: 65). The authors propose 4 
different modes to address this management dilemma. Substantive Decision 
Management means ensuring that each group of managers is strong enough 
to articulate their respective view points. This however leads to biased 
information provided to top management, top management overload, as 
many decisions are being delegated upward, and lacking implementation 
commitment of managers, who feel disadvantaged by arbitrated solutions. 
Substantive Decision Arbitration means the delegation of the decision making 
to ‘trusted arbitrators’, such as area managers who are empowered to take 
decisions on behalf of the top management. The disadvantages of arbitration 
are the same as in the first solution and key decisions will still be escalated to 
top management. Temporary Coalition Management means creating ad-hoc 
groups or task-forces that are assigned to resolve temporary issues of 
strategic dimension. Important considerations for the assignment of such 
groups are the legitimacy of the participating managers, the points of view 
that need to be represented (or not) in the group, and the empowerment of 
the group, so that their recommendations will actually be followed by top 
managers. Decision Context Management means creating an environment 
where managers are motivated by multiple perspectives on a problem and 
create appropriate groups by themselves that allow balancing and resolution 
of issues on an intermediate management level. An example given by the 
authors from one company was that all departments were entitled to object to 
decisions of other departments that negatively affected them and the parties 
then had to attempt to negotiate a compromise. Generally speaking this 
approach requires the promotion of shared cooperative values (Doz et. al, 
1986).  
Murtha et al. (1998) have developed survey scales for attitudes influencing 
international strategy processes. Specifically they have also developed 
scales for the amount of strategy alignment of subsidiaries. They found that 
managers in MNCs were needing to ‘cognitively reconcile conflicts and 
paradoxes presented by the globalization of his or her job’ and ‘faced a need 
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to unlearn a logic that evaluated integration and responsiveness as trade-offs 
before they could replace it with a logic of synthesis.’ (Murtha et al., 1998: 
112). 
 
2.1.4 Management Control According to Organizational Theory 
Ouchi (1979) has identified three fundamental mechanisms for organizational 
evaluation and control referred to as markets, bureaucracies and clans. 
When using the market principle, organizations rely on the price mechanism 
for control: ‘Given a frictionless price mechanism, the firm can simply reward 
each employee in direct proportion to his contribution, so that an employee 
who produces little is paid little, and all payments, being exactly in proportion 
to contribution, are fair.’ (Ouchi, 1979: 835). The only social requirement for 
this mechanism is that of reciprocity, meaning that not adhering to the 
agreement will result in ‘punishment beyond the severance of the crime’ by 
the social system. Profit centers are an example of the attempt of 
organizations to use market mechanisms for internal control. 
The bureaucratic principle relies on rules, hierarchical supervision, direction, 
performance observation etc., resulting in administrative overhead cost. 
Beyond reciprocity, this mechanism thus has the additional social 
requirement of legitimate authority. It is used when the price mechanism fails, 
e.g. when task completion can only be determined by observation, tasks are 
performed by teams with difficulty to determine individual contributions or 
when it is generally difficult to establish a consistent pricing for tasks to 
ensure appropriate quantities of supplies.  
Clan control can be observed when complex group tasks are to be 
accomplished and individual contributions are very costly to measure - 
organizations then try to rely on ‘workers who display a high internal 
commitment to the firm’s objectives.’ (Ouchi, 1979: 837). Extended 
socialization processes for the development of values are then typical in the 
form of traditions. In addition to reciprocity and legitimate authority, this 
mechanism thus has the additional social requirement of shared values and 
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beliefs. Groups that are relying on such socialization mechanisms in a 
specific professional environment, such as ‘healthcare’, are referred to as 
‘professions’, political entities with such common traits are known as 
‘cultures’, and Ouchi refers to groups in the case of individual organizations 
as ‘clans’. Organizations that correspond to pure stereotypes of these three 
mechanisms are rare, most organizations relying on all three of the 
mechanisms, each to a different degree. However market and bureaucratic 
mechanisms both rely on the capacity to measure either the output of a task 
or the exact behavior involved in the completion of the task, while clan control 
can function even in situations where both are difficult to establish. Ouchi 
thus recommends output control in situations with easily measurable outputs, 
behavioral control in situations with easily measurable transformation 
processes and clan control in situations where neither are easy to quantify. 
Ouchi concludes that efficient control ultimately depends on the ability to 
assess performance and the amount of goal incongruity of the organizational 
actors: ‘In everyday language, people must either be able to trust each other 
or to closely monitor each other if they are to engage in cooperative 
enterprises.’ (Ouchi, 1979: 846). 
Jaeger (1983) describes a form of corporate control in some American 
companies that combines aspects of traditional Japanese and American 
forms. Japanese ‘type J’ companies are marked by implicit and informal 
control, consensual decision making and collective responsibility, life-
employment, high level of identification with and loyalty of employees 
towards the organization. Headquarters–subsidiary relationships are shaped 
by personal interaction and expatriate managers. The classical bureaucratic 
‘type A’ organization form pre-dominant in the US is marked by opposite 
characteristics, such as explicit formalized control, individual decision making 
and responsibility, and short-term employment. The modified ‘type Z’ control 
form combines implicit, informal control with explicit formalized measures, 
long-term employment and consensual decision making but with individual 
responsibility. 
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2.1.5 Management Control According to Agency Theory 
Nohria and Ghoshal hold that headquarters – subsidiary relations have 
similar attributes as principal – agent relationships (Nohria and Ghoshal, 
1994: 492). Eisenhardt found that while organizational theory was primarily 
focusing on organizational design (matrix, decentralization, divisionalization 
etc.), control was another important, but neglected aspect (Eisenhardt, 1985: 
134). She amended Ouchi’s (1979) views with arguments from agency theory 
to develop and test an integrated model of organizational control: When an 
agent acts on behalf of a principal, and the agreed behavior is observable, 
the contract between the two should be behavior based. When the behavior 
cannot be directly observed, the principal can either try to acquire information 
about the agent’s behavior at a cost, for example by investing in information 
systems, or reward the agent based on the outcome of his behavior. The 
latter method however transfers some of the principal’s risk to the agent as 
the outcome usually does not solely depend on the agent’s efforts. Two 
organizational features are explicitly built into agency models: goal 
incongruence, manifested in ‘effort aversion’, and outcome uncertainty, an 
influence factor in case of ‘risk aversion’.  
 
Figure 3: Situational Arguments for Outcome Based versus Behavior Based 
Control  
(Eisenhardt, 1989) 
Thus, organizations in agency theory ‘… are seen as risk sharing as well as 
work sharing collectives.’ (Eisenhardt, 1985: 137), amending Ouchi’s 
outcome-based control behavior-based control
information systems availability - +
outcome uncertainty - +
risk aversion of the agent - +
risk aversion of the principal + -
principal-agent goal conflict + -
task programmability - +
outcome measurability + -
longterm relationship - +
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arguments by the possibility of purchasing information, the cost comparison 
of outcome control versus behavior control, control as a basis for rewarding 
agents and risk bearing issues. Eisenhardt then formulated the hypothesis 
that behavioral control is more likely as task programmability, the cost of 
outcome measurement and outcome uncertainty, increases and she 
supported these hypotheses in a survey of 95 specialty stores (Eisenhardt, 
1985: 139-148). On the basis of a review of principal-agent studies she later 
postulated a number of factors favoring outcome control over behavioral 
control and vice-versa. 
According to her analysis, behavioral control should be favored when good 
information systems are available, outcome uncertainty is high, agents are 
risk-averse, tasks are programmable, and there is a long-term relationship 
between principal and agent. Outcome control on the other hand should be 
favored when the outcome is easy to measure, the principal is risk-averse 
and when there are potential conflicts of interest between principal and agent 
(Figure 3). 
 
2.1.6 Management Control in the Marketing and Sales Function 
Anderson and Oliver (1987) look at control systems in the specific case of 
sales forces. From a theoretical viewpoint, they add the perspectives of 
transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1985) and cognitive evaluation theory to 
the general discussion on control systems discussed above. They interpret 
transaction cost theory as being generally skeptical of the capabilities of firms 
to establish more effective controls than markets, suspecting that managers 
often rule in their own personal interest rather than in pursuit of company 
results. They however see one exception, as transaction theory 
acknowledges the need for behavioral control when firm-specific knowledge 
acquired by the employee over time is particularly important for success. 
According to transaction cost theory, loyalty of such employees should be 
sought by a behavior-based reward system. These views are consistent with 
the theory of internalization described earlier. 
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Anderson and Oliver find with cognitive evaluation theory that people strive 
for self-determination and that they therefore prefer intrinsic over extrinsic 
motivation. Feed-back is found to be only intrinsically motivating if it allows 
the correction of behavior for self-improvement in an informal and non-
controlling way. Since this is problematic in outcome control, Anderson and 
Oliver predict a tendency for salespeople to prefer behavioral control. 
Generally they conclude that the different theories are complementary and 
each add different perspectives to the discussion about behavioral versus 
outcome control. 
They further find that with outcome-based control systems, sales people 
receive clearly quantifiable objectives but little managerial direction and 
supervision. ‘Outcome-based control, then, is laissez faire management 
whereby the salesperson is made an entrepreneur, responsible for his of her 
performance but free to select the methods of achievement.’ (Anderson and 
Oliver, 1987: 77). The major advantage seen in outcome-based control is the 
motivational aspect, as salespeople are only rewarded if they produce, and 
motivation being of central importance due to ‘the often discouraging nature 
of selling’ (Anderson and Oliver, 1987: 77). Disadvantages of such systems 
are identified in a potential tendency of sales people to prioritize short-term 
sales results over long-term strategic objectives, e.g. by neglecting services 
or the sales of new or particularly profitable products. This can be countered 
by using multiple outcome-criteria for evaluation, such as sales with new 
products, profit margins etc., however this makes the control system more 
complicated and also represents a first step towards behavioral control. 
Anderson and Oliver further argue that in behavior-based systems, sales 
people on the other hand are evaluated according to their skills, efforts and 
strategies, with criteria such as their number of sales calls made, their 
presentation skills, their product knowledge etc., and they receive substantial 
monitoring and guidance from their sales managers. The advantage of 
behavior-based systems is seen in the possibility for sales managers to guide 
their salespeople towards long-term strategic objectives. Another advantage 
occurs when the sales persons have little individual control over the sale, as 
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behavior control can avoid unjustified monetary under- or overcompensation.  
Anderson and Onyemah (2007) suggest that output-control systems make 
the sales force primarily focus on their customers while behavior-control 
systems focus the salespeople more on their sales managers. The output-
control culture is marked by considerable autonomy of the salespeople in 
how they service their customers. Behavioral-control oriented companies on 
the other hand establish multiple criteria for the evaluation of their sales 
people that relate to their activities, efforts and skills. While these two 
different systems represent different sales force cultures, Anderson and 
Onyemah suggest that ‘In the most cases, the right choice will be a 
consistent system somewhere in the middle of the OC-BC (output control – 
behavioral control) continuum.’ (Anderson and Onyemah, 2007: 2). They 
identify three typical patterns of inconsistencies that lead to problems in sales 
management. ‘The ever-present manager’ describes a conflict situation 
where sales people are evaluated and compensated by an output control 
system that leads them to focus on bottom-line sales figures, but the 
manager tries to closely monitor and guide the sales people towards other 
qualitative objectives. ‘Sublime neglect’ is a phenomenon that occurs when a 
behavioral control system is not fully understood by the sales people and not 
backed by the sales managers, e.g. because they have selling objectives 
themselves. ‘The black hole’ characterizes an output control system that is 
lacking transparency in it’s evaluation parameters leaving sales-people 
frustrated, believing to be evaluated and rewarded in an arbitrary manner.  
Generally speaking the authors find that output control is advisable when 
sales peoples skills and efforts are the primary source of success of the sale, 
e.g. when there is no clear competitive advantage in the offering, when the 
customer trusts in the sales person as an advisor in long-term relationships, 
when the customer is unclear about their needs and the sales person can 
shape them and when multiple different successful sales approaches are 
possible. Also output control requires an efficient and reliable accounting 
system for measurement of the individual performances. Behavioral control 
on the other hand should be favored when the salespeople lack experience, 
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particularly in an environment with strict governmental compliance rules, 
when there is a strong need to build and maintain brand equity, when there 
are other priorities than sales allocated to sales people (e.g. assisting in 
product development) or when it is difficult to measure a salesperson’s 
individual contribution to sales. 
Importantly, according to these authors, the decision on management control 
is also largely influenced by the culture and legal system of individual 
countries. They name the US, Canada, Argentina, Italy, and parts of India as 
examples for output control prone countries and Sweden, Japan and Korea 
as countries oriented towards behavioral control. Specifically, countries that 
are particularly driven by hierarchy, such as France and Germany, are said to 
disfavor output control. 
 
Figure 4: Antecedents of Management Control Systems  
(Krafft, 1999) 
Krafft (1999) has identified antecedents of sales force control in a study of 
270 German sales organizations. He finds support that the variables 
‘environmental uncertainty’, ‘number of customers per salesperson’, ‘cost of 
output measurement’, ‘measurability of behavior’, ‘knowledge level 
concerning the transformation process’ and ‘salespersons’ minimum utility 
requirement (meaning formal education)’ positively correlate with behavioral 
outcome-based control behavior-based control
environmental uncertainty - +
customers per salesperson - +
sales force size + -
managements' risk aversion
output measurability + -
cost of output measurement - +
behavior measurability - +
transformation process knowledge - +
transaction specificity
sales persons' risk aversion
sales persons' effectiveness
salespersons' utility requirement - +
not supported
not supported
not supported
not supported
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control, while ‘sales force size’ and ‘output measurability’ correlate 
negatively. Managements’ and sales persons’ risk attitude, transaction 
specificity and sales persons’ effectiveness (age and experience) did not 
show any significant relation to control system design (Figure 4). He 
concludes that environmental influences have a higher impact on control 
systems than sales persons’ characteristics. Also he finds that while Ouchi’s 
(1979) and agency theory’s propositions are well supported (with the 
exception of risk attitudes), transaction cost theory has limited predictive 
power in this context. 
 
2.2 Management Control in International Marketing and Sales 
Organizations 
2.2.1 Headquarters – Subsidiary Relations 
Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) define the subsidiary as ‘a value adding entity in 
a host country’ (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998: 774). They find that subsidiaries 
are typically established for seeking of resources, markets or efficiency. They 
then evolve according to the assignments of the head-office, the decisions of 
the subsidiary managers and the local market opportunities and restrictions. 
The authors identify two theories for the development of subsidiaries. The 
product life cycle model explains how MNCs will establish foreign 
subsidiaries in the search for low-cost manufacturing opportunities for 
maturing products. This theory does not apply well to this research context, 
as we are dealing primarily with sales rather than manufacturing 
organizations. The second theory is that of internationalization whereby 
MNCs are in a constant cycle of learning about foreign markets and adjusting 
their commitment accordingly in the form of additional investments. The 
authors identify 5 typical development paths for subsidiaries: parent driven 
investment or divestment, subsidiary driven charter reinforcement or 
extension and atrophy through subsidiary neglect. The authors propose that 
influence factors favoring further expansion of the subsidiaries activities can 
be found in a strong subsidiary track-record, a favorable parent-subsidiary 
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relationship, a dynamic local business environment, a good support level 
from the host countries government, the strategic importance and the factor 
input cost of the host country. They further propose that a strong internal 
resource allocation mechanism and decentralization will favor subsidiary 
driven decisions and disfavor parent-driven decisions.  
Gestetner (1974) reported on his experience in managing 1300 sales and 
services offices in 130 countries in his family owned office equipment 
company. He has identified two fundamental strategies of managing 
international branch offices of multinational companies. The centrist 
approach allows little decision-making authority on the part of the 
international branch offices, who typically are stereotypes of the domestic 
branch offices. The objectives of the home company are prioritized over the 
needs of the international subsidiaries. In a non-centrist approach the country 
subsidiaries have the same hierarchical and decision making status as the 
domestic sales force and are only ‘subject, …, to minimal central control. … , 
and, provided a satisfactory, continuous growth in profit and return on 
investment, the head office maintains a policy of non-interference.’ 
(Gestetner, 1974: 103). This corresponds to what has been said earlier about 
‘laissez faire management’ and outcome control. In parallel, centralized 
strategies correspond to behavioral control. Strong central control is believed 
to be leading to ‘greater efficiency in operation and to the avoidance of 
unnecessary and wasteful duplication in such areas as market research, 
product development, and sales techniques.’  
Other advantages are seen in the development of a standard global image 
towards the customers, in optimizing financial returns and in the capability of 
manipulating world trends to the advantage of the company. Disadvantages 
are seen in inflexibility in coping with international cultural, political and 
regulatory differences concerning for example salary and variable income 
structures, pricing and discounting, hierarchies, labor laws, taxes etc. Also, 
the lack of empowerment can lead to a lack of self-confidence of the local 
management, lengthy decision making, difficult communication and 
misunderstandings, negative feelings towards the head office and little 
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reactivity to local trends. Decentralized strategies largely avoid such short-
comings and in addition cater to the nationalist pride in various countries. On 
the other hand the lack of central control leads to ‘needles repetition of 
learning cycles in sales, finance, or technology …’ and ‘often makes the local 
executives act like prima donnas.’ (Gestetner, 1974: 105). The local 
management might develop a tendency to search for specific local solutions, 
e.g. in materials sourcing, only to demonstrate local independence and to 
‘hamster’ funds that might be better invested in other subsidiaries. 
Nohria and Ghoshal (1994) found that structural headquarters-subsidiary 
relations that were fit to the individual subsidiaries’ environmental and 
resource context through varying combinations of centralization and 
formalization, could improve the overall performance of MNCs. They propose 
that in situations with high environmental complexity, subsidiaries need to 
benefit from their superior local knowledge and need autonomy to do so. 
Consequently, both centralization and formalization become less efficient. 
While a higher amount of resources of a subsidiary also decreases the 
efficiency of centralization, it increases the headquarters’ need for 
formalization, as they may wish to install procedures ‘to keep in check 
potential agency problems.’ (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994: 493). Nohria and 
Ghoshal also identify shared values between headquarters and subsidiaries, 
by establishing ‘equifinality’, aligning the mutual goals and interests, as an 
alternative control mechanism that has a positive impact on MNC 
performance. 
Hewett and Bearden (2001) found that establishing successful relationships 
between headquarters’ and subsidiaries’ marketing operations had a positive 
impact on the local sales performance of products. This effect became more 
important as headquarters’ were trying to standardize marketing processes 
internationally. Differences in national culture moderated the importance of 
trust in the relationship. In their model, dependence and trust are 
antecedents of acquiescence (‘…the extent to which one party in an 
exchange situation accepts or adheres to another’s specific request.’ (Hewett 
and Bearden, 2001: 53)) of the subsidiary, meaning that the lesser a 
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subsidiary depends on central marketing activities and the lesser trust they 
have in the central marketing team, the more unlikely they will be to accept 
their requests. Trust, in addition, is an antecedent of cooperation of the 
subsidiary that is moderated by the level of individualism or collectivism in its 
country culture. Acquiescence, and cooperation of the subsidiary have a 
positive influence on subsidiary product performance. While the authors 
generally found support for their model in empirical testing, they could not 
prove the predicted influence of dependence on acquiescence. 
Podnar et al. (2010) have established identification with an organization as 
dual construct. Individuals identify distinctly with the organization as a group 
of people, in the sense of corporate culture and the organization as a whole 
in the sense of corporate identity. 
Baliga and Jaeger (1984) have presented a decision model for the choice of 
control system and appropriate level of delegation of subsidiaries in MNCs. 
Based on the variables ‘type of interdependence’ (pooled, sequential, 
reciprocal), ‘environmental uncertainty’ (high / low) and ‘cultural proximity’ 
(high / low) they define the type of control system (cultural / bureaucratic) and 
the extent of delegation (centralized / moderately decentralized / highly 
decentralized). Bureaucratic control is only recommended in the absence of 
reciprocal interdependence and when cultural proximity is low, in all other 
situations cultural control is advised. Centralized control (low level of 
delegation) is recommended when some sort of interdependence exists and 
environmental uncertainty is low. In all other situations moderate or high 
decentralization is recommended. 
In an analysis of 70 interviews, mostly with subsidiary managers of 10 MNCs 
included in the French CAC 40 stock market index, Beddi (2011) was able to 
associate 3 typical corresponding role types of headquarters that they named 
‘interventionist’, ‘mediating’ and ‘moderating’. ‘Interventionist’ headquarters 
are observed when the subsidiaries all have the same range of activities and 
carry the same brands. The cooperation is marked by a strong centralist 
presence at the subsidiaries, which are all managed in a uniform way. Know-
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how is transferred in a unilateral way from the headquarters to the 
subsidiaries. ‘In the end, the relationship circles around the headquarters’ 
wish to control and the subsidiaries‘ search for knowledge’i (Beddi, 2011: 84). 
France Telecom is given as a well known example. The ‘mediating’ 
headquarters is marked by numerous reciprocal activities with the 
subsidiaries and a mediating role of the headquarters in connecting the 
subsidiaries that are managed in a uniform way. The headquarters has a 
large staff of functional and regional responsible international managers. An 
example is given from the company Air Liquide, where functional managers 
are running transversal programs for establishing best practices and 
benchmarking concepts.  
A subsidiary manager states:  
‘We are solicited by people with whom we have strictly no connection. We are asked to 
participate in projects that have no immediate influence on our everyday activities. (…) Your 
team can sometimes report functionally to people who do not report to you, sometimes you 
are informed, sometimes you are not informed, sometimes you know the results, sometimes 
you do not.’ii (Beddi,2011: 85) 
The ‘moderating’ headquarters is marked by direct relationships between the 
subsidiaries and very limited contact with the headquarters, whose role is 
essentially in establishing the organizational design and the rules of 
interaction. The subsidiaries are highly differentiated, leading to 
interdependence between each other. As one of the study participants, a 
subsidiary manager put it: ‘And the only role of the central board is to make 
the matrix work’iii (Beddi, 2011: 84). Vinci Energies for example has adopted 
such a mediating model. 
Malnight (1996) have described 3 models of headquarters – subsidiary 
relationships, ‘centralized’, ‘decentralized’ and ‘network’. While an 
‘interventionist’ role of the headquarters seem to be associated with 
centralized organizations and a moderating role with network organizations, 
Beddi does not find the mediating role to be particularly related to 
decentralized organizations. Also, they attribute the fact that only 2 out of 10 
companies in their study had adopted a network approach with a moderating 
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head-quarters function to the fact that the companies were still very much 
marked by the French home market. 
Doz (1981) finds that headquarters’ influence on subsidiary strategy remains 
considerable as long as subsidiaries depend on key resources of the 
headquarters. In situations where MNCs become fragmented into 
autonomous, self-sufficient subsidiaries, ‘rebuilding headquarters influence 
becomes much more difficult.’ (Doz, 1981: 15). They identify 3 management 
mechanisms to achieve strategic change: ‘data management’ in the form of 
information and measurement systems, resource allocation procedures, 
strategic planning and budgeting, ‘managers’ management’ in the form of 
choosing key managers, career paths, reward and punishment systems, 
management development and socialization patters, and ‘conflict resolution’ 
in the form of decision responsibility assignments, integrators, business 
teams, coordination committees, task forces and issue resolution processes. 
They find that power shifts from subsidiaries to headquarters can only be 
achieved in a purposeful and controlled way when they ‘appear legitimate to 
a great majority of managers involved’ (Doz, 1981: 27). Care must therefore 
be taken by top management to establish such legitimacy. 
Egelhoff (1984) has studied differences between 24 US and 26 European 
MNCs with respect to the control mechanisms of their subsidiaries. The 
author has operationalized output control in the marketing function by the 
frequency with which sales and expense reports are provided by the 
subsidiary. The reasoning behind this measurement is the assumption that 
substantial deviations to the selling and expense plans would necessarily 
result in an immediate response of the parent company in the form of the 
request for a meeting or further information, an assumption that was 
confirmed by the majority of the participants. Behavioral control, was 
measured by the number of expatriate managers being sent to subsidiaries 
using the following argumentation: 
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‘This is consistent with the concept of behavior control, because parent company managers 
within a foreign subsidiary are likely to be monitoring and evaluating the activities and 
behaviors within the subsidiary (for example, how salesmen are trained and briefed prior to 
the launch of a new product) … As these managers monitor and evaluate behavior within the 
subsidiary organization, they tend to use standards of comparison derived from the parent.’ 
(Egelhoff, 1984: 74). 
Edström and Galbraith (1977) have hypothesized that multinational 
corporations use expatriate managers as a means of socialization for local 
managers and for creating verbal information networks, allowing for 
increased decentralization.  
Egelhoff found that, at the time, US companies were relying more on output 
control, requiring precise planning and budgeting, whereas European 
companies were favoring behavior control, with a necessity for a ‘company-
wide understanding and agreement about what constitutes appropriate 
behavior … probably best conveyed in a strong company culture and long 
careers in the same company’ (Egelhoff, 1984: 81). European companies 
also showed shorter reporting spans between parent and subsidiary 
organization than US companies. They further argue that behavioral control 
is decentralist, as measuring, comparing and feed-back all occur at the 
subsidiary level. We challenge this point of view, as behavioral control might 
also occur between the headquarters’ managers and subordinate subsidiary 
managers. 
Tran et al. (2010) have analyzed the effectiveness of headquarters 
knowledge sharing with subsidiaries. Prior literature suggests that effective 
knowledge sharing depends on the capacities, the motivation and the 
capabilities of subsidiaries to receive it, the ability and motivation of 
headquarters managers to share it, the type of knowledge to be shared, the 
communication channels and the relationship between the communication 
partners (Tran et al., 2010: 295). In their study of 132 European sales 
subsidiaries of a Danish fashion retail corporation they could empirically 
support the above assumptions. 
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Concerning subsidiaries, Jaeger (1983) finds empirical support that type Z 
subsidiaries are more likely to share the values of the headquarters, use 
more expatriate managers, and use more informal, personal communication 
with the headquarters.  
Kostova and Roth (2002) studied the adoption of organizational practices by 
subsidiaries, that were imposed by their headquarters. They used institutional 
theory and specifically the concept of institutional duality that states that a 
subsidiary is at the same time subject to pressures from the headquarters 
and potentially conflicting institutional patterns specific to their host country 
(Kostova and Roth, 2002: 216). 
 
Kim and Mauborgne (1993) analyzed the impact of procedural justice, which 
they define as ‘the extent to which the dynamics of a multinational 
corporation’s strategy-making process are judged to be fair by the top 
managers of its subsidiaries.’ (Kim and Mauborgne, 1993: 503) on 
compliance of subsidiary top managers with strategic decisions of MNCs. 
Procedural justice includes headquarters knowledge about the local situation, 
two-way communication on strategy, consistent decision making across 
subsidiaries, the possibility to challenge headquarters’ views and information 
about strategic decisions. Their model holds that procedural justice has a 
direct impact on subsidiary managers’ compliance, but also a mediated effect 
via organizational commitment, trust and outcome satisfaction. Subsidiary 
industry type is a moderating factor for both effects, suggesting that theses 
effects are believed to be stronger in global industries than in multinational 
industries. In their study of 119 subsidiary executives from different 
companies in different industries, they found empirical support for their 
model. 
Birkinshaw (1997) have identified initiative, ‘a discrete, proactive undertaking 
that advances a new way for the corporation to use or expand its resources’ 
as a key element of corporate entrepreneurship. They found that MNCs were 
neglecting the creative potential of their subsidiaries, while subsidiary 
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initiatives have ‘the potential to enhance local responsiveness, worldwide 
learning and global integration…’ (Birkinshaw, 1997: 208). 
Jarillo and Martinez (1990) have presented a framework to describe the 
strategic role of subsidiaries of MNCs. According to the dimensions ‘degree 
of integration’ (high – low) and ‘degree of localization’ they have 
distinguished three principle subsidiary strategies. In this framework 
‘autonomous subsidiaries’ are performing most activities of the value chain, 
such as R&D, marketing and manufacturing, by themselves, with a low level 
of integration and a high level of localization. ‘Active subsidiaries’ also 
perform many value chain activities locally but are highly integrated in the 
global corporate network. ‘Receptive subsidiaries’ are highly integrated in the 
corporation but show a low level of localization, as they only perform few 
value chain activities, typically only marketing and sales.  
Ambos et al. (2010) have studied the influence of initiative-taking by 
subsidiaries on relationships in MNCs. They believe that subsidiary 
managers are trying to increase their autonomy concerning the headquarters 
and to increase their influence over other subsidiaries. When subsidiaries 
create value-adding resources for the MNC, a mutual dependence comes 
about, that central managers view with ambiguity: while they must appreciate 
the exploitation of opportunities, they want to maintain their own level of 
central control. This is why they will increase close monitoring of such 
subsidiaries that show a high level of initiative. Ambos found empirical 
support for these assumptions. 
Luo (2003) has studied the impact of headquarters-subsidiary links in 
emerging economies. They point out and show empirical evidence for the 
particular importance of headquarters’ resource allocation and information-
sharing, local responsiveness and control-flexibility (‘less rigid control’; Luo , 
2003: 303) in their study of 196 subsidiaries of MNCs in China. 
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2.2.2 Cultural Aspects 
In his survey of 116,000 industrial employees in 50 countries, Hofstede 
(1983) has identified the 4 dimensions power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism versus collectivism, and masculinity versus 
femininity as the main explanation of the variance in the participants’ work-
related values. These dimensions are used to account for different 
approaches to structure, motivation and societal interaction. The author 
defines power distance by the participants’ observations and preferences 
concerning their superiors autocratic or paternalistic as opposed to 
democratic decision making style, and by the general perception of fear of 
disagreeing with superiors. Hofstede’s dimensions, although they have been 
often criticized and misunderstood, have proven to be stable over the years 
and they have later been amended by a fifth dimension specific to East Asian 
nations, labeled ‘long-term versus short-term’ orientation (Minkov and 
Hofstede, 2011). 
Chapman et al. (2008) find that cultural distance is not an absolute measure, 
but that personal interpretation of intercultural interaction is strongly related to 
the common historic background of nations. In their qualitative study they 
found that while Britain and Germany have similar profiles according to 
Hofstede’s dimensions, cultural distance between Poland and Britain as 
opposed to Poland and Germany was perceived very differently by 66 senior 
managers involved in respective bilateral business relationships. 
Steenkamp and Geyskens (2012) have tested the impact of Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions on the predictive power of transaction cost economics 
(TCE) theory concerning governance decisions of companies.  
They summarize Williamson’s (1975) theory:  
‘…when the dimensions of transactions raise transaction costs and combined create market 
failure, TCE postulates that firms gain competitive advantage by opting for non-market 
governance, for which two broad options are available – hierarchical governance and 
relational governance.’ (Steenkamp and Geyskens, 2012: 255), 
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these dimensions being uncertainty related to transaction volume, technology 
involved and behavior of the transaction partners. They hypothesize, and 
present empirical evidence in a Meta-Study of more than 60 000 companies, 
that transaction cost logic is less important for governance decisions in 
countries with high power distance and short term orientation. They also find 
that TCE has a higher power to predict hierarchical governance and a lower 
power in predicting relational governance in countries with higher power 
distance, higher uncertainty avoidance and higher masculinity. 
Nakata and Sivakumar (2001) have used Hofstede’s dimensions to formulate 
a large number of propositions in order to describe the influence of national 
culture on the interpretation, adoption and implementation of the marketing 
concept. They proposed that while strong individualism leads to a Marketing 
view associated with satisfying transactional customer needs, low 
individualism leads to a focus on relational customer needs. A high cultural 
predisposition for uncertainty avoidance will result in offering incremental 
innovations, a low predisposition in offering radical innovations and a higher 
likelihood of general adoption of the marketing concept. While higher 
uncertainty avoidance will positively impact on the generation of market 
intelligence, lower uncertainty avoidance will positively impact dissemination 
and utilization of market intelligence. High power distance will lead to 
segmented and differentiated treatment of customers, low power distance to 
equal treatment of customers and a higher likelihood of general adoption of 
the marketing concept. While high power distance will positively impact on 
the generation of market intelligence, lower power distance will positively 
impact dissemination and utilization of market intelligence. Countries 
following a Confucian dynamic will see a more long-term focus of customer 
activities, a high acceptance of the Marketing concept, and a predisposition 
to collect, disseminate and utilize market intelligence. 
Uncertainty avoidance was defined by the items tension at work, tolerance of 
breaking company rules and employees’ intention to remain with the same 
employer. Individualism was defined by the goals employees had concerning 
their dependence on the organization. Masculinity was defined by high 
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scores with items concerning career and job challenge while femininity was 
defined by high scores for work relationship, quality of life and employment 
security items. Countries with a large gender gap are considered masculine 
and countries with low or zero gender gap as feminine.  
 
2.2.3 Global versus Local Marketing Strategy 
Birkinshaw et al. (1995) have identified the determinants of global integration 
strategies. They found that the degree to which an industry should be 
globalized depended on the degree an industry structure favored 
globalization and on the level of global competition. In their analysis of 7 
industries they found that only 3 of them were appropriately globalized while 
the remaining 4 industries were under-globalized. 
Buckley and Casson (2011) have extended their internalization theory to the 
marketing function. They found that while the academic disciplines of 
management strategy and multi-national enterprise had some overlap, the 
Marketing paradigm, with its focus on practitioners’ issues, was almost 
entirely separated in its research (Buckley and Casson, 2011: 493). 
According to Buckley and Casson, economic theory has therefore continued 
to reduce marketing to the advertising function. Specialized knowledge about 
customer needs and suppliers offerings however allows marketers on the 
one hand to act as a broker for the two parties and, more importantly, on the 
other hand to evaluate the market acceptance of new technologies according 
to their perceived cost-benefit ratio. Marketing thus assumes an important 
role in the R&D process, depending on the industry potentially a critical role. 
The authors conclude that there are industries that are driven by technology 
where the classical R&D function has the most important role in product 
development and that there are more market driven industries, where product 
development depends essentially on the marketing function. In either of 
these situations, the less important function might be respectively subject to 
outsourcing as it does not represent the company’s core competency.  
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As the term ‘Global Marketing Strategy’ has been used with different 
meaning in literature, Zou and Cavusgil (2002) have conceptualized it and 
also studied its effect on firm performance. They found that prior literature 
had taken three different perspectives all of which Zou and Cavusgil integrate 
in their model. One part of the literature focused on standardization of 
products, promotion, distribution and pricing, another one on sustaining 
competitive advantage by managing the value chain and yet another one on 
global competitive leverage effects such as cross-subsidizing of different 
countries, competitive dislocation and rationalization. The global marketing 
strategy thus comprises decisions concerning the parameters of these three 
perspectives. International experience, global orientation and external 
globalizing conditions influence the global marketing strategy, that has both a 
direct effect on financial performance, as well as a mediating effect via the 
global strategic performance of the company. Global strategic performance is 
also directly impacted by the international experience of the company (Zou 
and Cavusgil, 2002: 44-46). 
Kirka et al. (2011) have used institutional theory to analyze how subsidiaries 
implement market orientation of MNCs. They formulate a theoretical 
framework that states that the implementation of market orientation is 
positively influenced by the strength of local legal institutions, the local 
competitive intensity and the local country managers’ perception of the 
marketing orientation of their headquarters. The effect of perceived 
headquarters’ market orientation is positively moderated by a higher 
identification of subsidiary managers with the headquarters and the effect of 
local competitive intensity is positively moderated by a higher cultural 
distance between headquarters and subsidiaries. In their study of 78 
subsidiaries in 45 countries they could support this framework with the 
exception of some of the moderating effects of cultural distance. 
Homburg et al. (2012) have developed a marketing classification of foreign 
subsidiaries. They have surveyed 133 subsidiaries and their respective 
headquarters in 29 countries according to their structure, subsidiary age, 
subsidiary size, value-added scope, strategy, strategic influence, strategic 
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importance and strategic competence, market characteristics, efficiency and 
performance. They could identify 5 clusters: ‘saturated administrators’ are 
very old subsidiaries, mostly in consumer packaged goods industries, that 
have very stable market situations. ‘Universal Champs’ are successful large 
subsidiaries with a large number of value-creating activities. ‘Important 
Dependents’ are subsidiaries with a very high strategic importance but a 
relatively low strategic competence often located in East Asia in the 
automotive or chemical/pharmaceutical industries. ‘Promising Aspirants’ are 
smaller subsidiaries in dynamic, ethnocentric markets that have a lot of 
strategic freedom. ‘Flexible Implementers’ are young, small subsidiaries that 
have little additional value-adding functions except marketing and a medium 
strategic importance. 
On the basis of the social attraction paradigm and social identity theory, 
Homburg et al. (2002) have developed 6 hypotheses concerning the 
cooperation between manufacturers and distributors. In their survey of 212 
German manufacturing systems engineering companies they could confirm 
that inter-organizational similarity had a positive effect on the cooperation of 
manufacturers and distributors that then led to a greater relationship 
effectiveness for the manufacturer. They also found that distributor power 
had a negative impact on relationship effectiveness. Participation of 
distributors in the manufacturers decision making process had a positive 
impact on cooperation, but at the same time increased distributor power.  
Frazier (1983) has developed a model of inter-organizational exchange 
behavior in marketing channels. His model describes a repetitive circular 
pattern of 3 processes. The initiation process is a negotiation that leads to an 
exchange agreement. This process is influenced by the macro environment, 
the organizational and personal characteristics of both channel partners, the 
required investment and the expected rewards. The exchange agreement 
regulates role responsibilities, authority and dependence as well as goals 
and motivation of the partners. The implementation process is marked by 
product and service information flows, role performance and reciprocal 
influence strategies. Goal compatibility and role satisfaction influence the 
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level of conflict and conflict resolution. The implementation process leads to 
rewards of the partnership that are subject to the review process, where 
responsibilities are attributed in the form of credit or blame, firm and personal 
performance are evaluated and the level of equity is determined. The 
outcome of the review process is either satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the 
partnership that will influence the initiation process of the continued 
cooperation in the sense of the renegotiation of the exchange agreement. 
Hewett et al. (2003) have studied the conditions under which locally 
customized as opposed to centralized processes are preferable in Marketing 
activities. Generally speaking they have studied the influence factors internal 
relations, specific industry and market conditions on the roles that 
headquarters and subsidiaries take in brand development, pricing, promotion 
and advertising, distribution channel and customer service management. The 
identified influence factors for internal relationships are ‘(1) the level of 
cooperation between subsidiary marketing managers and the marketing 
operation at headquarters, (2) the extent to which the subsidiary perceives 
itself as being dependent on the headquarters, and (3) the degree to which 
the subsidiary is involved in setting the product-level marketing objectives for 
its market.’ (Hewett et al., 2003: 569). In their survey of 128 Managers from 
35 different country markets and 30 industry they could support their 
hypotheses that in companies with high vertical dependence, more 
standardized processes were likely, while companies who had a high degree 
of subsidiaries’ participation in goal setting, also had more locally customized 
processes.  
‘Our results imply, then, that global marketing managers taking on greater roles in attempting 
to hand down marketing activities to foreign subsidiaries may be more successful the greater 
the degree of perceived vertical dependence among foreign subsidiaries.’ (Hewett et al., 
2003: 578). 
The hypothesis, that a high level of cooperation between headquarters and 
subsidiaries would lead to more customized procedures, had to be rejected. 
The authors conclude that managers in subsidiaries do not necessarily see 
the need for coordination as a restriction to their autonomy. Specific industry 
 
37
influences such as technological turbulence and high product market 
concentration had the tendency to favor standardized processes while local 
market turbulence rather lead to customized processes. The authors’ 
expectations that strong cultural and economic differences between the 
home market and the subsidiaries’ markets would lead to more customized 
processes could not be supported.  
Cayla and Penaloza (2012) have used ethnographic studies of subsidiaries 
of MNCs in India to research the effect of organizational identity on foreign 
market adaptation. They found that when companies enter new foreign 
markets, customer perceptions can be so different to their traditional markets, 
that fundamental company principles are not successfully applicable. Local 
managers thus might recommend strategies that are incompatible with these 
principles. The authors then observed that a strong shared organizational 
identity  
‘made it more difficult for (central) managers to integrate and act on feed-back inconsistent 
with that identity … Members appeared especially prone to counter-argue, discredit, ignore, 
and outright reject information inconsistent with elements contributing to their understanding 
of their firm.’ (Cayla and Penaloza, 2012: 51). 
They advocate organizational non-members, in their examples external ad 
agencies, as teachers and arbitrators that can educate the central managers 
so that the necessary organizational learning can take place. The authors 
recommend that MNCs should make their organizational identity explicit, 
proactively identify incompatibilities with local market adaptation strategies 
and should then ‘seek to reestablish the coherence of their identity with their 
activities in the market.’ (Cayla and Penaloza, 2012: 52).  
 
2.2.4 International Sales Management Control 
International aspects of sales management have been largely neglected in 
management literature (Piercy et al., 2011; Hill and Still, 1990). Piercy et al. 
(2011: 104), apart from their own, only identify two other studies dealing with 
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international sales management control (Baldauf et. al 2001; Grant and 
Cravens, 1999). 
Cravens et al. state that ‘…firms are learning that similarities across countries 
are making the old way of regional or local management control less effective 
in today’s global business environment’ (Cravens et al., 2006: 291). In their 
study of several different countries, including developed, emerging and 
developing countries, the authors find ‘substantial, but not complete, 
convergence in sales management practices and outcomes’ (Cravens et al. , 
2006: 302). In their opinion, multi-national firms are thus successfully moving 
from local to global sales management systems. Johnston and Marshall 
(2011) define sales management as ‘… all activities, processes, and 
decisions involved in managing the sales function in an organization’ with the 
sales function being seen as an ‘indispensable part of marketing strategy’ 
and the sales management process being described as the formulation, 
implementation, evaluation and control of sales programs (Johnston and 
Marshall, 2011: 9-11). The formulation of a sales program involves the 
adaption of the personal selling process to the company’s environment and 
it’s marketing strategy, the definition of selling teams and territories and the 
way that accounts are managed, as well as forecasting and budgeting 
(Johnston and Marshall, 2011: 29). The implementation includes the 
selection, supervision, training, motivation and compensation of sales 
personnel (Johnston and Marshall, 2011: 182). The evaluation and control 
function on the one hand consists of cost and sales analyses per territory, 
per product and per customer and of personal evaluations of the sales 
people (Johnston and Marshall, 2011: 371).  
Sales performance research in the past has overwhelmingly focused on 
individual sales persons as unit of observation. Churchill et al. (1985) e.g. 
have identified more than 400 studies concerning sales person performance 
since 1918. Accordingly, they define three related concepts for measuring 
sales success on the basis of individuals, rather than organizations: 
‘Behavior refers to what the job occupant does – that is, the tasks on which the individual 
expends effort while working. Performance is behavior evaluated in terms of its contributions 
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to the goals of the organization. Effectiveness refers to some summary index of 
organizational outcomes for which an individual is at least partly responsible, such as sales 
volume or market share.’ (Churchill et al., 1985: 116) 
There has been very limited research about (other) antecedents of sales unit 
effectiveness, such as sales managers and sales management control (Grant 
and Cravens, 1999: 945). While ‘effectiveness’ and ‘performance’ are used 
with varying meanings and sometimes synonymously, leading to an 
academic controversy discussed in literature (Küster and Canales, 2008: 
297), we like to stick to the above simple and straight-forward definitions from 
Churchill et al. 
 
2.2.5 Performance Evaluation 
Sales Force Effectiveness 
Much like the term ‘effectiveness’ in general, the term ‘sales force 
effectiveness’ has taken different meanings in literature (Zoltners et al, 2008: 
115) and management literature reveals a large number of heterogeneous 
influence factors on sales force effectiveness. Questioning 360 US CEOs 
about how to achieve revenue growth, Comeau-Kirschner (1999) found that 
43 percent of respondents judged their sales forces to be only ‘somewhat 
effective’ or ‘not very effective’. They have identified numerous areas of 
improvement e.g. in motivation, customer-knowledge, post-merger morale 
and optimization of sales executive freedom. Hunter and Perreault (2007) 
find a positive effect of sales technologies, such as customer relationship 
management and sales automation tools, on relationship building activities of 
sales people, enhancing sales force effectiveness. Dubinsky (1998) states 
that leadership to enhance sales force effectiveness is ‘a major puzzle’ for 
sales managers. Interestingly he finds that while transformational leadership 
can positively influence sales persons’ attitudes and behaviors, it does not 
have a greater impact than transactional leadership. Dubinsky (2003) finds 
that while branding in itself does not improve the bottom line of companies, 
one way of transforming brand recognition into business results is improving 
 
40
sales force effectiveness by translating the brand into sales force training and 
communication materials. Lee et al. (2007) have studied the effect of 
negative sales person stereotype perceptions of UK students and their 
negative impact on recruitment of sales people and hence on sales force 
effectiveness. El-Ansary (1993) finds that companies in their training 
programs neglect experienced sales people, knowledge and interpersonal 
skills, diversified training sources and the involvement of customers and 
merchants.  
Rather than defining the term, Zoltners et al. present a framework of the 
different variables and organizational elements that are impacting on sales 
force effectiveness (Figure 5). The sales system, consisting of the sales force 
structure and the sales people, including their roles and activities is 
influenced by the ‘effectiveness hunt’ of the marketing and sales strategy. 
This signifies the constant strive for performance improvement in indicators 
concerning sales volume, sales people, account development etc. 
Specifically, Zoltners et al. identify a number of ‘effectiveness drivers’ that are 
influencing the sales system. ‘Definers’ explain the roles of the sales people 
and identify territories, influencing the Sales Force Structure (sales force 
design, size, territory alignment). ‘Shapers’ are the processes responsible for 
skills, capabilities and values of the sales people (recruiting, training, 
coaching, culture, leadership, compensation and incentives). ‘Enlighteners’ 
represent processes providing knowledge about customers and markets, 
opportunities, problem solving and time management (customer research, 
targeting, customer relationship management). Exciters are influencing the 
individual’s and the team’s motivation (culture, leadership, compensation and 
incentives, motivation programs, meaningful work) and ‘controllers’ are 
responsible for their activities and performance (compensation and 
incentives, sales managers, performance management and measurement, 
goal setting and forecasting, coordination and communication). Exciters, 
Enlighteners and Controllers all impact on the sales activities. 
The external environment including the competition, as well as other 
company factors are influencing the performance outcome of the sales 
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system for the final company results. On the other hand these factors outside 
the sales system are the basis for the company strategy from which the 
Sales and Marketing Strategy is derived and so on. Zoltners et al. (2008: 
128-129) conclude with presenting the example of the highly successful 
approach of the company Novartis to constant improvement of their world-
wide sales force effectiveness. In an annual sales force effectiveness review 
based on performance surveys, high-priority sales force effectiveness drivers 
are identified and an annual improvement plan is created accordingly.  
 
 
Figure 5: The Sales System  
(Zoltners et al., 2008: 117, 120) 
Hill and Still (1990) have surveyed 14 multi-national companies with a total of 
135 subsidiaries to examine the relative influence of environmental 
differences in different countries, factors related to organizational structure 
and industry type. Individual influence factors on international sales force 
design are identified in market maturity, company size, sales volumes, 
manufacturing cost levels, technology and portfolio complexity, degree of 
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divisionalization, cultural differences, labor cost for sales people and political 
turmoil.  
Based on their literature review on performance evaluation in MNCs, Schmid 
and Kretschmer (2010) present a contingency framework of performance 
evaluation of foreign subsidiaries. They distinguish three levels of influence 
factors they identified in the various publications. At the corporate level the 
main factors are nationality, size, industry and the degree of 
internationalization, additional factors are interdependence, the ‘parenting 
style’ and the level of diversification. At the subsidiary level size, country, age 
and interdependence are named as main influences and at the environment 
level environmental uncertainty, perceived host market attractiveness and 
perceived host market risk are cited (Schmid and Kretschmer, 2010: 223). 
Specific topics of performance measurement in an international context are 
identified in the consideration of currency, inflation and transfer pricing 
(Schmid and Kretschmer, 2010: 225). 
Interestingly, Schmid and Kretschmer found that different studies come to 
different conclusions as to the effect of these factors on management control. 
They attribute these differences to differences in operationalizing variables as 
well as general weaknesses in contingency studies, such as differences in 
samples, in study periods, in measurements and scales. Some authors find 
evidence for a strong influence of the nationality of an MNC on their 
preference of either output (e.g. US based companies) or behavioral control 
(e.g. Europe-based companies), while others deny such an influence. Some 
authors find that internationalization increases output control, some find the 
opposite. Some authors associate increasing interdependence between 
headquarters and subsidiaries with more output control, others with 
behavioral control (Schmid and Kretschmer, 2010: 224). In spite of these 
inconsistencies, Schmid and Kretschmer have identified some general 
trends. Formal control seems to be more dominant in US-based MNCs than 
in Europe and Japan, while Japanese MNCs seem to have a strong 
preference for personal control. Formal control and cultural control both seem 
to be positively related to both the size of MNCs and to the degree of 
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interdependence between the subsidiary and the headquarters (Schmid and 
Kretschmer, 2010: 227). 
The contingency framework proposed by Schmid and Kretschmer suggests 
that performance evaluation usually represents output control: ‘As 
performance is reached when objectives are achieved, it can be interpreted 
as being similar or identical to output.’ (Schmid and Kretschmer, 2010: 223). 
The process of performance evaluation can be formal (in the form of 
standardized performance reports), personal (in the form of management 
audits, e.g. during review meetings at the subsidiaries or at the headquarters) 
or cultural (e.g. in the form of workshops promoting shared performance 
values). The content of the evaluation can be represented quantitatively in 
the form of financial (e.g. profits or cash-flow return on investment) or non-
financial measures (e.g. productivity, market share) or internal or external 
qualitative measures (e.g. employee satisfaction, customer loyalty). The 
standard of comparison of the measures can be actual results versus past 
results or budget, or internal or external benchmarking. Schmid and 
Kretschmer identify more than 50 contingency factors categorized as 
‘general’, ‘strategy and management’, ‘structure and integration’, ‘market and 
technology’ and ‘environment’, on the MNC- as well as on the subsidiary 
side, determining the actual content and process of performance evaluation 
in individual situations. 
Kaplan and Norton have presented the balanced scorecard as a means to 
measure performance with respect to strategic visions as opposed to output 
or behavior (Kaplan and Norton, 1992: 79). They hold that overall company 
performance measures need to include the customer perspective, the 
internal business perspective, the financial perspective and the innovation 
and learning perspective. Importantly they emphasize the need to decide on 
few strategic measures, as many companies keep adding new measures 
while already suffering from information overload (Kaplan and Norton, 1992: 
73). In their experience with the balanced score card in over 100 companies 
they claim that in all cases  
‘the senior executives discovered that the scorecard supplied a framework and thus a focus 
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for many critical management processes: departmental and individual goal setting, business 
planning, capital allocations, strategic initiatives, and feedback and learning.’ (Kaplan and 
Norton, 2007: 152). 
They see the main objective of performance measurement systems in 
translating the company’s vision into operational measures. By involving 
multiple hierarchy levels in the definition of these measures, deriving targets 
and ultimately individual objectives from them, the strategy can be 
understood and then implemented. Importantly, the incentive system also 
needs to be linked to this system on each level and investments need to be 
selected based on their contribution to it.  
Micheli et al. (2011) have analyzed the link between performance 
measurement, strategy implementation and strategic alignment. In their case 
study, they show how a highly diversified company had extreme difficulties in 
strategic alignment of their subsidiaries in spite of a common ERP system 
(SAP), that the subsidiaries had customized to a point where they were in 
fact entirely different systems (Micheli et al., 2011: 1131). Ultimately this led 
them to divest several companies and to implement a harmonized 
performance measurement system including non-financial key performance 
indicators. 
Grewal et al. (2009) presented a framework for the evaluation of subsidiary 
marketing performance. They distinguish two elementary performance 
criteria. In their study of 18 international subsidiaries of a fortune 50 
company, the first criterion, market asset creation, was based on the inputs 
marketing personnel deployed and marketing expenditure. Outputs were 
measured in terms of brand-awareness, number of industrial customers and 
number of retail outlets. These outputs were at the same time considered 
inputs for the second performance criterion, market yield. Output for market 
yield was measured by the variables sales, market share and profits. The 
authors point out that the competitive and regulatory environment for each 
country is significantly different and that performance measurement needs to 
account for this. In their study they had central and local managers rate the 
respective situation in each country to be able to create control variables 
 
45
accordingly. In their study they could distinguish 4 types of subsidiaries. 
‘Miners’ were such organizations that showed high short term market yield, 
but neglected market asset creation. ‘Prospectors’ were such organizations 
that showed low market yield, but strong market asset creation, essentially by 
having low per customer yield for various reasons. Universal champs were 
such organizations who were strong, ‘poor operations’ such organizations 
who were weak in both categories. The strategic path should try to move all 
subsidiaries in the direction of universal champions. The authors however 
point out, that emerging markets may require a prospector strategy while a 
miner strategy may be more suitable for highly competitive markets, where 
the incremental cost for gaining new customers may become very high. 
In their survey of 500 US managers from various industries, Rigby (1994) 
found that, while the number of management tools was increasing, there was 
‘absolutely no correlation between the number of tools used, or the specific 
tools used, and satisfaction with the financial results of a business.’ (Rigby, 
1994: 20). They conclude that the usage of management tools must be highly 
selective and careful.  
 
2.3 Summary and Relevance for this Research 
 
The following text passage summarizes the findings from the literature. 
Theories on organizational structure and control have been presented, as 
they apply to MNCs in general and specifically to the sales and marketing 
functions. Understanding the concepts about how individual market 
conditions are related to different organizational setups will later help the 
evaluation of the situational and organizational factors shaping the different 
headquarters-subsidiary relationships we have analyzed in our study.  
Strategic challenges and opportunities that have presented themselves to 
entrepreneurs and company managers over time, have continuously required 
organizational changes that have led to the emergence of today’s 
multinational, divisionalized corporations. In contradiction to neoclassical 
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theory, companies can continue to grow in spite of increasing organizational 
costs in highly concentrated industries where the benefits of controlling know-
how in management, marketing and R&D offset these costs.  
A number of factors have been presented that can motivate companies to 
continuously invest in foreign operations, such as international disequilibria in 
factor cost and productivity, the wish to find additional markets for existing 
products, positive or negative governmental incentives etc. The emergence 
of the matrix organization can be seen as a consequence of increasing 
internationalization due to multinational companies’ pursuit of managing 
global cash-flows instead of local profit centers in their fight for global market 
share, with an increased need for international, inter-functional coordination.  
Importantly, depending on individual market environments, different 
organizational setups have prevailed or needed to be modified over time. 
Global companies serve uniform world-markets with highly centralized 
organizations, multinational companies continue to focus on local adaptability 
with largely independent international subsidiaries, international companies 
are expanding their expertise to their international subsidiaries, trying to 
balance standardization and local responsiveness and transnational 
companies are trying to continuously build organizational capabilities and 
flexibility in integrated international subsidiary networks. 
Fundamentally, organizations can be organized geographically, typically in 
low-tech industries with locally adaptive competition, or by business division 
in the case of world-product markets with high R&D investments. The 
international matrix organization is balancing the advantages of both 
organization forms by trying to reach managerial trade-off decisions, however 
there are many well known problems associated with this system. Without an 
unambiguous decision making structure, managers can get caught up in 
internal discussions and power struggles to the point where the organization 
gets pre-occupied with itself and can diminish its reactivity concerning market 
opportunities and challenges. Clear matrix-role definitions and pressure-
groups are recommended to improve these issues. 
The competitive posture of an organization can be seen as a result of the 
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resource allocation decisions of its sub-units. The conflicting goals of local 
adaptability and global strategy therefore represent a systematic resource 
allocation problem for MNCs that has often been addressed unsuccessfully 
with repeated reorganizations.  
The fundamental mechanisms of organizational control have been identified 
as the market principle, whereby organizational members are rewarded 
strictly according to their contribution and decision making is based on price 
mechanisms, the bureaucratic principle, that relies on formal rules that define 
hierarchies and authorities, and clans, whereby the coordination is reached 
by a high internal commitment of the members to the organizational goals. 
Output control is associated with the market principle and easily measurable 
outcomes. Behavioral control is associated with a clearly definable 
transformation processes and bureaucratic control. Where neither outcome 
can be measured nor behavior can be defined, clan control is the only 
functional solution. In reality, organizations usually are using all three 
mechanisms to different degrees. 
Outcome control makes the sales person an entrepreneur which might be 
preferable from a motivational aspect; however in such systems, short-term 
profit goals might be favored over long-term strategic goals. In sales, output 
control might be the method of choice when products are undifferentiated or 
customers unclear about their needs and sales peoples’ skills and efforts 
take an important role in sales success and when outcome measurement is 
reliable. Inexperienced salespeople, legal compliance rules, country-specific 
corporate cultures, importance of building brand equity, assisting in product 
development and difficult measurement of individual contributions might on 
the other hand favor behavioral control mechanisms in sales.  
The second part of the literature review focused on international aspects of 
management control in MNCs. In this section theories about the relationships 
and control mechanisms in the headquarters-subsidiary relationship were 
presented. These theories will later help us to describe and categorize the 
situational and organizational factors found in the organizations we have 
analyzed. 
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Subsidiaries can be defined as value-adding entities in different host 
countries that MNCs install in pursuit of resources, markets or efficiencies. 
Internalization theory can be used to predict subsidiaries as a means to 
pursue and protect foreign investments over time.  
Fundamentally, headquarters-subsidiary relationships can be grouped into 
‘centralized’, ‘decentralized’ and ‘network’. Headquarters typically take an 
interventionist role when subsidiaries have similar activities and are managed 
in a uniform way. When there are many reciprocal activities and when 
subsidiaries need to be connected to each other, headquarters take a 
mediating role with a large staff of international managers. When the 
interactions are primarily between subsidiaries, headquarters tend to take a 
moderating role by merely defining the rules of subsidiary interaction.  
Depending on the level of integration and the degree of localization, 
subsidiary strategies can be classified as ‘autonomous’, ‘active’ or ‘receptive’. 
Advantages in central behavioral control can be seen in more efficient 
operations, similar worldwide corporate identity and world-wide market 
influence, the optimization of financial returns and avoidance of duplicating 
organizational efforts. Important country specificities on the other hand might 
be neglected and the local management might lack self-confidence and 
appreciation for the headquarters and its managers. Decentralized output 
control on the other hand might lead to an excessive self-confidence of local 
managers who might favor local to the detriment of central needs.  
Subsidiary managers tend to try to increase their local autonomy and their 
influence over other subsidiaries. Additional value-adding activities at the 
subsidiary for the MNC increases the level of mutual dependence and 
headquarters managers therefore closely monitor subsidiaries who take 
initiatives. MNCs are often neglecting subsidiary initiatives as a creative 
potential for world-wide organizational learning.  
Depending on and trusting in the headquarters might enhance the willingness 
of subsidiaries to cooperate, whereby these effects seem to be moderated by 
the individual countries’ cultural level of individualism or collectivism. Self-
sufficient subsidiaries can become very independent of their headquarters 
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and it might then become difficult to reinstall central control. Different 
mechanisms are proposed in order to reach such strategic change, that can 
only be achieved when it is regarded as legitimate by a majority of managers. 
Examples are information and measurement systems, resource allocation 
procedures, strategic planning and budgeting, selection of key managers, 
coordination committees, task forces etc. Knowledge sharing of the 
headquarters-subsidiary relationship can be impeded by the unwillingness of 
the headquarters to share and the unwillingness or incapacity of the 
subsidiary to receive. The adoption of practices proposed by the 
headquarters might be compromised by conflicting institutional patterns in the 
subsidiaries host country. Perceived procedural justice of the headquarters in 
dealing with the subsidiaries seems to lead to better compliance of subsidiary 
managers.  
Deployment of expatriate managers is seen by some as a vehicle of 
behavioral control, others argue that it serves the creation of informal 
networks and thus might allow for more decentralization.  
Levels of power distance, individualism, risk attitude and masculinity 
influence organizational structure, motivation and societal interaction. They 
also might impact on marketing aspects such as transactional versus 
relational customer needs, incremental versus radical innovation, utilization 
of marketing intelligence, treatment of different customer segments,  
Performance evaluation of subsidiaries can be formal, personal or cultural. 
As a general tendency, US based MNCs seem to focus more on formal 
control than European and Japanese companies and Japanese MNCs 
strongly seem to emphasize personal control. Both, formal control and 
cultural control seem to increase with the size of the MNC and with the 
interdependence of headquarters and subsidiaries. Shorter reporting spans 
to their subsidiaries and life-careers in the same company are argued to be a 
sign for more behavioral control in European countries than in the US. Much 
like in the sales manager - sales person relationship described earlier, the 
concepts of outcome control in the form of entrepreneurial ‘laissez-faire’ 
management and behavioral control in the form of identical reproduction of 
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proven sales strategies can be found in the headquarters-subsidiary 
relationship. 
Internalization theory can be extended to the Marketing function. MNCs might 
internalize marketing activities if proprietary information about customers and 
suppliers is critical for success. Marketing then can broker between these two 
parties and it takes an important role in R&D by evaluating the market 
acceptance of new technologies. In marketing driven industries, the R&D 
function may therefore be outsourced while in technology driven industries 
the marketing function may be outsourced. 
Global marketing strategy comprises decisions on standardization of 
products, promotion, distribution and pricing, decisions on sustaining 
competitive advantage by managing the value chain and decisions on global 
competitive leverage effects such as cross-subsidizing of different countries, 
competitive dislocation and rationalization.  
Local market orientation depends on the legal environment, the local 
competitive situation and the perceived market orientation of the 
headquarters. These factors are moderated by the level of identification of 
the subsidiary managers with the headquarters and the cultural distance 
between the two organizations. 
In the manufacturer-distributor relationship it has been shown that its 
effectiveness for manufacturers seems to be positively influenced by 
organizational similarity while distributor power might have a negative 
influence. Participation in decision making processes seems to have a 
positive impact on cooperation, but also enhances the power of distributors. 
 
According to relevant characteristics such as structure, age, value-added 
scope, strategy etc., marketing organizations in subsidiaries can be classified 
into ‘saturated administrators’, ‘universal champs’, ‘important dependents’, 
‘promising aspirants’ and ‘flexible implementers’.  
According to their performance in terms of market asset creation and market 
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yield, subsidiaries can be grouped into ‘miners’, ‘prospectors’, ‘world-class 
operations’ and ‘poor operations’. 
The drivers of sales-force effectiveness have been identified as ‘definers’, 
‘shapers’, ‘exciters’, ‘enlighteners’ and ‘controllers’. An example for 
successful constant improvement of sales force effectiveness is the 
respective review and improvement program of the company Novartis. 
Higher vertical dependence of the subsidiaries’ marketing organizations to 
the headquarters seems to lead to more standardized processes, while a 
high degree of subsidiaries’ participation in goal setting seems to lead to 
more locally customized processes. Perceived vertical dependence can thus 
be seen as a success factor for implementing central marketing processes. 
However subsidiary managers do not seem to necessarily see the need for 
coordination as it may present a restriction to their own autonomy.  
Relevance for this research 
The publications presented in our literature review focus on various aspects 
of MNCs and their subsidiaries. Apart from establishing a general theoretical 
background of MNCs and their international subsidiaries, this literature 
review provides theoretical categories for the structured analysis and 
comparison of the organizational units studied in this research. Combining 
the different approaches, figure 6 presents a framework for the structured 
analysis of MNCs as they relate to their individual local sales and marketing 
organizations, mapping onto the research questions. Most of the identified 
influence factors relate to our first two sub-questions about situational and 
organizational factors, decentralization and delegation, namely international 
organization and structure, organizational relationships, control mechanisms 
and strategy, subsidiary classifications, and cultural dimensions.  
The last three categories are directly related to the third sub-question about 
successful improvement activities and tools: headquarters role, performance 
evaluation and sales force effectiveness drivers.  
Thus figure 6 presents the relevant situational, organizational and relational 
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factors and activities impacting on strategy implementation in subsidiaries of 
MNCs relevant to each research question. 
 
Figure 6: Analysis Framework for MNCs and their Local Sales and Marketing 
Organizations 
  
Research Question Criteria Categories
international organization 
Galbraith and Kazanjian (1986) geographic, division, matrix
international structure 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) 
multinational, global, international, 
transnational
headquarter - subsidiary 
relationship 
Malnight (1996) 
centralized, decentralized, network
control mechanisms 
Ouchi (1979) 
market, bureaucratic, clan
control strategy 
Ouchi (1979) 
output, behavior, common goals / 
socialization
investment initiative 
Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) 
parent driven, subsidiary driven, 
atrophy
subsidiary  strategy 
Jarillo and Martinez (1990) 
autonomous, active, receptive
subsidiary marketing 
organization types 
Homburg et al. (2012) 
saturated administrators, universal 
champs, important dependents, 
promising aspirants, flexible 
i l tsubsidiary marketing 
operations performance types 
Grewal et al. (2009)
miners, prospectors, world-class 
operations, poor operations
cultural dimensions 
Hofstede (1983) 
power distance (uncertainty 
attitude, collectivism / 
individualism, masculinity / 
f i it )manufacturer - distributor 
relationship 
Homburg et al. (2002) 
similarity, distributor power, 
distributor participation
headquarters role 
Beddi (2011) 
interventionist, mediating, 
moderating
performance evaluation 
Schmid and Kretschmer (2010) 
personal, formal, cultural
sales force effectiveness 
drivers Zoltners et al. (2008)
definers, shapers, exciters, 
enlighteners, controllers
What are Successful Activities 
and Tools to Improve Central 
Control?
How are situational and 
organizational influence factors 
specific to individual subsidiaries 
impacting on global sales and 
marketing strategy 
implementation?
How are decentralization, 
delegation and the absence of 
disciplinary control influencing the 
implementation of global sales 
and marketing strategy?
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For each subject the proposed categories for classification are detailed. 
Categorizing each of the local country sales and marketing organizations in 
this study according to this framework will facilitate the presentation of a 
thorough description that will underpin the analysis and comparison of the 
individual situations and challenges. This will later allow to compare the 
country-specific situations and challenges of the studied division of an MNC 
in order to identify corresponding successful activities and tools to improve 
central control and hence global strategy implementation.   
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Chapter 3: Research Design 
3.1 Problem Statement and Research Questions 
Based on a case study of the SurgiSupplies division that is part of the MNC 
HospiMed (for reasons of anonymity both entities have been assigned 
fictitious names), this research was developed to make a contribution to the 
practice of management in highly divisionalized multinational corporations 
and thus to contribute to the current theoretical debate on managing MNCs. 
SurgiSupplies, the case studied at the heart of this research, has 
experienced difficulty in implementing standardized strategies across its 
international sales and marketing organizations. It is this core challenge that 
this research is designed to address.  
SurgiSupplies is a division, but separate legal entity, of HospiMed, an MNC in 
the pharmaceutical and medical device business.  
 
 
Figure 7: HospiMed and SurgiSupplies International Sales and Marketing 
Organizations 
Figure 7 displays the HospiMed and SurgiSupplies international sales and 
marketing organizations for different countries, divisions and SBUs (e.g. 
C1D4S7 stands for the sales organization for country 1, division 4 and SBU 
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7). HospiMed has three product divisions whose management structures are 
located at the HospiMed Headquarters. One is dealing primarily with 
pharmaceutical products for hospital demand, one with consumables for out-
patient use and one is dedicated to a medical subspecialty. SurgiSupplies, a 
fourth product division, is a separate legal entity specializing in surgical 
equipment, implants and consumables, and it has its own divisional 
headquarters in a different location than the other three divisions. When 
HospiMed acquired and integrated SurgiSupplies successively in the 1980s 
and 90s the former independent local country subsidiaries of SurgiSupplies 
had been merged with the local representations of HospiMed. SurgiSupplies 
thus no longer had direct disciplinary control of their local country sales and 
marketing organizations except in certain emerging markets, where no 
subsidiaries had yet been established, and SurgiSupplies continued to 
manage their local dealers directly from the central divisional headquarters.  
Functional control over the subsidiaries was maintained via a central 
marketing SBU structure with product and marketing managers. There was 
also a structure of so called ‘regional heads’ who were assigned to develop 
and supervise the implementation of country strategies with the local 
managers. However this regional head structure had certain weaknesses, as 
the regional heads were often at the same time general managers of an own 
country subsidiary, leaving them limited time to fulfill their regional 
responsibilities. In larger countries, the country general managers assumed 
the regional head role for themselves, so that there was factually no 
corporate regional management assigned to them. 
In 2009, in the context of the definition of a new 5 years strategy, a number of 
weaknesses in the international SurgiSupplies sales structure had been 
identified:  
‘sales execution is often too weak in many markets, undetectable market shares per SBU, 
untuned conflicts about sales resources in different countries amongst the responsibility of 
divisions / SBUs, high staff turnover in some local sales organizations’ (source: PowerPoint 
presentation of the Senior Vice President of Sales at a SurgiSupplies international SBU 
meeting, July 8, 2010). 
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Besides quality problems in sales execution, lacking product focus had been 
identified in many subsidiaries, leading to dispersed market presence with 
small segment shares. SurgiSupplies’ 5 years company strategy paper 
therefore set the sales focus on ‘systematic networking … for a new level of 
efficiency and effectiveness in our sales force.’ (source: SurgiSupplies 5 year 
strategy presentation, January 19, 2011).  
As an organizational measure to overcome these shortcomings, an 
international central sales department was created in addition to, but partially 
based on existing structures. Specifically, a senior vice president of global 
sales was nominated and became part of the SurgiSupplies executive team. 
Central sales managers were newly assigned to most of the top-selling 
country sales organizations, while such functions had already been in place 
previously for smaller organizations. The goals of the central sales 
department were defined as the targeted and focused development of the 
sales force in close cooperation of central and local managers, competent 
and consequent implementation of the company strategy in the local sales 
organizations, implementation of central sales performance management and 
the development of knowledge about local markets, trends and customers 
(source: SurgiSupplies 5 years sales strategy, May 5, 2010). 
In the following case study, a thick description of management control 
concerning the SurgiSupplies local sales and marketing organizations is to 
be developed and the early activities of the new central sales department are 
to be evaluated. To this aim the principle research questions has been 
formulated as ‘How can divisional sales and marketing managers enforce 
global strategies in subsidiaries of highly decentralized multi-national 
corporations?’ 
In order to guide the research it has been complemented with the following 
sub-questions: 
How are situational and organizational influence factors specific to individual 
subsidiaries impacting on global sales and marketing strategy 
implementation? 
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How are decentralization, delegation and the absence of disciplinary control 
influencing the implementation of global sales and marketing strategy? 
What are Successful Activities and Tools to Improve Central Control? 
How useful are performance surveys for the improvement of international 
sales force effectiveness? 
 
3.2 Contribution to Knowledge and Business Practice 
Apart from the contribution to business practice by addressing a current 
management problem of an existing MNC, a recent publication also confirms 
the academic relevance of the research question. In their Delphi study with 
the participation of 115 leading scholars in the field of international business 
studies concerning future research themes in this domain, Griffith et al. 
(2008) have identified a large number of open research topics. These 
included research questions similar to those of this research, such as:  
‘How do the structure and form of MNEs influence their performance? How can headquarters 
effectively address local resistance against global coordination? How can MNEs integrate 
their subsidiary skills and competencies into global strategic assets? What are the factors 
that moderate the role of subsidiaries in decision-making?’ (Griffith et al.; 2008: 1227-1228). 
Also, as mentioned above, very few studies have been performed in the 
context of international sales management (Piercy et al., 2011). In addition, 
there is little knowledge of the specific problems of middle managers in 
international sales management in divisionalized matrix organizations, 
despite the increasing strategic importance they are given in literature 
concerning strategic change (Kuyvenhoven and Buss, 2011). 
 
3.3 Epistemological Aspects 
Johnson and Duberly define epistemology as the ‘study of the criteria by 
which we can know what does and does not constitute warranted, or 
scientific, knowledge.’ and they hold that ‘epistemology is pivotal to science 
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since ‘proper’ scientific theorizing can only occur after the development of 
epistemological theory.’ (Johnson and Duberly, 2003: 3). This research is 
based on the philosophical movement known as pragmatism, which holds 
that ‘Something is true if it allows us to accomplish what we set out to 
accomplish; if it helps us achieve our objectives.’ (Greetham, 2006: 77) or, in 
other words, ‘to have knowledge is the ability to anticipate the consequences 
of manipulating things in the world’ (Johnson and Duberly, 2003: 159). It is 
the combination of a social constructivist epistemology and ontological 
realism (Johnson and Duberly, 2003: 157), meaning that human beings 
negotiate and construct varying interpretations of a singular physical reality. 
Pragmatism as seen by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) considers 
knowledge the result of trial and error in human activity, developing and 
testing ideas in the pursuit of desirable consequences (Stevenson, 2002: 
211). Knowledge claims in pragmatism are always preliminary and subject to 
falsification (Johnson and Duberly, 2003: 159-160). Epistemological 
pragmatism allows the usage of all known management research methods 
because firstly both structural relations and subjective meanings of human 
beings are in the scope of pragmatists’ interest, where different research 
methods might lend themselves when ‘assessed through the lens of practical 
adequacy’, and secondly, the epistemological subjectivism does not justify 
the supremacy of any particular method’ (Johnson and Duberly, 2003: 168). 
According to Schön (1983) the traditional positivist conception of practice 
following science is no longer adequate, since professional knowledge as 
taught by universities in today’s world is not adequate to address actual day-
to-day challenges of business professionals: 
‘… professional knowledge is mismatched to the changing character of the situations of 
practice - the complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflicts which are 
increasingly perceived as central to the world of professional practice. In such fields as 
medicine, management, and engineering, for example, leading professionals speak of a new 
awareness of a complexity which resists the skills and techniques of traditional expertise.’ 
(Schön, 1983: 14). 
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Schön, using terms such as ‘knowing-in-action’ and ‘knowing-in-practice’, 
describes professional knowledge as being ‘tacit’, as it is manifested in 
courses of action. Professional knowledge understood by these terms needs 
to be reflected upon consistently in order to integrate continuous subtle 
changes that require modifications of traditional action patterns. This process 
is being described in literature as ‘double-loop learning’, whereby in addition 
to the ‘single-loop’ of trial-and-error of actions and consequences, the 
governing variables need to be screened simultaneously (Argyris, 1999: 68). 
This can be seen as a constant screening of the governing variables, as 
described above in the context of double-loop action learning (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: Single-Loop and Double-Loop Action Learning  
(Argyris, 1999: 68) 
Gibbons et al. (1994) similarly argue that traditional science produced within 
and by university departments, that they refer to as mode 1 of knowledge 
generation, is no longer the single source of scientific knowledge generation 
in post-industrial societies. Their so called mode 2 of knowledge creation is 
characterized by occurring within the context of application in the sense that 
the motivation for research are practical, highly contextualized problems 
rather than the formulation and testing of grand theories. The two other main 
differences to traditional science are that this mode of knowledge generation 
is truly interdisciplinary and that the quality of research is judged by 
stakeholders in terms of practical usefulness of the results. However mode 2 
still advances theory as ‘… discovery occurs in contexts where knowledge is 
developed for and put to use, while results – which would have been 
Governing 
Variables
Actions Consequences Mismatch
Match
Single-loop
Double-loop
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traditionally characterized as applied – fuel further theoretical advances.’ 
(Gibbons et al., 1994: 19). As this research occurred in a real life, highly 
contextualized problem-solving situation it represents this type of knowledge 
generation. 
 
3.4 Aspects of Ethics and Insider Research 
Approval for this study was sought from the University of Bradford’s 
Committee for Ethics in Research, respecting the Bradford School of 
Management’s Guidance Document for Ethics in Research Projects. 
As the researcher himself is one of the responsible international sales 
managers, he has the opportunity to get privileged access to information.  
While insider research by members of an organization has become an 
accepted method, specific care needs to be taken to evaluate and document 
the researcher’s pre-understanding, role duality and data access as well as 
to manage organizational politics and ethics (Coghlan and Brannick, 2005: 
101-140). 
 
3.5 Considerations in Research Design 
In order to distinguish research designs, Bryman and Bell (2007: 38-73) 
identify cross-sectional, experimental, longitudinal, case-study and 
comparative forms. Yin (2009:53) refers to comparative designs as multiple 
case studies. When deciding on the design of this research, experimental 
forms were excluded as they are uncommon and difficult to apply in business 
research (Bryman and Bell, 2007: 44) as well as longitudinal designs that 
would surpass the available time frame. Cross-sectional designs are 
recommended for quantitative research (‘what?’, ‘how many?’, ‘how much?’ 
type questions), while explanatory (‘how?’ and ‘why?’ type questions) are 
better addressed by experiments, histories or case studies (Yin, 2009: 8-10).  
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Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) recommend cases for theory building, when 
‘…the research question is significant, and (…) there is no existing theory 
that offers a feasible answer.’ (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007: 26).  
While confirming to the continued academic relevance of intercultural 
research in multinational organizations, Buckley and Casson (2002) suggest 
the use of comparative methods in this context:  
‘The interplay of national cultures and organizational cultures of multinational organizations 
which might augment, transcend or conflict with particular national cultural traits, represents 
a research agenda with much life left in it. … These issues are perhaps best understood as 
exemplars of a particularly fruitful methodological approach – the comparative method …’ 
(Buckley and Casson, 2002: 369). 
Following above findings from literature, a case study with multiple 
embedded sub-units of analysis was chosen, as the research question 
demands an explanatory answer. In order to achieve a comparative design, 
improving the external validity of the results, we have chosen to use 
SurgiSupplies’ divisional sales and marketing teams in country subsidiaries 
of HospiMed as sub-units of analysis. To achieve maximal heterogeneity, the 
five teams were selected to represent different geographical regions (Asia, 
North-, South-, East- and Central-Europe) and at the same time different 
strategic business units. Further there was representation of the domestic 
versus foreign sales forces, and of developed versus emerging economies. 
The selected country organizations that are being referred to as countries 1, 
2, 3, 4 and 5 were to represent strategically important organizations either by 
current sales volume or by future sales expectations.  
While the research is based on a case study, it also includes elements of 
action learning. Business professionals engaging in DBA study programs will 
most often choose to study the organization they are part of. In fact, we 
believe this to be one of the strengths of these research programs, as it 
allows privileged access to current data that is otherwise usually confidential. 
Besides contributing to theory, DBA (doctor of business administration) 
research requires a contribution to business practice in the sense of applied 
science. By the nature of their jobs, managers are permanently involved in 
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group activities looking for improvement. Their research will hence often lead 
to collective learning loops with corrective action single- and double loop 
group, and hence, action learning. Even in doing a retrospective case study, 
managers are likely to look for the current and future implications 
simultaneously in the course of their research and to involve their peers at 
work with the implications. We therefore believe that insider business case 
studies will often include elements of action learning and that this can be 
beneficial to the orientation of the research towards relevant current business 
challenges.  
 
3.6 Methods 
Research Approach 
This is an embedded case study using both qualitative and quantitative 
research techniques.  
 
Figure 9: Research Objectives and Analysis Methods 
  
Objectives Methods
Identification of situational and organizational 
factors impacting on strategy implementation
Identification of the relationship of 
decentralization, delegation and disciplinary 
control and strategy implementation.
Identification of successful activities to improve 
central control
Evaluation of the usefulness of performance 
surveys for the improvement of sales force 
effectiveness
* factor analysis: validation of survey scales
* correlation analysis: relationship of measured 
performance and actual sales force effectiveness
* literature review: development of a qualitative analysis 
framework
* coding and content analysis of semi-structured interviews
* cross-case analysis of qualitative results, survey 
responses and actual sales outcomes from 7 subsidiary 
sales organizations
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The qualitative element comprises 32 semi-structured interviews and the 
quantitative part consists of two surveys, one to evaluate self-perceived 
performance of subsidiaries (n = 141) and a second survey to understand 
subsidiary attitudes towards headquarters activities (n= 125). 
While the external validity of a single case study by definition is limited, we 
enhance it by adding heterogeneity with the use of multiple local sales and 
marketing organizations in different countries and different product markets 
as embedded sub-units of analysis. The fact of covering all 7 SBUs of the 
studied company should also contribute to internal validity. The use of 
qualitative and quantitative data allows the additional analytic strategy of data 
triangulation, improving construct validity (Yin, 2009: 116). 
Figure 9 shows how the different analysis methods relate to the individual 
research objectives.  
The research objectives corresponding to the first three research sub-
questions are addressed by the development of an analysis framework from 
literature, by coding and content analysis of the semi-structured interviews 
and by cross-case analysis of the qualitative results, the survey responses 
and the actual sales outcomes from 7 subsidiary sales and marketing 
organizations.  
The research objective corresponding to the fourth research question is the 
evaluation of the usefulness of performance surveys as established by 
SurgiSupplies for the improvement of sales force effectiveness. To this end, 
firstly the consistency of the survey responses is verified by statistically 
checking the validity of the scales used in these particular surveys by means 
of factor analysis. Actions improving on measured performance criteria of the 
sales force can only be successful, if these criteria are relevant for actual 
sales outcomes. Therefore, secondly, the power of the sales and marketing 
performance measured by the surveys to predict actual sales force 
effectiveness is verified by means of correlation analysis.  
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3.6.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
This phase consists of 32 semi-structured interviews with sales and 
marketing managers of the SurgiSupplies division in 5 countries and 7 SBUs. 
The interviews were performed in the period between September 2011 and 
July 2012. The data collection technique of using semi-structured interviews 
with highly involved participants allows the creation of substantive middle-
range theory, that falls ‘between the ‘minor working hypotheses’ of everyday 
life and the ‘all-inclusive’ grand theories’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1999: 32-33). 
This data collection method should therefore help to establish such middle-
range theory in the specific context.  
Sample 
Participants were selected from the headquarters of SurgiSupplies as well as 
from the selected country subsidiaries in a way that all marketing and sales 
management functions concerning a given unit of analysis were represented. 
From a headquarters perspective the participants were the respective vice 
presidents of marketing, product managers, business development managers 
and regional vice presidents of sales. For the subsidiaries, local general 
managers, division managers, sales managers and marketing managers 
were interviewed. In order to ensure anonymity, all participants were 
assigned fictitious names (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10: Interview Participants 
  
Country 1 2 3 4 5
SBU 1 2 3a and 3b 4 5a and 5b
Central Marketing Head Max Fred Adam, Toni Oliver Brian, Charlie
Central Sales Manager Kevin Daniel, Harry Paul, Claire
Central Business Development Manager Peter Susan Thomas
Central Product Manager Mike Marc
Central Training Manager Joe
Local General Manager Luke Albert George
Local Division Manager William Patrick
Local Sales Manager Ian Tom Keith Larry
Local Marketing Manager Justin James Sean Edward
Local Sales Person David
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Interview protocol and implementation 
The method for data collection and data analysis was pre-tested in 5 
additional interviews of local sales managers prior to this study (Schill, 2010). 
The interviews were guided by a schedule (Robson, 2002: 269 - 291) and 
contextualised by the nature of the management challenge of the case 
company. This protocol contained how participants were to be informed 
about the study form and background, what were the introductory comments 
of the interviewer, a topic list and the closing comments. Interviews were 
scheduled at least 24h ahead and participants were informed about the 
background (DBA program of the University of Bradford) and the form of the 
study, specifically the procedures for audio-recording and transcribing were 
explained at the moment of interview scheduling. Interviews were usually 
held in privative atmosphere, most often in company meeting rooms. At the 
beginning of each interview, the interviewer explained to the participants the 
procedure for informed consent. Once the audio-tape was running the 
interviewer always asked as a first question, if participants agreed to 
participate in the research project they had been informed about. When 
participants had agreed, the researcher started reading open questions from 
a topic list to them (Annex 4). It is important to point out, that the purpose of 
the topic list was merely to guide the participants towards the general topic 
areas of the research questions. In order to allow an open inductive approach 
and theory generation, the topic list was not a result of the literature review. 
During the interview, the interviewer attempted to motivate participants to talk 
freely about the topic areas, and encouraged them to go into detail. 
Specifically the participants were asked to provide ‘thick descriptions’ of their 
perceptions of the divisional sales performance management at the 
subsidiary and the headquarter level. The researcher tried to avoid leading 
questions or activities. At the end of each interview, each participant was 
given the opportunity to suggest topics by themselves that they thought to be 
of importance or interest in the research context and to give their opinions on 
these topics. 
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In order to stay as close as possible to the original interview data, original 
citations from the participants were used frequently in the text. Citations from 
foreign languages were translated by the researcher into English, the original 
citations can be found in Annex 5. For country 2, one of the local subsidiary 
managers, James, functioned as a translator during the interviews with two of 
the other participants, Tom and David. The recording of the conversations in 
native language was later transcribed and translated by an external 
professional translator. 
Another qualitative data source were three internal strategy documents that 
were used to explain SurgiSupplies’ strategic challenges and objectives 
(section 3.1). 
Data capture, management, transcription and storage 
All interviews were tape-recorded using the laptop computer provided to the 
researcher by his employer and a connected microphone. Data security 
back-up was managed automatically on this computer via the company 
network. This proved to be practical, as only a single device was necessary 
and all data was stored in a single database. Participants were assigned 
fictitious first names to ensure anonymity. All transcriptions were performed 
by the researcher on the same computer, resulting in about 750 pages (225 
000 words) of transcripts including the pilot study interviews.  
Data reduction 
Transcripts were divided into text passages representing single ‘units of 
meaning’ and codes were assigned to them, these were then regrouped into 
categories using an axial coding process (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 55-
68). For case one, data coding was performed using the text analysis 
software Atlas.ti 6.2. As this proved to be lengthy and cumbersome, this 
technique was abandoned and all cases were coded with a manual 
technique, by creating short summaries of all relevant text passages and 
assigning them headers that represented the initial open codes. The coded 
text passages were then regrouped into bigger categories that represent the 
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final axial codes of the data. These codes are found in the text as sub-
headers of all text passages (e.g. section 5.2.1 ‘influence of central 
managers on local strategies’, ‘central managers’ credibility’, ‘motivating and 
committing all local hierarchy levels’, etc.). The result of this coding process 
was organized for each country according to the research questions into the 
three main categories ‘situational factors’, ‘organizational factors’ and 
‘strategies, activities and attitudes’. As it is the main focus of this research, 
only the last category was represented in full in the main body of text of the 
analysis. The other two categories are summarized in the main body of text, 
while the complete analysis can be found in Annex 3, with the exception of 
the code ‘influence of central managers on local strategies’. Due to its 
importance the full data for this code is also represented in the main analysis. 
Analysis technique 
Miles and Huberman distinguish three fundamental approaches to qualitative 
data analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 8-9). Interpretivism, such as 
phenomenologism or social interactionism generally are interested in gaining 
practical understanding of human discourse and activity by using methods 
such as for example discourse analysis or analysis of group (inter) actions. 
Social anthropology sets its focus on developing contextual theory about 
communities, using a wide range of methods such as ethnography, grounded 
theory or case studies. Buckley and Chapman (1996) advocate comparative 
social anthropologist approaches and methods for international business 
research. Collaborative social research appears in the form of social 
experiments designed and carried out by groups of people. The method is 
usually action research, where a group task is defined and the group goes 
through a number of learning cycles initiating change and reflecting on the 
success of their actions. Following this argumentation we would claim a 
social anthropologist approach, as our research is trying to develop 
contextual theory about the community of managers at SurgiSupplies.  
Yin (2009: 130-163) differentiates 4 fundamental analytic strategies (following 
theoretical propositions, developing a case description, using both 
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quantitative and qualitative data and examining rival explanations) and 5 
analytic techniques (pattern matching logic, explanation building, time-series 
analysis, logic modeling, and cross-case synthesis) for case studies.  
Our principle analytical technique is cross-unit synthesis, as we will analyze 
multiple units of analysis. This improves the reliability and the external validity 
of the results, along with establishing a research protocol (Yin, 2009: 81). In 
order to further improve the reliability of the study, all evidence used were 
stored in a study data base (Yin, 2009: 118-119). A framework for cross-unit 
synthesis was developed in the literature review. In section 6, tables 
comparing the different local marketing and sales units are presented, 
placing them into the different categories identified in the literature. For this 
categorization we used elements from actual sales outcome statistics, survey 
data and interview data. Cross-patterns were identified by means of 
argumentative interpretation (Yin, 2009: 156, 160).  
The completed study was also presented to the CEO of SurgiSupplies who 
found the study to be an accurate representation of the actual situation of the 
company and regarded the findings to be interesting and important. 
 
3.6.2 Performance Surveys: Objectives and Methods 
This section describes the phase of the research involving the secondary 
analysis of data from performance surveys of local subsidiary sales 
organizations and of central headquarters marketing departments. The 
analysis steps are presented in figure 11. The purpose of this analysis was to 
evaluate the usefulness of these surveys for gaining valid information about 
local perceptions of self-performance and headquarters performance. Such 
information should help with the definition of action plans for performance 
improvement and generally increase central control capabilities. The first step 
therefore was the validation of the scale items used in the surveys. Factor 
analysis can be used to reveal the underlying structure of data sets in the 
form of latent variables, to validated questionnaires and to reduce the amount 
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of data while keeping as much of the initial information as possible (Field, 
2009: 628).  
We thus used this technique in an attempt to identify the constructs 
underlying the responses of the survey participants and to verify if the survey 
actually measured what it was intended to measure. The second analysis 
step was to determine, if performance measured by the surveys was related 
to actual sales output, i.e. sales force effectiveness criteria. 
 
Figure 11: Quantitative Study Objectives and Methods 
To this end Pearson’s correlation coefficients were calculated for individual 
survey item outcomes and extracted factors and actual sales outcomes. A 
third step was to determine if perceived subsidiary self-performance was 
related to perceived headquarters performance, in other words to determine 
to what extent the subsidiary managers believed that their own performance 
Subsidiary Performance Survey Headquarters Performance Survey
Research Question
Participants local division managers
local marketing and sales 
managers
Sample size n 141 125
Step 1
Method
Step 2
Method
Step 3
Method
Step 4
Method
Pearson's correlation coefficients for factors from both surveys
usefulness of survey results for definition of improvement strategies
interpretation and comparison of survey results from studied cases
How useful are performance surveys for the improvement of 
international sales force effectiveness?
validation of survey scales
factor analysis
predictive power of the survey for sales force effectiveness
Pearson's correlation coefficients for survey items / extracted factors 
and sales output variables
influence of central performance on local performance
 
70
was enhanced by headquarters activities. Pearson’s correlation coefficients 
were therefore calculated for all combinations of extracted factors from both 
surveys. A fourth step was to determine if the survey results were useful for 
the definition of country specific improvement strategies. To achieve this, the 
survey results from the 5 countries that we specifically focused on were 
individually analyzed and interpreted by the researcher. 
Sample, Implementation, Data Management and Data Analysis 
The secondary cross-sectional data from the two performance evaluation 
surveys of 141 (survey 1) and 125 (survey 2) divisional sales and marketing 
teams from 32 countries has been analyzed with state of the art statistical 
methods such as factor analysis and correlation analysis. The details of the 
data collection and data analysis are presented separately in section 4. The 
questionnaires were internet based. Links to the questionnaire software were 
sent to the participants with an explanation of the background of the survey. 
Data analysis was performed using the software package SPSS 17.0. As 
required by the software, each survey item was assigned a single word as a 
variable name. For factor analysis, following the recommendations of Field 
(2009: 627-685), we used the principle components method with Varimax 
Rotation of the component matrix. In accordance with the Kaiser criterion, 
only factors with Eigenvalues > 1 were extracted. KMO and Bartlett’s tests 
were used to ensure sampling adequacy. Cronbach’s Alpha was used as a 
reliability statistic to validate the scale items for the extracted factors.  
 
3.6.3 Subsidiary Performance Survey 
In their attempt to improve management control of the subsidiaries, 
SurgiSupplies’ central sales management department surveyed division 
managers of the leading subsidiaries. The ultimate goal was to measure 
sales and marketing performance and to identify improvement potential, from 
which action plans then could be derived. In order to answer the sub-
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research question ‘How useful are performance surveys for the improvement 
of international sales force effectiveness?’ the usefulness of these surveys 
required evaluation. To this aim firstly we verified the statistical validity of the 
survey responses and secondly we analyzed how the performance measured 
in the survey was related to actual performance output measures, such as 
sales volumes, growth rates and market shares. 
Jamarillo et al. (2005) have tried to test the validity of self-evaluations of 
sales people by comparing subjective managerial evaluations with sales 
person self-evaluations. In their meta-analysis of 33 sales performance 
measurement studies self-evaluations and managerial evaluations showed 
low convergent validity, indicating that these measures were not 
interchangeable. Another finding was that managerial evaluations had higher 
correlations with objective performance than sales-people self-evaluation 
(Jamarillo et al., 2005: 320-322). The authors have explained this with what 
they called the ‘performance effect’, representing that participants with low 
performance will overestimate their own performance while participants with 
high performance inversely will underestimate their performance. The study 
of Jamarillo et al. involved self-evaluations of sales people, while in this 
research self-evaluations were collected from divisional managers in country 
subsidiaries. In the following we want to test the validity of self-performance 
evaluation in our specific context of international sales and marketing 
organizations. 
Instrument development 
The survey design was not developed by the author, but by a business 
performance manager of SurgiSupplies. The team of central sales managers 
of which the author is a member however gave feed-back concerning the 
content of the survey forms. The survey form (Figure 12) had thus been 
modified from previous versions that had been evaluated in an unpublished 
pilot study prior to this research (Schill, 2011). The formulations indicating 
examples of ideal vs. poor situations are subject to further improvement for 
future repetitions of the survey. 
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Figure 12: Subsidiary Evaluation Survey 
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The data was collected by an internet based survey of the division managers 
of the top selling 25 SurgiSupplies countries. Each country manager was 
asked to respond to 12 survey items about 7 SBUs (Figure 11), resulting in a 
theoretical sample size of 25*7=175 questionnaires. The participants were 
asked to rate their local marketing and sales organizations on Likert scales of 
1 (excellent) to 10 (poor) for each survey item. 
For better understanding of the question, for each survey item a description 
of an ideal situation and a poor situation was given. The 12 survey items 
were pre-grouped into the four categories ‘sales and dealer organization and 
management’, ‘people’, ‘detailed market knowledge’ and ‘detailed customer 
knowledge’. 
The previous versions had found little acceptance as the survey form had 
taken too much time to complete, they contained too many survey items, and 
each one of them either suggested a written comment (survey version 1) or 
lengthy explanations to read (survey version 2). Besides shortening of the 
survey to 12 items on one printed page, the need for written comments was 
omitted and it was presented on an internet platform. The survey items had 
also been completed to globally cover all topic areas from the survey design 
presented by Zoltners et al. (2008). Also, following the suggestions from 
Zoltners et al., a second scale ‘need for improvement’ with the scale options 
‘high’, ‘medium’ and ‘low’ was integrated in the new version. 
One country failed to respond and two countries were excluded as they had 
essentially only used Likert scale value 1 with few exceptions of using value 
2, indicating a strongly positively biased response. Some of the remaining 
countries had not answered for all SBUs and the total number of responses 
included in the analysis was n = 141. 
3.6.4 Headquarters Performance Survey 
In order to better understand how the subsidiaries viewed the support they 
received from central marketing departments at the divisional headquarters, 
SurgiSupplies central sales management surveyed subsidiary managers. 
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The goal was to reveal sources of dissatisfaction and to improve the service 
level and the cooperation. 
As in the previous survey, in order to answer our sub-research question How 
useful are performance surveys for the improvement of international sales 
force effectiveness?, in this section we want to evaluate the value of these 
surveys for improving management control by verifying the validity of the 
survey responses and by analyzing how the performance of central 
marketing as measured in the survey is related to actual performance output 
measures of the subsidiaries. 
Sample 
The data was collected by an internet based survey of the division managers 
of the top selling 27 SurgiSupplies countries. Each country manager was 
asked to respond to 16 survey items about 7 SBUs (Figure 13), resulting in a 
theoretical sample size of 25*7=189 questionnaires.  
Instrument Development 
The participants were asked to judge the performance of central marketing 
departments according to the four categories ‘+ +’ (excellent), ‘+’ (good),’ -‘ 
(fair) and ‘- -‘ (poor). For better understanding of the question, for each 
survey item a description of an ideal situation and a poor situation was given.  
The survey items were pre-grouped into the five categories ‘organizational 
setup and strategy’, ‘competency’, ‘communication’, ‘support level’ and 
‘product quality and availability’. Like for the previous survey, the survey form 
(Figure 13) was developed essentially by a business performance manager 
at SurgiSupplies. Although all countries responded and no countries were 
excluded the sample size was lower in this survey than in the previous one, 
as people only responded concerning SBUs that were important in their 
country and where they felt they had significant contact with the people they 
were asked to evaluate. The total number of responses included in the 
analysis was N = 125. 
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Figure 13: Central Marketing Evaluation Survey 
++ + - --
Please rate the SBA 0 organizational setup and strategy
The organizational setup of the SBA is clear, 
transparent and logic. I always know the right 
contact person for any matter.
I really do not understand the organizational setup of 
the SBA. Often, it is difficult to find the right person 
for a task. I could think of better ways to structure 
The SBA strategy is clear and well communicated. 
The goals are demanding but realistic. I understand 
the impacts to my local activities.
The SBA strategy has not been very well 
communicated. We could benefit from a more clear 
and supportive strategy.
The SBA strategy is the ideal basis to achieve a 
unique competitive position in the local market.
The SBA strategy is not well suited to my local needs, 
and does not improve my local competitive position.
++ + - --
Please rate the SBA 0 competency regarding the following aspects
The SBA team has an excellent knowledge of the 
international competitive situation. They are able to 
transfer conclusions to our local market situation and 
its specific requirements.
The SBA team is not able to transfer their knowledge 
to our local marekt situation and specific 
requirements. Thus, their support often does not 
meet our local needs.
The SBA team has an excellent product knowledge, 
giving us the right level of support.
Often, we have a deeper product knowledge locally 
than the central SBA team can offer.
The SBA team supplies us with the right marketing 
and sales tools to be sucessful in our market. The 
well-prepared campaigns ideally complement our 
local activities and drive our business.
Usually, we have to develop our own marketing and 
sales tools in order to get the products to our 
market.
++ + - --
Please rate the SBA 0 communication
The communication level with the SBA is excellent. 
We receive the right amount of information, at the 
right frequency. The communication is clear, 
structured, and proactive.
Communication with the SBA could be improved. It is 
either too much or too little, and often not clearly 
understandable. 
If we have questions, the response time and level of 
detail is exactly what we need.
Requests are not replied to in a timely manner, we 
often need to ask several times.
++ + - --
Please rate the SBA 0 support level
For our local organization, we get the right level of 
support from the SBA. The support is very effective, 
both on operational and on management level. When 
required, the central team is present in our local 
market.
We could be more successful, if we would get the 
right level of support from the SBA. Often, the 
support process is rather complicated and time 
consuming.
The SBA training standards for existing and new 
products and processes support our local 
organization to get ahead of the local competition.
With adequate training, we could significantly 
improve our market competitiveness. However, the 
SBA can not support our specific training needs.
It is always great to work with the SBA team. The 
support that we get from the SBA is flexible and 
adapted to our local needs. 
The support that we get from the SBA is based on 
centrally-defined standards which are not 
appliccable to our local market needs. They do not 
seem to have the right "feeling" for our local team, 
the level of support does not meet our needs.
++ + - --
Please rate the SBA 0 product quality and availability
The SBA product quality level is outstanding and 
helps to increase our local market share.
With the current SBA product quality level, we will 
probably lose market share in the near future.
The SBA delivery performance and logistic quality 
level is outstanding and helps to increase our local 
market share.
With the current SBA delivery performance and 
logistic quality level, we will probably lose market 
share in the near future.
The SBA innovation performance (innovation strength 
& speed) is outstanding and helps to increase our 
local market share.
With the current SBA innovation performance 
(innovation strength & speed), we will probably lose 
market share in the near future.
The level of clinical evidence, clinical studies, 
medical publications is excellent and helps to 
increase our local market share.
With the current level of clinical evidencee, studies 
and publications, we will probably lose market share 
in the near future.
We get all products with all necessary certificates 
(CE, …), IFUs in local language. The SBA strongly 
supports us with local registration issues.
Most products that we get do not have all required 
certificates. IFUs are not available in our language. 
Registration issues need to be solved without central 
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Chapter 4: Interview Results 
In this section, the results of the interviews with the different local and central 
managers are presented. For each country, the interview responses are 
sorted according to the sub-research questions into the sections ‘Situational 
and Organizational Influence Factors’, ‘Effects of Decentralization and 
Delegation’ and ‘Successful Activities and Tools to Improve Central Control ‘. 
The sub-headers within these sections represent the relevant recurrent topics 
brought up by the respondents as they relate to the research questions. 
These topics were identified and labeled in the course of the text coding 
procedure. In the cross-case analysis tables (Annex 5) the topics and 
respective findings are summarized as they were brought up by the 
respondents concerning the different countries. This is to help with the 
comparison of the different country observations in the discussion chapter of 
this thesis, serving the improvement of the overall validity of the study.  
 
4.1 Country 1: The Domestic Sales Force 
4.1.1 Situational and Organizational Factors 
The summarized and coded interview data for situational factors concerning 
country 1 can be found in Annex 3.1.1. 
Specific case context 
Country 1 is the European domestic country of SurgiSupplies. They have 
traditionally been involved in all SBUs. The local sales team is usually among 
the first teams to launch new products and the products are often developed 
in cooperation with local opinion leaders in the respective medical domain. 
This situation gives them a certain advantage over competitors from other 
countries and SurgiSupplies usually has higher market shares in their 
domestic country than in most other countries. The fact of being 
geographically and culturally close to the headquarters and the fact that 
products are often developed with surgeons from their own customer base, 
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typically allows the sales force to have more direct contact with different 
functions at the headquarters, such as Marketing and R&D than their 
colleagues from international subsidiaries of SurgiSupplies.  
The sales and marketing team of SBU 1 in country 1 is providing implant 
systems for a highly specialized surgical field of indications. The sales 
organization in country 1 has the second largest sales volume in SBU 1 of all 
subsidiaries. Sales in this SBU grew 28% over the past 3 years, reaching a 
market share of 7%. Growth has slowed down in 2011 and the market is 
estimated to be stagnating (Figure14).  
 
Figure 14: Sales Output Variables for the Studied Cases 
 
Team 1 is an organization of 14 sales people and a marketing team of one 
marketing manager and two junior product managers, all of them supervised 
by Ian, their sales and marketing director. The team has been operating in 
this field for about 20 years rather successfully and they have reached a 
considerable market share. Over the past two years numerous competitors 
have launched innovative treatment concepts, while SurgiSupplies has been 
struggling with the development of a new state of the art implant system for 
this product group. The launch has been delayed several times and is now 
foreseen only in another two years. Consequently the team is having 
difficulties in maintain and expanding their customer-base. 
Interviews were held on the headquarters side with the marketing head of 
SBU 1 (Max), a central business development manager for SBU 1 working 
for Max (Peter) as well as a central sales manager (Kevin). On the local sales 
Country 1 2 3 3 4 5 5
SBU 1 2 3a 3b 4 5a 5b
SBU country ranking 2 4 28 24 13 9 8
SBU total sales 2011 (1 000 Euros) 13.619    13.092    1.255      1.926      3.335      2.641      2.669      
SBU growth 2011 (%) currency adjusted 3% 9% -1% 12% 16% -2% -18%
3 years SBU growth (%) currency adjusted 28% 20% 9% -6% 63% 1% -3%
marketshare 7% 19% 1% 1% 6% 16% 14%
marketgrowth 2011 -1% 1% 2% 3% 7% -6% -4%
Sales Output Variables (Sales Force Effectiveness)
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team side the divisional manager of SurgiSupplies in country 1 (Luke), the 
local sales manager (Ian) and the local marketing manager (Justin) 
responsible for SBU 1 were interviewed. 
Staff turn-over and loyalty 
The SBU 1 team-work in country 1 is considered to be exemplary, with all 
group members being capable of acting independently without permanent 
direct supervision. The local managers state that this positive situation has 
grown organically over the past decade, as there had been hardly any 
fluctuation in the team. This was different to other competitors who typically 
had high turn-over rates during the same period.  
In some countries, specifically in emerging markets, SurgiSupplies is facing 
high fluctuation rates. This is particularly problematic, when sales teams are 
very small. When sales teams are very small, sometimes the entire team is 
exchanged in a short period of time and it can then be difficult to maintain 
control of the business. 
Sales management practice 
Sales management in the country 1 sales organization is largely based on 
very frequent direct personal communication. Sales management has tended 
to become even less formalized in the past years.  
While the local managers believe that sales management should be entirely 
left to the local country organizations, as it depends largely on situational 
factors such as individual product portfolio, sales channels, legal restrictions 
etc., central managers see a potential for the diffusion of best practices 
collected from the various countries, e.g. for the provision of local value 
added services, throughout the global sales organization. However, local 
sales managers see the requirements for sales management to be very 
different from SBU to SBU, although they believe that reporting systems for 
sales figures and CRM systems could be standardized globally. 
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4.1.2 Effects of Decentralization and Delegation  
The summarized and coded interview data for organizational factors 
concerning country 1 can be found in Annex 3.1.2. 
Decentralization 
Contrary to its mostly American competitors who expect their subsidiaries to 
execute central orders without challenging them too much, the SurgiSupplies 
subsidiaries are relatively independent in their strategic decision making and 
entrepreneurial thinking on the part of the local general managers is favored. 
While this leads to a strong financial orientation and a capability of adapting 
flexibly to changing local requirements, it also leads to difficulties in the 
implementation of global strategies, as they become the consolidated result 
of individual local decisions. The quick and consequent global roll out of 
products and solutions thus can become very challenging. Also, as 
subsidiaries seem to have a more short-term perspective as the 
headquarters, they sometimes pursue short-term opportunities to the 
detriment of necessary long-term investments. Additionally, central managers 
in SBU 1 are having difficulties of controlling global expenses for their field of 
activity, as budget control is a local responsibility. The central managers of 
SBU 1 are to some extent frustrated with their lack of control of the 
subsidiaries and would sometimes prefer to have a direct line organization. 
Particularly it is pointed out that in situations where the functional matrix 
organization at the headquarters limits the control of central sales and 
marketing managers, this is observed by the subsidiary managers and 
undermines the credibility of the central managers. The influence of central 
managers is also limited by the sheer number of local organizations. They 
say that they can really only follow the top-ten subsidiaries effectively. 
Another point is that, as soon as a local subsidiaries reach an acceptable 
overall financial result, the local managers have difficulty in challenging them 
on individual SBU aspects or encouraging them to increase their efforts. 
While local managers are convinced that their independence concerning 
sales strategy should be maintained, they would like to see more central 
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guidance as to how to position and price products. Local managers seem to 
have some reservations concerning the central managers understanding of 
the real world market situation. An example was given of unfruitful, lengthy 
discussions in one SBU between local country 1 managers and central 
managers that were frustrating for both sides and no common understanding 
could be reached.  
Delegation 
On the other hand, empowerment on the subsidiary side often is limited to 
the level of the general manager. Depending on countries and individual 
company cultures at subsidiaries, these are sometimes organized in a very 
hierarchical way with little or no decision making power at lower levels. This 
can lead to additional difficulties for central managers in pursuing their 
strategies, as their local counterparts need to get the individual approval from 
their top managers even for minor decisions. However, professional maturity 
of staff members seems to be a generally accepted factor for delegation on 
all hierarchy levels. As the local power situation is often not well understood 
by central managers, they are sometimes surprised about activities they had 
agreed upon with their counterparts, later not being engaged or delayed. 
Some participants therefore pointed out the important learning experience for 
central sales and marketing managers of spending a certain time of their 
careers working in local subsidiaries in order to understand the different 
company cultures and dynamics of such smaller organizations.  
The central managers of SBU 1 believe that SurgiSupplies has a more long-
term orientation than its competitors and that there is generally speaking less 
pressure, more delegation of decision making and less sanctioning if financial 
results are unfavorable. Particularly, managers are pointing out common 
values of company staff members. This environment seems to lead to a 
better identification and loyalty of staff members to the company, on the other 
hand to a certain level of complacency of the employees. On the other hand,  
the company is perceived as being overly bureaucratic.  
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Influence of central managers on local strategies 
Max, the head of central head of SBU 1, says that in some countries he feels 
like a solicitor trying to persuade local organizations even concerning very 
basic operational activities. Only exceptionally he sees the initiative of a local 
subsidiary to ask him for active conceptual support. Much like Peter, the 
business development manager for SBU 1, he states that in order to gain the 
subsidiaries’ commitment he needs to provide certain services to them in 
order to raise their interest. While sales are their own local responsibility and 
they need to define their own goals and activities, he believes that the 
country organizations are often not aggressive enough in their efforts. Max 
says that subsidiaries even sometimes take advantage of the central 
managers, using their activities to provide services to customers without 
investing in learning how to provide these services themselves in the future. 
He speculates about the view of some local managers about himself: ‘…if he 
helps me occasionally to win a customer that’s good, and then he can leave 
again and please do not interfere with my business’ ’iv. 
Max admits that while he is involved in formulating and communicating 
strategic development goals globally for the product group, he is not involved 
in the definition of annual objectives in the subsidiaries. He believes that 
these are defined and communicated to the countries on a divisional level. 
The local organizations break down the total sales objective to a product 
group level by themselves.  
But even when business is generally weak, as was the case in the study 
period for the product group in case1, the divisional headquarters still have 
very limited possibilities to influence the local situation, as Max admits. On 
the one hand to him this is a capacity problem with too many countries to 
manage, on the other hand he believes that local goals are often set much 
too low and that it is difficult to move people out of their ‘comfort zone’. ‘A 
country like (country name), they grow nicely at 10-15%, they are practically 
untouchable. Although you plainly see they do it with one single new account 
… and then you ask ‘And where are 5 other accounts?’ They simply do not 
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exist. The countries are just too quickly satisfied and happy and you do not 
have a grip. And that’s annoying.’ v Although he is generally very satisfied 
with the quality of the team in country 1, he is still unsatisfied with their 
acquisition of new customers. While he acknowledges that this task is more 
difficult at the moment than it was in the past, as the product group is facing a 
dry-spell concerning innovative product launches, he also finds that the team 
is using this as an excuse not to try to break into new accounts.  
Local view point 
Luke, the general divisional manager of SurgiSupplies in country 1, thinks 
that the new organization of central sales managers has not really been 
implemented in his country and that he does not feel any change in his 
organization. He believes that there is a redundancy between the regional 
head function and the central sales organization that needs to be stopped 
because the country managers now have 3 strategic contact persons, the 
regional head, the central sales manager and the central marketing heads, 
leading to even more difficulties in coordinating strategies. 
Max similarly believes that the newly installed central sales department has 
not improved the general lack of empowerment of central managers, as he 
stated: ‘Honestly I would have hoped for more. I hope that we have now 
found a better approach with the workshops. So far what central sales is 
doing has not been mirrored back to me as successful. … Well I think that in 
the end, central sales, too, is a toothless tiger.’vi 
Ian explains that the coordination and adaptation of the product related 
planning with central and local marketing and research and development 
takes place in regular meetings every two to three months. Concerning 
strategic goals with respect to specific product promotions he states that 
while he and his team do try to fulfill central expectations, in the end the 
market decides whether products are successful or not: ‘…we centrally 
decide to make a product for which we take three years or longer. And then 
the market for the product is no longer there. Once we have it, I mean. The 
market decides. … the more centrally we decide, the more abstract 
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everything becomes sometimes.’vii  
While Justin, the local marketing manager for SBU 1, believes the central 
marketing department to have an important influence on their local sales and 
marketing organization, he confirms that the final decision on what activities 
will actually be realized is with the local organization. He also independently 
confirms Ian’s view that, ultimately, decisions are dictated by the market 
conditions. He adds another example for this, where some years ago the 
headquarters had tried to enforce a uniform world-wide pricing strategy for a 
specific implant system against the resistance of the local subsidiaries - the 
product did not sell in his country until the price was finally reduced. 
Concerning the local sales strategy, Luke thinks that the situations in the 
countries, the sizes and forms of the organizations, are so different, that the 
SurgiSupplies decision to leave this in the responsibility of the countries 
should be maintained. He believes that tight guidelines by the headquarters 
would be counter-productive. 
On the other hand in his opinion there should be strict guidelines concerning 
marketing related issues such as product and price positioning in the local 
competitive context, and respective commercial argumentation proposals. In 
this field, he believes, the central organization is not providing sufficient 
guidance and support, especially for the smaller country organizations. 
Fighting over resources 
The fact that the central managers from different divisions and SBUs are 
permanently courting the local decision makers, in order to obtain more of 
their local sales resources, further adds to the local position of strength as 
the local organizations can pick and choose the best central offering at any 
given time. The newly installed central sales department is trying to put in 
place procedures and planning systems in an attempt to limit the possibilities 
of the subsidiaries to change direction too quickly and too often. Overall, 
however, there seems to a lack of empowerment of the central organization 
with respect to strategically guiding the subsidiaries and the fact of having 
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installed an additional central sales department had not significantly 
improved this situation 18 month after the launch of this initiative.  
Importantly, the attitude of subsidiaries towards different SBUs seems to 
depend largely on the former career experiences of local top managers, but 
also to some extent on their personalities. If they have little knowledge about 
certain products and markets, they seemed to be less inclined to believe in 
their potential and engage in them in their countries. If they locally do not 
tend to delegate their decision making, they also seem to be less inclined to 
cooperate with central managers.  
 
4.1.3 Activities and Tools to Improve Central Control 
Central managers’ credibility 
The local SBU 1 team is particularly dissatisfied with the speed of innovation 
and the reliability of planning of product launches for this product line at 
SurgiSupplies, and it seems that this is to some extent undermining the 
credibility of central managers. 
Another influence factor on the local standing of central managers seems to 
be the size of the local organization. Smaller organizations, that have less 
own resources and procedural know-how at their disposal, therefore typically 
are more dependent of the central activities. Larger organizations, who 
themselves dispose of a large marketing staff tend to be more self-sufficient 
and self-confident.  
Local view point 
Luke thinks that the central organization is sometimes very disconnected 
from the market reality in country 1, and therefore they do not always 
understand the needs of the local organization and do not respect their 
requests. A particularly negative example is SBU 4, where he believes that 
the central product strategy does not correspond to the needs of the country 
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1 market any longer and that the support from central is dissatisfactory. The 
local managers had clearly communicated their needs for more complete 
product portfolios and simpler OR procedures but the central marketing did 
not show a lot of understanding and support. This temporarily had led to 
strong frictions in the cooperation. Several meetings were organized to 
overcome these issues but the meetings ended with no result and frustrated 
participants on both sides.  
Motivating and committing all local hierarchy levels 
Peter believes that communicating with, committing and motivating the sales 
and marketing staff in the subsidiaries is the key to success. Interestingly, he 
talks about having and transmitting fun: ‘First of all it is important to 
communicate well together. …that you show them that you are committed 
yourself, that you are having fun and that you also transmit the fun … to 
vitalize the process you also need to provide them with ideas, tell them ‘why 
don’t you try this’ or ‘we should do that again’, say a workshop, to get people 
to sit down and discuss again, that they become aware that SurgiSupplies is 
here.’viii 
He makes it a big point that it is important to commit all hierarchy levels 
individually and separately. This however is difficult in some countries when 
the lowest hierarchy level, the sales people, do not speak English. In some 
countries he can communicate with the customers, the doctors, but not with 
the local sales persons. 
Local view point 
Justin points out that once the commitment of the subsidiary is gained, it is 
also important that the central organization is committed to support the 
activities that have been agreed upon, which is not necessarily always the 
case. 
Local field support 
Max states that, besides innovative products, his team can give support for 
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winning new customers, with key opinion leader related marketing tools such 
as training courses, events and reference hospitals. Although, with time, 
country organizations are expected to develop their own key opinion leaders, 
he acknowledges that, depending on the size of a local organization, their 
respective possibilities might be limited. But even with the central support, 
these tools can only work with ambitious goals and sufficient aggressiveness 
in reaching them within the country organization. 
Mutual trust, respect, frequent and truthful communication 
Local view point 
Justin reports that he usually spends one entire day a week working at the 
central headquarters. Much like Peter, he believes that communication is 
key: ‘…I have been fighting for it for years and I see in communication our 
biggest improvement potential for us’ix He believes that the biggest problem 
is that people in the organization do not dare to communicate openly about 
difficulties. His major example is that time-tables for development projects 
are always unrealistic. He believes that it is easier for people to live with a 
difficult truth than with an obvious illusion.  
Luke generally believes that the quality of the cooperation between the 
central and the local organizations varies largely between different SBUs, 
depending on the acting people and on the mutual trust of the two 
organizations. He thinks that, of all teams, his team for SBU 1 has the best 
cooperation with central marketing. He believes that the fact that the local 
marketing manager for SBU 1 is spending one work-day per week at the 
central marketing office is contributing very much to this by means of informal 
networking. But the main reason he sees in the general openness of the 
individual central marketing managers of SBU 1 to listen to their local 
counterparts and to take them seriously and to work cooperatively on the 
solution of existing problems, to share relevant information. He points out that 
particularly in the past, this cooperation was not always good, a fact that he 
also blames on certain former employees on the local side.  
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Long-term personal relationships 
All local and central participants directly involved in the product group of team 
1 emphasized the trust and excellent cooperation with their counterparts. 
They attribute this to the fact that they have been working together for a long 
time, that they communicate frequently and that they frequently work together 
directly with the key customers. 
Strategic meetings with multiple local and central hierarchy level involvement 
The dispute between local and central managers concerning SBU 4 could 
finally only be resolved in a large strategy meeting with participation of 
SurgiSupplies executive board members and local SBU managers from 
countries 1, 3, 5 and one other country. In this meeting, the different 
participating local country organizations found that their local needs were 
relatively similar and that the central organization really had an outdated 
perception. These findings lead to substantial strategic changes in the global 
strategy of SBU 4. 
Luke believes that this positive example should be institutionalized. He could 
imagine the division managers and SBU heads from the 5 leading countries 
of each SBU to meet once per year and that the respective research and 
development departments should also be invited. In these meetings the 
different country trends and needs should be matched between each other 
and with the central marketing and research and development strategy. He 
does not believe on the other hand that executive team members necessarily 
need to participate in such meetings. 
Strategic sales development workshops 
According to Max’s initial presentation to the workshop members in country 
1, the goals of these workshops were ‘to boost the penetrating power of the 
product group by increasing market share considerably, pushing business 
with new customers and planning the business in focus markets’. The 
milestones to achieve these goals were the preparation of a market 
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development plan, the establishment of a treatment concept approach for 
reference centers, a sales training program for new sales people, the clear 
targeting and monitoring of the acquisition of new customers and the review 
of distribution channels with regard to efficiency. 
Max saw as positive results of this workshop, that the local team 1 had 
compiled their information concerning their potential customer base and had 
extensively analyzed and reflected on the data. As a result, concrete, 
account-based new customer development plans had been established. 
They involved specific niche product strategies and certain plans to attack 
major accounts, local sales and central marketing together. As these plans 
also involved certain investments in research and development, the plans 
were presented to and approved by the divisional board.  
Local view point 
Although he claimed that there had been nothing new to him in the strategic 
sales workshop with central marketing and sales, Ian admits that such 
activities forced him and his team to distance themselves from day-to-day 
business and to spend time on necessary strategic reflections. 
Strategic planning and reporting systems 
Kevin gives another example of how the central headquarters are trying to 
achieve sustainable development of new customers in the local subsidiaries. 
A tool for systematic customer potential analysis and targeting has been 
developed and Kevin tells the story of how he had presented it in a smaller 
country and how the local managers had willingly adopted it. In a regional 
meeting they had then later presented their results to other regional country 
managers and Kevin had the feeling that this peer to peer communication 
was a promising way of promoting this new method. Kevin also points out the 
importance of key performance indicators. A new system of key performance 
indicators has been introduced at SurgiSupplies to measure the level of 
strategic implementation within each country. Among those indicators are the 
number of new customers gained and the number of customers lost and the 
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number of local key opinion leaders developed in the country.  
Max points out that only since the key performance indicator tool had been 
established by the newly created central sales department, he has 
systematic knowledge of the local planning commitment in the 5 year 
planning period and the momentary level of goal achievement per each 
subsidiary.  
Peter states that in his SBU 1 the up-front investment in building a customer 
base is particularly high. He admits that he used to have power struggles with 
two other related SBUs over resources in certain countries in the past. He 
however believes that with the installation of the new investment planning 
system, they have started to coordinate with the other product group 
managers where it makes most sense for each group to be active.  
Local view point 
Concerning the newly installed central planning and reporting tools, Luke 
believes that to have a strategic checklist for following up on long-term 
strategic goals is generally a good idea. Also he is in favor of the new 
investment planning tool that should oblige subsidiaries to focus their 
activities. On the other hand he thinks that the actual implementation of 
decisions is more important than the documentation of plans, and that 
documentation in general should be kept to a minimum. In his opinion the 
weakness of the organization does not necessarily lie in the lack of analysis 
of the individual situation of subsidiaries, but in really reacting consequently 
to these situations. He suggests creating the positions for central market 
researchers who systematically visit the different countries in order to collect 
data about market needs and to provide this as input for central decision 
making. Generally he believes that the organization needs to develop a 
greater market proximity. Another example for this lack in market proximity 
he sees in the way that international customer complaints are treated. Luke is 
convinced that customer feed-back in the form of complaints could be a 
valuable source of ideas for future product developments, but today they are 
more seen as a nuisance.  
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He believes that in its initial phase the new central sales organization 
exaggerated the simultaneous launch of new measuring and reporting tools. 
Justin is concerned about the fact that new methods such as the above 
mentioned customer potential analysis tool, might be reasonable for younger 
immature organizations but not suitable for large, mature organizations, as 
they have already established their own methods over time. He tries to 
explain this with the following picture: ‘I place my form and fill it with sand, 
that is much, much easier than if I already have my sand castles and now 
press the form over them.’ x 
Geographical focus in order to deal with limited resources 
Peter believes that discipline is required to focus on a certain number of 
countries and a necessity to disengage, by simply refusing to serve them, 
from other countries that have been ‘allotted’ to other SBUs. He thinks that 
this new discipline is benefitting his team by concentrating their activities, 
while, at the same time, the countries are more committed to truly investing in 
defined product groups in a sustainable way and to show an appropriate 
return on investment. 
 
4.2. Country 2: Complex Solution Selling in International Markets 
4.2.1 Situational and Organizational Factors 
The summarized and coded interview data for situational factors concerning 
country 2 can be found in Annex 3.2.1. 
Specific case context 
Country 2 is a top 10 selling country for SurgiSupplies in Asia. They have 
traditionally been involved in all SBUs of SurgiSupplies. The subsidiary in 
country 2 has generally developed favorably in sales and profits over the past 
years for SBU 2, one of the core businesses of SurgiSupplies. However, 
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central marketing and sales managers were not satisfied with the 
development of one particular product line and they decided to introduce a 
new innovative solution selling approach to country 2, that had been very 
successful in other countries. The sales organization in country 2 has the 
fourth largest sales volume in the country ranking of SBU 2. Sales in this 
SBU grew 20% over the past 3 years, reaching a considerable market share 
of 19%. Growth rates continued to be satisfactory in 2011 at +9% while the 
market for SBU 2 was estimated to be stagnating (Figure 24). 
As the central managers of SBU 2 are operating in a mature product market, 
as part of their global strategy they are trying to differentiate their offering by 
adding unique value added services to their products, essentially by 
proposing to the customer a ‘total solution’ project of running and servicing 
their entire stock of these devices. Specifically, this program is aimed at 
actively creating demand on the customer side instead of waiting for 
customers to signal demand and it is aimed at generating large contracts as 
opposed to small daily orders. 
Interviews were held on the headquarters side with the marketing head of 
SBU 2 (Fred), the responsible Marketing Director for the Total Solution 
Selling program (Mike), a central business development manager (Susan) 
who had spent some time as an expatriate manager in country 2, and a 
central human resources manager (Joe). On the country 2 subsidiary side 
the general manager (Albert), the marketing manager (James) and the sales 
manager (Tom) for SBU 2, and the sales representative responsible for the 
Solution Selling Project (David) were interviewed. 
Mike, one of the central marketing managers, sees his own objectives in 
transferring the ‘total solution’ selling know-how to the subsidiaries and in 
increasing sales with major hospital projects. He states that country 2 is the 
first country organization where it was so far impossible to launch the ‘total 
solution’ approach successfully. According to Mike, the local country 2 
organization remains a mystery to the central headquarters even after 15 
years of working together with them. Five years ago in an earlier attempt to 
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improve the situation, the ‘total solution’ approach was launched for the first 
time with a complete failure. Central managers had tried to establish a show 
case for the program in a local hospital, but the local sales and marketing 
team was overwhelmed by the approach and questioned its relevance and 
applicability in their local market.  
In a more recent initiative, the headquarters managers had approached the 
general manager of this subsidiary, its SBU manager and the responsible 
field staff in an attempt to relaunch the ‘total solution’ approach. They 
organized a three and a half day strategic review meeting in order to 
establish the status quo situation with respect to the competency level in this 
SBU country organization. Against the resistance of the local organization 
they finally also managed to visit and discuss with a local customer. An 
action plan was identified to lay the ground for two ‘total solution’ trials in two 
new target hospitals and the action plan was carried out efficiently and 
precisely by the members of the local organization. After the trials had been 
accomplished, the responsible headquarters project manager, who was 
responsible for running the trial cases and transferring the related knowledge 
to the local sales and marketing team, was initially enthusiastic about the 
course of the project. The cooperation with the local colleagues and the 
customers was well organized and appreciated. However, after the first 
project phase was over, it led to only marginal increases in sales results. 
Even though the local team seemed to let themselves be convinced of the 
value of the project, no significant dynamics had been created on the part of 
the subsidiary. While some elementary weaknesses in the local operations 
could be identified and addressed, such as for example the lack of simple 
conversion lists of competitors’ item number into SurgiSupplies item 
numbers, others remain unsolved. Mike names several specific obstacles at 
this particular subsidiary. One problem in this country is, that one of several 
product lines involved in the ‘total solution’ program has been exclusively 
contracted to a single nation-wide dealer, limiting the subsidiary’s possibilities 
to use it as part of the ‘total solution’. Also, the country 2 subsidiary cannot 
provide repair and maintenance service for other brands than SurgiSupplies 
products, an important feature in other countries. Mike is surprised by the 
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overall impression that the initiative for this project seem to lie solely with the 
headquarters. He has the feeling of a general lack of vision concerning this 
business model and a lack of transparency that he describes as ‘black-box’, 
meaning that he does not understand what the true beliefs and intentions of 
the local staff are. 
Brand awareness and market share 
Fred, another Marketing Manager at the headquarters, points out that while 
in SBU 2 SurgiSupplies is globally a leading player, in country 2 they are only 
a follower with low market shares. He says that in country 2 they were hoping 
to use the ‘total solution’ selling approach to differentiate the offering in order 
to improve market share. He however believes that SBU 2 does not have a 
very high priority in country 2 because their most important sales volumes 
historically lie with other SBUs and that therefore investments are focused on 
these other areas as well.  
Central SBU 2 managers are confident to have a clear 5 year global strategy, 
they have communicated it to the subsidiaries by providing respective 
strategy documents and via the divisional board, and they have successfully 
rolled out the strategy in some major markets. Even after many specific 
efforts the strategy implementation in country 2 remains dissatisfactory and 
even attempts at having a locally customized product line did not show the 
expected results. The central managers, who clearly believe in a global 
product strategy and want to keep local adaptation to a minimum, believe 
that country 2’s conservative culture is hindering the adaptation of the ‘total 
solution’ program. Other reasons given for the slow progress are small 
market shares and brand awareness, and weak end-customer relationships. 
Generally speaking the acceptance of the program seems to also depend on 
a certain level of market maturity. Communication problems are seen as 
being due to cultural distance and language problems. Different central 
managers, including an expatriate manager who was deployed to this aim, 
worked in parallel to convince the local organization of the ‘total solution’ 
project, but even the commitment of the general manager was not sufficient 
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to overcome resistance on the part of the organization. An impulse from the 
market place, the pronounced interest of some local dealers, helped to 
support a serious attempt at relaunching the project at some trial centers and 
to nominate two local sales people to be in charge.  
 
Local view point 
Albert, the general manager of the subsidiary in country 2, believes that the 
‘total solution’ project is generally speaking successful, although the 
implementation is slow and they are struggling with the final stages of the 
program. In the two pilot centers there has been positive feed-back from the 
customers, although they did not substantially increase their purchases. In a 
third hospital that has been initiated by the local team since, the project has 
been very successful and a large project sales volume is likely to be closed 
shortly. 
When he first heard about the ‘total solution’ approach it fascinated him, 
because it was a direct approach to hospitals as opposed to a passive way of 
selling via dealers and depending on their goodwill and their customer 
contacts, so he decided to implement it. 
The marketing manager for SBU 2 in country 2, James, remembers the very 
first initiative for the ‘total solution’ selling program 5 years earlier, when 
central managers had performed a program in one hospital all by themselves 
without informing and training any of the local people. There was no reaction 
from that hospital to this effort. 
David is a local sales person who has been assigned the job of carrying out 
the ‘total solution’ projects only a few years ago due to his experience with 
other large scale purchasing projects. He sees himself as the central person 
and customer interface for this activity in the country 2 organization and he 
was involved in all three of these customer projects so far. Although he 
acknowledges having learnt a lot from the two pilot projects, he is only 
satisfied with the last case, the one that he has selected himself as a target. 
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He believes that this one was successful because the customer had a 
confirmed purchasing need and he could communicate the scope and the 
different steps very clearly from the beginning and obtain all relevant 
information from them. The other two cases he sees as trial cases that 
helped him learn but did not turn into a success because the customers had 
no purchasing intention from the beginning. In other countries the solution 
selling approach had been successful in actively creating demand on the 
customer side without the initial intention to buy at the customer side, but 
David does not believe this to be possible in his country. The two first trial 
hospitals had been targeted by the distributors because they were major 
customers of them and they wanted to offer them some free services. He still 
thinks that it was useful for brand recognition purposes at these two customer 
sites. In the domestic market of SurgiSupplies the brand is already well 
established but not in country 2.  
Albert believes that the headquarters treat subsidiaries and their members 
differently according to their contribution to world-wide profits. As country 2 is 
a high priced market he therefore believes to get more central attention than 
other subsidiary managers. 
Other contextual difficulties 
The local organization is under the impression that their market is very 
different than the domestic market of SurgiSupplies and that it needs different 
products. They therefore would like to be more involved in product 
development. Although in the mean time they seem to have understood the 
principles of the ‘total solution’ program, and they acknowledge its positive 
branding effects, they are not sure if this is totally applicable to their situation. 
They doubt that it can allow them to actively create demand with their 
customers and they are not convinced that the huge effort to pursue major 
purchasing projects is more efficient as focusing on day to day sales 
activities.  
Central and local managers seem to have very different perceptions of the 
success of the program. While central managers believe it to be a clear 
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failure, local managers seem to be quite happy with it and believe that 
financial success will show mid-term or long-term. Also, while the central 
managers are still not sure about the true intentions of the local team, these 
seem to have accepted the ‘total solution’ program in the mean time. 
 
4.2.2 Effects of Decentralization and Delegation  
The summarized and coded interview data for organizational factors 
concerning country 2 can be found in Annex 3.2.2. 
Decentralization 
Both the central and local managers agree to the fact that decision making is 
largely in the hands of the local organization. This seems to be a difference 
to publicly traded, particularly American competitors, who are considered to 
be more driven by central authority and the necessity to continuously show 
short term profits. Unsurprisingly, the local general manager is very happy 
with this situation and believes this to be the right solution. The central 
managers seem to be more skeptical of the local decision making power, as 
they often observe a very passive attitude towards the adoption of centrally 
developed strategies and tactics, sometimes even showing a certain 
arrogance towards them. The local general manager admits having observed 
such attitudes in his own organization. Central employees seem to be much 
more empowered than their local counterparts, who seem to act more 
procedural and need to follow strict hierarchical decision making paths and 
seniority rules. Surprisingly however in spite of this hierarchical structure, the 
general manager in country 2 seemed to have initial difficulties in 
implementing his decision to launch the ‘total solution’ project. 
Influence of central managers on local strategies 
Mike says, and Fred independently describes it in a similar way, that the top 
management at HospiMed deliberately does not give any authority to the 
central marketing departments in the matrix organization with respect to their 
product offerings and lets the general managers of the country subsidiaries 
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decide what solutions they want to implement. He calls this ‘survival of the 
best solutions’. He states that since the major product innovations in his 
particular product group of SBU 2 have ended 30 years ago, it is now an 
accepted idea at SurgiSupplies that the ‘total solution’ program is the only 
way to sustain leadership in this field.  
Mike believes that his goal at the subsidiary level is generally better 
described as ‘finding acceptance’ rather than ‘gaining control’. The key to his 
success in his opinion is to maintain a know-how lead versus the subsidiary 
and a certain self-confidence that goes along with it. While the ‘total solution’ 
selling project is relatively new, he admits to having needed time to build up 
the critical know-how his team now has. In the mean time, he believes to 
have enough experts in his team who can visit the countries and create 
successful real live show-cases that allow them to learn and at the same time 
to believe in the new methods. The successes they already had in the past 
and the fact that the central top management specifically supports this 
project, is giving them wide acceptance in the subsidiaries. 
‘In a way I believe this represents a paradigm change. Because, when I 
usually watch this, also in other SBUs, it is rather like we develop a product 
and say, these are the features, here’s the brochure, now go sell it, it should 
work out all right….But it just doesn’t! ... What we do is, we take the 
responsibility to say, dear colleague in the country, let’s take each other by 
the hand and approach the customer and implement together what we have 
already proven to work in other countries.’xi  
Fighting over resources 
On a global scale, the divisions and SBUs of HospiMed are in competition to 
each other concerning the subsidiaries attention. The only guidance that is 
provided from the headquarters is the 5 years strategy document. The fact 
that SBU 2 globally has been quite successful in the past and also finds a lot 
of attention at the subsidiaries is attributed by central managers to the  
company declaring it as a focus activity in the global strategy in 2005, and 
putting additional resources into its development ever since. In the past, this 
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SBU had been seen more as a cash cow and the profits were used to invest 
into other less mature areas. Another reason for the success of SBU 2 was 
the development of the ‘total solution’ program and its communication via the 
5 years strategy document and the support of the divisional board. On the 
other hand, experience of the central managers shows that local managers 
tend to focus on certain SBUs mostly according to their own historical 
experiences.  
Short-term risk-averse local strategies 
Although this is against the global strategic intention, it seems to be a 
favorable strategy with diminished risk for local subsidiaries to grow many 
different businesses on a low market share level, rather than to focus on few 
areas and trying to become a significant player. Controversially, the local 
general manager in country 2 believes that his organization has been 
focusing on the most promising SBUs for his country successfully for years 
and that it is the central managers who are trying to push him into adding 
more product groups. This might well be an explanation as to why country 2 
is pursuing the ‘total solution’ project half-heartedly, with too little investment 
in dedicated field sales people. 
 
4.2.3 Activities and Tools to Improve Central Control 
Central managers’ credibility 
Importantly, Mike points out that, even in the now very successful domestic 
sales organization (country 1) of SurgiSupplies, when they first started the 
service concept of the total solution program the local domestic sales team 
was very reluctant to accept the new concepts proposed by central 
marketing. He states that ‘in the domestic market we were confronted with a 
very self-confident sales team, who let us understand: ‘‘we know how this 
works, we do not need any theoretical solutions from the ivory tower’’- this 
was never explicitly said, but that was their behavior for years.’xii  
Joe, a central human resources manager involved with subsidiaries, points 
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out that it is important on the headquarters’ side to be reliable with keeping 
promised time-lines for the launch of new products in order to maintain 
credibility in the eyes of the subsidiary. And since this is not always the case 
at SurgiSupplies, he believes that the subsidiaries do not always take the 
proposed strategies of the headquarters too seriously. ‘One can imagine the 
countries being a little laid back, saying, well, let’s wait for the products to 
really arrive and then we can still think about what we are going to do.’ xiii 
Local view point 
Albert admits that people in his organization have a strong self-confidence 
versus the headquarters that leads them to ignore or deny central ideas. 
They believe to have superior and more specific market knowledge that 
allows them to know what’s best for their situation. In particular, as the 
subsidiary had a very solid growth development for many years, they have 
developed a mentality of being able to be successful on their own. Albert is 
trying to change this as he believes that a more open minded mentality would 
be beneficial in order to learn from benchmarking with other subsidiaries or 
competitors.  
Concerning the ‘total solution’ program, David says that Susan always tells 
him how successful and important the active creation of customer demand by 
the ‘total solution’ selling is. However, his own experience shows this to be 
difficult in country 2’s business environment. He says he needs to worry 
about his own (variable) income and therefore he prefers to look for hospitals 
that already have announced a major purchasing project, and then to use the 
‘total solution’ program as a differentiating feature. Tom, David’s Sales 
Manager, on the other hand is still uncertain as to what is more important, the 
daily business, meaning updating or enlarging existing stock with customers, 
or major purchasing projects. He acknowledges, though, that winning big 
projects could potentially enhance their so far small market presence more 
quickly than before.  
James believes that the market in country 2 is very specific, a fact that they 
are trying to communicate to the managers at the headquarters, and 
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sometimes these are willing to provide customized products or solutions. 
Most of the time, however, his team is only presented with new products 
once they are fully developed. The local team then sometimes feels that the 
products are not well adapted to their market and need to find creative ways 
of selling them in spite of it. 
Motivating and committing all local hierarchy levels 
Fred believes it to be crucial before launching any kind of product or project 
in a subsidiary to have an opportunity to openly discuss and agree on 
common goals and approaches. Concerning the ‘total solution’ project he 
admits to having practically ‘forced’ the country into trying out this approach 
with some customers, however the country 2 colleagues could not achieve 
the positive customer response that SurgiSupplies is used to with such 
projects in other markets. ‘I think in the past we have simply forced the 
colleagues in country 2 into certain things (laughs), just to do what the 
headquarters want.’xiv Fred is not sure why this approach has not worked, if it 
was the method itself that was not successful, or the communication, or the 
understanding of the staff in country 2.  
For Susan, the ‘total solution’ project really started with SurgiSupplies inviting 
representatives of the most important dealer organizations every year for a 
motivational trip to the headquarters facility and a sightseeing trip. At these 
occasions the ‘total solution’ project was regularly presented and after one of 
these meetings a pilot hospital for country 2 was agreed upon with one of the 
dealers.  
John underlines that it is important to directly communicate with the local 
sales managers and agree on targets and activities, not only with their top 
managers, although it is important to involve those at the same time. 
Local view point 
Albert believes that the subsidiary and the headquarters share the same 
goals with respect to the project, but he also thinks that the central managers 
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might be dissatisfied with the slow progress. In the beginning, the local team 
did not really believe in the project and asked for modifications and specific 
adaptations for country 2, but now they seem to start to see opportunities. 
Albert believes that the ‘total solution’ project is a core competency of 
SurgiSupplies and therefore it is very important to implement it in his country. 
He thinks that once they can create one, even a smaller, success story, the 
motivation of the team will increase. Albert recalls that the ‘total solution’ 
program required a lot of preparatory work such as the setting up and 
translation of related software interfaces into country 2’s language, which 
took a long period of time. When he presented the idea to the team, he felt 
they were ‘ … reluctant to implement’ it. The process of targeting and 
negotiating with the trial hospitals was also time-consuming so 2 years 
passed with no real progress. The only person who seemed interested in this 
topic was David, so they created a ‘total solution’ program team around him, 
but still there was no progress. The internal promotion of this project was 
completely unsuccessful. The picture only changed when there was an 
incentive journey of some dealers, who visited the headquarters and received  
information about the ‘total solution’ program there from the central 
managers. One of the dealers, who covers the area neighboring the 
subsidiaries main office, got interested and proposed two hospitals that were 
willing to participate in a trial run of the project. Albert thinks this was the real 
start of the project. 
Local field support 
Mike describes that together with his team they try to understand customer 
needs, develop solutions and transfer them to the different organizations. He 
thereby points out the importance of ‘taking responsibility’, meaning, instead 
of just handing them a package of tools and information, to actively develop 
initial customer activities in the field with the local sales teams. This however 
requires competence and self-confidence on the part of the headquarters 
managers and the permission of the local subsidiary of doing so. Mike is 
happy to point out that the arrogant attitude of the domestic sales team in 
country 1 has been declining over the years and he feels that he and his 
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team have earned their acceptance. 
The know-how transfer concerning the ‘total solution’ concept in Susan’s 
opinion was only really successful during joint field work. During the 
preparatory theoretical training program the colleagues did not seem to get 
very involved and did not have any relevant questions. Susan thinks that 
from the central point of view, the ‘total solution’ program is moving too slowly 
in country 2 while the local organization is under pressure, performing many 
activities that are new to them, starting from zero. 
Mike says that the ultimate way of convincing subsidiaries of the ‘total 
solution’ selling approach is what he refers to as ‘guerilla tactics’. For him this 
means initiating some low level activities in the country to slowly create 
success and thus gradually increase the acceptance of his projects. He gives 
an example where he convinced some lower level managers, who really did 
not believe that customers in their country would be interested in such a 
program, to perform some ‘innocent free trial cases‘ with some customers, 
without alerting the local top managers to the fact. Once one or two 
successful ‘lighthouses’ then could be successfully established, it was easy 
to convince the top managers to invest in this method. On the other hand he 
admits that there is at the same time a disadvantage of this method, as he 
needs to invest a lot of capacity himself without being sure if the necessary 
investments in headcounts and resources will follow in the country 
subsidiary. Mike gives another example of ‘guerilla tactics’ where he 
managed to successfully penetrate one of the major subsidiaries of 
SurgiSupplies with his project, by slipping the idea to a local top manager at 
a casual moment. He had thus by-passed the responsible local Marketing 
manager, who until this moment had never shown any interest.‘… I received 
a telephone call the following Monday from the Marketing Manager who 
suddenly wanted to be informed about what we were doing … This is what I 
mean by positive Guerilla-Marketing, I need to blaze my own trail. And it 
would be nice if there were some kind of official procedure where I would 
come and say ‘these are the solutions, tell me if you want them’ but it does 
not work that way, I haven’t found that in our company.’xv  
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Long-term personal relationships 
Joe in country 2 at SurgiSupplies does not really see the characteristics of a 
headquarters – subsidiary relationship, he thinks it is more like a 
manufacturer – distributor relationship. And like in a dealer relationship, it is 
important to build good human relationships between the people who interact 
on both sides and to create success stories together. He believes that 
working together on major purchasing projects and on the general customer 
approach in order to be more successful in such projects, is a good 
opportunity to create such success stories.  
Communication of global strategic orientation 
Fred thinks that SBU 2 has been reasonably successful for the past 5 to 6 
years with continuous growth, but he believes the fact that SBU 2 has been 
officially declared to be part of the core businesses of SurgiSupplies in 2005, 
has contributed largely to this success. Since then he feels like ‘ …living in a 
relatively comfortable position’.xvi Prior to this moment, other SBUs had been 
the major focus and there had not been any resources invested in SBU 2. 
Other success factors to him were a branding campaign that connected SBU 
2 to the SurgiSupplies brand and the development of the ‘total solution’ 
program. On the other hand he is still convinced that with more resources his 
SBU could be even more successful. 
Fred attributes a lot of importance to the 5 years strategy document of 
SurgiSupplies. He believes that with this document they are really influencing 
the countries as it does not only contain sales and profit expectations for 
each SBU but also the products and strategies intended to achieve these 
numbers. As the ‘total solution’ project is an integral part of this 5 years 
strategy, he thinks that subsidiaries such as country 2 will also let themselves 
be guided in this direction. 
Expatriate / compatriot managers 
In some countries with a very large cultural distance to the domestic country 
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of SurgiSupplies, Mike thinks they will not be able to achieve motivational 
local success stories simply by doing short-term customer projects together 
with the local teams. In some of these countries he and his team do not 
understand the mentality of the customers, who react unpredictably and it is 
also very difficult to perform what he considers a straight-forward project with 
them. He rather believes that it will be necessary to send expatriate manager 
for at least 2 years to such countries in order to customize the approach and 
train local staff on it. 
Mike has been told by a former colleague who has moved from a subsidiary 
of SurgiSupplies to a subsidiary of the competitor Olympus in the same 
country, that they staffed a much higher number of expatriate managers from 
the corporate office in Japan and therefore were linked much more closely to 
the central organization.  
Susan, a native speaker of country 2’s language usually living in the 
domestic country of SurgiSupplies, has spent 2 years working for the 
subsidiary in country 2. One of her main objectives during that period was the 
promotion of the ‘total solution’ program in the subsidiary. She believes that 
her presence was one of the main reasons why the project was eventually 
launched. While she thinks that there was a sincere wish on the local side to 
get active in this field, it was never given a top priority. She could imagine 
that it was mostly done in order to satisfy the headquarters and activities are 
done more or less aside of other more important priorities.  
Strategic meetings with multiple local and central hierarchy level involvement 
Local view point 
In Albert’s opinion the subsidiary board meetings, where board members 
from the central divisions meet with the subsidiary management, serves only 
to discuss the business results, but does not work well as a platform to reach 
strategic agreement. 
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Strategic planning and reporting systems 
Local view point 
Concerning the new strategic planning and resource allocation reports that 
have been established by the global sales team, Albert thinks that they are 
not really understood in his organization and seen more as benefitting the 
headquarters rather than the subsidiary organization. James thinks that some 
sort of tools might be useful, however he thought that two of the new reports 
were almost identical. He is not convinced that the reports are already ideal, 
however he admits to not having any better idea to design them. Tom 
appreciates some of the operative software tools of the ‘total solution’ 
program. Before it can be used more widely in the sales team, the country 2 
adaptations need to be finalized and more sales staff needs to be trained. 
Interestingly, David would like to get more feed-back from the central 
managers on his own performance and the way he is proceeding with 
customer activities, in particular for the latest ‘total solution’ project, where he 
is often acting alone. He also thinks that it would be important to take one of 
his customers to a successful show-case hospital in the domestic market to 
ultimately convince them. These customers then could serve as a testimonial 
in country 2. 
 
4.3 Country 3: Combining Selling Teams for Different SBUs 
4.3.1 Situational and Organizational Factors 
The summarized and coded interview data for situational factors concerning 
country 3 can be found in Annex 3.3.1. 
Specific case context 
Country 3 is a top 10 selling country for SurgiSupplies in Europe. They have 
traditionally been involved in all SBUs of SurgiSupplies. For two of them, that 
we will call SBU 3a and 3b, despite attempting for many years, they failed to 
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establish a significant market presence and the comparably small sales 
number could not sustain the sales and marketing expenses, resulting in 
regular financial losses. SBU 3a is providing consumables and implants for 
two highly specialized surgical indications while SBU 3b, a core business 
activity of SurgiSupplies, provides mostly consumables for a very wide 
spectrum of different surgical indications. The sales organization in country 3 
holds low country ranks for SBUs 3a (28) and 3b (24). Sales in SBU 3a grew 
slowly by only 9% over the past 3 years and declined by 1% in 2011. SBU 3b 
sales declined by 6% over a 3 year period but grew by 12% in 2011. Market 
shares are negligible for both SBUs at 1% and both markets are estimated to 
grow slowly at 2-3%. In order to redress the situation the local organization 
decided to combine the two selling teams to reduce cost and become more 
efficient in their market approach. We will call this the ‘CombiTeam project’. 
Interviews were held on the headquarters side with the marketing heads of 
SBU 3a (Adam) and 3b (Toni), and a product manager from SBU 3a (Marc). 
On the country 3 subsidiary side the general manager (George), a marketing 
and sales manager for multiple SBUs (Keith), and the business unit manager 
for the team that is responsible for SBUs 3a and 3b (Sean) were interviewed. 
Toni, the SBU 3b marketing head says that they had unsuccessfully tried to 
launch their major product line for many years in country 3. With another 
smaller product line they had been successful in certain, but not in all regions 
and the overall activity had resulted in financial losses over many years. One 
of the reasons why they had not been successful were certain surgical 
techniques required for their product that were not accepted by country 3 
physicians. The second reason was the fluctuation in the sales staff and in 
sales management. However Toni thinks that the main reason was the failure 
to systematically build up the business in a disciplined way.  
After 5-6 unsuccessful years with the country sales organization Toni and his 
central marketing team had taken the initiative to name a central product 
manager who analyzed their market and healthcare environment for SBU 3b 
products. Toni believes that this was the initial trigger of the ‘CombiTeam 
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project’, that was later put in place to redress the unsatisfactory situation. 
They then identified geographical clusters in country 3 around a certain 
specific indication and surgical user group. Every cluster was defined by a 
number of hospitals and 2 sales reps who were supposed to work together 
and support and fill in for each other. In order to differentiate from the mass 
market, they identified a dedicated product range for this user group including 
‘door-opening products’. They also identified within the local organization 
people they thought capable of pursuing such an approach that Toni refers to 
as ‘plan your work and work your plan’ where an original plan needs to be 
maintained over a period of time in spite of daily business and obstacles. 
Toni believes that this takes a very structured personality, particularly for the 
sales manager, and he also believed that not all of the team in country 3 had 
this kind of personality. They then presented this to the local general 
manager in country 3, George. George had agreed to the idea, however he 
had immediately pointed out that besides SBU 3b he also needed to find a 
solution for SBU 3a, so essentially he added those products to the cluster 
concept. Also, George identified the manager of SBU team 3a as the right 
person to lead this new concept. Toni summarizes that the objectives of the 
responsible sales and marketing director Keith was to combine the two SBUs 
to become profitable, successfully establish the cluster concept, multiply the 
cluster concept and then again separate the two SBUs. Toni does not believe 
that the (re)separation of the two SBUs in the end will be a problem, as every 
cluster is covered by two sales people who support and fill in for each other. 
Over time individual product preferences and skills can be identified and the 
people can be divided in separate teams. For the time being, Toni is happy 
with the way the project has evolved. He sees the critical success factors in 
developing a sufficient critical mass to sustain specialist sales people in very 
specialized markets, instead of general mass markets. 
Adam, the central marketing head for SBU 3a recalls that in country 3 the 
team responsible for his products had not worked profitably for an extended 
period of time. The decision by the local country organization to combine 
product areas SBU 3a and 3b into one selling team, the ‘CombiTeam’ 
project, according to Adam led to a team configuration unique in the medical 
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device world. The main idea was to reduce cost with a shared sales team by 
reducing the overall headcount and thus achieving a positive financial result. 
The central organization for SBU 3b was involved only at a very late stage of 
the project when it had already become an accomplished fact. There had 
then been a productive meeting with the country 3 managers and the support 
for the project by the central SBU 3b managers was defined. Adam states: 
‘We approached this with little emotion as country 3 at the time did not give a 
positive contribution to our result. … And I consider the risk that this will 
develop into a recipe of success for other countries as very low.’xvii 
To him, although it represents a major market, country 3 is of little interest, as 
it has relatively low sales, no profits and no substantial growth perspective 
within the 2015 planning horizon. He names some European countries with 
much smaller market volumes where sales and profits are much higher, even 
with smaller selling teams. 
Although Adam is not very enthusiastic about this project, he appreciates that 
by the end of year one, the losses had been stopped and additional 
investments in the selling structure could be made. Toni remembers that they 
were very happy about the fact that the country 3 team announced that they 
intended to work on certain indication specific product approaches, but they 
were unpleasantly surprised when they were confronted with the intention of 
combining SBU 3b products with other product lines that had nothing to do 
with them. Serving different selling points, customers who worked in the 
same hospital but did not even know each other. He also recalls that his 
colleague Adam from SBU 3a felt the same way. But lastly they had to 
accept that this was necessary to eliminate losses. 
When asked why the result was negative in the first place, he identifies 
fluctuation in the sales team and in sales management as the main reason. 
Also he believes that country 3 is a difficult market for SBU 3a as all, 
essentially American, major competitors consider it a European key market 
and at the same time pricing is heavily regulated and the overall pricing level 
thus relatively low.  
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Marc, a central product manager for SBU 3a, states that the price 
deterioration for their products, forced by the local health system, was the 
main reason for the profitability problems in country 3. Also, a local 
competitor with significant market shares engaged in price dumping at the 
point that they were no longer competitive and they had to abandon certain 
product lines. His main critique of the local organization is that they 
overemphasized the pricing issue and were not very resourceful in identifying 
other ways to convince customers. 
Concerning the CombiTeam project, Marc points out the difficulty for the new 
sales force of dealing with completely different disciplines that, aside of being 
located in the same hospital, have nothing else in common. So the sales reps 
have no understanding of the respective new customer group they need to 
cover and no prior relationships. ‘You start over again. It’s not congruent, it 
does not fit together. Even if you try to sugarcoat it, it does not really fit 
together.’ xviii  On the other hand, Marc understands the necessity of the 
program and he acknowledges that it was well planned and carried out by the 
local organization. Also he admits that they have never tried anything like this 
before and that the project deserves its chance. 
Local view point 
George, the general manager of the HospiMed subsidiary in country 3, 
considers himself to be the initiator of the CombiTeam project. Both the 
selling teams for SBU 3a and 3b were producing losses and they decided to 
reduce the resources by combining the two selling teams while keeping the 
same sales level. George thinks that the project was ‘…well prepared, well 
communicated and well delivered.’ Before presenting it to the two central 
SBU Heads he had communicated it to and had obtained approval from the 
central senior vice president of sales as well as the CEO from SurgiSupplies. 
Then the implementation process was initiated ‘…which meant that to 
communicate this within our organization and rewrite job descriptions and 
then basically defining, you know, the goals and objectives and to move on 
and to do it.’ 
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George points out that the central SBU heads initially had reservations about 
the program and it was agreed that the two SBUs in country 3 would be 
separated again, once both product groups had reached a critical mass in the 
new structure. 
Sean, formerly manager of the SBU 3a team was given the opportunity to 
become the sales manager of the CombiTeam. Sean identifies the major 
inefficiencies of the former two sales teams with traveling substantial 
distances and covering large numbers of hospitals. He believed his objective 
to be to ‘identify the best pathway and the best utilization of the products and 
the resource that we have, to make both business divisions operate more 
efficiently.’ His first goal was to establish a 5 year business plan in which he 
believes to have incorporated all relevant marketing strategies and activities 
provided by the central SBU managers for both product groups. They then 
also visited the central SBU managers to present them with this plan. After 
Sean and one of his colleagues had identified the products and the sales 
people they wanted in the new team, they informed the people concerned 
and asked their feed-back in order to gain their ‘buy-in’. Sean believes that 
the first year has already proven the concept to work as sales for the two 
individual SBUs and thus also for the combined activity showed double-digit 
growth and the losses were stopped. In order to focus the sales team, less 
than 10 focus products were defined that had short selling cycles and that 
needed to show either high sales value or high profit margins. The sales reps 
were focused on few target hospitals that represented geographic clusters 
and could be visited efficiently with limited traveling time. 
Keith is responsible for a number of SBUs in country 3 as a sales and 
marketing director. He sees himself as the initial driving force behind the 
project as the negative results in the teams for SBUs 3a and b had, in spite of 
both being small organizations, negatively affected his overall results in a 
significant way. His intention was to take cost down by taking a number of 
people out and to make the remaining sales people more efficient. 
Concerning the choice of products to sell, in addition to the selection criteria 
already named by Sean, Keith points out the similarity of required selling 
 
111
skills achieved by focusing on implantable devices. ‘Despite the fact that they 
are from different SBUs, the selling process, i.e. an implantable device, to an 
implanting clinician is the same.’ 
Keith believes that a key factor of success was to visit both central SBU 
heads individually twice over a period of 6 months and to ensure their ‘buy-in’ 
into the project. The central senior vice president of sales joined both first 
meetings to act as a moderator. 
Staff turn-over and loyalty 
Staff loyalty is seen as a key to long-term success, because the customers 
are looking for a stable environment concerning their medical device 
purchases with companies, and sales people they can trust in. In country 3 
the sales forces, particularly for SBU 3a were so small that the departure of 
few sales people factually meant the end of the team. Central managers 
have no influence on the selection of local staff. Product ranges requiring 
higher skill levels from sales and marketing staff might lead to higher staff 
loyalty over the years and loyal staff members seem to manage to develop 
long-term relationships with the headquarters, reducing the number of conflict 
situations. 
Sales management practice 
Local managers think that while customer planning, sales call rotation and 
sales figure reporting can be standardized within the company, the format 
and content of activity reporting of the sales people should be left to the 
individual sales managers, as the product lines and situations are very 
different. Reassuring, motivating and educating the sales team concerning 
the reorganization during the CombiTeam project was seen as essential by 
local managers. 
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Delegation 
More mature sales people can be allowed to work quite autonomously, being 
monitored mostly according to their sales figures. Some SBUs allow 
employing less mature sales people who then on the other hand need more 
guidance and supervision in their activities. This might be related to the 
contact with different purchasing decision makers for different SBUs, as 
implantable devices tend to be selected by surgeons while consumables are 
mostly chosen by hospital administrators and OR supervisors. 
Brand awareness and market share 
Different statements, particularly from local managers, suggest that the 
competitive strength of the products lines 3a and 3b from a point of view of 
relative market share, adaptation of the products and pricing is relatively 
weak in country 3. This leads to conflicts between the central managers, who 
are trying to push the local managers to sell their respective products and the 
local managers who need to select resource efficient products. 
The high complexity of the product portfolio presents challenges on different 
hierarchy levels. Managers responsible for multiple SBUs might not 
understand every market segment in appropriate depth to be able to 
challenge the recommendations of their subordinate specialized managers. 
Sales people who are confronted with products from multiple and different 
indication areas, like in the CombiTeam project, might be overburdened by 
the amount of detailed knowledge necessary to sell them successfully. On 
the other hand, having too many specialized sales teams might not always 
allow to reach a critical team size. There seems to be a contradiction in the 
proclaimed willingness of the company to focus its efforts, and a reality of 
further developing products in ever more detailed segments and niches. 
Central managers are said to have in mind solely the success of their 
individual SBUs and not enough the welfare of the entire company. Both 
central SBU heads independently suggest to organize strategic workshops to 
work on the identification of cross-SBU portfolio synergies. 
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Cultural differences 
The different national cultures were, with few exceptions, not pointed out as 
having an importance on the headquarters – subsidiary relationship, 
sometimes it was perceived that culture was used as a ‘dummy argument’ to 
justify certain local issues. The attitude towards certain SBUs seemed to 
more depend on the personal experiences and likings of the subsidiary 
managers. From a central SBU point of view the relationship seems to be 
largely defined by the business opportunity that an individual subsidiary 
represents for the field of the individual central managers. 
 
4.3.2 Effects of Decentralization and Delegation  
The summarized and coded interview data for organizational factors 
concerning country 3 can be found in Annex 3.3.2.  
Decentralization 
While SurgiSupplies’ competitors are believed to have very pronounced 
central control, allowing for world-wide product launches and marketing 
activities, central managers at SurgiSupplies have limited control over the 
subsidiaries and need to rely on persuasion with no possibility to apply 
pressure. This is attributed to the high degree of divisionalization of the 
company. There seems to be a particular difference with the American 
competitors as to the much higher pressure concerning the achievement of 
ambitious financial objectives set by the headquarters. 
During the times with dissatisfactory sales and financial results for SBUs 3a 
and 3b in country 3 the relationships with the respective headquarters 
departments somewhat degraded, but suggestions from the headquarters for 
improvement always included even bigger investments.  
In earlier days, when SurgiSupplies started to work with a larger number of 
subsidiaries, these subsidiaries supposedly were completely autonomous in 
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their local decisions and there was little support from the headquarters. Only 
with time the organization had built up knowledge about managing a large 
number of international subsidiaries. 
Central strategies, such as the divisional guideline obliging all subsidiaries to 
invest and develop market shares in the core business SBU 3b, are enforced 
very inconsequently. SBU 3b for example is clearly not a focus area for 
country 3, as local managers believe that other SBUs are more resource 
efficient and promise a better return on investment here. 
Some inconsequent behaviors are observed by central managers in certain 
subsidiaries, where non-performing sales people are kept on the teams 
instead of exchanging them. Interestingly both central SBU heads speak of a 
pronounced ‘need for harmony’ in this context that they had not observed in 
other companies. Adam does not believe that adding an additional central 
department such as the new central sales department will allow the 
SurgiSupplies management to change this. 
Inconsistencies between the different divisions, such as different 
geographical breakdown of the sales regions seem to be hindering central 
control. Also, it is being suggested that the top managers who attend the 
local subsidiary surveillance boards need to be trained on the strategic 
planning and reporting tools in order to understand and support strategies 
pursued by central managers in lower hierarchy levels. 
Local managers recognize the importance of central strategies and 
understand that local strategies must be derived from them. On the other 
hand they see a need for a lot of local autonomy and flexibility in order to 
adapt to the local situation.  
While the matrix organization seems to work reasonably well within the 
functions of the headquarters, the definition of the interaction of people on an 
international level might not be sufficiently clear. 
Another problem is the lacking central influence on enforcement of 
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appropriate local expense levels to ensure global financial performance. 
George, reversely points out that concerning local cost issues the 
headquarters frequently increase transfer prices for certain product groups 
substantially at too short notice. While he understands that this has no impact 
on the global consolidated corporate financial result, it creates problems with 
local tax authorities due to international profit reallocation and it also 
undermines the financial planning of the subsidiary.  
Influence of central managers on local strategies 
Central and local managers alike state that the headquarters do not get 
involved in and have no influence on the operational strategy of country 3. 
Central managers have less information about the market situation and 
cannot evaluate it as well as the local team. Both sides find that at present 
the central role essentially lies in providing products and product related 
training. One of the central managers would prefer to have direct disciplinary 
control over the SBU 3a activities in some of the larger countries while he 
considers the current set-up to be adequate for the smaller countries. Some 
countries pursue activities incompatible with the global SBU 3a strategy, 
such as hiring sales teams for non-focus product areas without informing the 
central headquarters, let alone consulting with them. 
The central managers appreciate the fact that a central sales department has 
been created in order to gain more influence on the subsidiaries. On the 
other hand they believe that it has not yet really established itself. The 
division of responsibilities between this department, the central SBU 
departments and the local subsidiaries are still unclear. The planning and 
reporting systems installed by the new sales department are not well 
understood and enforced and these tools by themselves are seen to only 
create additional bureaucracy without resolving the underlying issues. 
Adam says his sole influence on the countries is to provide good new 
products, good service and reasonable transfer pricing for the local 
subsidiaries to be successful. When asked if he would like to have more 
influence on the subsidiaries, he points out that in the domestic market the 
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sales force responsible for SBU 3a products is under his disciplinary control 
and that this has been very successful in the past. He could imagine having 
the same setup for a selection of other countries, but only the one’s where a 
major direct sales force is already in place. In his opinion this would not hurt 
the general setup of the SurgiSupplies organization, as his customer group is 
very distinct and more or less exclusively relevant for the SBU 3a. For 
smaller or less developed countries he believes the grouping of sales 
responsibility for all SBUs to be efficient. As opposed to some other SBUs 
who are in his opinion trying to stay as independent as possible, Adam 
believes that it is very important to make use of all synergistic effects such as 
e.g. logistics and controlling etc. 
In one example a country was investing in a non-focus product group without 
his knowledge and against the company strategy: ‘We know the people in 
that country ..., but we have hardly any influence on the structure. All of a 
sudden there are three more people, because they want to get into (a 
specific product segment), that isn’t even part of our strategy. It’s not the 
point to check who comes at 8 or 9 o’clock in the morning, that’s not our 
responsibility.’xix 
The central sales department does not seem to play any role in country 3, 
aside the involvement of the senior vice president of sales during the initial 
negotiations concerning the CombiTeam project. The local managers do not 
seem to see the necessity for their involvement in country 3 and believe it is 
more important for smaller and emerging countries. 
Concerning the central sales department, Adam appreciates this initiative to 
gain more central influence, on the other hand he does not believe that this 
can be ‘achieved solely by additional paperwork’. Toni believes that the new 
central sales department is still in its orientation phase and that the 
differentiation of central marketing activities and central sales activities is not 
yet optimal and that there are certain redundancies of activities and 
responsibilities. In particular he believes that the ultimate decision making 
power should stay with the local managers, as they have the best knowledge 
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of the local situation. Central sales should then have more of a external 
consulting function. 
Much like George he could imagine a situation where central sales managers 
would spend an extended period of time in subsidiaries (he talks of several 
weeks) with problems of challenges, in order to set up road maps to redress 
such situations.  
Marc, the central product manager for SBU 3a, says that he must respect the 
conclusions of country 3 concerning the CombiTeam project as he does not 
have any every day experience with the local situation and the customers. 
When asked about his involvement with the definition of local country 
strategies, he acknowledges that in many countries he is not involved at all.  
Concerning the CombiTeam project, Toni very much appreciated that a very 
detailed development and activity plan had been formulated, that gave him 
and his colleagues the impression that the local team was sincere about the 
project. He has also observed that Sean, the responsible sales manager, has 
been consequently pursuing every point in the activity plan. 
Local view point 
Sean is convinced that the central product managers are well aware of and 
appreciate the newly developed country 3 product focus strategy. He 
underlines that everyone agrees that once a critical mass has been attained, 
that the two activities of SBU 3a and 3b need to be once again separated. 
Sean is proud of having developed excellent relationships with his central 
counterparts in the course of the CombiTeam project, as this gave him the 
opportunity to be in regular contact with them. He also says that he visits the 
SBU head offices quite regularly for international product meetings and 
trainings. 
Keith who is Sean’s manager agrees with this view of having openly and 
successfully communicated with the headquarters about the CombiTeam 
project. He points out the additional importance of permanent communication 
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with the HR department concerning change of job roles etc. 
There however had been verbal and documented resistance to the project, 
mostly from the head office of SBU 3a, who initially were ‘less than positive’ 
about it, while SBU 3b had ‘much more positive enthusiasm.’ 
On the other hand Keith says that no one from the headquarters gets 
personally involved in or influences the actual local planning and he thinks 
that this is the right way, as he considers being granted local implementation 
autonomy a motivational factor. He believes that the headquarters is well 
ensuring their role with strong R&D and a good product related training 
program. 
George indicates that his organization has not had a lot of contact with the 
new central sales department from the headquarters. He believes that his 
managers are so well connected with the central SBU marketing 
organizations, that they do not need any additional support or liaison person. 
Also he speculates that this new department might not have enough 
capacities to really work with all individual countries and might focus on 
individual problem situations.  
Keith agrees with George that the impact of the Central Sales Department in 
country 3 has been minimal, and that it might not even be useful at all in 
developed countries with developed SurgiSupplies subsidiaries like the one 
in country 3, as they are already well connected to central activities. ‘We 
consider ourselves to be totally integrated to the activities of SurgiSupplies 
headquarters, as I mentioned, both in terms of training, and reporting etc.’ He 
thinks such central sales activities are more necessary in new subsidiaries in 
emerging markets.  
Short term risk-averse local strategies 
Local general managers might be motivated to establish and maintain as 
many SBUs and product groups as possible in their respective countries in 
order to diversify the financial risk and also to establish good relationships 
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with as many as possible central managers from different departments to 
support them personally in their career. Central managers believe that the 
local product strategies are very short-lived and depend on short-term 
business opportunities. 
Competition between SBUs 
There seems to be a consensus that there are not enough resources to 
invest in all SBUs in an optimal way and that struggles and conflicts over the 
allocation of the scarce resources are inherent to the divisionalized matrix 
organization. 
 
4.3.3 Activities and Tools to Improve Central Control 
Motivating and committing all local hierarchy levels 
George remembers that the SBU heads initially had reservations concerning 
the CombiTeam project, that sales people would get overwhelmed and 
confused by handling products from the two different SBUs. Also they where 
worrying that the organization would ‘lose the focus and that the whole 
business gets more and more diluted without a clear drive and strategy.’ He 
therefore believes that it was crucial to visit them and to convince them about 
the necessity and the professional roll out of the project and then to keep 
them updated regularly on the implementation in review meetings. On the 
other hand to keep the door open to separate the two activities again in the 
future.  
Local field support 
Sean thinks that one of the most important tasks for him in the course of the 
CombiTeam project was the development of a comprehensive training plan 
for the sales force to understand their products and the related medical 
indications. The central product managers were involved in designing but 
also in delivering the training to the local sales force in country 3. Sean 
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believes that the central product managers have a good appreciation and 
understanding of the different individual country situations and they take the 
local suggestions well into consideration. His impression is that this is true 
not only for country 3 but also for many other country organizations. On the 
other hand he thinks that the CombiTeam project might have helped him to 
develop a privileged relationship. 
Long-term personal relationships 
For the communication with the central headquarters, George thinks that 
long-term personal relationships between the local sales and marketing 
managers and their central marketing counterparts are essential. He believes 
that this is very well the case in his organization and that there is an 
‘extensive exchange’. There is only one SBU where he believes the 
relationships are not that good, as the person traditionally responsible had 
taken other responsibilities and another person had had a long sick leave, 
and so the relationship had degraded with central marketing. He also thinks 
that the central involvement, e.g. frequency of visits to country 3 varies from 
SBU to SBU. He believes that central managers need to be well informed 
about resources and knowledge levels available in the subsidiaries.  
Keith has the impression that his team has very good relationships and 
efficient cooperation with the divisional headquarters. He believes that this is 
due to the long term experience of the various product and sales managers 
on the local as well as on the central side and the mutual trust that they have 
developed over the years. He believes that the same is true for the 
customers, the implanting surgeons. ‘We want people implanting products 
from us for rather 25 years. The whole of their implanting career, you know, 
we want them to be implanting products from us, so in summary I think it 
works well because we have long term trust.’ 
Keith also believes that his organization has a similar culture as the 
headquarters and that this is cultivated in a positive way for example in the 
annual international division meeting. 
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Strategic meetings with multiple local and central hierarchy level involvement 
Local view point 
As mentioned above, George is convinced that regular institutionalized 
meetings of the divisional board members and the managing directors of the 
leading countries would be beneficial as the board members are not always 
aware of recurrent operational problems resulting from corporate activities. 
George also believes that the new central sales department could have an 
important role in communicating such organizational issues, that are not part 
of the daily business to the divisional boards. ‘Well to understand, and at 
least to establish a kind of thinking process that, before making a decision to 
really think what implication a certain decision might have for a different legal 
entity.’ 
George regrets that the practice of having regular meetings between the 
SurgiSupplies executive board and the most important subsidiary managers 
or regional heads had been abandoned some years ago. ‘At that time I think 
there was a very close exchange on top management level. Now, I think we 
lost that a little-bit when we decided to go into annual meetings on a bigger 
scale. Because there you have a hundred or a hundred and fifty people 
sitting in a room and you do not have this, let’s say, strategic discussions and 
opportunities to discuss strategic topics.’ 
George is very eager to point out that the top managers of important 
subsidiaries should also be involved in the creation of global strategy and 
that regular meetings with the central divisional top managers are essential. 
He gives the positive example of a recent meeting between central managers 
from R&D, Marketing, Sales as well as executive managers and important 
country managers, who sat together to define the future strategy for one 
specific SBU together. He points out that this kind of exchange is much more 
organized and frequent in other divisions of HospiMed, in comparison to 
SurgiSupplies.  
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Strategic sales development workshops 
Marc and the central SBU 3a team are presently trying to develop explicit 
country strategies for a very promising innovation with the potential of 
becoming a ‘block-buster’. The aim is to improve the cooperation between 
the SBU central head office and the focused subsidiaries concerning the 
promotional activities for this product. They are organizing individual country 
meetings including all relevant local and central sales and marketing 
managers. They have also addressed a questionnaire to these subsidiaries 
to determine the individual country situation, what has already been achieved 
and what are the mid-term plans of the subsidiary concerning the 
development of this particular product group.  
Marc has had very different experiences with this approach. With two country 
organizations, including the domestic sales team, they had very creative 
discussions and came up with a sales commitment, an investment plan, and 
an agreement about activities and who would contribute which resources. 
The situation with this new product is very different concerning regulatory 
approvals, reimbursements, but also concerning the local presence of 
SurgiSupplies in terms of sales and marketing staff and market shares. Also 
the awareness level of the new product is very different from country to 
country. While some subsidiaries have run extensive Marketing campaigns 
and the product is already in routine use, others have not even started basic 
Marketing activities. In some countries Marc thinks the organization and the 
branding of HospiMed and SurgiSupplies are just too weak to force a major 
innovation into the market on a large scale. 
Still, Marc and his colleagues were able to initiate certain activities with these 
country meetings and follow-up meetings are now being scheduled. 
Generally speaking, Marc believes that the central team for SBU 3b is 
understaffed and that they therefore cannot support even the top 12 to 15 
focus countries sufficiently with such an ambitious project. He points out that 
every meeting generates additional activities and workload, not only in the 
local subsidiary but also in the main office, in addition to the existing daily 
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business. Marc therefore thinks they would need additional people to cover 
such strategic cooperation with the country organizations. 
Expatriate / compatriot managers 
George has observed that, in contrast to other HospiMed divisions, 
interesting international positions at the SurgiSupplies headquarters are not 
announced to the international subsidiaries. He points out that country 3 has 
an identified pool of talented young managers who might be qualified and 
interested in such positions. Another HospiMed division, driven by their 
senior vice president of Marketing and Sales, emphasizes expatriate 
experience much more than SurgiSupplies and a large portion of their 
international managers have at least 2 or 3 years of such experience. A 
number of managers from this division had worked in the country 3 
subsidiary in local Marketing and Sales positions for 2 years and then went 
back to the headquarters where they were assigned international 
responsibility. This experience has allowed all of them to relate much better 
to local organizations and their issues. With SurgiSupplies such exchange 
programs are not institutionalized but can happen only with particular 
initiatives of individuals or their managers. Also, George believes that 
SurgiSupplies does not value the expatriate experience sufficiently. He gives 
the example of one young employee from the SurgiSupplies central 
headquarters, who spent several years at the country 3 subsidiary, where he 
substantially widened his perspective. When he went back he returned to his 
old job at a relatively low hierarchy level, where he could not make use of the 
additional experience he had gained. George believes this to be demotivating 
and puts people at risk of leaving the company. 
George questions if the principle of having a permanent overall central sales 
manager is the right approach at all, as even highly qualified and motivated 
people ‘cannot be everywhere at the same time’. Rather he suggests highly 
specialized experts who could be expatriated for 3 to 6 months to countries 
with crisis situations or special projects, like for example the CombiTeam 
project. ‘But, I think maybe, maybe the word global sales might be not the 
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correct way. I think what maybe the group needs are people who can be sent 
into certain countries as maybe interim managers and help a local 
organization to get out of a strategic issue or an operational issue they have. 
And prepare them, the organization so a local person can take over. So, 
maybe ‘Global Sales’ is not the right word I think, if somebody would come 
here and talk to our sales managers, (like a) ‘Business Angel’’ He points out 
that such kinds of positions are common at competitors such as Johnson & 
Johnson and Smith & Nephew. 
Communication of global strategic orientation 
Local view point 
Concerning the matrix organization, Keith is happy about how the 
organizational chart is updated and sent to all responsible people regularly. 
Much like George, he believes that the local product managers are well 
connected and work closely together with their corresponding SBU 
headquarters. He also appreciates the supporting information and reporting 
systems from headquarters that he considered very useful. 
Strategic planning and reporting systems 
Adam generally supports the creation of the central sales department. 
However he warns that additional reporting tools will not have any impact if 
they are not accepted and enforced. 
Toni generally speaking appreciates the new reporting tools. On the other 
hand he shares George’s skepticism as he thinks that the success of 
reporting tools is the adoption in the organization. ‘Well, when (the resource 
allocation plan) and (the performance indicators) point in a certain direction, 
but in the local surveillance boards there are people who do not know these 
things, or would like to go in a different direction, then this will not work. 
Because the local responsible manager needs to present the bill to his board. 
That’s the bottom line. And then all (resource allocation plans) can be on the 
table, and he presents himself to the board, and they say the results are 
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dissatisfactory, do something, then any (resource allocation plan) will be 
abandoned.’xx 
Local view point 
George, who is the general manager of the country 3 subsidiary, at the same 
time ensures a regional head function for a number of countries in the same 
region. George essentially appreciates certain tools such as the resource 
allocation plan and the key performance indicator report when he has his 
review meetings with the other countries in his region as a regional head. 
These tools then give him an easy overview about the status of the different 
SBUs in the various countries as a basis of discussion. On the other hand, as 
a general manager for country 3, he believes the tools to have no added 
value, as the level of detail is low and the information is already available in 
other reports, such as the local marketing plans. He points out that the 
marketing plans for country 3 are very detailed and professional and include 
all the performance indicators, such as new target accounts, new key opinion 
leaders etc., that the reporting tools from central are asking for, essentially 
doubling the administrative effort. He admits that these new reporting 
systems are ‘not greatly adapted’ in his organization. George believes that 
many of the reports that are demanded by the headquarters are filed away 
without being analyzed and thus are probably not really needed, or central 
people do not have the capacity to read reports coming in from dozens of 
subsidiaries. 
‘…I’m very protective of our people here, that there are not too many reports 
they have to fill out, send back and they are filed, … just to tick that country 3 
has responded.’ 
Keith, the SurgiSupplies division manager for country 3, is less critical of the 
new reports, which he finds rather easy to use and useful. He believes that 
more complex information systems in today’s world are normal and useful. 
He also thinks that certain standard reporting tools, such as the CRM system 
should be standardized in the company. He thinks that local CRM system 
they are using at present is very poor and is not well adopted in the country 3 
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subsidiary, so he is looking forward to a new centralized version. He also 
points out in that context that some of the important implant customers and 
key opinion leaders have personal contact and relationships with central 
marketing managers, so the internationalization of customer information is 
important to him. He is quick to point out that the CRM system should not 
become a ‘policing’ instrument to control the activities of the sales people. He 
believes that the culture in country 2 is to give people objectives and let them 
accomplish them independently, instead of monitoring them closely. He 
acknowledges that this may be different in other countries.  
Geographical focus in order to deal with limited resources 
As there had only been funds available for a team of one manager and 4 
sales people, in Toni’s opinion it would have been necessary to focus on 
small geographical areas instead of trying to cover all of country 3. ‘You 
obviously need to build geographic and temporal focal points. And where you 
go you need to have at least the same power as competition, otherwise it will 
get difficult. …We went there, we had initial successes in the region of the 
main office. That lead to customer requests from other parts of the country 
and then we went anywhere calls came from instead of saying, no, we are 
sorry, we cannot cover this right now, we have so much to do here. To 
remain concentrated and disciplined within one cluster, to make this cluster 
successful and then to multiply this model. Yes, but that is somewhat always 
the problem that we also have with other subsidiaries, that they let 
themselves be guided by daily business and the exploitation of any business 
opportunities’xxi 
 
 
4.4 Country 4: Creating a Sales Organization in an Emerging Market 
4.4.1 Situational and Organizational Factors 
The summarized and coded interview data for situational factors concerning 
country 4 can be found in Annex 3.4.1. 
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Specific case context 
In country 4 SurgiSupplies is operating a top 15 selling subsidiary. This 
country is considered an emerging European market. The subsidiary has 
traditionally been involved in all SBUs of SurgiSupplies. The market for SBU 
4 is growing quickly and SBU 4 is a declared focus business area for the 
country 4 subsidiary. Although sales are developing favorably, the 
headquarters managers are under the impression that sales growth is at the 
best keeping up with the extreme market growth and that SurgiSupplies 
market share in SBU 4 in country 4 are stagnating at an average level for 
SurgiSupplies. The sales organization in country 4 holds rank number 13 in 
the SBU 4 country ranking. Sales in this SBU grew substantially at 63% over 
the past 3 years and continued to grow (+18%) in 2011. The market share 
was estimated to be 6% and the market growth was assumed to be about 
7%. 
Interviews were held on the headquarters side with the marketing head of 
SBU 4 (Oliver), a business development manager from SBU 4 working under 
Oliver (Thomas), the central sales director responsible for country 4 at the 
headquarters (Daniel) and the central sales manager working under Daniel 
with country 4 (Harry). On the country 4 subsidiary side only the responsible 
SurgiSupplies divisional manager (William) could be interviewed. 
Thomas has worked with country 4 for SurgiSupplies since 1996. As the 
market is growing rapidly and the formerly strong local manufacturers are 
diminishing, he is somewhat dissatisfied with the fact that SurgiSupplies 
market shares are stagnating. He is convinced that this is due to a general 
lack in local marketing and sales staff. As the country 4 economy and also its 
health sector is growing rapidly there is a strong competition for qualified 
employees and the company is having a hard time recruiting, but also the 
local management is reluctant to allocate financial resources to SBU 4 and 
Thomas thinks that other divisions and SBU have much more marketing staff. 
Although Thomas considers the personal cooperation with all his 
counterparts including the local division manager as good, the work 
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relationship suffers from lacking capacities of the local staff. 
Thomas also thinks that the expectations of the customers in country 4 
hospitals concerning service have been increasing and will in the future 
reach the same level as in traditional industrialized countries. He is 
convinced that the company needs to invest more money in building up and 
educating professional dealer structures and also supplying them with a 
sufficient amount of surgical sets up front to be able to develop their 
business.  
Thomas believes it to be crucial to establish some knowledgeable dealers in 
the main metropolitan areas of country 4. To him this is particularly important 
as all SBU 4 business is channeled via dealers and the demand is very much 
concentrated on few extremely large hospitals in these areas. He believes 
the local staff to agree with his view, as the local division manager has set a 
highly ambitious sales target for the 2015 planning period. Although 
corrective action plans have been agreed by all persons concerned, the 
situation could not be changed over a longer period of time.  
Oliver thinks that country 4 is one of the few countries with a true intention to 
focus their activities on SBU 4. On the other hand he believes that the local 
team is too small to achieve the very ambitious aspired growth rates, 
although the product portfolio in his opinion would allow them to. So he 
assumes that, even though the market growth rate is very high, they will not 
reach their ambitious goals, unless the country managers become aware and 
a major change is initiated. He clearly sees it as the objective of the 
responsible central sales manager to ensure that a professional sales and 
logistics infrastructure is created. Oliver describes this market as volatile and 
depending on the contacts of dealers to political decision makers. Central 
marketing is very satisfied with the cooperation with the local team and even 
has some good personal contacts to local customers and opinion leaders. He 
also thinks that a success factor is the cultural closeness of the country 4 
physicians to their fellows in the domestic country of SurgiSupplies, although 
the American competitors in SBU 4 have long established themselves there.  
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Daniel believes that there is little continuity and sustainability in doing 
business in country 4, in particular since hospital directors change when 
politicians change. He thinks that the only way to win is to convince all 
customers that SurgiSupplies has superior products with marketing activities 
and to deliver service support to the end-user irrespective of the sales 
channel that invoices the product. ‘In the end it needs to be that way, that the 
hospital says, yes, I want SurgiSupplies and I want to have it delivered by 
you, my dealer.’ xxii 
Some product segments are still underdeveloped as country 4 hospital staff 
is still using outdated procedures and technologies. Daniel sees the 
opportunity for SurgiSupplies to promote international standards and to train 
hospital staff accordingly. 
The country is run in a very centralistic way, where government has a major 
say where investments will be allocated to, sometimes leading to paradox 
situations, e.g. with high-class ward rooms but ill-equipped and outdated 
ORs. However, health-care spending now has a high priority, leading to a 
favorable development of this sector. 
William believes that there has not been enough progress made with SBU 4 
in country 4 in the past years due to a lack of general vision and due to 
certain problems with staff members in the management team. 
Market life-cycle 
For SBU 4 a small number of global companies are dominating the world-
market with varying market shares in the different countries. The products 
require a high on site service level and a high up-front investment of the 
supplier to start business with new customers. Markets are differentiated 
mostly according to their growth rates that differ largely according to the 
market life-cycle situation. Besides growth-rates, emerging markets 4 show 
untypical characteristics, such as extremely high and volatile individual 
product consumption of individual customers, higher stocking requirements to 
compensate for inadequacies in the local logistic infrastructure and a 
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comparably low price level. As these extreme specific requirements can 
breach the limits of typical central performance indicators, this can lead to 
conflicts with the central supply chain function. 
The dealers in country 4, while having excellent relationships to the local 
customers and decision makers, are lacking competence in servicing and 
consulting customers concerning medical devices. Specific difficulties of 
SurgiSupplies in country 4 lie in the missing clear product specialization and 
lack of empowerment of local sales and marketing staff and in a high staff 
fluctuation, but also in an unusually high customer fluctuation typical for the 
country 4 market. Also there seems to be a gap concerning the 
professionalism of procedures between the headquarters and the country 4 
subsidiary. There are language barriers for central managers as the English 
language is not sufficiently spread throughout country 4. 
Staff turn-over and loyalty 
The subsidiary in country 4 is having difficulty to find adequate staff for SBU 
4. One of the reasons is that HospiMed serves different market segments 
that have different sectoral salary averages for equivalent marketing and 
sales positions and the company has difficulty in paying people differently for 
equivalent positions in different divisions or SBUs. SBU 4 typically has a 
relatively high salary level and therefore top performers can find often find 
higher salaries with other companies. 
Other contextual difficulties 
A way to overcome some of the logistic problems would be to have a local 
manufacturing site, maybe as a joint venture with a local company, an idea 
that has been discussed at SurgiSupplies for many years but without any 
tangible results so far. This would also allow some local key opinion leaders 
in the development and promotion of the products which could further 
ameliorate the overall product acceptance in country 4. As Thomas knows 
the top 10 key opinion leaders in country 4 personally, he is confident that he 
could find cooperation partners. 
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4.4.2 Effects of Decentralization and Delegation 
The summarized and coded interview data for organizational factors 
concerning country 4 can be found in Annex 3.4.2 
Decentralization 
In order to improve central control and alignment with the subsidiaries, a 
planning process for resource allocation had been established and applied 
for the first time. But even with a lengthy planning process, and discussions 
involving all hierarchy levels, it was not possible to agree between central 
and local managers on how investment budgets should be allocated and the 
subsidiary was once again given a certain investment budget and overall 
financial objectives and the freedom to use the resources according to their 
own judgment. Interestingly, the local division manager still believed such a 
procedure to be good and necessary even after the dissatisfactory first time 
experience. 
For central marketing managers on the other hand these investment or 
disinvestment decisions seem to be crucial for the success of their product 
lines in any given country. And the way these decisions are taken locally 
often remains ominous to them. The local managers sometimes seem to be 
too optimistic concerning the necessary time to reach return on investment. 
Investments therefore might be abandoned too quickly, if sales results do not 
show fast enough. There are high expectations towards the new central sales 
department to create more transparency and consistency concerning these 
issues. Also, this department is expected to challenge the structure and 
performance of the individual country organizations. It seems to be difficult to 
judge the actual contribution to these objectives that this department has 
achieved so far. 
Influence of central managers on local strategies 
The former central sales manager responsible for country 4 was disillusioned 
 
132
about his and the headquarters’ possibilities to influence the subsidiary 
strategy. He also believes that this company is still very much marked by the 
culture and processes from the times when it was an independent distributor. 
He could not make out a real strategic focus, only quick reaction to short-
term business opportunities. As this subsidiary is quite successful, he is now 
unsure if in emerging high growth markets a very well defined product focus 
strategy even makes sense. The local division manager was too busy with 
day to day work to get involved in the kind of strategic discussions and 
decisions the central manager was trying to achieve and this ultimately 
resulted in conflict. The fact of being a fellow country-man for the local sales 
manager in this case turned out to be ambiguous. While it was an advantage 
for communication, it might have turned out to bring a deficit in respect, 
authority and trust. There seems to be a general perception from the central 
managers that the local managers receive central managers respectfully for 
meetings in their country, but not to worry too much about the results of the 
discussions afterwards.  
Oliver expects of the global sales department to particularly focus on and 
influence such countries that are considered historically successful SBU 4 
subsidiaries, whose success is now slowing down. Sometimes local 
disinvestment decisions are not transparent to him and he believes that it is 
the responsibility of the central sales department to deal with such issues and 
to create more transparency. In the end he believes lacking local growth 
expectations often to be self-initiated by the subsidiaries and that the central 
sales department needs to address this.  
‘I believe that the true support from international sales can only lie in 
accompanying, surveying; accept or also criticize a decision in favor or 
against an SBU or an investment. That would mean for the local gentlemen, 
that they would need to lay open their cards, that this is checked with respect 
to the strategic guidelines and it then needs to be accepted by international 
sales, because only they are capable of judging on all 7 SBUs, whereas, say 
someone from SBU 4 or 5 can only lament about things but does not have 
any possibility to really influence anything.’ xxiii  
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On the other hand, Oliver would wish for the central sales department to 
critically question the operative sales structure and procedures in the 
subsidiaries, but he considers this to be difficult, given the high local 
autonomy. ‘ … this is really the expertise that needs to come from sales, ‚how 
are you structured?, what is your cost structure?’, or sometimes ‚how do you 
distribute your expenses?‘, also in this area there are sometimes erratic 
developments. And in this I really expect global sales to be a kind of sparring 
partner for the local organization. But I believe this to be difficult in view of the 
high autonomy that they have locally and in the end it really depends on the 
acceptance and the diplomatic skills of global sales to really be active there. 
’Do you have a proper internal execution? Do you have a customer service 
that truly deserves the name?’’xxiv 
Generally speaking he also sees the role of central sales in establishing, 
measuring and following up on performance indicators, such as how many 
surgical sets are provided per customer and how many implants are sold per 
each set. 
In some countries he sees a positive development in the past years, but he 
could not say if this has been initiated by central sales or not, in any case he 
could observe that they sometimes were involved. 
Local view point 
William widely appreciates the fact that a central sales department has been 
created. He believes this to be normal and necessary for all international 
companies. On the other hand he thinks that this department is lacking 
clearly defined goals and organizational power to achieve them. But he is 
optimistic that this will develop with time as the relevance of domestic as 
opposed to international sales is declining.´ 
William on the other hand feels that central managers do not sufficiently 
consider his and country 4’s specific requirements and that all strategies are 
largely influenced by the requirements of SurgiSupplies domestic market 
requirements. Generally speaking central managers seem to have difficulty 
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understanding the culture in country 4, particularly with respect to 
communication and decision making. Also the company culture of the country 
4 subsidiary seems to be influenced more by other HospiMed divisions than 
SurgiSupplies’ who historically got involved later with this company. 
 
4.4.3 Activities and Tools to Improve Central Control 
Central managers’ credibility and acceptance 
Harry has recently worked as a central sales manager for country 4 for a 
period of 9 months. As a native of this country he speaks its language even 
though he has been living abroad for many years. He considered this a big 
advantage in his dealings with the local staff. His understanding of this job 
was to define strategies and objectives together with the local division 
manager and to help implement these plans, visiting the subsidiary about 
twice every months for at least one day. During these visits he had meetings 
with the local division manager and the local marketing managers. He recalls 
that these meetings were difficult, as the division manager always was 
following daily business at the same time, with frequent interruptions by 
phone calls etc. The cooperation started well until he had a confrontation with 
the local division manager over a report that in spite of many reminders, 
William always avoided doing. When Harry got pushy about this report, 
because his superiors at the headquarter demanded it from him, William got 
upset and as of then the situation was more difficult, not only with William but 
also with the rest of the team. Retrospectively Harry believes that he took this 
report too seriously and he could have avoided this situation by filling it out 
himself in a superficial way. 
Expatriate / compatriot managers 
Daniel says that Harry who, recently had the position of central sales 
manager for country 4 for a short period of time, met a lot of resistance by the 
local organization as he tried to initiate changes and tried to personally 
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generate business opportunities with customers. Harry is originally from 
country 4 but has been living abroad for many years. 
‘…he believed to virtually be the re-inventor of the bicycle in country 4. And 
that will earn him confrontation, that is clear. Because they do not really play 
with open cards and they also evidently say, we do not need a former 
compatriot to teach us arithmetics, or selling, or the ABCs. While from his 
approach Harry saw things correctly, you cannot change all that from one 
day to another’.xxv 
Also, Daniel speculates that country 4 staff felt spied upon, as unlike most 
other people from central, Harry understood their native language. 
Thomas thinks that the fact that Harry is a fellow-countryman of the country 4 
staff in the end was rather to his disadvantage. He thinks that it did not allow 
him to be seen as an outside authority. ‘He is really one of us but now he 
thinks he knows everything better and tells us what to do.’ xxvi 
In Daniel’s experience, central staff regardless of their position or hierarchy, 
are always welcome, but when they have left, the local managers do what 
they want anyway. The only way to deal with this is to document all decisions 
and to constantly remind and question the implementation. In his opinion, 
local staff even expects this kind of behavior from central managers. 
Harry also points out that hardly any of the local sales and marketing people 
ever comes to the headquarters, so that most people do not even know and 
have little contact with the mother company. In his opinion their only 
expectation of the headquarters is to deliver products in a timely manner. 
Visits from central managers and their coaching or consulting attempts are 
not taken seriously and also they try to avoid sharing too much local 
information. 
Local view point 
William sees the role of the headquarters in identifying the international 
market needs and supplying products that represent major technological 
 
136
innovations accordingly. He believes that there is an imbalance concerning 
expectations by central marketing managers and their effort to collect the 
opinions of local managers about their market requirements. 
He however has noted the beginning of a change in mind-set in the 
company. HospiMed had launched a training program for all marketing staff 
world-wide by an external internationally leading marketing academic. In the 
course of this program, people were asked to perform in-depth market 
research. ‘…some people…realized that the own opinion, the (domestic) 
view, is not the only one, and if talking about (the) United States, China, 
Brazil, Russia it could be absolutely different.’ 
Local field support 
Oliver sees the role of the business development function in providing a basic 
service to the local countries in terms of guidance, training and surgical set 
supplies in the launch phase of new products, as well as courses and 
fellowships for the local physicians. He generally believes all of this to work 
quite well in his organization. He considers his business development 
manager for country 4 to be a particular connoisseur of this region, a fact that 
is not true for many other regions.  
A major part of Thomas’ strategy is to work with country 4 physicians who are 
well connected to the government and are considered national key opinion 
leaders and to establish scientific and educational exchange programs with 
opinion leaders from the domestic country of SurgiSupplies, or maybe also 
with other important users of SurgiSupplies products world-wide. Another 
important activity for him is to organize training events for dealer reps and 
medical professionals. But this is to him more difficult in country 4 than in 
subsidiaries in other countries due to lacking support from the local marketing 
team. 
Daniel thinks that the cooperation between the headquarters and the country 
4 subsidiary is good, particularly in SBU 4 where he believes that Thomas, 
the responsible central business development manager is doing a very good 
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job with a lot of personal commitment. Thomas is arranging many foreign 
opinion leaders to come to country 4 and convince local physicians of 
SurgiSupplies products. Interestingly Daniel is of the impression that such 
commercial leads that are initiated by central managers are often not 
followed-up appropriately. ‘I get the impression, that one person initiates 
something and then it is not followed-up because it was initiated from the 
headquarters and they do not see it as their own Baby. But we are serving 
them a new customer on a silver platter, who would just need to be taken 
care of.’ xxvii 
Long-term personal relationships 
Daniel points out that in country 4 personal relationships are particularly 
important. He gives the example that a customer would still buy from an old 
school friend, even if he lived far away and could not provide any service, 
meaning that if the hospital director changed, the new one would buy from a 
different person he had a good relationship with. 
Unlike in developed countries, most of SurgiSupplies’ sales and marketing 
staff in country 4 are physicians or nurses. This allows them to have a good 
customer network, as many of their customers are former colleagues or 
fellow-students. In Harry’s experience, the selling activities are more about 
personal relationship and very little product related. 
Communication of global strategic orientation 
Oliver believes that the global strategic decision to primarily invest in two 
core business SBUs was reasonable and has been implemented reasonably 
well in the past years, and that other departments like SBU 4 have been 
respecting this decision.  
Another objective for central sales he sees in sharing success stories and 
best practices among the subsidiaries, e.g. during the annual division 
meeting. 
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Strategic meetings with multiple local and central hierarchy level involvement 
Local view point 
Williams believes that when analyzing the different local markets, some 
clusters of countries with similar market needs could be found. He would like 
to see the managers of such countries work together with headquarters on 
new solutions to what he calls ‘hot topics’.  
Strategic planning and reporting systems 
Local view point 
When asked about his impression about the new planning tools that 
headquarters has recently installed, William similarly states that he is quite 
fine with providing any information about his organization as long as he 
receives feed-back about the outcome. At the moment he does not feel to 
receive such feed-back.  
‘Because we send a lot of information during our whole life, and never 
(receive any) answer, … I mean we do not know the final decision, we do not 
know the final result. It’s hidden somewhere ... . I can feel … some changes 
in the management …, in the internal structure, in approaches in marketing, 
definitely yes. But I do not know, had I some influence to this procedure? My 
contribution is not clear for me. And it … demotivate(s) our employees 
because we cannot show the final result.’  
He gives an example of a hospital that had asked all their employees for 
suggestions of improvement. There had been hundreds of suggestions and 
the hospital had explicitly communicated their decision on each one of them 
and also publicly recognized the best contributions. Although there had been 
no financial rewards the motivational effect had been outstanding for the 
organization. 
Oliver believes that the new investment planning report initiated by the global 
sales department helps communication, but does not have any practical 
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relevance. He believes there is a big difference in what subsidiaries proclaim 
in such reports and what they actually do or what is realistically feasible. 
4.5 Country 5: Working with an Indirect Dealer Sales Force 
4.5.1 Situational and Organizational Factors 
The summarized and coded interview data for situational factors concerning 
country 5 can be found in Annex 3.5.1. 
Specific case context 
The SurgiSupplies organization in the European country 5 is among the top 
10 subsidiaries in sales. The subsidiary has traditionally been involved in all 
SBUs of SurgiSupplies. The specificity here is that, as opposed to most other 
European countries all of which operate direct selling teams, in country 5 the 
vast majority of sales are executed via an indirect sales force of independent 
dealers. The sales organization in country 5 holds country rank 9 for SBU 5a 
and rank 8 for 5b. Sales in both SBUs have been stagnating with even a 
small decline of 3% in SBU 5b over the past 3 years. This decline has 
accelerated in 2011 (-18%). Market shares for both SBUs are similar at 16% 
(5a) and 14% (5b) and both markets are estimated to be presently shrinking 
at 4-6%. 
For two of the two SBUs 5a and 5b, there is only a single person in charge 
for all sales in the entire country. SBU 5a is providing equipment and 
implants for a highly specialized surgical indications while SBU 5b provides 
equipment for a wider spectrum of different surgical indications. 
Interviews were held on the headquarters side with the marketing heads of 
SBU 5a (Brian) and 5b (Charlie), the central sales manager responsible for 
country 5 (Paul) and another central sales manager who had performed a 
major survey concerning SBU 3b in 20 subsidiaries (Claire). On the country 5 
subsidiary side the SurgiSupplies divisional manager (Patrick), a marketing 
and sales manager responsible for multiple SBUs (Larry), and the local sales 
manager (Edward) were interviewed. 
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Brian is the central marketing head for SBU 5a. He explains that the business 
in country 5 has been handled via local dealers for decades. He says the 
business there had its ups and downs over the years and the main influence 
factor to him are the individuals in the different periods who have been 
managing these dealers. To have appropriate people to him is the number 
one success factor for the business. Today he believes to have the right 
people, and he is very satisfied with the situation, even though the business 
is currently difficult due to a general economic crisis in country 5.  
Charlie is the central marketing head for SBU 5b. He says there has been a 
very positive development in country 5 over the years, because the different 
responsible people over the years always had long-term prior experience in 
these products. Generally speaking, Charlie thinks that the structure for SBU 
5b in country 5 is appropriate for a market that is defined by a dealer driven 
sales channel and also the sales level is satisfactory. Over the years country 
5 has always been a top 10, sometimes a top 5 selling country for his SBU. 
Patrick is the division manager in country 5. He states that the objective for 
SBUs 5a and 5b has been for many years to maintain the same annual sales 
level or at most to grow very slowly, but at the same time to ensure a high 
profit. As the markets for these products in country 5 is relatively small he 
does not really see an opportunity to grow sales. Even by entering into a new 
product segment he believes only minor growth could be achieved, although 
he considers all the products to be of high quality. 
There are only two people working to promote the SBU 5a and 5b products. 
There is one local manager, Edward, who is in charge of the marketing and 
sales of these to product lines and his boss Larry. Larry is the Marketing and 
Sales Manager of SBUs 4, 5a and 5b in country 5. He says that Edward 
manages the sales force for SBU 5a and 5b that consists to 70% or dealers 
and to 30% of independent agents himself while Larry is his manager. He 
estimates the total market size for these products in country 5 at about 10 
million Euros. 
The biggest challenge to him for this business is the lack of funding of the 
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distributors in the face of an economic crisis in country 5 that is threatening 
the survival of many of the dealers. So their strategy is to convert some of the 
buying and reselling dealers into commissioned independent sales agents. 
This leads to a major change in the company’s cost structure, as the 
commissions for agents are a cost factor while dealers live of their own 
generated margins at no expense to the manufacturer. Larry thinks that in the 
face of the crisis, sales levels are down and so they cannot invest in a direct 
sales force, a few additional product specialist or clinical consultants at most.  
 
4.5.2 Effects of Decentralization and Delegation  
The summarized and coded interview data for organizational factors 
concerning country 5 can be found in Annex 3.5.2. 
Decentralization 
Delegation and decentralized decision making seems to be widely 
recognized as a motivating factor for employees. While the local managers 
seem to be enjoying their independence, the central managers seem to 
somewhat appreciate the fact that the responsibility for potential failure is 
largely born by the local managers. However it is being pointed out that there 
is no defined process of how central and local managers should interact, 
what kind of planning and reporting systems they should use and how they 
should agree on goals. Communication seems to rely very much on long-
term personal relationships and on the cooperativeness of individuals both 
centrally and locally. Cultural closeness and speaking the native language is 
seen as a big advantage. As it seems to be important for central managers to 
get unfiltered market experience by talking to local customers and sales 
people, language barriers can be an important problem. 
SurgiSupplies’ American competitors appear to be much more directive in 
dealing with their local subsidiaries than SurgiSupplies. While this seems to 
allow them to roll out global strategies more consequently, on the other hand 
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there have been examples of local failure due to insufficient consideration of 
the local people and situations. Interestingly Synthes, the only significant 
European competitor seems to be acting in a similar way as SurgiSupplies. 
There seems to be more autonomy for employees at SurgiSupplies than in 
some other companies and also less sanctioning. People seem to be 
evaluated in a more qualitative way than at competitors, where 
dissatisfactory financial results can lead to separation more quickly, 
apparently resulting in a permanent underlying fear of being laid off.  
The relatively large autonomy of the subsidiaries with an unclear direction of 
control sometimes leads to local decisions that are contradicting the central 
strategy such as investing in non-focus product areas.  
Privileging the domestic market 
There is a pronounced envy of the local sales team in country 5 towards the 
domestic sales team of SurgiSupplies. The local managers believe that the 
central managers are favoring the domestic sales team and develop the 
products mostly according to their needs, neglecting different requirements 
from other countries. Also, opinion leaders and speakers at educational 
events are mostly drawn from the domestic market. This is why they 
encourage central managers to visit country 5, to get involved with their 
customers, opinion leaders etc. and to simply acknowledge and agree to 
local strategies and activities. Also, they like to send expatriate local 
managers to the headquarters to improve country 5 contacts and influence. 
The local managers strongly advocate more exchange and influence of the 
different countries concerning the R&D strategy. 
Influence of central managers on local strategies 
Brian is usually satisfied with his possibilities to influence the local 
organizations, but there are exceptions. The subsidiary in country 2 for 
example to him is unique and totally different than any other subsidiary he 
knows and changing things there takes very much longer. While he would 
like to have more influence, on the other hand he believes that also the 
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managers there need to make their own experiences, even if he believes this 
might result in draw-backs. 
Brian has a clearly defined global strategy, but he says that he does not force 
local managers to apply it in their countries. He rather tries to convince them 
of this strategy, which he says usually works out fine. Although he says no 
one ever told him that his strategy was generally wrong, sometimes local 
managers have good reasons why it would not work exactly like this in their 
particular situation and it needed to be adapted. ‘The global strategy should 
be a general framework, like left and right guard railings, where I say we 
should stay within these limits. It is logical and reasonable that there should 
be local variants of this strategy. On the other hand I do expect that the 
countries do not breach or cut across this framework. As a practical example, 
we do not want to enter into certain technologies or product segments, and if 
the countries argue, they want to take them up anyway and sell them, then of 
course I try to make it clear that this is not in our interest. ’ xxviii 
Brian makes a strong point that he wants to consult the local managers, to 
convince them with strong arguments, rather than giving them strict orders. 
The reasons are firstly that he would not want to be given strict orders 
himself, but secondly that he does not want to take over the responsibility for 
the local success: ‘Because a) I do not want to work this way, meaning I 
wouldn’t want to be the person myself who merely gets told what to do and b) 
it is also to some extent more convenient for myself, otherwise if things went 
wrong they could relax and lean back and say, but Brian told us to do it this 
way and that’s why it went wrong…. There are local discrepancies but you … 
should tolerate them. … If it’s successful we all tap each other on the back 
…if it’s a flop I can intervene and say ‘I told you so’. So I’m always in a very 
comfortable position’.’xxix 
Concerning his cooperation with the new global sales department, Brian 
thinks it has been considerably improving and he sees an improvement in the 
capabilities of the headquarters to assert local influence. He says that sales 
responsibility for years had been delegated to the country managers and 
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then central marketing had taken over some of these responsibilities. He 
believes the decision to reinstall a central sales department was correct and 
he believes that his SBU 5a has benefitted a lot from this decision during the 
past 2 years. 
In the beginning there were some fears of losing certain responsibilities 
among the central marketing people. He admits to still sometimes forget to 
inform the responsible central sales managers about certain of his country 
activities.  
Concerning the product strategy, Charlie is quite happy about country 5, as 
they have historically always been selling into the medical specialties 
recommended by the headquarters. Concerning the business strategy, he is 
somewhat skeptical, because the business goals in his opinion are not really 
ambitious, so he observes a lack of commitment to SBU 5b. On the other 
hand he understands, that a reduction in local head-count is a logical 
consequence. 
Charlie clearly sees it as among his responsibilities to influence the local 
strategy of the countries by proposing the implementation of the central 
strategy to them and to follow-up on the implementation in the countries. He 
however points out that there is no defined process for this, like standardized 
formats for marketing plans. Some countries take the initiative to write 
marketing plans themselves, but they typically do not coordinate this activity 
with Charlie and his team:  
‘If I came to Edward and said ‘Show me your business plan and your 
marketing plan, please.’ he would probably feel intimidated and would say 
‘What does he want now, that’s none of their business!’ That’s the problem 
we have.’xxx  
Local view point 
Aside from the fact that in his opinion there are not enough new product 
launches in SBU 5b, Patrick is very satisfied with the cooperation with the 
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headquarters and he believes the headquarters managers think so, too. But 
he says that the selling targets and strategy is defined locally without 
interference from central managers. They manage their own dealers who act 
very independently towards the end customers. Headquarters is also not a lot 
involved in marketing strategy and activities. This however is different for 
other SBUs, particularly for SBUs 2 and 3b where they ask for and receive a 
lot of support from central marketing.  
Concerning the new central sales department, Patrick is very satisfied with 
the cooperation with Paul, the dedicated central sales manager for country 5. 
He appreciates very much that Paul is a fellow-country man who is easy to 
communicate with. They have known each other for a very long time, also 
prior to the creation of the new central sales department. Patrick says that 
Paul to him is like a link reaching into the headquarters, communicating and 
pushing important issues and providing relevant information. They 
communicate several times a week. 
While Edward knows Paul, the central sales manager, and they have joined a 
meeting together in the past, he does not have any specific contact to him. 
He thinks that Paul usually speaks to Patrick, the boss of Edward’s boss. But 
he believes the central sales department to be a good initiative, as there are 
more and more problems in country 5, such as the delays in customer 
payment, that the headquarters needs to get involved in. Also he thinks that 
central sales managers can gather experience with problem solving in 
different countries and then help countries who newly encounter the same 
issues.  
Concerning SBUs 5a and 5b, the local managers have been treating them as 
cash-cows for the past years with less than ambitious sales targets and the 
responsible central managers are not very happy about that. The local 
managers on the other hand are dissatisfied with the innovation potential of 
the central activities in this field that in their opinion is limiting their market 
opportunities. 
While central sales managers get involved in the operative business of 
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smaller countries, in larger countries their function is seen as being 
consultants to the top management of the subsidiaries. The local 
organization of country 5 sees their responsible central manager as a good 
platform for communication with the headquarters, but does not see his role 
as beneficial for their local sales activities, believing that it is rather the 
smaller country organizations that are in need of such services. Both local 
and central managers for SBU 5a and 5b seem to be generally satisfied with 
their cooperation. If confrontations arise, they are typically about profit 
distribution between central and local due to transfer pricing. The central 
managers have accepted that their role lies in convincing the local managers 
of certain concepts and letting them decide what projects and products to 
engage in, as long as they stay within certain limits of the global strategy. 
On the other hand, some local managers apparently have difficulty in 
accepting their role as a local subsidiary and try to develop own strategies 
outside of the global strategy framework. One example is given where this 
has ultimately led to the replacement of the local management team.  
Short-term risk-averse local strategies 
There seems to be a tendency for local managers to try to satisfy as many of 
the central managers as possible in order to protect their own standing at the 
headquarters, leading to very diversified large local ‘super market’ product 
portfolios. There also seems to be a general culture of avoiding confrontation. 
Even when there is a pronounced wish to reduce the portfolio complexity by 
abandoning certain activities, and even if this is documented in the planning 
system, often this still does not lead to a consequent disinvestment because 
neither central nor local managers really dare to give up an existing sales 
volume. The role of the new sales department in improving these issues is 
being recognized by central marketing managers, but their actual contribution 
does not seem to be very clear.  
Competition between SBUs 
There appears to be a strong competition of central managers for the sales 
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resources of country 5 that is pointed out to be typical for all subsidiaries. 
When country 5 for example decided to dedicate 50% of the time of the 
traditional SBU 5b sales manager to SBU 5a, the sales in 5b started to 
develop unfavorably. Lobbying activities such as visiting the countries are 
described as an ‘arms race’ by a central manager. If there is a major 
innovation in one SBU, local managers often decide quickly to reallocate 
sales resources in favor of short-term opportunities, neglecting the fact that 
this might be to the detriment of the long term development of other product 
groups. Also, central meetings requiring local sales managers to visit the 
headquarters, are not coordinated between the different SBUs, sometimes 
making it impossible for local managers to participate. 
The local subsidiaries on the other hand are in competition over central 
resources, such as R&D capacities for locally adapted solutions and loan 
systems for specific customer needs. 
 
4.5.3 Activities and Tools to Improve Central Control 
Central managers’ credibility and acceptance 
Paul states that he usually is not informed about visits of central SBU 
managers in country 5, sometimes he will receive a report retrospectively. 
Other than that he will only be involved in discussions concerning the 
individual SBUs in the quarterly review meeting, where together with several 
executive team members of SurgiSupplies, he will discuss the current 
situation of country 5 with the local top management. In smaller subsidiaries, 
Paul and his team are also charged with the operative daily support for the 
subsidiaries. Paul regrets not having any operative tasks in the larger focus 
countries, as he believes that the central marketing does not spend enough 
time with them and does not satisfy the needs of these countries: ‘What do 
the countries want? In the end, what they tell me, they simply want to be 
accompanied in their activities. They do not necessarily want you to join all 
activities, but at least you should be there several times a year, to visit some 
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key customers or simply to exchange about the market activities and plans. 
And then to either give an ok or to propose some improvements. That’s really 
what the countries want.’ xxxi 
He remembers an SBU 2 meeting where the country 5 managers presented 
their plans, and Paul and his boss simply agreed to them and approved the 
proposed investment. ‘They still today cite that meeting as prime example of 
what they expect from us …And they say with that support they dared to start 
their venture that ultimately was a success.’ xxxii 
Brian points out that some years ago the responsible managers were difficult 
to communicate with and there were difficulties in mutual understanding. He 
believes that this is a question of both sides having an open attitude of 
listening to each other, being open for critique and willing to accept advice 
from the other.  
Brian thinks that some managers in local countries just cannot get over the 
fact that all their products are designed at the SurgiSupplies headquarters 
and not in their own country. ‘I always try to put myself in their place. Imagine 
SurgiSupplies were an American company and the headquarters were in the 
US, then I would need to adapt to the partner over there. You can’t always 
take the position ‘in my country things are different and you need to think 
about my country’, you need to be open and see the glass to be halfway full 
rather than halfway empty. Those are matters of attitude where I can say 
some have it and some do not. And for those who have it, it makes their life 
much easier and they will usually be more successful mid to long-term.’ xxxiii 
Paul thinks that country 5 is one of the easiest countries to work with. He 
believes that the main reason for this is that the local general manager and 
the local division manager both have a very positive attitude toward 
SurgiSupplies and like to accept but also demand guidance particularly for 
some product groups. In particular with SBU 2 and 5a, very traditional 
businesses of SurgiSupplies where they are market leaders, and trust in the 
competency of the company and they appreciate the global marketing and 
sales approach. Paul in the past was working in marketing for SBU 2 and had 
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many prior relationships with country 5. Also he is a fellow-countryman of 
country 5 and he therefore believes to have a high level of acceptance for 
these two reasons there. In other SBUs, the local country 5 managers are 
much more skeptical about the competency of SurgiSupplies and do not trust 
so much in the global marketing and sales approach. Interestingly however, 
in a recent satisfaction survey they had more critical questions concerning 
the 2 ‘popular’ SBUs. Paul thinks this might be, because they feel more 
confident themselves in these areas. He points out that after this survey, they 
had individual meetings with the central and local managers of SBU 2 and 
5a, and he had the feeling that the central managers had little knowledge of 
the specific problems of the respective country 5 team. He thinks that their 
general attitude is to assume that there are no problems, as long as sales are 
up, so he considers them to be very distant to the market. Paul thinks that the 
central managers maybe know a few local opinion leaders in country 5 but 
other than that do not know the market reality. He thinks that they should be 
more directly involved. 
On the other hand, the local country managers in his opinion do not even 
want the central managers to get involved in operative business, that they 
consider their own domain. They want them to be solely involved in product 
development and strategic guidelines. 
Paul also has some examples of large subsidiaries that he considers as 
negative examples as far as his cooperation with the headquarters is 
concerned. In one country for example, while he believes that his personal 
cooperation is works reasonably well as he has personal cultural ties to this 
country and speaks the language very well, he does not think they work well 
with the central SBU managers. The reason why the overall cooperation with 
central is not so good, he blames mostly on the local division manager, who 
has been on this job for a very long time and is approaching retirement. Paul 
believes that this person has no longer any motivation for change and also 
believes to be the ultimate expert for the local market and does not listen to 
any outside opinions. This is why Paul thinks there is not a cooperative 
partnership but rather mutual reproaches. Similarly to country 5, however, 
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this division manager is more cooperative with SBU 2, as he believes 
SurgiSupplies to have its highest competency there. SBU 5b is unsuccessful, 
because they do not really know what team to charge with these products 
and keep reorganizing the sales and marketing responsibilities.  
Paul believes that the subsidiaries do not really distinguish between central 
sales and central marketing, but that they would like to have some SBU 
specific support with their sales management. They do not receive this kind 
of support, because the central marketing does not feel responsible for that. 
‘Sales support, e.g. for SBU 5b means, how do I structure my team, in order 
to sell SBU 5b products? What are the options, which are the existing best 
practices, and so on.’ xxxiv 
Paul describes another subsidiary where the cooperation with central does 
not go well. In this case, the local team always considers their country to be 
of highest importance and expects special treatment by the SBU managers. 
These in return seem to have given up on them, as they have not met 
expectations in any of the SBUs for many years. The management team 
there has been exchanged and the new managers seem to be more open for 
advice from the headquarters, but the success still needs to be shown. 
Local view point 
Interestingly, the local managers in country 5 seem to have very different 
levels of trust in the competency of the central managers in different SBUs, 
the quality of their strategies and their knowledge and market shares in 
international markets and their efforts to develop them. But they have a very 
general skepticism about the understanding of the central managers from all 
SBUs about the market situation and needs of country 5 and the required 
sales structures to be successful there.  
Patrick generally speaking encourages more central managers from different 
departments to visit the subsidiaries, in order to understand the different 
situations of the various countries. In his experience, many central managers 
only have experience with the domestic country of SurgiSupplies and do not 
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believe their international counterparts, when they claim that things can be 
radically different in other markets. Sometimes he even experienced that 
central managers had a wrong understanding of market situations in their 
own domestic country and had the same kind of conflicts with the local 
domestic sales force. So in his opinion, central marketing often misses to 
pick-up on new world market trends. Also Patrick has observed that central 
managers are often hired directly out of university and they do not have the 
knowledge and the experience to be accepted by subsidiary staff who often 
have spent a life-time in the industry. Another way of improving this situation 
is to send people from the subsidiary to the headquarters for a certain period 
of time in order to get to know the system and build relationships and trust. 
He has good experiences with such programs, but they are very rare.  
Edward has observed that a lot of new colleagues from emerging markets 
are now joining the international SurgiSupplies meetings. His feeling is that 
the cooperation of the headquarters with all the countries is good and he is 
very satisfied with his daily contacts. On the other hand he thinks that the 
research and development programs should be decided by an international 
team. The annual international meetings at present are good to learn about 
existing products, but Edward would like to present the input from his own 
customers to new product developments, in order to ensure adequate 
products for his market in the future. 
In SBU 4 they believe to be in need of a lot of support but do not receive it. 
He gives the example of a recent quality problem where they felt left alone by 
the headquarters:  
‘It has been managed very strangely by the headquarters. Because 
everything (was) by phone, nobody comes here to help us with the 
customers. We asking several times because we were without good 
information, or recent information, … but we already communicated this 
disappointment from our side, .. I think it’s very well known.’  
Concerning SBU 4, Patrick feels to be generally left out considering 
international activities. He would appreciate his country to be visited more 
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frequently by head quarters managers and to visit local key opinion leaders 
together to gain contacts, input and cooperation. Many physicians who are 
working in the SBU 4 specialty are looking for scientific and educational 
cooperation with companies, things that local subsidiaries can only offer in a 
limited way. Even when they manage to start a consulting relationship 
between a local KOL and the headquarters, there are problems, because the 
headquarters managers do not necessarily follow the advice of the 
consultants, resulting in problems for the local relationship with these 
physicians. 
Larry believes that central marketing is biased in their world-view by their 
domestic market and focuses too much on this market in their activities. His 
observation is that speakers in international meetings, such as expert 
physicians invited to educational meetings, usually come to 90% from the 
domestic country of SurgiSupplies. Also, these speakers, while they might be 
experienced users of the products, often are not internationally renowned 
opinions leaders. It is sometimes difficult to justify to his customers to accept 
such training courses. 
Larry says that central managers often claim that it is the subsidiaries, who 
do not propose any opinion leaders of their respective countries to participate 
in international activities. Larry on the other hand thinks that country 
managers have been discouraged to do so, as their requests have been 
declined for too many times in the past. He believes that his international 
colleagues have made the same kind of experience. In order to overcome 
such shortcomings, Larry suggests to involve the local managers more in 
central decision making, e.g. by organizing meetings several times a year to 
discuss current market intelligence and trends and to share local ideas and 
expectations with headquarters. He believes that such new inspiration could 
revitalize managers at central marketing.  
Concerning the newly appointed central sales manager Paul, Larry believes 
that he is very knowledgeable and helps to explain the particularities of the 
country 5 markets to the headquarters. Also he can sit in on meetings with 
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the different central SBU managers and follow up on activities and help with 
the internal organization of international conferences and trainings for 
customers. On the other hand, Larry believes that the responsibilities of 
central sales and central markets at the moment are not very clear in the 
organization, and he is not always certain who to address and who to inform 
about different issues. Larry however believes that this lack in clarity will be 
resolved with time. 
Local field support 
Brian likes to get deeply involved in the local organization because in his 
experience the local sales and marketing managers usually are filtering the 
true market information. In countries where he can communicate with the 
customers and sales people directly without language barriers, he often 
perceives a different atmosphere speaking directly to them, than suggested 
or simplified by their managers and this gives Brian more self-confidence in 
his evaluation of local decision-making. 
In the launch phase of products, Charlie and his team try to directly support 
sales people in the different countries, by visiting customers together with 
them and directly get involved in the demonstration and usage of the 
products. Sometimes he thinks they should push such direct customer 
activities much more, but he sees two disadvantages. Firstly the local teams 
need to become self-sufficient; otherwise they will not be able to service the 
customer in a timely and satisfactory manner. Secondly Charlie fears to get 
into a kind of arms race with other central SBUs: ‘That would really lead to: 
‘5b does a monthly conference call, so we will fly over there every quarter’. 
Then we would say: ‘Ok, if they fly over every quarter, we will do that too’. 
Then the others would fly over every two months and, this actually happened 
before, we would be beating down the doors at the subsidiary, saying ‘Mine 
is important, this is the most important.’ and I believe we are far from finding 
a good structure for this at SurgiSupplies, this is somewhat left to the 
egoisms of the individuals.’xxxv 
Larry believes that a local organization needs to feel close to the central 
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marketing department. He would like to see many visits from central 
managers in his country to do training updates for the local staff, to visit 
customers together and explain to them the international strategy and world 
market trends, to give them the impression of dealing with a truly 
international company. He is not quite satisfied with the level of engagement 
of the central managers in his country and he would like to see more 
activities. 
Mutual trust, respect, frequent and truthful communication 
Brian particularly dislikes local managers who every time they meet tell him 
that they will now start putting more focus in SBU 5a and that they will invest 
and start activities and in the end of the year he realizes that nothing has 
changed. He believes that such managers are wasting the resources of 
Brian’s team: ‘Honesty is also really important for me. …, there’s a clear ABC 
classification with A countries, which we take care of, B countries we can 
support if we have remaining resources and C countries, we will probably 
never go there personally, unless there is a congress.’xxxvi  
Brian tries to give the local managers the feeling that he is open to their 
culture and their suggestions. He tries to respect the different local meeting 
cultures and also to always to great them or throw in some phrases in their 
local language. He thinks that this helps a lot to make them more open and 
cooperative. While there is a lot of daily email, Brian believes that regular 
personal contact in meetings and telephone conversations are crucial for the 
success. But also here it is important to adapt to the likings of his business 
partners, some prefer weekly or almost daily contact, others find it offensive if 
he calls too often. 
Long-term personal relationships 
Brian thinks that over the years some of the local staff have been exchanged 
for the better, some of the older staff have become more cooperative and 
also himself and his team have learned to be more open to the suggestions 
from the countries. Also he believes with time people learn to understand 
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each other better. ‘You walk the same path together for a certain time, you 
have successes, you have failures, that somewhat bonds people together, 
people get closer and develop a better understanding for each other.’ xxxvii 
Local view point 
Concerning SBU 5b Larry believes the cooperation with the headquarters to 
be excellent, as Edward has been dealing with the business for so long, has 
good relationships with the central managers, knows the ‘internal dynamics’ 
and can organize the technical service required for these products. Also, 
sharing the discount with central marketing, they have been organizing an 
annual sales promotion program for the dealers that has worked out well over 
the years. In SBU 5a the situation is different, because their former local 
product manager did not manage to create a good partnership with the 
headquarters. Larry thinks it was a matter of ‘personal feeling’ and ‘personal 
credibility’ and this person has left the company in the mean time. 
But since Edward has been taking over this activity in addition to his other 
products two years ago, the situation has been improving. They have been 
investing in marketing activities and this year, for the first time, they had 
organized a meeting with Brian from central marketing to present their 
marketing and business planning to them. 
Patrick believes that sales management in country 5 requires much more 
intensive personal relationship with the customers, dealers and also the 
agents than in many other countries. 
Communication of global strategic orientation 
For Paul the key to success for individual SBUs from a central point of view is 
to have a simple and clearly communicated strategy concept that makes it 
easy for country managers to decide if they should introduce certain product 
groups or not. Some SBUs have such a clear focus, others do not. He says 
that the central managers cannot force countries to participate, but need to 
convince them. As a negative example he explains that even with a highly 
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innovative product in their product line, the responsible central managers of 
SBU 5a have not been able to show the local subsidiaries how to 
successfully implement it and to trust in their strategy. 
Strategic meetings with multiple local and central hierarchy level involvement 
Today’s international meetings with 50 to 100 participants in his opinion are 
too large to achieve a constructive kind of exchange. He rather suggests 
smaller meetings with 4 to 5 country representatives to discuss individual 
topic areas. Local managers would then also get a better feeling of their own 
strategic involvement. Talking to colleagues from other countries, he thinks 
that many trends and issues in these markets are really global and more or 
less the same for all countries - but central marketing does not always seem 
to acknowledge such trends.  
Strategic planning and reporting systems 
Brian generally has a positive attitude towards the new reporting tools 
installed by the central sales department, but he says that they only make 
sense and can be used at a reasonable effort for the top selling countries, 
where to him they are a useful help for his decision making. He believes that 
the new resource allocation planning system is very good but that the 
decisions documented in this report are often not consequently implemented, 
because managers have a difficult time to abandon any activities. ‘Because 
in the end, I believe, that’s the big problem of SurgiSupplies: we always want 
to do everything but never let go of anything in return. And that does not 
work. If I want to pursue certain things consequently, then some other things 
need to be neglected or ignored.’ xxxviii 
Charlie gives the example of country 3 that has a very elaborate marketing 
plan, which in his opinion nobody reads, as it is too lengthy. Also he points 
out that the targets in this plan are far less than ambitious.  
Charlie thinks that the company could benefit from a more systematic 
strategic planning approach. But he at the same time believes this to be a 
difficult task, as it would require to break down the overall sales plan into 
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SBUs, product groups and products, with quarterly focus and top priority 
strategies and action items on the subsidiary and on the headquarter side. 
For launches of new products, however, Charlie’s team does require the 
country to give them written forecasts for units sold and demo units required 
and this is understood and accepted by the subsidiaries. For some countries, 
e.g. in country 5, he considers the planning and coordination to work well in 
an informal process with regular communication. They present their global 
strategies and their expectations for the individual countries in the beginning 
of the year and there usually is no particular resistance, so he assumes that 
the countries agree. These countries, that are easy to work with, are typically 
the ones that need and appreciate help from the headquarters, for example 
the BRIC and the MIST countries, who often have young and inexperienced 
staff, and who regularly seek for input in the form of know-how but also 
financial support, or the absolute top-markets who know that they get a lot of 
central attention. If the countries feel to be self-sufficient concerning know-
how and resources, often with people who have been with the company for 
many years, there is little exchange about the business strategy, unless they 
have really bad results and are obliged to justify themselves.  
Charlie thinks that by introducing a standard format to report market data in 
overview charts and to collect this data in a systematic way is a big step in 
the right direction that leads to more accountability on the subsidiary side. 
Concerning the subsidiary marketing and sales organization survey, Paul first 
tried to fill it in together with the central SBU managers. His observation was, 
that they did not have enough detailed information about the subsidiaries in 
order to answer the questions. He believes that the managers often made 
unfounded negative assumptions resulting in poor survey results. His 
conclusion is that central SBU managers should not be asked to answer such 
questionnaires. 
In a second attempt Paul used the questionnaire to fill it in during an 
interview with the local country managers without having made any pre-
assumptions. He says it was a very good experience, because the local team 
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during the discussion started asking themselves critical questions about their 
own organization and the real weaknesses of the local organization actually 
emerged in their self-evaluation. Important issues could thus be identified 
and activities could be derived. An external evaluation in Paul’s opinion is 
interpreted as an attack and the local managers get defensive. But with the 
self-evaluation, the central managers had the opportunity to give their input 
and the learning experience for all of them was much better. The second 
version of the questionnaire also included an evaluation of the urgency for 
improvement. This to Paul also was very helpful as it focused the action 
plans. 
In the same way, they had performed the market potential analysis together 
with the country. Although the main finding was, that the market data 
submitted by the local team was inappropriate, this at least led to an action 
item about improving market research and market knowledge concerning 
certain SBUs. The self-evaluation in these categories consequently also were 
very poor. Paul concludes that the market potential tool is particularly suitable 
for smaller emerging countries, who do not have many local marketing 
resources at their disposal and there are limited official statistics. He believes 
that it is a simple and realistic display that is appreciated by the local 
managers. 
For the larger subsidiaries Paul finds it hard to sell them the tools, because 
the local countries already have their own ways of analyzing their markets 
and they do not want central to get too much involved. 
One thing that is missing in the market potential analysis tool is a realistic 
indicator and predictor for the competitive strength of the SurgiSupplies in a 
given SBU and a given country, that allows to really compare the true 
business opportunities in the different market segments. He does not believe 
that the relative market share is a sufficient indicator. 
The radar screen, in his experience, so far is neither understood by the 
countries, who see it as just another report they need to fill in for the 
headquarters, nor is it being used by the regional managers to communicate 
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with the countries. In the quarterly review meetings, the radar screen is never 
considered or discussed. 
Local view point 
Concerning the new reporting tools initiated by the central sales department, 
Patrick says that he is trying to deal with them all by himself and not to get 
his organization involved. He believes to have a very lean organization and 
that his team needs to spend all their time working their markets and their 
customers and not with internal planning and reporting activities. Also he 
generally does not consider the planning activity as useful, because the plans 
most of the time involve new product launches, which are notoriously delayed 
and the plans become obsolete very quickly.  
‘... new product(s), … available set(s) are the base of the success …, if 
everything is functioning, …the timing for the product launch, the transfer 
price that we expected, the support that we expected, but many time(s) we 
signed a lot of dreams.’ 
Patrick thinks that the fact that country 5 has an indirect sales force also has 
a big impact on the IT reporting tools that are being used, such as CRM 
systems. Independent agents and dealers, other than direct sales 
representatives, only with great difficulty can be obliged to write activity and 
customer reports etc. Also, the access to internal data is much more critical 
for them. The system proposed by HospiMed thus does not apply to the 
country 5 situation and needs to be heavily adapted. Another aspect is the 
editing of tender documents. While direct sales reps frequently handle such 
documents by themselves, internal administrators need to perform this as a 
service for agents and dealers. 
Larry has heard about new central reporting tools, and he believes it is 
important to share information with the headquarters in order to be able to 
compare the activities in different countries. On the other hand his impression 
is, that this kind of information is kept at the top hierarchy in country 5 and 
Larry somewhat regrets that. He finds it difficult to decide, if sales 
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management in the form of reporting, incentive programs and training 
programs should be internationally standardized within a company group. He 
says that this had also been a long discussion at his former employer 
Johnson & Johnson nine years ago. On the one hand, he thinks that sales 
managers like to have their own personal approach to these things, on the 
other hand standardized tools make communication between managers 
easier. 
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Chapter 5: Performance Survey Results 
In line with our fourth sub-research question, the objective of the analysis in 
this section is to evaluate the usefulness of performance surveys, such as 
the ones used by SurgiSupplies, for the improvement of international sales 
force effectiveness. As accurate and meaningful performance measurement 
is the basis of any central activities for improvement of subsidiary 
performance, this analysis relates to the core challenge of this thesis.  
The following two sections displaying the data analysis results for both 
surveys are structured in an identical way. Firstly the appropriateness of the 
data for factor analysis is verified. Secondly the underlying structure of the 
data is analyzed by extracting the maximum number of factors that can 
explain the variance in the survey responses in a meaningful way. This 
method combines different survey items that were answered by the 
respondents in a similar pattern into common factors. Interpreting the 
underlying reason of these similar responses then allows the assignment of 
explanatory labels to these factors. In a third step, the reliability of the 
statistical analysis is validated. The performance measures are then 
correlated to actual sales output data to verify how team performance as 
perceived by team managers is related to actual sales outcomes. 
After the usefulness of the survey data from the two surveys has been 
verified, a third section uses the results of the relevant individual survey 
responses and actual sales outcome data to describe the perceived 
performance and actual sales effectiveness in the 5 focus countries of this 
study. 
 
5.1 Subsidiary Performance Survey Results 
Mean survey ratings for each variable ranged from 3,0 to 4,2, well above the 
theoretical mean of the scale of 5,5, indicating the tendency for a rather 
positive self-evaluation. The standard variation ranged from 1,8 to 2,4 (Annex 
1: Table 1). 
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Factor Analysis 
All survey responses were significantly correlated to each other at p < 0,01 
with the exception of the pairs ‘incentive systems’ and ‘market knowledge’ (p 
= 0,052) and ‘incentive systems’ and ‘customer targeting’ (p = 0,02) (see 
Annex 1 correlation matrices). Correlations ranged from 0,21 to 0,85 with no 
values > 0,9 and the determinant was 0,0000334 > 0,00001 which is an 
accepted heuristic test to ensure the absence of multicollinearity (Field, 2009: 
648). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure showed a value of 0,877, indicating a 
very good adequacy of the sample size for factor analysis, and Bartlett’s Test 
was significant (p < 0,000), indicating sufficient correlations between 
variables for running factor analysis (Field, 2009: 659-660) (Annex 1: Table 
2).  
In accordance with the Kaiser criterion, only factors with Eigenvalues > 1 
were extracted. This led to the extraction of 3 factors, this model explaining 
78,3 % of variance (Annex 1: Table 3).  
 
Figure 15: Rotated Component Matrix 
1 2 3
‘market and 
customer 
knowledge’
‘team 
competence’
‘competitive 
strategy’
customer targeting 0,89
customer analysis 0,84
account planning 0,83
market knowledge 0,79
team motivation 0,84
leadership 0,79
sales organization 0,76
clear strategy 0,73 0,41
team competence 0,47 0,64
incentive systems 0,86
competition knowledge 0,5 0,74
market trends 0,55 0,66
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
(a) Rotation converged in 5 iterations
Component
Rotated Component Matrix (a)
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The rotated component matrix is displayed in figure 15. 
The variables ‘customer targeting’, ‘customer analysis’, ‘account planning’ 
and ‘market knowledge’ loaded on factor 1 with the highest values. 
Cronbach’s Alpha for these 4 variables was excellent at 0,92 and Cronbach’s 
Alpha after deleting items was 8,74 or higher for each variable, indicating 
highly consistent responses for these items and thus an excellent measuring 
scale (Annex 1: Table 4). The variables ‘market trends’, ‘competition 
knowledge’ and ‘team competence’ also showed noteworthy loadings on this 
factor that we labeled ‘market and customer knowledge’. 
The variables ‘team motivation’, ‘leadership’, ‘sales organization’, ‘clear 
strategy’ and ‘team competence’ showed the highest factor loadings on factor 
2 that we named ‘team competence’. Cronbach’s Alpha for these 4 variables 
was excellent at 0,89 and Cronbach’s Alpha after deleting items was 8,54 or 
higher for each variable, indicating highly consistent responses for these 
items and thus an excellent measuring scale (Annex 1: Table 5).  
The variables ‘incentive systems, ‘competition knowledge’ and ‘market 
trends’ represented factor 3 that we labeled ‘competitive strategy’. 
Cronbach’s Alpha for these 3 variables was good at 0,83 and Cronbach’s 
Alpha after deleting items was good for ‘incentive systems’ ( = 0,88), 
acceptable for ‘market trends’ ( = 0,17), but questionable for competitive 
knowledge (( = 0,67), indicating an overall acceptable measuring scale 
(Annex 1: Table 6). 
Correlations with sales output variables 
Highly significant positive correlations were found between survey results 
and actual sales outputs, however the effects were relatively small. In the 
display of the results, positive effects have negative values, as small survey 
ratings correspond to positive ratings.  
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Correlations of sales output variables with individual survey items 
Only five out of twelve survey items showed significant correlations to sales 
outcomes. Although highly significant, effect sizes were rather small, ranging 
from - 0,17 to -0,3 (Figure 16).  
 
 
Figure 16: Correlations of Individual Variables with Country Outputs 
Interestingly, four of the variables (market trends, sales organization, team 
competence and market knowledge) were correlated to total country sales 
volumes and respective SBU sales volumes, but not to sales growth, while 
one of the variables (leadership) was correlated to total country sales growth 
and SBU sales growth but not to absolute sales volumes. A plausible 
explanation for this is that teams with larger sales volumes typically have 
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been in place for a longer period of time, have more staff members and more 
resources and therefore have developed a more professional structure with 
higher competency and better knowledge about markets and market trends. 
Sales leadership on the other hand seems to be seen by the responding 
country managers as the single most important source of annual sales 
growth. 
Correlations of sales output variables with the extracted factors 
 
Figure 17: Correlation of Extracted Factors with Sales Output Variables 
 
As only a few of the individual variables correlated to sales growth and with 
small effects, it is unsurprising that correlations with the extracted factors 
                          Correlations 
  total sales 
growth 2011 (%) 
local market and 
customer knowledge 
Pearson Correlation ,048 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,569 
N 141 
team competence Pearson Correlation -,188* 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,025 
N 141 
competitive strategy Pearson Correlation -,119 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,161 
N 141 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Correlations 
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total country 
growth 2011
local market and 
customer knowledge 
Pearson Correlation -,184* -,103 ,093
Sig. (2-tailed) ,029 ,225 ,272
N 141 141 141
team competence Pearson Correlation -,094 -,095 -,203*
Sig. (2-tailed) ,269 ,265 ,016
N 141 141 141
competitive strategy Pearson Correlation -,053 ,072 ,029
Sig. (2-tailed) ,533 ,395 ,731
N 141 141 141
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were even weaker. However ‘team competence’ is significantly correlated to 
2011 country growth in percent (r = -0,19; p = 0,025). ‘Competitive strategy’ 
and ‘local market & customer knowledge’ were not significantly related to 
sales growth (Figure 17).  
Team competence was significantly correlated to country growth both in 
Euros (r = -0,20, p = 0,016) and in percent (r = -0,19, p = 0,025) and local 
market and customer knowledge was significantly correlated to total sales of 
the respective SBU (r = -0,18, p = 0,029), the explanation for this being 
essentially the same as given above for individual variables of these factors.  
Interestingly, competitive strategy thus shows no correlation with any of the 
sales output variables. 
Another finding was, that only 2011 sales results showed any correlations 
with survey variables. More long-term measures such as 3 years SBU sales 
growth or market shares did not show any correlation with the survey data, 
indicating a rather short-term perspective of the respondents. 
 
5.2 Headquarters Performance Survey Results 
The results of survey item ‘documentation’ were excluded from the analysis, 
because the responses were not significantly related to the other responses 
and because this item did not seem crucial to us, as it was more related to 
regulatory affairs than marketing and sales issues. 
Mean survey ratings for each variable ranged from 1,5 to 2,6, mostly above 
the theoretical mean of the scale of 2,5, indicating a rather positive evaluation 
of central marketing. The standard deviation ranged from 0,6 to 0,8 (Annex 2: 
Table 1). 
All survey responses were significantly correlated to each other at p < 0,05 
with the exception of ‘product quality’ paired with the variables ‘organizational 
setup’ (p = 0,06), ‘communication’ (p = 0,09) and ‘clear strategy’, as well as 
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the pairs ‘clear strategy’ and ‘clinical evidence’ (p = 0,05) and ‘response time’ 
and ‘innovation’ (see correlation matrices in Annex 2). Correlations ranged 
from 0,11 to 0,64 with no values > 0,9 and a determinant of 0,004 > 0,00001, 
which is an accepted heuristic test to insure the absence of multicollinearity. 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure showed a value of 0,879, indicating a very 
good adequacy of the sample size for factor analysis, and Bartlett’s Test was 
significant (p < 0,000), indicating sufficient correlations between variables for 
running factor analysis (Annex 2).  
Factor analysis was used with the same parameters as in the previous 
survey in order to identify the constructs underlying the responses of the 
survey participants and to verify the measuring scales. 
In accordance with the Kaiser criterion, only factors with Eigenvalues > 1 
were extracted, leading to a total of three factors that together accounted for 
55 percent of the variance in the initial data set (Annex 2: Table 3).  
 
Figure 18: Rotated Component Matrix 
1 2 3
‘operational 
support’
‘strategic support’ ‘product package’
communication 0,83
response time 0,79
organizational setup 0,64
support locally adapted 0,62 0,46
competitive knowledge 0,52 0,47
training standards 0,47
product knowledge 0,45 0,42
adequate strategy 0,79
clear strategy 0,73
support level 0,45 0,65
clinical evidence 0,74
product quality 0,74
innovation 0,62
marketing & sales tools 0,51
delivery performance 0,41 0,41
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
(a) Rotation converged in 6 iterations
Rotated Component Matrix (a)
Component
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Figure 18 shows the factor loadings of the rotated component matrix. Again, 
factor loadings < 0,4 are suppressed in the display for easier interpretation.  
The variables ‘communication, ‘response time’, ‘organizational setup’, 
‘support locally adapted’, ‘competitive knowledge’, ‘training standards’ and 
‘product knowledge’ loaded mainly on factor 1 that we labeled ‘operational 
support’. Cronbach’s Alpha for these 4 variables was good at 0,84 and 
Cronbach’s Alpha after deleting items was 0,8 or higher for each variable, 
indicating highly consistent responses for these items and thus an excellent 
measuring scale (Annex 2: Table 4). 
The variables ‘adequate strategy’, ‘clear strategy’ and ‘support level’ showed 
the highest factor loadings on factor 2 that we named ‘strategic support’. 
Cronbach’s Alpha for these 3 variables was 0,73, indicating an acceptable 
measuring scale, although Cronbach’s Alpha after deleting items was only 
0,62 or higher for each variable, indicating questionable results. (Annex 2: 
Table 5).  
The variables ‘clinical results’, ‘product quality’, ‘innovation’, ‘marketing and 
sales tools’ and ‘delivery performance’ represented factor 3 that we labeled 
‘product package’. Cronbach’s Alpha for these variables was borderline good 
at 0,7 and Cronbach’s Alpha after deleting items was between 0,63 and 0,68 
for the individual variables, indicating questionable individual variables 
(Annex 2: Table 6). 
Correlations with sales output variables 
Correlations between survey results and actual sales outputs were even 
more significant than in the previous survey, however, again, the effects were 
relatively small. In the display of the results for sales growth 2011 and market 
share, positive effects have negative values, as small survey ratings 
correspond to positive ratings. In the display of the results for SBU ranking, 
positive effects have positive values as for both variable sets small numbers 
correspond to better outcomes. 
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Correlations of sales output variables with individual survey items 
Nine out of out of fifteen survey items showed significant correlations to sales 
outcomes. All of them are positively correlated to 2011 sales growth, 
although some fail to reach significant levels. Importantly, also the average 
total score for all survey items was positively correlated to 2011 sales growth. 
As opposed to the first survey some of the survey items also were correlated 
significantly to market share. Although highly significant, effect sizes were 
rather small, ranging from - 0,18 to -0,27 (Figure 19).  
 
Figure 19: Correlations of Individual Variables with Country Outputs 
There are some unexpected results that however can be explained plausibly 
when correlating output data to SBU ranking, meaning the ranking of any 
country’s total sales for a given SBU compared to the respective sales 
volumes of all other countries. As with both, the sales output data and the 
  Sales growth 2011 (%) SBU ranking market share 
oorganizationalsetup Pearson Correlation -,234** -,113 ,063
Sig. (2-tailed) ,009 ,211 ,502
N 125 124 114
oadequatestrategy Pearson Correlation -,153 -,085 -,228*
Sig. (2-tailed) ,087 ,350 ,015
N 125 124 114
oproductknowledge Pearson Correlation -,205* -,151 -,030
Sig. (2-tailed) ,022 ,094 ,754
N 125 124 114
oresponsetime Pearson Correlation -,148 ,248** -,224*
Sig. (2-tailed) ,098 ,006 ,017
N 125 124 114
otrainingstandards Pearson Correlation -,028 ,099 -,200*
Sig. (2-tailed) ,758 ,275 ,033
N 125 124 114
osupportlocallyadapted Pearson Correlation -,184* ,018 -,048
Sig. (2-tailed) ,040 ,844 ,612
N 125 124 114
oproductquality Pearson Correlation -,183* -,257** -,093
Sig. (2-tailed) ,042 ,004 ,324
N 125 124 114
odeliveryperf Pearson Correlation -,053 -,002 -,265**
Sig. (2-tailed) ,554 ,980 ,004
N 125 124 114
oinnovation Pearson Correlation -,194* -,205* ,041
Sig. (2-tailed) ,030 ,023 ,662
N 125 124 114
ototalscore Pearson Correlation -,208* -,052 -,154
Sig. (2-tailed) ,020 ,570 ,103
N 125 124 114
 
organization setup
adequate strategy
product knowledge
response time
training standards
support locally 
adapted
product quality
delivery 
performance
innovation
innovation
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SBU ranking data, small numbers correspond to better scores, we would 
expect positive correlations for this pair of variables. However, most items 
show negative correlations notably ‘product quality’ and ‘innovation’ at highly 
significant levels, indicating that perceived low product quality and 
innovativeness are correlated to a better SBU rank. We believe the 
explanation to be that local managers with higher SBU ranks firstly are more 
self-confident and thus also dare to be more critical of the headquarters, and 
secondly higher absolute sales levels usually are associated with bigger, 
more professional and competent teams, who might set higher standards for 
product quality and innovativeness. Another very surprising finding is that 
while delivery performance is totally unrelated to SBU ranking (r = 0,00, p = 
0,98), it is highly positively correlated to market share (r = -0,265, p = 0,004). 
Delivery performance thus is not associated to absolute, but to relative sales 
volumes per country. We believe two interpretations to be plausible, 
depending on the direction of the effect. Either country managers of SBUs 
with high market shares have spent more energy on organizing their supply 
chain processes with central headquarters, or SurgiSupplies has developed 
stronger market shares in such countries, where delivery performance is 
easier to achieve, e.g. such countries that are closer to the central ware 
house in the domestic country. 
Correlations of sales output variables with the extracted factors 
 
Figure 20: Correlations of Extracted Factors with Sales Output Variables 
The findings for the correlations of sales outputs to extracted factors 
somewhat correspond to what has been found for the individual variables. All 
three factors show very weak positive correlations with sales growth and 
  Sales growth 2011 (%) SBU ranking market share
operational support Pearson Correlation -,125 ,184* -,028
Sig. (2-tailed) ,164 ,041 ,770
N 125 124 114
strategic support Pearson Correlation -,099 -,003 -,163
Sig. (2-tailed) ,272 ,978 ,083
N 125 124 114
product package Pearson Correlation -,149 -,311** -,075
Sig. (2-tailed) ,097 ,000 ,431
N 125 124 114
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market share, and most effects are too small to be significant (Figure 20). 
Significant positive correlations can be found for ‘operational support’ and 
‘SBU ranking’, indicating that country teams with higher absolute SBU sales 
are more satisfied with the operative support they receive from headquarters, 
probably because headquarters focuses more on these top performers. The 
largest and highly significant effect however is the negative relationship 
between ‘SBU ranking’ and ‘product package’, meaning that the higher their 
sales ranking, the more dissatisfied local managers tend to be with the 
product related variables ‘clinical results’, ‘product quality’, ‘innovation’, 
‘marketing and sales tools’ and ‘delivery performance’. We follow the same 
explanation as above, believing that local managers with higher rankings are 
one the one hand more self-confident in criticizing the headquarters and on 
the other hand, teams with higher sales are more competent and more 
demanding with respect to product related quality aspects.  
Influence of prior years on sales results 
Figure 21: Other Influence Factors on Short-Term Sales Results 
Sales volumes and growth rates are statistically best explained by projections 
from prior years. In our data for example, 3 years total country growth was 
strongly correlated to 2011 total sales (r = 0,71, p = 0,000) and total growth 
Correlations 
  market growth 
2011 sales growth (%) Pearson Correlation ,271** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,001 
N 161 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Correlations 
  Total 3 year growth 
Total sales 2011 Pearson Correlation ,706** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 
N 150 
Total growth 2011 Pearson Correlation ,564** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 
N 150 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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2011 (r = 0,56, p = 0,000) (Figure 21). As performance measurements only 
correlated to short term results in both surveys, local managers seem to take 
a short-term perspective and thus the small effect size seems plausible. 
Another important factor of course are the specific growth rates of SBU 
market segments in each country. 2011 sales growth were significantly 
correlated to local market growth per SBU (r = 0,271, p = 0,001). 
Correlations between the results from the two surveys 
For easier interpretation we have added ‘local’ to the displayed factors from 
the self-evaluation survey and ‘central’ to the factors from the evaluation of 
central marketing (Figure 22). 
As expected, the results for ‘local team competence’ and ‘local competitive 
strategy’ are positively correlated to all three factors representing 
headquarters’ activities, however effects are too small to be significant. 
‘Local market and customer knowledge’ is negatively correlated to ‘central 
operational support’ and ‘central product package’, the latter showing the 
sole significant effect. This means that the higher they judged their own 
knowledge about markets and customers, the more dissatisfied local 
managers were with the product related aspects and daily support activities 
from central marketing. 
 
Figure 22: Correlation of Extracted Factors from both Surveys 
 
  local market and 
customer 
knowledge 
local team 
competence 
local competitive 
strategy 
central operational 
support 
Pearson Correlation -,018 ,081 ,129
Sig. (2-tailed) ,857 ,432 ,208
N 97 97 97
central strategic 
support 
Pearson Correlation ,052 ,065 ,014
Sig. (2-tailed) ,610 ,526 ,895
N 97 97 97
central product 
package 
Pearson Correlation -,230* ,078 ,054
Sig. (2-tailed) ,024 ,447 ,601
N 97 97 97
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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5.3 Individual Survey Results of the Studied Cases 
As the most important goal of the performance surveys was to identify 
improvement potential, the analysis is focused on the identification of below 
average item ratings (Figures 23 and 24).  
 
Figure 23: Subsidiary Survey Results for the Studied Cases 
The sales and marketing team in country 1 was the only top 25 country that 
did not contribute to the subsidiary performance survey. Since this is the 
domestic sales team, although it is considered a local organization, it belongs 
to the legal entity of SurgiSupplies. Concerning the headquarters 
performance survey, all items for operational and strategic support received 
excellent scores. Interestingly, this organization rated product innovation very 
critically with the worst score 4 and product quality below average with 3. 
Country 2 survey results showed to be the most self-critical at average 
subsidiary survey item ratings of 5,8 below the scale mean of 5,5. Market and 
customer knowledge items were the lowest at a mean score of 6,8 with 
particularly poor ratings for customer analysis (7) and customer targeting (8). 
But also the other two factors had poor individual item ratings such as for 
team competence (7) and for knowledge concerning competition (7) and 
market trends (7). Consequently, the need for improvement was rated ‘high’ 
for team competence, market and competition knowledge. Only for the items 
Country 1 2 3 3 4 5 5
SBU 1 2 3a 3b 4 5a 5b
customer analysis 7 1 1 5 5 4
customer targeting 8 1 1 2 4 4
account planning 6 2 2 3 3 3
market knowledge 6 1 1 3 5 2
mean score F1,1 6,8 1,3 1,3 3,3 4,3 3,3
team motivation 6 1 1 4 5 5
leadership 6 3 3 6 9 9
sales organization 3 3 3 9 8 7
clear strategy 3 1 1 5 5 5
team competence 7 2 2 6 3 3
mean score F1,2 5,0 2,0 2,0 6,0 6,0 5,8
incentive systems 3 1 1 3 5 5
competition knowledge 7 3 3 3 2 2
market trends 7 1 3 2 2
mean score F1,3 5,7 1,7 2,0 3,0 3,0 3,0
total score 5,8 1,7 1,7 4,3 4,7 4,3
Subsidiary Performance Survey
F1,1: 'market 
and customer 
knowledge'
F1,2: 'team 
competence'
F1,3: 
'competitive 
strategy'
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sales organization and incentive systems the need to improve was rated 
‘low’, all other items were rated ‘medium’. All items for the headquarters 
evaluation were rated 2 with the exception of items marketing and sales 
tools, communication and clinical evidence. 
Country 3 presented a very favorable self-evaluation with all ratings good or 
excellent (between 1 and 3) and survey ratings for product groups 3a and 3b 
were identical with the exception of one missing value for unknown reasons 
for item ‘market trends’ for product group 3b. The need to improve was also 
rated identical for 3a and 3b. In no category a high improvement need was 
identified. However the need to improve for the items team competence and 
competition knowledge was rated ‘medium’, for all other items ‘low’. The 
headquarters performance ratings were equally favorable with all items rated 
2 or higher.  
 
Figure 24: Headquarters Survey Results for the Studied Cases 
Country 4 survey results showed a reasonably positive self-evaluation 
concerning marketing and competition knowledge as well as competitive 
strategy items, but was self-critical about the items for factor 2, team 
competence, with a particular poor rating for the item sales organization (9). 
Need for improvement was rated ‘medium’ for team motivation, market and 
Country 1 2 3 3 4 5 5
SBU 1 2 3a 3b 4 5a 5b
communication 1 3 1 1 1 4 2
response time 1 1 1 1 1 3 2
organizational setup 1 2 1 1 1 2 2
support locally adapted 1 2 2 1 1 4 2
competitive knowledge 1 2 2 2 1 3 2
training standards 1 2 1 1 2 3 2
product knowledge 1 2 1 1 1 2 2
mean score F2,1 1,0 2,0 1,3 1,1 1,1 3,0 2,0
adequate strategy 1 2 2 2 2 3 3
clear strategy 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
support level 1 1 2 2 1 4 2
meas score F2,2 1,0 1,7 2,0 2,0 1,7 3,0 2,3
clinical evidence 2 3 2 1 2 3 3
product quality 3 2 1 1 1 2 2
innovation 4 2 1 1 2 4 2
marketing and sales tools 1 3 2 2 2 3 2
delivery perf 1 1 1 1 3 2 2
mean score F2,3 2,2 2,2 1,4 1,2 2,0 2,8 2,2
total score 1,4 2,0 1,5 1,3 1,5 2,9 2,1
Headquarters Peformance Survey
F2,3: 'product 
package'
F2,1: 
'operational 
support'
F2,2: 
'strategic 
support'
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competition knowledge, customer targeting and account mapping and 
planning, and ‘high’ for all other categories. Ratings for headquarters 
performance ranged from excellent for operational support to good for 
strategic support and product package. 
Similar to country 4, country 5 self-evaluation results were rather favorable 
for factors 1 and 3 and below average for factor 2, team competence, items. 
Results were particularly poor for items leadership (rating 9 for both product 
groups 5a and 5b) and sales organization (rating 8 for 5a and 7 for 5b). 
Ratings were similar for product groups 5a and 5b with the exception of item 
market knowledge that was rated excellent (2) for 5b and fair (5) for 5a. 
Headquarters performance was rated good (2) for all items except for 
‘adequate strategy’ and ‘clinical evidence’ which were rated fair (3). Need to 
improve was rated ‘high’ for items team competence and customer targeting 
only for product group 5a. ‘Low’ improvement need was seen for both 
product groups for the items incentive systems, market and competition 
knowledge and for team motivation in product group 5b. All other items were 
rated ‘medium’. Headquarters performance ratings were by far the most 
critical for product group 5a at a very low total average score of 2,9 and poor 
ratings (4) for items ‘communication’, ‘locally adapted support’, ‘support level’ 
and ‘innovation’.  
These survey outcomes will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
Section 6.1. of this chapter discusses the results around the first two 
research questions about situational, organizational factors, decentralization 
and delegation. Section 6.2. accordingly deals with the third and fourth 
research questions dealing with successful activities and tools, and the 
usefulness of performance surveys. 
 
6.1 Situational and Organizational Factors, Decentralization and 
Delegation 
The study results of this section are discussed according to the 
corresponding 11 criteria displayed in Figure 25. This section is organized in 
the order of the classification criteria identified in the analysis framework 
developed from literature earlier. Where applicable, the different sales teams 
have been categorized individually in accordance with them. The individual 
influence factors identified by the respondents are discussed along with the 
criteria we respectively found most fitting.  
An overview of the cross-case analysis for situational and organizational 
factors as well as improvement activities can be found in Annex 5. 
Respondents pointed out subsidiary size and business priority, traditional 
SBU orientation of the individual subsidiaries, brand awareness and market 
share, market life-cycle, language barriers, cultural differences between the 
headquarters and the individual subsidiaries, other contextual difficulties, 
central innovation performance, privileging of the domestic market as 
important situational influence factors impacting on strategy implementation 
Concerning the respective organizational factors they identified local 
autonomy, delegation and sanctioning, impact of delegation on global 
strategy, fighting over resources, short-term and risk-averse local strategies, 
influence of central managers on local strategies, central managers' 
credibility, inconsistencies between different divisional policies, global cost 
and profit issues, sales management practice, staff turn-over and loyalty. 
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Figure 25: Analysis Framework for Situational and Organizational Factors 
 
6.1.1 International Organization, Structure and Control 
HospiMed and SurgiSupplies sales are organized in an international matrix 
structure. The disciplinary organizational power lies with the subsidiaries with 
their general managers typically reporting directly to the HospiMed 
international board of directors, sometimes via an intermediate regional 
structure. The divisional influence is maintained by a centralized 
Criteria 1 2 3a 3b 4 5a 5b Impact
international organization 
Galbraith and Kazanjian (1986) 
international structure 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) 
headquarter - subsidiary 
relationship 
Malnight (1996) 
highly divisionalized 
structure allows 
decentralized local 
organizations to avoid 
individual SBUs
control mechanisms 
Ouchi (1979) clan clan bureaucratic
control strategy 
Ouchi (1979) 
investment initiative 
Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) 
parent driven 
investment
parent driven 
investment
subsidiary 
driven 
disinvestment
subsidiary 
driven 
disinvestment
subsidiary 
driven 
investment
maintenance 
of status quo
maintenance 
of status quo
headquarters decide on 
the amount of 
investment, local 
management decides on 
which SBUs to invest in
subsidiary  strategy 
Jarillo and Martinez (1990) 
active receptive active active receptive receptiive receptive
strategic choices strongly 
influenced by general 
managers prior carreer 
experience
short term and risk-avers 
local strategies
subsidiary marketing 
organization types 
Homburg et al. (2012) 
champ
champ / 
dependent
implementer / 
aspirant
subsidiary taxonomy 
useful in simplifying and 
objectifying performance 
evaluation
subsidiary marketing 
operations performance types 
Grewal et al. (2009)
world-class 
operation
miner poor operation poor operation prospector
average 
operation
average 
operation
necessary headquarters / 
subsidiary as to perform 
mining or prospecting 
strategies
cultural dimensions 
Hofstede (1983) 
low power 
distance
high power 
distance
low power 
distance
low power 
distance
high power 
distance
medium 
power 
distance
medium 
power 
distance
subsidiaries with high 
(low) power distance 
require top-down (bottom-
up) implementation of 
strategies
conflict between global 
efficiency and local 
adaptability
global
decentralized
bureaucratic bureaucratic inconsistency between 
global structure and 
decentralized control
global strategy is defined 
by the 'survival of the 
fittest SBUs'output
Sales and Marketing Units
matrix
champ champ / dependent
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management of strategic marketing, R&D and manufacturing.  
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) have defined four types of international structure. 
The multinational structure is seen as typical for prewar European family 
owned businesses, where owners delegated ‘operating independence to 
trusted employees sent to manage offshore subsidiaries’ (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1998: 56). The multinational structure is defined by decentralization 
of assets and responsibilities, control based largely on personal relationships 
and largely independent operations of subsidiaries. The international form 
also has independent subsidiaries, but they depend on the technologies, 
products and organizational knowledge from the mother company while 
keeping their independence as to which products and strategies are most 
suitable for their country. Global structures centralize assets and 
responsibilities, and the role of the subsidiaries is reduced to sales and 
service. The transnational structure is defined by a specific organizational 
culture and mind-set that allows international managers to permanently judge 
and balance the needs for global efficiency with the needs for local 
adaptability. 
With products being largely developed by and distributed from facilities in the 
domestic country and manufactured in world-scale factories in few countries, 
SurgiSupplies international structure can be best categorized as global. On 
the other hand, the control mechanisms sometimes seem to still echo an 
organizational heritage of earlier days, when subsidiaries were managed very 
independently and mostly based on personal relationships. One of the local 
general managers recalls that in the early days of internationalization of 
SurgiSupplies there was an almost total local autonomy as the mother 
company had not yet developed any know-how as to how to manage foreign 
subsidiaries. 
Headquarter-Subsidiary Relationship 
As the subsidiaries have a very high level of autonomy, the headquarters – 
subsidiary relationship at SurgiSupplies can be described as decentralized 
(Malnight, 1996). This seems to be a deliberate long-term strategy of the top 
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management. The difficulty for individual central SBU managers lies in the 
fact that with the large number of divisions and SBUs the local managers 
have a certain amount of freedom that allows them to avoid one or several 
product groups and the central organizations and managers that are 
respectively responsible for them. While the subsidiaries are obliged to sell 
the world products provided by the central divisions, the large variety of 
product lines provides them with a high degree of liberty to design their own 
marketing and sales strategy. In choosing or changing their SurgiSupplies 
product foci, they do not necessarily consult with or follow guidelines of the 
divisional headquarters. This leads to a situation where strategic product 
focus risks becoming a random result of the decisions of local managers, 
particularly for minor product groups, or product groups that face momentary 
difficulties. 
The divisional headquarters sometimes seemed to fail in consequently 
establishing central guidelines throughout the world-wide organization. This 
might have led to a lack in clarity of intended matrix roles and unwanted 
additional power-imbalance in the headquarter-subsidiary relationships 
(Goold and Campbell, 2003). Even though the theoretical advantages of the 
matrix organization form are understood, some managers believe that the 
clear decision structure of a line organization would suit their development 
goals better and lead to a better acceptance of the central goals in the 
subsidiaries. Several of the ‘Matrix pathologies’ described by Davis and 
Lawrence (1978) could be identified (e.g. power struggles, decision 
strangulation) however these seem to prevail within the headquarters in the 
product development and industrialization process, rather than in the 
relationship with the subsidiaries. The impact on the headquarters – 
subsidiary relationship lies in the fact that the credibility of central managers 
is compromised, as they cannot fulfill their promises of making innovations 
available as planned. In country 1 for example, the local sales organization 
seemed to become complacent while waiting for delayed innovations, using 
this fact as a universal excuse for low performance. Local SBU 1 managers 
from country 1 as well as central managers believe that the matrix 
organization and an over-developed bureaucracy at the divisional 
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headquarters level are at least partially responsible for the slow development 
of new products. This has a very important negative impact, as SBU 1 
product life-cycles are judged to be particularly short-lived, requiring a close 
communication between central and local and a high reactivity.  
Control Mechanisms 
MNCs can generally rely on the market principle, bureaucratic principle or the 
clan principle for control. As the local subsidiaries are largely independent in 
their decision as to what product lines they would like to adopt and invest in, 
SurgiSupplies seems to be relying at least to a certain extent on the market 
principle, in the sense of ‘survival of the fittest SBUs’. Central SBU managers 
are competing for the attention and favor of the local managers to invest in 
their respective product lines. Subsidiary managers need to analyze their 
local market place and decide on the product portfolio that will allow the best 
return on investment in their specific environment. Generally speaking there 
seems to be a feeling among central managers of permanently needing to 
persuade and convince the countries to cooperate by offering them value, 
services and resources, always risking being taken advantage of and doing 
their job for them. Interestingly, the subsidiary managers seem to present 
themselves to the central manager more like the buying center of an external 
customer than as an aligned sub-group of the same organization. 
Local managers widely appreciate the decision making latitude they are 
allowed by the headquarters and they believe it to be justified by their 
intimate knowledge about local differences concerning sales opportunities for 
different product groups, sales channels, legal restrictions etc. The 
management control system of SurgiSupplies is particularly vulnerable to a 
high staff-turn over, such as typically exists in some emerging markets. On 
the one hand, with the high degree of divisionalization, local teams are often 
very small and central managers can lose a large portion or even all of their 
local contacts when there is fluctuation among local managers. On the other 
hand, as the control system relies more on long-term personal relationships 
than on formalized reporting relationships, it takes a long time to reestablish 
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lost successful contacts. 
It is very important to distinguish the level at which control mechanisms are 
applied within the MNC: the control systems within the headquarters, the 
control system within the subsidiary and the control system between these 
organizations, that we have described above. At the headquarters-level, 
SurgiSupplies to us is best described as a type Z organization, according to 
Jaeger (1983) or by clan control (Ouchi, 1979), featuring informal control but 
with formalized measures, long-term employment, consensual decision 
making but individual responsibility. This however is not necessarily the case 
at the level of the subsidiaries. Country 2, e.g. shows strong characteristics of 
a type J organization, with life-time employment, implicit and informal control 
and collective responsibilities, and there are other examples of type A 
bureaucracies with short-term employment and very explicit, formalized 
control (Jaeger 1983: 93). The local subsidiary control system thus does not 
seem to be determined by the MNC but by the local culture and the local 
managers. Central managers who have never worked in subsidiaries might 
be unaware of these differences which can potentially result in 
misunderstandings. 
Control Strategies 
As has been discussed at length earlier, control strategy can be based on 
output control, behavior control or socialization mechanisms. Control at the 
headquarters of SurgiSupplies seems to be marked by shared values, taking 
pride in working for the company and a high level of delegation and a low 
incidence of sanctioning in case of underperformance. These values are also 
communicated to local top managers by central top managers (country 2) 
and understood by these (examples in countries 1, 3 and 5). The system thus 
seems to show strong elements of clan control (Ouchi, 1979) and seems to 
lead to a high level of employee satisfaction and loyalty and a low staff turn-
over rate, also in the domestic sales force (country 1). On the level of local 
sales people in country 1 however, the principle of output control seems to be 
prevailing over different organizational levels, as sales leadership is seen as 
depending very much on the personality of individual managers and a large 
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amount of independence is granted on the basis of mutual trust to individual 
sales people as long as their overall results are acceptable (Anderson and 
Oliver, 1987: 77).  
There is a wide consensus between central and local managers, that 
management control at SurgiSupplies is different to it’s American 
competitors. These are believed to be marked by strong central strategic 
directives which might be interpreted as elements of behavioral control and at 
the same time high pressure on short-term financial outcomes with strong 
sanctioning mechanisms, such as eliminating under-performers, and thus 
elements of output control (Anderson and Oliver, 1987). Participants of 
country 1 for example believe that in competitors’ companies, which are 
usually American based publicly traded corporations, there is tighter 
management control with less liberty for the employees, more sanctions, 
higher variable income proportions and higher staff turn-over. The local 
managers in country 1 seem to strongly prefer the company culture of their 
own company to those of competitors. It seems to be based on common 
values and enjoying and taking pride in working for this company.  
The sales managers in countries 1 and 3 both state that they believe in 
independent decision making and output control for more senior sales 
people, typically in implant related businesses, while seeing behavior control 
more appropriate for less senior sales people, typically employed in less 
complex product groups. 
Egelhoff (1984) predicts a tendency for output control for US companies and 
a tendency towards behavioral control for European countries. In our case, 
US companies are perceived as using mechanisms of output control, such as 
high variable income structures probably explaining at the same time a 
higher staff turn-over, as non-performers will face diminished financial 
rewards and consequently might leave the company. On the other hand, US 
companies are also seen as having tighter enforcement of global strategies, 
which could be interpreted as elements of behavioral control. The members 
of the European marketing and sales team studied in country 1 on the other 
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hand, be they in the central or in the local domestic sales organization, seem 
to be guided more on the basis of common values with a lot of personal 
empowerment, which could rather be explained by clan control than output or 
behavioral control (Ouchi, 1974).  
The fact that the only European competitor in SBU 5b is perceived as 
behaving more like SurgiSupplies than like the American companies hints at 
a regional cultural background to this observation. On the other hand the fact 
that HospiMed and SurgiSupplies are privately owned and not publically 
traded companies might explain the fact of being more long-term oriented. 
In summary, the conflicting interests between global efficiency and local 
adaptability are difficult to resolve due to an inconsistency between the global 
structure and strategy and the decentralized control system, the global 
strategy risking to be defined by the 'survival of the fittest SBUs’. In order to 
further improve on these conflicts, SurgiSupplies could either adapt the 
control system to the global structure by installing tighter control of the 
subsidiary managers or further invest in the development of a transnational 
company culture that enables international and local managers to find 
compromises for balancing the need for global scale and global efficiencies 
with the need for local adaptability. 
Investment Initiative 
Birkinshaw and Hoods’ theory (1998) describes the internationalization of a 
company as a stream of investment decisions concerning different countries. 
While the overall amount of money that should be invested in a country at 
SurgiSupplies can be controlled by central top-managers, the decision in 
what specific areas to invest is largely left to the subsidiaries. As the 
objective of central SBU managers is to ensure the global success of their 
respective product lines, they permanently try to convince local managers to 
invest additional resources in them. They are risking to enter an ‘arms race’ 
with other central managers with their lobbying activities, wasting central and 
local resources alike, given the high degree of divisionalization with 7 SBUs 
at SurgiSupplies alone. On the other hand the local managers are required to 
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allocate their investments to the best investment opportunities. The 
competing offerings from different SBUs at the headquarters put them in a 
powerful position. The reasons for their final investment decisions often 
remain ominous to the central managers. 
While overall divisional financial objectives for subsidiaries are set by top 
matrix managers at the headquarters’ board level, the way these objectives 
are broken down into individual SBUs and product groups is largely left to the 
local managers. In country 4, e.g., even after lengthy discussions involving 
central and local top-managers the final decision was that the local 
organization had to deliver a fixed financial result, but could decide for 
themselves what SBUs to invest in at what level. The parent-driven 
investment decision thus defines how much to invest in each region, while 
the subsidiaries decide how much to invest in each division or SBU.  
In two of our countries there is a clear negative effect of decentralized 
decision making on global strategy. In country 2 it took many years to 
establish one of the core global initiatives of SurgiSupplies with a less than 
satisfactory result, due to a lack of local investment and resistance at lower 
hierarchy levels. The local managers in country 3 decided to disinvest in one 
of the two core businesses of SurgiSupplies, completely contradicting global 
strategy. With their more directive approach to management control of 
subsidiaries, as opposed to SurgiSupplies, American companies are believed 
to be capable of quick and complete global roll out of corporate initiatives 
such as global product launches. A more general example is given for the roll 
out of a ‘block-buster’ product in SBU 3a, where the quality and the 
investment in market launch activities varied largely from country to country, 
compromising the world-wide role-out.  
6.1.2 Subsidiary Strategy  
According to Jarillo and Martinez (1990) the strategy of a subsidiary can be 
active, receptive or autonomous depending on the degree of integration into 
the MNC and the degree of localization of activities. The degree of 
localization measures the number of value chain activities that are 
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performed. Pure marketing and sales organizations are considered to have a 
low degree of localization. Although they might carry out other value chain 
activities for other divisions, all 4 international subsidiaries viewed in our 
study are mainly focused on marketing, sales and service activities. Even 
distribution is being more and more centralized, as products are mostly being 
shipped directly to the end-customers from the central warehouses in the 
domestic country. The degree of localization can thus be considered as low. 
The degree of integration is measured by how many value chain activities are 
being performed autonomously or in a way that is integrated with the mother 
company and the other subsidiaries. The degree of integration of marketing 
and sales activities varies largely in the organizations we have analyzed. In 
the domestic country as well as in country 3 it seems rather high, and it 
seems to get lower with a higher cultural and geographical distance. 
Specifically, central managers have referred to the one Asian subsidiary 
studied as a ‘black box’. Generally speaking, however, the international 
SurgiSupplies organizations can be classified as ‘receptive’. 
Prior experience of local top managers 
Interestingly, the choice of local business foci seems to be strongly 
influenced by the former career path of the local managers. The four 
divisions of HospiMed and even all seven SBUs of SurgiSupplies are serving 
distinct market segments with specific competitors and specific customer side 
buying centers. Top managers of HospiMed subsidiaries are unlikely to have 
personal career experience in all of these different fields. Participants in 
countries 1, 2, 3 and 4 are under the impression that prior experience of 
these managers has an important impact on their investment decisions in 
these respective areas. Interestingly participants speak of ‘personal beliefs’ 
or even ‘religious confessions’ when talking about the SBU orientation of 
individual managers. But it is not only the managers’ habits that are difficult to 
change. In case 2, once the general manager had been convinced of a 
central initiative, it then still took years to convince the lower hierarchy levels, 
as they had no prior experience with the new program and did not believe in 
it. 
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Central managers do not seem to have difficulty in gaining a common 
understanding with local managers who are themselves experts of the same 
product group. Delicate situations can arise when the local managers are not 
sufficiently empowered and their bosses are not familiar with their particular 
business. 
Impact of delegation on local strategy 
The high level of subsidiary autonomy makes it difficult for functional matrix 
managers from the central divisional headquarters to develop global 
strategies and enforce them in the subsidiaries. Although the organization is 
defined as a matrix, the organizational power in the sales function lies largely 
with the country organizations, sometimes privileging local responsiveness 
over global business integration needs (Prahalad and Doz, 1987: 172). One 
of the central managers pointed out that global strategy became a random 
sum of local strategies. 
Particularly when subsidiaries are showing overall satisfactory sales growth 
and profits, there often will be no critique or sanctions for the neglect of 
world-wide strategies or individual strategic product groups. This corresponds 
to the non-centrist approach described by Gestetner (1974). The country 
subsidiaries have the same hierarchical and decision making status as the 
domestic sales force and are only ‘subject, …, to minimal central control. … , 
and, provided a satisfactory growth in profit and return on investment 
continues, the head office maintains a policy of non-interference.’ (Gestetner, 
1974: 103). While it needs to be reminded that the local sales team in country 
1 is operating in the domestic market of the MNC, the central managers 
seem to find the same, maybe even a higher autonomy in international sales 
organizations.  
Short-term and risk-averse local strategies 
Generally speaking the local strategy seems to be more short-term and the 
central strategy more long-term oriented. This is in line with the prediction by 
Anderson and Oliver (1987) that output control leads to the prioritization of 
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short-term sales objectives over strategic goals.  
A problem might lie in the fact, that strategies are not pursued in a 
sustainable way, as local organizations turn their focus and resources to 
other product groups quickly when new opportunities come up or when 
obstacles arise. The central sales manager in country 4 had the impression 
that there was no defined strategy in the subsidiary at all, but that the 
managers were only reacting to short-term market opportunities. The same 
manager speculated, that in emerging markets with multitudinous growth 
opportunities, maybe long-term market strategies were less important. One 
SBU manager pointed out that when there were promising new products in 
other SBUs, local managers sometimes reallocated their SBU’s resources to 
these products, leading to a short-term positive effect as the new products 
could be sold additionally, but to a mid-term problem, as the traditional 
product group sales then started to decline.  
Generally speaking it seems to be easier and less risky for local subsidiaries 
to develop minor market shares in additional products, than to focus on 
certain strategic product areas and to consequently develop market shares 
there. Also, local managers seem to want to satisfy as many central 
managers as possible, by giving them ‘a little piece of the cake’ in order to 
have a large base of supporters of their own personal career at the 
headquarters. Another point brought up by a central manager was that 
subsidiaries sometimes do not allow for sufficient time to reach return on 
investment and abandon already engaged investments too quickly.  
 
6.1.3 Subsidiary Marketing Organization and Performance Types 
Organization Types 
In their taxonomy of international marketing subsidiaries of MNCs, Homburg 
et al. (2012) have found 5 clusters according to the cluster criteria ‘structure’ 
(age, size, value-added scope), ‘strategy’ (strategic importance, influence 
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and competence), ‘environmental conditions’ (market, customer, MNC), 
‘region’ and ‘industry’. Saturated administrators are older subsidiaries in 
stable market conditions. Universal champs perform numerous value adding 
activities successfully on a large scale. Important dependents are 
strategically important but are closely managed from central headquarters. 
Promising aspirants are smaller subsidiaries with a lot of strategic freedom in 
ethnocentric countries and flexible implementers are young, small 
subsidiaries responsible essentially only for sales and marketing. We have 
categorized the country 1 organization as ‘universal champ’ as it centralizes 
all value adding activities on a global scale. Without performing a detailed 
analysis of Homburg et al.’s criteria for the 5 marketing and sales 
organizations in our study, we have made rough estimations and matched 
them to the stereotypes proposed by the authors (Figure 26).  
 
Figure 26: Subsidiary Organization Types 
We achieved this by subtracting the case values from the stereotype values, 
summing up the positive absolute values and selecting the stereotype with 
the smallest sum. In our rough estimation we omitted the criteria concerning 
the MNC as a whole, as the values are the same for each subsidiary and 
therefore do not add to the internal comparison within a single MNC. This 
resulted in subsidiaries 1, 2, 3 and 5 being classified as ‘universal champs’ 
1=high
2 = medium
3 = low
1 2 3a 3b 4 5a 5b
admini-
strators
champs
depen-
dents
aspirants
imple-
menters
age 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 3 3
size 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2,5 1 2 2,5 3
scope 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 1,5 1 1,5 2,5 3
influence 1 3 2 2 3 2 2 1,5 1 1,5 2,5 3
competence 1 2 1 1 3 2 2 3 1 3 2 3
importance 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 1 2 2
market dynamics 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 3 2 2 1 2
market growth 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 2 1 1 1
GDP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 2 2
population 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 1
GDP per capita 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 2 2 2
customer 3 1 3 3 3 2 2 1 2 2 1 3
Homburg (2012) Subsidiary TypesSales and Marketing Units
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and subsidiary 4 as flexible implementer. While the result was rather robust 
for subsidiaries 1 and 3, subsidiaries 2 and 5 also reasonably well matched 
the category ‘important dependents’ and subsidiary 4 the category ‘promising 
aspirants’. Homburg et al. have compared their stereotypes to performance 
outcomes and found that ‘universal champs’ scored high for marketing 
effectiveness and efficiency and for profit margins while ‘flexible 
implementers’ score only high for marketing effectiveness and low for all 
other performance measures. We judge this to be coherent with our cases 
and conclude that this taxonomy might indeed be helpful in simplifying and 
objectifying subsidiary performance evaluation. On the other hand it needs to 
be pointed out that the rough analysis did not allow to come to clear and 
meaningful conclusions with this method. 
Performance Types 
Grewal et al. (2009) see the first goal for subsidiary to create market assets 
in the form of brand-awareness, a base of industrial customers and sales 
outlets. These assets support the second goal, achieving market yield in the 
form of sales, market share and profits. Depending on their success in 
creating market assets and market yield they identify subsidiaries as miners, 
prospectors, world-class operations and poor operations. Different situational 
aspects such as competitive and regulatory environment as well as market 
maturity need to be taken into account during the assessment, and more 
mature markets might require yield strategies while younger markets may 
require asset-building strategies. In Figure 27 we have rated the investigated 
sales and marketing units by their achievements in terms of market asset 
creation and market yield, according to performance figures and interview 
results. Each country organization is facing individual specific 
competitiveness issues. In country 1 they are struggling with the innovative 
potential of the product line, in country 2 with country specific demand, in 
country 3 with price competitiveness, in country 4 with logistic problems and 
in country 5 with an economic crisis. Additionally there are specific SBU 
related issues. SBU 1 seems to encounter bureaucracy and matrix problems 
at the headquarters R&D level, SBU 2 is struggling with the known problems 
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of teaching a product sales force how to sell services (e.g. Reinartz and 
Ulaga, 2008), in country 3 there is a subsidiary driven reduction of 
investment, by combining two underperforming sales teams as well as price 
competitiveness issues, country 4 is encountering emerging market 
dynamics and particular supply chain issues and country 5 has a particularly 
strong impact on local dealers on the business.  
 
Figure 27: Subsidiary Marketing Performance Types 
In their performance evaluation system, Grewal et al. account for the specific 
environment of each country by having a number of different managers rate 
the level of competitiveness and the level of regulation of a given market 
between 0 and 100 points. In view of the real-life complexity and 
incommensurability of each country and SBU situation, it could in our opinion 
be a difficult task to produce useful data with such a system. 
Country 1 2 3 3 4 5 5 
SBU 1 2 3a 3b 4 5a 5b
country specific context
innovative 
market
culturally distant 
market
emerging market
SBU specific context
headquarters 
matrix problems
solution selling 
know-how
supply chain 
issues
total country ranking 1 3 7 7 11 8 8 
SBU country ranking 2 4 28 24 13 9 8 
SBU total sales 2011 
(1 000 Euros)
             13.619                13.092                 1.255                 1.926                 3.335                 2.641                 2.669   
SBU growth 2011 (%) 
currency adjusted
3% 9% -1% 12% 16% -2% -18%
3 years SBU growth (%) 
currency adjusted
28% 20% 9% -6% 63% 1% -3%
marketshare 7% 19% 1% 1% 6% 16% 14%
marketgrowth 2011 -1% 1% 2% 3% 7% -6% -4%
average 3 years growth / 
market growth
11% 5% 1% -5% 14% -5% -4,5%
growth rank 2,00 3,00 4,00 2,50 1,00 6,00 5,00
market share rank 4,00 1,00 6,50 6,50 5,00 2,00 3,00
average rank 3,00 2,00 5,25 4,50 3,00 4,00 4,00
Market Maturity high high high high low high high
Market Asset Creation high low low low medium medium medium
Market Yield high very high very low very low high low low
Subsidiary Performance 
Type
world-class 
operation
miner poor-operation poor operation
miner / world-
class operation
mediocre / poor 
operation
mediocre / poor 
operation
economic crisis market
dealer market, resource allocation
price competitive market
combining two sales forces
 
191
Neither of the investigated sales units in our study has achieved a market 
leading position, so the ratings are relative compared to other SurgiSupplies 
subsidiaries. In country 1, the domestic market, brand-awareness and sales 
coverage is high and absolute sales levels are high, but with moderate 
market shares. This thus can be called a world-class operation in the terms 
of Grewal et al. However, sales have been stagnating lately and with the high 
market maturity, the cost of gaining incremental customers is high. The 
bureaucratic matrix organization as well as coordination difficulties between 
two R&D departments in two different countries, paired with overall limited 
dedicated R&D capacities for SBU 1 due to the high level of divisionalization, 
has lead to difficulties in competitiveness. SurgiSupplies is too slow in 
launching new products according to latest market trends. Strategy 
implementation in country 1 is good, as the strategy is developed in a well- 
coordinated way. Long-term personal relationships and regular structured 
and unstructured meetings between central and local managers are the basis 
of this coordination. In country 2 market shares and sales are comparably 
high, but brand-awareness is low, indicating a mining strategy. As this is a 
very big and important healthcare market, central managers are trying to 
encourage a prospecting strategy with their ‘total solution’ program, in spite 
of the high market maturity. In country 2, local managers were under the 
impression, that the ‘total solution’ program that had been developed in 
SurgiSupplies’ domestic market where the company has a very strong 
competitive position, had difficulty in country 2 because the brand was not 
established strongly enough to convince customers of this innovative 
offering. While central managers in the end acknowledged this as a possible 
reason for the slow progress, local managers believed that central managers 
were not sensitive enough concerning the specific local situation. Locally 
adapted products for SBU 2 and also other SBUs had been developed in the 
past, with mixed success. The local subsidiary has been pursuing a yield 
strategy, while the headquarters wanted them to continue building up market-
assets. The central initiative to implement the ‘total solution’ program met a 
lot of resistance and could only be advanced very slowly. This is due to a 
lack of trust between the two organizations, cultural and language barriers 
and a general lack of disciplinary power of the divisional headquarters. In 
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country 3 sales, coverage and number of customers are low in the 
investigated product groups, indicating poor operations. The local subsidiary 
failed to put sufficient investment to develop a sustainable market position in 
SBUs 3a and 3b. This resulted in poor operations and eventually in a 
subsidiary initiated disinvestment. This is remarkable, as SBU 3b had been 
declared a core business with defined objectives of developing market share 
for all subsidiaries. In this case, the contradiction between local and central 
objectives becomes most obvious: the local management focused investment 
in product groups who promised the best return on investment in their 
country’s environment, irrespective of the global strategy. 
Grewal et al. point out the importance of recognizing the specific competitive 
environment. One might suspect that the failure in SBU 3a was mostly due to 
SurgiSupplies’ overall incapacity to compete in this particularly price sensitive 
market, this possibility was however not sufficiently acknowledged by the 
central managers, who rather blamed the local management. Country 4 is an 
emerging market and the subsidiary is at the verge of becoming a world-
class operation. The results from country 4 showed that headquarters was 
not able to decide, where to invest limited resources and had to delegate the 
investment decision to the subsidiary managers. Also it showed that even 
productive help from the headquarters in the sense of creating new customer 
opportunity is not necessarily appreciated and exploited at the subsidiary, if 
there is no local commitment. Country 5 has visible market shares but poor 
growth. With a moderate brand-awareness they can be called a mediocre to 
poor operation. With the CombiTeam project, the local team is trying to get 
the critical mass to improve market asset creation and market yield 
simultaneously, an ambitious task. The results from country 5 showed how 
competing SBU structures at the headquarters level are influencing 
subsidiaries to move investments from one SBU to the other. 
Overall we judge Grewal et al.’s method as very useful for the evaluation of 
subsidiary performance and strategy.  
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6.1.4 Cultural Dimensions 
Of Hofstede’s original 4 cultural dimensions, only power distance seemed to 
be of major concern to the interviewees. Power distance ratings according to 
Hofstede (1983: 52) for countries 1 and 3 are identically low, for country 5 
they were higher and for country 2 still higher. Country 4 was not part of 
Hofstede’s study. A higher power distance can be associated with less 
empowerment of lower hierarchies. Imbalance in empowerment seemed to 
have an impact on the relationship of central managers and local staff in our 
study. While central SurgiSupplies managers have a lot of decision making 
freedom, local managers, top managers aside sometimes seem to have very 
limited decision making power and thus cannot make binding agreements 
with central managers. This is unsurprising, given the cultural differences, 
e.g. of more archaic Asian countries and the finding, that local management 
style at SurgiSupplies is left to the personality of the local managing 
directors.  
Steyn et al. (2011) describe how at the Daimler Chrysler subsidiary in South-
Africa, despite managers’ perception that they were balancing authoritative 
and participative communication, and that they understood the need for staff 
members to feel empowered and proud of their company, staff members in 
reality did not feel that way. They were under the impression that it was ‘them 
versus us’ and they expressed a strong need for more belongingness, 
recognition and involvement in decision-making 2011: 136-137). The authors 
recommended the implementation of a formal internal communication 
framework, symmetrical communication between staff and managers, and 
active aid by the company for managers who lack interpersonal 
communication skills. 
We believe that this inconsistency in management cultures can lead to 
specific problems in strategic implementation at lower hierarchy levels of the 
matrix, when ‘empowered’ central managers encounter ‘non-empowered’ 
local managers. First of all, central managers might not be aware of the local 
power situation and expect too much independence in implementation from 
their direct counterparts, who on the other hand might be reluctant to reveal 
 
194
their lack of power to them. If the central manager is aware of the situation, 
they need to clearly understand the local decision making process (e.g. 
bottom-up or top-down) to approach all managers involved in the correct 
order.  
Cultural differences impacted on the relationship between headquarters and 
subsidiaries firstly, because central managers had difficulties in 
understanding the language and communication style of local managers and 
thus their true intentions. This problem was by definition absent in the 
domestic country 1. It also seemed absent in country 3 where there were no 
language difficulties and cultural closeness to the domestic country is given. 
As the geographical and cultural distance increased in the order of countries 
5, 4 (Eastern Europe) and 2 (Asia), these issues became more predominant. 
Language difficulties still seem to be an important obstacle to central 
management control of foreign subsidiaries as was documented in countries 
2, 4 and 5. This leads to difficulties in communicating between managers 
(country 2 and 4), lengthy translation efforts (country 2) and general 
difficulties for central managers of being able to collect first hand market data 
from customers and sales people. They then cannot challenge filtered 
information provided from local managers. 
In their introductory article to a 2011 special edition of the Journal of World 
Business concerning ‘language-sensitive research in international business 
and management’, Piekkari and Tietze find that concerning this topic area 
‘despite few exceptions (e.g. Tietze, 2008) there is still little common thrust in 
developing research agendas and in informing managerial practice.’ (Piekkari 
and Tietze, 2011: 267).  
Piekkari and Welch (2010) point out that different theoretical perspectives of 
the MNC treat language in different ways. The theoretical perspective 
focusing on organizational design views language standardization as 
instrumental for top management in managing the MNC. The network 
perspective, that views the MNC as a network of actors driven by ‘context 
rationality’ rather than ‘economic rationality’ views language as a tool to fulfill 
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relational requirements. The institutional perspective views language as a 
‘source of institutional pressure and legitimacy’ (Piekkari and Welch, 2010: 
469). The critical perspective, that postulates irrationality of organizational 
members, has the paradoxical view of language as being both powerful, in 
the sense of dividing organizational members into groups and elevating 
individuals’ organizational influence, and at the same time powerless, as 
studies have shown that attempts to standardize language in organizations 
frequently fail. 
A study of 8 German and Japanese company headquarters and their 
respective foreign subsidiaries in Japan and Germany by Harzing et al. 
(2011) analyzed if there were language barriers between headquarters and 
subsidiary managers, and what solutions were used to resolve them. 42 out 
or 44 interview respondents indicated that language barriers were indeed 
present. Methods to resolve these barriers could be found in informal day-to-
day solutions (such as building redundancy in communication, adjusting the 
mode of communication, or frequent switching of languages during meetings) 
the use of bridge individuals (such as bilingual employees, expatriates, 
inpatriates, non-native locals and parallel information networks) and in 
structural solutions at the organizational level (such as the definition of a 
corporate language, machine translation, external translators and language 
training).  
In their survey of 119 general managers of subsidiaries of MNCs in Finnland 
and China, Björkmann and Piekkari (2009) studied the influence of subsidiary 
language skills on corporate control mechanisms. They found that lower 
competence in the corporate language was associated with more centralized 
control in strategic decision making and more formalized control. They found 
no influence of language competence on the level of output control and 
control by socialization, indicating that language competence was a construct 
distinct from cultural distance. 
Marschan-Piekkari and Welch (2004) point out that, while international 
business studies traditionally have been largely carried out in the Western 
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World and by Western researchers, it cannot be assumed that the research 
methods that have worked there can necessarily be used in other parts of the 
world without adaptation (Marschan-Piekkari and Welch, 2004: 9). Their 
‘Handbook of Qualitative Research Methods for International Business’ thus 
features articles from various authors around the ongoing debates on 
‘contextualisation of the research process; design and management of cross-
national collaborative research; rethinking current and alternative research 
methods; and the quality, codification and publication of qualitative research.’ 
(Marschan-Piekkari and Welch, 2004: 8). An obvious example given for 
necessary contextualization is political violence and physical danger in 
certain countries, where respondents are afraid of repercussions. Another 
example is given by MNCs with complex multinational and highly political 
headquarters – subsidiary relationships.  
Design issues in international business are identified by the frequent 
necessity for translation and different national attitudes towards the practice 
of interviewing. As a response to the above difficulties, some researchers are 
calling for the extended usage of qualitative methods beyond the explorative 
purpose, e.g. for theory testing, and entirely different approaches, research 
paradigms, techniques and epistemological and ontological stances, such as 
postmodernism, postcolonial theory, critical theory, ethnography, 
hermeneutics and discourse analysis (Marschan-Piekkari and Welch, 2004: 
13-15).  
 
6.1.5 A Model of Manufacturer – Distributor Relationship 
Although the model by Homburg et al. 2002 was created to describe the 
relationships effectiveness for manufacturers with independent distributors, it 
seems to describe the relationships between SurgiSupplies’ headquarters 
and their local sales and marketing organizations quite well. The relationship 
effectiveness for the manufacturer is positively influenced by cooperation, but 
negatively by higher distributor (subsidiary) power. Cooperation is positively 
influenced by perceived similarity and participation of the distributor in 
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decision processes. This is a dilemma, as participation in decision processes 
at the same time positively influences distributor (subsidiary) power (Figure 
28). 
 
Figure 28: Manufacturer - Distributor Relationship Effectiveness 
(Homburg et al., 2002) 
As described above, it seems like the competition of the numerous SBUs, 
paired with the absence of disciplinary control has led to a relationship that is 
rather marked by a market mechanism than a bureaucratic control system 
and thus resembles a manufacturer – distributor relationship. The categories 
‘similarity’, ‘distributor power’ (in our case ‘subsidiary power’), ‘participation’ 
and ‘cooperation’ categorize well many of the contributions we gathered from 
our interviews (Figure 29).  
Homburg et al. (2002) defined similarity in terms of price and quality 
positioning, marketing and sales orientation and organizational culture. 
Participation refers to the operational and strategic decision making process 
in all aspects of marketing and sales, such as products, advertisement, 
budgets, staff, after-sales service etc. Cooperation is defined in mutual 
problem solving, development of ideas, target definition, etc. as well as open 
communication about pricing and costs. Relationship effectiveness is defined 
in terms of achievement of sales goals, growth contribution, new product 
development, overall performance etc. (Homburg et al., 2002: 23).  
Participation in 
Decision Processes
Relationship 
Effectiveness for the 
Manufacturer
Cooperation
Similarity Distributor Power 
(Subsidiary Power)
+
‐
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Figure 29: Participant Observations Organized in Categories 
categories proposed by Homburg et al., 2002 
The criteria used for ‘relationship effectiveness’ by Homburg et al. are quite 
similar and overlapping with the criteria for ‘sales force effectiveness’ used by 
Zoltners et. al. (2008), both papers mostly referring to sales output criteria, 
such as growth rates, target achievement etc.. The definition of Homburg et 
al.’s relationship dimensions is not identical to our observations but strongly 
overlapping. The international cultural aspect e.g. was not part of the 
definition of ‘perceived similarity’, however we think that it is plausible to 
extend it in this direction. ‘Perceived similarity’ in our context can be found in 
cultural aspects, such as power distance, language and communication, 
personal background, former SBU and product experience but also in 
personal relationships, as perceived similarity should increase in 
relationships over time. ‘Distributor (subsidiary) power’ has been very clearly 
Participant Observation Category
different empowerment level of local and central managers similarity
small subsidiaries can have different corporate culture than large headquarters similarity
long-term personal relationships similarity
compatriotes, expatriates help for relationship building similarity
dissimilarities in competitive position lead to misunderstanding and blame similarity
language problems similarity
empowerment differences in different cultures similarity
communication differences in different cultures similarity
development of many small local activities -> risk avers strategy vs. risk favoring strategy similarity
experienced local managers vs. unexperienced central managers similarity
top managers are knowledgable in certain SBUs and prefer them from prior experience similarity
clan control vs. - bureaucratic control similarity
internal HQ performance more important for successful local teams similarity
short-term business orientation of subsidiaries vs. long-term orientation of the European HQ similarity
large subsidiaries self-sufficient and self-confident via headquarters subsidiary power
product performance more important for local teams with higher market share subsidiary power
intransparency of local goal setting subsidiary power
uncoordinated central SBU activities are 'spoiling' of the local managers subsidiary power
obsessive corporate planning and control; local managers don't report true intentions subsidiary power
behavior control on an SBU level; output control on a country level subsidiary power
central capacities to small to deal with a large number of subsidiaries participation
international meetings too big to allow exchange participation
convince local hierarchy top down participation
buy-in from all hierarchy levels participation
approve local activities participation
communication of central strategy participation
envy of domestic activity participation
local field support cooperation
lacking process and role definition undermines local acceptance of central managers cooperation
creating light-houses cooperation
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pointed out as an obstacle to central control by central managers. Large 
subsidiaries are seen as being more self-confident and self-sufficient, more 
secretive about their local goal setting and strategic intentions and 
subsidiaries with higher market shares are more openly critical about 
headquarters’ strategies and performance. ‘Participation’ is also an issue that 
was brought up by many study participants. Many subsidiaries suspect that 
SurgiSupplies determines its global strategy mostly in cooperation with the 
domestic sales force in the domestic market and they strongly wish for more 
participation in these strategic decisions. Central managers on the other 
hand often manage communication and discussion about future strategic 
orientation in large meetings, where the possibilities for taking influence are 
low for individual local managers. This is partly due to the problem of 
managing the sheer number of different local organizations; on the other 
hand it may indeed be a strategy to limit the strategic power of individual 
subsidiaries. In our cases, sales organizations 1 and 3 have a strong 
perceived similarity, good cooperation and, arguably, good relationship 
effectiveness from the manufacturers point of view. For countries 4 and 5 and 
even more so for the Asian country 2, perceived similarity is lower and 
cooperation is more difficult, specifically for country 2. Here, also, central 
managers would probably see the relationship effectiveness more critically. 
Similarity: Long-term personal relationships 
‘…in a cultural control organization one would expect the interactions 
between the headquarters and subsidiaries to be weighted in favor of 
personal contacts such as visits and telephone calls. In a bureaucratic control 
organization one would expect a greater usage of company manuals, and a 
higher degree of impersonal communication in the form of written reports …’ 
(Jaeger 1983: 95) 
The successful cooperation between central and local managers is mostly 
attributed to their long-term personal relationships in all three Western 
European countries (1, 3 and 5). The importance of frequent personal 
contact, email aside, is pointed out. 
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It might not be a coincidence that personal relationships were not brought up 
as an important factor in the Eastern European and the Asian country. Maybe 
due to the cultural distance such relationships are more difficult to establish. 
The central managers believe that their possibilities to influence the local 
organizations depends largely on their personal relationships with individuals. 
Since the development of such relationships often takes many years, a high 
staff turn-over can lead to great difficulties in establishing central 
management control. The product group of country 1 could not be launched 
at all in some countries because it was impossible to build up any kind of 
sustainable customer relationships due to staff turn-over. On the other hand 
the good cooperation between central and local managers in country 1 is 
seen as linked to the particularly low staff fluctuation rate. Although this 
finding concerning this negative correlation between staff turn-over rate and 
headquarters–subsidiary relationships seems rather obvious, we have not 
found it described in any of the analyzed pieces of literature. 
Participation: Dissatisfaction of local managers with their influence on global 
product strategy 
International local managers seem to be envious of the domestic sales force, 
as they believe that products are mainly developed according to their 
requirements and not to global, let alone specific needs of other regions. The 
local managers in country 1 admit that domestic product development gives 
them a special competitive advantage. Central managers are also trying to 
help the domestic sales and marketing organization by investing additional 
central marketing and research and development resources for the 
development of big new accounts in the country. Local managers in countries 
2, 4 and 5 were dissatisfied with the way their local needs and requirements 
were solicited, understood and respected by the headquarters. Particularly 
they also complain about the fact that SurgiSupplies recruits clinical 
consultants and speakers mainly from their domestic country. These local 
perceptions seem to have a strong negative impact on the local acceptance 
of central managers. On the other hand it needs to be pointed out that an 
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initiative to manufacture specific locally adapted products in SBU 2 for 
country 2 has not brought the expected success.  
Distributor Power: Subsidiary Size and Strategic Importance 
Although subsidiary size is frequently stated in literature as a determinant of 
organizational control, different studies show contradictory results (Schmid 
and Kretschmer, 2010: 223). 
The participants in our study pointed out influences in different directions. As 
the company has grown in size, adding numerous additional subsidiaries, 
central marketing managers in SBUs 1, 3 and 5 pointed out that they can 
only deal intensively with a small number of top subsidiaries. Local managers 
in countries 3, 4 and 5 feel that international meetings with too many country 
representatives have grown too big to allow for true exchange with the 
central managers.  
The general manager of country 3, who has been with the company for many 
years, on the other hand states that the company has gained know-how in 
managing subsidiaries in time. 
Central managers have experienced that the larger a subsidiary becomes 
and the more own resources the country organizations have, the more self-
confident they seem to behave versus the headquarters, making central 
control more difficult. All subsidiaries in our case study are of important size 
and priority to the divisional headquarters, which might partly explain their 
claim to take strategic decisions autonomously. In country 3, however neither 
SBUs 3a or 3b have a high business priority to them, so they rigorously 
pursue their CombiTeam project in spite of strong reservations of the central 
managers. 
Another important aspect is, that the culture of smaller local organizations 
can be different to the corporate culture at large divisional headquarters. The 
subsidiary in country 4 used to be an independent distributor and a central 
manager had the feeling that they are still behaving that way. 
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6.2 Activities and Tools to Improve Central Control 
The third research sub-question ‘What are successful activities and tools to 
improve central control of local sales and marketing organizations?’ is 
addressed by the literature categories displayed in Figure 30. 
 
 
Figure 30: Analysis Framework for Improving Central Control 
Respondents pointed out the following activities for improvement of central 
control: motivating and committing all local hierarchy levels, local field 
support, long-term personal relationships, expatriate managers, 
communication of global strategic orientation, strategic meetings with multiple 
local and central hierarchy level involvement, strategic sales development 
workshops, strategic planning and reporting systems, geographical focus in 
order to deal with limited resources.  
As in the previous section, these are discussed along with the corresponding 
categories identified in literature. 
 
6.2.1 Headquarters Role 
Beddi (2011) has identified 3 typical role types of headquarters in their 
interactions with subsidiaries. ‘Interventionist’ headquarters display a strong 
centralist presence at the subsidiaries, which are all managed the same way 
with unilateral know-how transfer from the headquarters to the subsidiaries. 
‘Mediating’ headquarters have numerous reciprocal activities with the 
subsidiaries and the mediating role of the headquarters being to connect the 
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subsidiaries with each other with a large staff of functional and regional 
responsible international managers. ‘Moderating’ headquarters have very 
limited contact with the subsidiaries who have a lot of relationships between 
each other. The headquarters role is to establish organizational design and 
the rules of interaction. According to this categorization, SurgiSupplies is 
clearly an interventionist headquarters, as subsidiaries have very limited 
interactions between each other. Also, SurgiSupplies’ top management has 
decided to intensify central interventions in local strategy. In order to achieve 
this, a central sales management department was installed at the divisional 
headquarters with central sales managers responsible for each region. Its 
role is to monitor strategy definition, implementation and to install superior 
world-wide performance measurement and strategic planning tools. 
Influence of central managers on local strategy 
Central managers believe that country organizations are typically less 
successful if they try to develop their own strategies by themselves. Galbraith 
and Kazanijan predict that, as ‘one cannot use authority as a basis for 
influence’ (Galbraith and Kazanijan, 1986:52) managers in a matrix need 
skills in negotiation, team-building, group work and intercultural 
understanding. Country 1 leaves the impression, that these specific skills are 
expected in a unilateral way only from the central managers, sometimes 
leaving them frustrated with their interactions. 
SBU level central managers sometimes get involved in the local planning 
process via more or less regular, sometimes controversial strategy meetings 
of central and local managers. They try to persuade local managers to follow 
certain global initiatives, however they are limited in their capacity to organize 
and follow-up on such meetings frequently and in a large number of 
countries. 
While central lobbying activities can have an impact on the local strategies as 
seen in country 2, where persistent central managers overcame the initial 
resistance of local managers concerning the ‘total solution’ program, central 
SBU managers at SurgiSupplies do not have enough capacity to 
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consequently pursue a large number of subsidiaries. Also, as has been 
shown above, competing central offerings and lobbying activities are 
undermining central control and wasting resources. Another area of difficulty 
is global expense control. Central SBU managers cannot ensure global SBU 
related expenses when they have no respective control over the respective 
local organizations. 
In order to address these issues, the positions of central sales managers 
have been created at the divisional headquarters of SurgiSupplies. As 
counterparts for local divisional managers, they are overseeing all SBUs. 
Although this initiative is more or less appreciated by all central SBU 
managers, the results approximately 18 months into this program were not 
entirely satisfactory. Central managers in all cases stated that there had been 
little impact on central management control so far, and that the principle 
problem of lacking empowerment of central managers via their local 
counterparts had not improved. In country 1 central sales managers had not 
been applied at all and in countries 3 and 5 local managers did not see the 
necessity for their countries, believing that it was more appropriate for 
smaller, less mature subsidiaries. In country 4, the central sales manager 
was very disappointed with the impact he could make and took another job at 
SurgiSupplies after only six months. This shows that increasing central 
control is a difficult and long-term undertaking. It is important that these 
difficulties are made explicit in the organization in order to keep central 
managers motivated. Inconsistencies in divisional guidelines, such as 
different geographical breakdown of sales regions and uncoordinated 
international manager meetings are also weakening central control. 
Local general managers alternatively suggested that central sales managers 
should rather be deployed as expatriate ‘business angels’ to resolve 
temporary challenges at subsidiaries (country 3), or as researchers of local 
market needs (country 1).  
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Local field support 
The importance of central managers directly engaging in active local field 
activities becomes evident in all cases. In country 1, central managers have 
direct interaction with domestic opinion leaders and customers, actively 
supporting local sales. In country 2 this is particularly pronounced as central 
managers have introduced a ‘learning by doing together’ approach to their 
‘total solution’ program. Central managers spend entire weeks together, 
learning about the local situation by being exposed to customers and building 
relationships with the sales people. Local teams benefit from acquiring the 
necessary know-how and building confidence in it.  
In country 4, central managers are trying to establish contacts between 
domestic opinion leaders who are promoting their products and local opinion 
leaders of country 4. Unfortunately, local sales people and managers do not 
always make use of these contacts. This shows that it is important for central 
managers to engage in local field activities collaboratively so that the local 
team can develop ownership of the initiative. 
In country 5, the local managers express a strong wish for central managers 
to frequently get engaged with their local customers and opinion leaders and 
to listen and to and approve of their local initiatives. They want to increase 
the feeling of affiliation to the international corporation for their customers and 
themselves. Also they are interested in central managers learning about their 
local market situation and requirements. 
In addition to the notion of cooperative field work, the continuous importance 
of local opinion leaders for the life-sciences industry is pointed out by the 
study participants. This has similarly been confirmed by Stremersch and van 
Dyck (2009) in a recent publication. 
Importantly it was pointed out that central SBU managers should better 
coordinate their geographic foci in order to use their resources efficiently. 
Ghoshal and Bartlett (1988) have described how innovation is adopted by 
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subsidiaries of multinational corporations. In subsidiaries with good adoption 
of headquarters innovations, central and local managers were in daily contact 
and marked by regular travel of headquarters’ managers to the subsidiaries 
(Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1988: 372). 
Central managers’ credibility 
There is no formalized definition of the cooperation process between central 
and local managers at SurgiSupplies. Local managers often had reservations 
concerning the competency of central managers to judge not only their 
respective local markets, but also to identify global trends and define 
successful product strategies accordingly. This however varied widely 
between countries and SBUs. Local managers in countries 3 and 5 
mentioned that sometimes central managers came straight out of college 
without any prior field experience. Such young managers were typically not 
accepted by very experienced local managers. Consequently, MNCs should 
be very careful in defining the recruit criteria for international sales and 
marketing managers.  
Innovation performance 
Local managers expressed some dissatisfaction with the innovative 
performance of SBUs 1 and 5b, with some quality aspects of SBU 3a and 
with the overall global product strategy of SBU 4. In country 1 this perception 
led to a major unrest in the entire local sales team. Central managers pointed 
out that unreliable timing of product launches, mainly due to unreliable 
planning of the R&D department, were undermining their personal credibility. 
If central managers could not keep their promises, local managers did not 
feel obliged to keep theirs either. The major importance of reliable innovation 
planning and communication for the international sales organization becomes 
evident. 
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Communication of global strategic orientation 
Mintzberg (1993) has pointed out the downside of ‘obsessive’ corporate 
planning and control in limiting personal creativity and vision for quantum 
change (Mintzberg, 1993: 33). He suggests strategic vision and strategic 
learning as alternatives to formal planning. 
Local managers generally appreciated the fact that the global strategy was 
communicated at the annual division meeting. There seems to be an 
openness of local manager to adhere to global strategies as long as they are 
simple to understand, clearly communicated and openly supported by the 
central top-management. 
Motivating and committing all local hierarchy levels 
Walton has described ‘imposing control’ and ‘eliciting commitment’ as 
alternative strategies of workforce management (Walton, 1985: 78). The first 
strategy involves a fixed job definition with individual accountability, 
measurable minimum performance standards, hierarchical layering with 
procedural top down control and hierarchical status symbols, compensation 
according to individual job performance, limited information of the employee 
according to the scope of their individual activities with very narrow 
possibilities of the employee to provide input. The second strategy is 
characterized by an extended job responsibility of improving the system 
performance, flexible job descriptions, group-responsibility, dynamic stretch 
objectives, control based on shared goals and values, flat hierarchies with 
little status differentials, high level of employee involvement and information 
sharing (Walton, 1985: 81). The commitment strategy is seen as enhancing 
performance particularly in situations with involving team-work, problem 
solving, self-monitoring and organizational learning (Walton, 1985: 80). 
In order to gain the acceptance for their strategies, central managers need to 
persuade and get the commitment from local stakeholders on all hierarchy 
levels. While local managers dedicated to the same product group are easier 
to deal with, this can be difficult when local managers on higher hierarchy 
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levels are not familiar with that respective product group. This can be a 
particular challenge, as leadership requirements, criteria for staff selection 
and overall marketing strategies for SurgiSupplies are very different from one 
product group to another. As a consequence, central managers must be 
aware and openly address such personal biases and continuous SBU related 
training should be encouraged, also for local top managers. 
In country 2 a central manager speaks of pursuing a ‘guerilla strategy’. If he 
can’t get the attention of the local top management for his initiatives, he tries 
to create little local customer success stories by offering ‘free trials’ to the 
local managers on lower hierarchy levels. Once certain ‘light-houses’ are 
established, it is then easier to go back and convince the top decision 
makers. On the other hand, if lower hierarchy levels do not want to take the 
initiative to convince their superiors, this manager tries to bypass them by 
addressing the topic casually directly to the local top managers. 
The CombiTeam project in country 3 illustrates how much time, in this case 
the local top managers spent for getting ‘buy-in’ from all hierarchy levels on 
the central and local side. The smooth and successful role-out of the project 
seems to confirm their effort. 
 
6.2.2 Performance Evaluation 
In their literature review concerning performance evaluation of international 
subsidiaries of MNCs, Schmid and Kretschmer (2010) found that 
performance evaluation generally could be either personal, formal or cultural. 
At SurgiSupplies all three forms could be identified. 
Formal Evaluation: Strategic planning and reporting systems 
Kaplan and Norton (1992) found that establishing non-financial performance 
indicators can help strategic alignment. Micheli et al. (2011) showed that 
incompatible information systems between headquarters and subsidiaries 
can lead to difficulties in strategic alignment. SurgiSupplies started an 
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initiative of additional planning and reporting tools in order to increase the 
accountability of local sales organizations. These new tools were not entirely 
understood or used systematically in any of the subsidiaries studied. Local 
and central managers seemed to agree that it was not the fact of additional 
documentation that was missing, but that the implementation culture in the 
company needed to be improved. One suggestion made to improve the 
acceptance and relevance of some of the tools was to train the central and 
local members of the subsidiary boards on them and to oblige them to use 
them in their local board meetings. 
Local managers were believed not to necessarily report their true intentions 
into formal reporting systems. The reporting tools were mostly seen as 
additional bureaucratic work with little added value. Activity planning at 
SurgiSupplies is historically very decentralized and different from country to 
country. 
A point of dissatisfaction for central managers was the lack of transparency in 
local goal setting. Central managers on a product group level were not 
involved in goal settings at the local level and they believed that the goals 
were sometimes not ambitious enough, particularly when there were a lot of 
market opportunities. Dissatisfaction was particularly high about the activities 
for winning new accounts. The division is trying to improve the transparency 
of the systematic development of profitable new accounts by introducing 
common market and customer analysis tools to the countries. While some 
smaller countries showed some interest in such tools, the local managers for 
country 1 pointed out, that they already developed their own methods and 
that they were therefore reluctant to change.  
A performance measurement system has also been established to monitor 
the sales, margin and expense development as well as a number of key 
performance indicators such as number of new accounts and the number of 
new opinion leaders and reference centers won to support the marketing 
activities. In particular the latter, non-financial indicators can be seen as a 
measure to improve strategic alignment, beyond output or behavioral control 
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(Kaplan and Norton, 1992). 18 months into the program, all of these tools 
were still under considerable scrutiny. Overall, this experience shows, that 
formalization per se made no major contribution to the resolution of the 
underlying issues.  
Formalized long-term local investment planning 
A promising approach for coordination of central and local strategy was seen 
in the newly installed long-term investment planning system where 
subsidiaries need to commit what SBUs they intended to invest in the future. 
The 5 year investment plans is intended to calm internal power-struggles at 
the headquarters between central product group managers concerning local 
resources at strategically important subsidiaries. The idea is to avoid the 
simultaneous targeting of a given country by several central SBUs at the 
same time. This also has the advantage that the limited time and resources 
from the central headquarters can be used in a more focused way. Also they 
try to avoid a waste of resources on short-term opportunities that do not lead 
to sustainable development in a given country.  
Two of the central managers also independently suggested to organize 
strategy meetings for the central SBU managers, in order to coordinate SBU 
level strategies and identify synergies. 
Sales management systems 
Cravens et al. (2006) predict an increasing global convergence of sales 
management practice. While HospiMed has started a corporate customer 
relationship management system in few countries, the local sales managers 
do not seem to believe in complete standardization. Local managers in 
countries 1 and 3 pointed out strong differences in sales management control 
between different SBUs, also with little synergies between them. A local 
manager in country 5 remarked that sales reporting systems for indirect sales 
forces needed to be designed differently than for direct sales forces. A 
challenge for companies with a large product portfolio such as SurgiSupplies 
lies in keeping the individual sales person’s portfolio small enough so that 
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they can ensure a satisfactory detailed product knowledge, while on the other 
hand reaching a critical mass for the individual sales teams. A clear finding in 
our study was that failure to establish a critical mass for the size of a sales 
force can be detrimental to the business. Anderson and Onyemah’s (2007) 
finding that inexperienced sales people need to be managed by behavioral 
control and more mature sales people by output control was confirmed by the 
experience of local sales managers. 
Cultural Control: Expatriate / Compatriot Managers, Workshops 
Egelhoff (1984) has pointed out the function of expatriate managers in 
gaining behavioral control over foreign subsidiaries. In all 3 subsidiaries that 
were considered to have language barriers, fellow country men were 
engaged from the headquarters either as central sales managers visiting the 
countries frequently (Harry for country 4, Paul for country 5), or as expatriate 
and later compatriot (Susan for country 2). In addition, the general manager 
of subsidiary 3 (George) is an expatriate deployed from the domestic country. 
Local and central managers see both expatriate as well as compatriot 
managers as very helpful for communication and relationship building. In 
country 2, the deployment of an expatriate manager has contributed to the 
adoption of the ‘total solution’ program. This seems to be a successful 
method to increase perceived similarity and hence cooperation and 
relationship effectiveness. The negative example in country 4 however shows 
that native speaking compatriot managers are also under local scrutiny, as 
provide the headquarters with privileged local information. It does not seem 
that SurgiSupplies is already exploiting their full potential of such activities, as 
study participants find that other divisions at HospiMed are much more 
actively and successfully deploying expatriate managers both from the 
headquarters to the subsidiary and vice versa. It is pointed out that such 
deployments need to lead the concerned persons to a better career path 
after their return; otherwise they cannot make optimal use of their improved 
horizon, relationships and skills. 
Schmid and Kretschmer (2010) describe workshops as an alternative tool for 
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cultural performance evaluation. Quinn points out the importance of dialogue 
between managers, notably in times of rapid environmental and 
organizational change, and specifically when there are difficulties to hit 
targets. He suggests that ‘strategic control discussions should be vocal, 
reciprocating, issue-oriented, rational, imaginative, and honest.’ as ‘No matter 
how good an explanation of performance is, if it is not articulated it cannot 
influence the strategic agenda’ (Schmid and Kretschmer, 1996: 387, 388). 
Central managers in countries 1 and 3 reported about organizing strategic 
sales workshops that were aimed at improving local sales force 
effectiveness. The idea was to work together on very operational, target 
customer based action plans, based on extensive market and customer 
analysis tools. The results varied from very positive to very negative. The 
local teams sometimes believed these workshops to be time-consuming and 
added little value. A central manager reported not having enough resources 
to consequently follow up on such workshops. It is thus important to be 
realistic with expectations and resource planning for such activities. 
Personal Control: Strategic Meetings 
Local managers in all cases were dissatisfied with their possibilities to 
communicate their local needs to the headquarters, to influence global 
strategy and with the responsiveness of the headquarters to these 
requirements. The current international business meetings are generally 
seen as having too many participants in order to come to a true exchange 
with central managers. It is suggested by local managers to involve small 
groups of managers from subsidiaries with similar requirements in strategy 
meetings with central managers from all relevant functions, such as R&D and 
marketing, in order to identify global or regional trends and develop future 
strategies together. A first meeting of such kind, that several of the 
respondents had participated in, had taken place shortly before the 
interviews. This meeting was independently mentioned as a positive example 
of how such strategy meetings should be organized. It represented a step 
towards more subsidiary participation with the positive influence on 
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relationship effectiveness of improving cooperation but the potentially 
problematic influence of additionally increasing subsidiary power, from the 
central point of view. 
 
6.2.3 Sales Force Effectiveness 
Zoltners et al. (2008) found that sales force effectiveness depended on 
activities that defined, shaped, excited, enlightened and controlled the sales 
force. They proposed survey items to analyze these drivers in order to 
identify improvement potential and derive corresponding action plans. We 
have adopted this method to subsidiary sales and marketing team 
assessment and tested if the scales were valid and if the performance 
measures were actually correlated to sales force effectiveness. 
Findings from our Performance Surveys 
The analysis showed that while the scales for both surveys were valid, each 
survey could only explain three underlying factors in a meaningful way. 
These factors however were highly plausible and showed some significant 
correlations to actual sales output data, indicating that the performance 
measurements were related to actual sales force effectiveness. Plausibly, 
teams with higher total sales numbers were rated to have higher market and 
customer knowledge and short term sales growth was associated with team 
competency. Local competitive strategy could not be shown to correlate with 
sales outcomes, which again is plausible, as rather long-term effects could 
be expected from this variable.  
Comparing the way the survey was completed by the different country 
managers, it can be strongly suspected that the willingness to reveal 
weaknesses in their own organization was very different from person to 
person. Specifically, the country 2 organization that has been rated a world-
class operation earlier was very self-critical, while country 3, that for SBUs 3a 
and 3b was rated a poor operation, was very self-confident. On the other 
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hand, once these general biases were taken into account, improvement 
potentials could be identified for all participating country organizations (Figure 
31). Interestingly, all participating managers saw improvement potential in 
team competence. Other major improvement potentials were seen in market 
and competition knowledge, the overall sales organization or in customer 
targeting. Aside from these major improvement potentials, a large number of 
smaller issues were revealed.  
 
Figure 31: Identified Improvement Potentials 
Concerning the evaluation of central marketing support, it was a surprising 
finding that higher SBU country ranking was associated in a highly significant 
way with a less favorable evaluation of the product package. This also 
showed in our specific case examples, where the 3 subsidiaries with higher 
SBU rankings had critical remarks, while the 2 lowest ranked only had 
positive feed-back. The fact that in the statistical analysis the factor ‘local 
market and customer knowledge’ from survey 1 is negatively correlated to 
the ‘central product package’ from survey 2 might further help to explain this. 
Sales teams with higher absolute sales have been shown to have higher 
‘local market and customer knowledge’ and thus knowledge about customer 
needs and trends. They therefore seem to become more demanding and 
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exigent concerning the product package they receive from the headquarters. 
On the other hand these findings are also consistent of what has been said 
earlier about the effects of increasing distribution power.  
Overall the results of the survey seemed to be plausible and valid in 
providing performance information about the subsidiaries and in formalizing 
and agreeing on improvement potential. However, in order to study if the 
survey findings can actually be used to define and implement successful 
action plans and to ultimately improve sales force effectiveness, a 
longitudinal study approach would be required. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions, Limitations and Outlook 
Answering the research questions, influence factors, tools and activities 
impacting on global strategy implementation have been identified (Chapters 4 
and 5), summarized (Annex 5) and discussed (Chapter 6). This section sums 
up the findings and points out the contributions and implications of this 
research. 
Situational influence factors 
SBU specific local market assets that have been previously built up by 
subsidiaries in the form of team size, brand-awareness and market share, 
positively influence the local resources and capabilities that allow them to 
follow the global strategy. This is directly linked to the country specific market 
life-cycle situation. On the other hand, the larger these assets become, and 
the greater the market yield in the form of sales output gets, the less the 
subsidiaries need central operational marketing and sales support and the 
more they require strategic support in the form of innovative new products. 
While smaller international teams are easier to control, as they depend on 
central resources for operational daily activities, managers of larger teams 
become more self-confident, independent and critical of the headquarters. 
Specifically, several local managers of important subsidiaries challenged the 
international market orientation of central managers in our case study, as 
they believed that feedback for the development of new products was sought 
mainly in the domestic market of the company, neglecting the needs of other 
countries. Often, they also  challenged the general innovativeness of the 
company.  
It is important to point out that for every country organization studied, the 
specific competitive challenge was different. Team 1 had difficulties 
competing in fast innovation cycles, for team 2 cultural differences hindered 
the launch of new innovative solutions, team 3 had problems competing on 
country-specific low price levels, team 4 faced issues of managing fast 
growth, and team 5 was confronted with an economic crisis in their country. 
Such differences require local adaptability and have a strong impact on the 
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possibilities to implement global strategy. They also make it difficult for 
central managers to compare the true performance of teams in different 
countries.  
A cultural aspect contributing to difficulties in understanding between local 
and central managers is power distance. While headquarters managers in 
our case were highly empowered on all hierarchy levels, in certain 
subsidiaries all decision making was concentrated at the level of top 
management. Long-term relationships seem to potentially help to overcome 
difficulties with cultural differences, as understanding and perceived similarity 
increases. However, even in the 21st century, language barriers remain an 
issue in some countries. 
Organizational influence factors 
At the headquarters, central SBU level managers are competing for local 
country resources, sometimes in an uncoordinated way. As this competition 
involves the use of their own central resources in the form of lobbying and 
support activities, they risk entering into a wasteful arms race between each 
other. Also, as this competition will have winners and losers, those SBUs will 
thrive that are perceived as most attractive to the local managers, 
independently of the global strategic plan.  
Control system and company cultures are not identical in subsidiaries and at 
the headquarters. Central and local managers don't necessarily understand 
the control strategy of the other. Central managers need to be aware of the 
local power situation in order to address strategic issues such as investment 
decisions at the appropriate hierarchical level. Generally speaking, 
SurgiSupplies, as a European company, seems to have less restrictive 
control and sanctioning than its American competitors. 
A central habit of cultural control in combination with life employment can be 
incompatible with subsidiaries that have a high staff turn-over. A large degree 
of divisionalization contributes to this, as the size of local teams and the 
number of local experts for each SBU can be small, and fluctuation can thus 
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easily lead to a significant drain of local competence.  
Influence of decentralization and delegation 
The global marketing approach of a highly divisionalized company, paired 
with a decentralized decision making structure, was shown to bear potential 
difficulties in the enforcement of global product strategies. Local managers 
who are endowed with a high amount of liberty in strategic decision making 
and at the same time presented with a large number of strategic options from 
multiple central divisions and SBUs, might become difficult to control by 
central headquarters managers. Local top managers, e.g. are usually less 
knowledgeable about SBUs they have had no prior personal experience with 
during their career, and they therefore seem to be hesitant to invest in them. 
The global sales strategy then might risk becoming the random aggregation 
of such local strategic decisions. This lack of central control can also be 
observed with respect to global planning of SBU related investments and 
expenses: while the overall numbers per country can be controlled, the 
allocation to different SBUs is difficult. While decentralized decision making 
has the advantage of the market mechanism, where the most competitive 
central offerings should tend to eliminate weaker ones, the relationship 
between headquarters and subsidiary then can resemble strongly the one of 
a manufacturer with independent distributors.  
Instead of directly controlling the activities of the subsidiaries, intermediate 
central managers thus depend on the quality of their offering and compete 
with other central managers for the goodwill and the investments of 
subsidiary managers. Importantly, this seems to involve gaining the 
commitment from all local hierarchy levels, often independently. Although 
global investment levels and major investment projects as well as global 
sales and profit targets will typically be defined by central top managers, the 
way these are broken down to individual SBUs is largely left to the subsidiary 
managers. With creativity and persistence central SBU managers will try to 
'get a foot in the door of the subsidiary' even if this means taking away 
resources and thereby disturbing the activities of other SBUs. This implies 
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that taking control of subsidiaries requires the coordination of the 
international activities of divisional SBUs. Local managers stated that they 
appreciated clearly communicated strategies from the central headquarters' 
top management and they seemed to be quite willing to integrate them into 
their local strategies. Local managers, however, seem to tend to pursue 
rather short-term strategies, reducing risk by investing in many SBUs 
simultaneously, but might not focus on the most promising opportunities. At 
the same time this strategy avoids confrontation with any of the central 
marketing managers as local investments are shared between there SBUs. 
The international matrix organization as well as the matrix organization at the 
headquarters level can contribute to a dilution of central strategy by a lack of 
clear decision making competencies and unclear matrix roles. With a high 
level of divisionalization it also becomes difficult for local general managers 
to develop deep insight into individual market segments. They sometimes 
react by simply focusing on markets they are personally familiar with. 
Successful activities and tools 
A main finding of this research is that intermediate central sales and 
marketing managers at SurgiSupplies have very little formal authority with 
respect to their local counterparts they are intended to lead. The larger the 
subsidiaries get, the more self-confident and independent they seem to 
behave. In order to better coordinate local and central SBU activities, 
SurgiSupplies assigned central sales managers responsible for all 7 SBUs to 
most of the top selling subsidiaries. 18 months into the initiative of installing 
central sales managers, this was however still seen with a certain skepticism 
by most study participants. This shows that the attempt to establish more 
central control is challenging and takes a long time. 
In order to establish successful leadership, central sales and marketing 
managers need to be credible partners for the subsidiary managers. A 
number of activities have been shown to influence local implementation of 
central strategies in decentralized, highly divisionalized organizations such as 
SurgiSupplies. Very importantly, the activities of central managers with 
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respect to the individual subsidiaries need to be planned and coordinated, 
again, a central task for the central sales managers. Competing for local 
attention and resources in an uncoordinated way is wasteful and allows local 
managers to play central managers off against each other, undermining 
central authority. While at SurgiSupplies the high staff-loyalty at the 
headquarters and in some of the subsidiaries has led to long-term personal 
relationships, which help to overcome such issues, major problems arose in 
subsidiaries with higher fluctuation. Also, central sales and marketing 
managers need to have sufficient personal international field experience to 
be accepted by their local counterparts. The practice of putting young 
graduates directly in such positions needs to be avoided.  
Subsidiary managers seemed to be chronically dissatisfied with their own 
possibilities of ensuring that strategic product development respected their 
individual country needs. Involving them in strategy workshops can help to 
overcome this, however sufficient resources need to be available to follow-up 
subsequently on the results of such meetings. Central managers need to be 
perceived as market oriented, meaning that they need to develop intimate 
knowledge of and accept the specificities of each country situation and the 
challenges that local staff are faced with. 
Central managers also need to understand the local control systems, that 
can differ largely from the headquarters, and the actual local power situation, 
in order to properly address different central initiatives. Generally speaking 
‘buy-in’ must be obtained simultaneously on all local hierarchy levels. The 
fact of having prior career experience of working in a local subsidiary can be 
very helpful to this end.  
Expatriate and compatriot central managers seem to contribute to perceived 
organizational similarity. However they are still considered to be 
headquarters agents, which can compromise their local acceptance, as we 
found in the example of a compatriot who took the international sales 
responsibility at the SurgiSupplies headquarters for the subsidiary in his 
home country. 
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A particularly fruitful method of improving the headquarters - subsidiary 
relationship seems to be to jointly engage in local field activities. This gives 
central managers first hand market information from customers and sales 
people, allows an easy and operational transfer of knowledge to the local 
teams and contributes to the formation of personal relationships due to 
shared experiences. Here again however, it is of great importance that the 
central managers dispose of sufficient personal field experience to be a 
credible counterpart for the local field staff. 
Regular and clear top management communication of global strategic 
orientation seems to be very well accepted locally and seems to reduce local 
resistance to central initiatives. Clearly defined processes and organizational 
roles for the interactions of central and local managers are desirable. 
Realistic planning of initiatives that require central activities and resources 
and truthful communication of setbacks and delays seems to be crucial for 
the credibility of central managers. Local teams might have a tendency to 
become complacent, when the mother company does not fulfill its promises. 
This might be a bigger problem in SBUs with short product life-cycles, that 
are more depending on the regular introduction of new innovative solutions. 
Performance evaluation and strategic planning tools 
An important role of central sales managers at SurgiSupplies was to develop 
and implement strategic planning and reporting systems that would reveal 
critical local information and allow the definition and commitment to 
coordinated marketing and sales strategies. The implementation and 
acceptance of such tools proved to be challenging. Experienced managers 
did not seem to take them seriously, as if they were expecting the tools to 
eventually fail and disappear. Some value was seen in a long-term 
investment planning report as a common communication platform formalizing 
decisions. Mostly, however, the additional strategic planning and reporting 
systems were seen as an additional bureaucratic effort with little added 
value.  
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Performance surveys of local and central sales and marketing organizations 
were found in this study to be a valid tool for the identification of performance 
improvement potential relating to sales force effectiveness. The successful 
implementation of such surveys however, in our opinion will require a 
consequent deployment and follow-up as well as top management support 
for years. 
Conceptual developments, implications and contributions to management 
practice 
A review with a wide scope of organizational, marketing and performance 
evaluation literature allowed the creation of a comprehensive framework for 
the classification of subsidiaries, as they relate to the headquarters of their 
multinational mother companies. The relevant classification approaches, 
namely international organization form, structure, control mechanisms and 
strategies, investment initiative and strategy, cultural dimensions and 
performance criteria, thus were identified and combined for a for a more 
thorough analysis framework. The practicability of this framework was 
demonstrated by the example of HospiMed’s SurgiSupplies division and its 
international marketing and sales organizations. In this way, the research 
contributes to the practice of management by providing insight into potential 
situational and organizational factors that can compromise global strategy 
implementation in MNCs and by helping their managers identify and 
counteract such issues in their own organizations. The most important 
practical implication is that divisionalized and decentralized MNCs who want 
to improve central control need to be very explicit and coordinated about their 
global strategies and the roles and competencies of their central sales and 
marketing managers, who are to diffuse those strategies throughout the 
organization. These findings advance the current academic discussion on 
how MNCs can react to resistance against global coordination (Griffith et al., 
2008: 1227-1228). 
The theoretical framework of this research was used as a lense to present 
the results, but not to structure the interview questions. While the research 
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questions provided an agenda of issues, an open inductive approach to the 
interviews was chosen. This allowed the inductive identification of 
contemporary situational and organizational factors relevant for strategy 
implementation and thus the incremental advancement of  management 
theory. As subsidiaries are driven by short-term performance and the 
headquarters are driven by long-term strategy, the globalization – localization 
debate is not straight forward and it is important to broaden the theoretical 
basis for understanding the resulting tensions. 
Limitations and outlook 
The major limitation of our research is the fact that it is based on a single 
case study, by definition allowing only limited external validity. We have tried 
to address this by comparing all 7 different SBUs of the investigated 
company and by choosing 5 different geographic and diverse cultural 
regions, also including countries with different states of economic 
development. The situation of SurgiSupplies as a single MNC however 
remains highly contextualized, specifically the fact that SurgiSupplies is itself 
a subsidiary of a privately owned MNC. 
While we believe it to be important to distinguish situational and 
organizational factors, we found this categorization of these factors difficult, 
as the concepts were interwoven. ‘High staff-turn over’ e.g. is certainly an 
organizational problem, however the experience of the study participants 
showed that it was in fact often caused by a general attitude of employees, 
that was specific to certain countries. As another example, control systems 
are part of the organizational culture of the company, on the other hand they 
are strongly influenced by the situational country culture. 
It needs to be pointed out, that in spite of all the identified potentially negative 
effects of high divisionalization and decentralization, this particular strategy 
has allowed the company SurgiSupplies to be reasonably successful for 
many decades. Apart from the effect of an overall favorable growth 
environment of the medical device industry, it can be speculated that the 
individual highly regulated national life-science markets each present very 
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different opportunities and challenges, and that this might be a specific 
characteristic of such markets in favor of decentralized decision making. This 
offers an interesting route for future research. We generally encourage future 
studies in the under-researched field of management control in international 
sales organizations, specifically concerning the problem of  overcoming 
resistance from local subsidiaries to central strategies.  
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Annex 1 SPSS Tables Subsidiary Performance Survey 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Self-Evaluation Survey 
Table 2: KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Table 3: Total Variance Explained by the Three Factor Model 
  
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation Analysis N 
sclearstrategy 3,4113 1,84031 141 
ssalesorganization 3,8085 2,14114 141 
sleadership 3,6383 2,44738 141 
steamcompetence 3,7092 1,79101 141 
sincentivesystems 3,0496 2,09191 141 
steammotivation 3,2128 1,88152 141 
smarketknowledge 3,7092 1,95864 141 
scompetitionknowledge 3,6879 1,98615 141 
smarkettrends 3,3262 1,79482 141 
scustomeranalysis 4,1135 1,93867 141 
scustomertargeting 4,0567 2,10025 141 
saccountplanning 4,2411 2,14110 141 
 
clear strategy
sales organization
leadership
team competence
incentive systems
team motivation
market knowledge
competition knowledge
market rends
customer analysi
customer targeting
account planning
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure 
of Sampling Adequacy. 
,877 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 1393,296 
df 66 
Sig. ,000 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Compo
nent 
Initial 
Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 57,149 6,858 57,149 57,149 
2 69,551 1,488 12,402 69,551 
3 78,437 1,066 8,886 78,437 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Scale: Market and Customer Knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
Case Processing Summary
  N % 
Cases Valid 143 95,3 
Excludeda 7 4,7 
Total 150 100,0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all 
variables in the procedure. 
 
 
 
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
,918 4 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
customer analysis 11,9021 31,047 ,869 ,876 
customer targeting 11,9510 29,526 ,868 ,874 
account planning 11,7692 30,320 ,798 ,900 
market knowledge 12,2937 33,589 ,721 ,923 
 
Table 4: Reliability Statistics Factor 1 ‘Market and Customer Knowledge’ 
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Scale: Team Competence 
 
 
 
 
Case Processing Summary
  N % 
Cases Valid 142 94,7 
Excludeda 8 5,3
Total 150 100,0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all 
variables in the procedure. 
 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
,894 5 
 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
 team motivation 14,5282 50,989 ,673 ,886 
 leadership 14,0915 43,644 ,716 ,884 
 sales organization 13,9225 45,817 ,771 ,865 
 clear strategy 14,3310 48,010 ,831 ,854 
 team competence 14,0282 50,169 ,760 ,869 
 
Table 5: Reliability Statistics Factor 2 ‘Team Competence’ 
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Scale: Competitive Strategy 
 
 
 
 
Case Processing Summary
  N % 
Cases Valid 142 94,7 
Excludeda 8 5,3
Total 150 100,0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all 
variables in the procedure. 
 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
,826 3 
 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
incentive systems 6,9930 12,830 ,564 ,884 
competition knowledge 6,3521 11,393 ,770 ,668 
market trends 6,7254 12,896 ,733 ,717 
 
Table 6: Reliability Statistics Factor 3 ‘Competitive Strategy’ 
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Correlation Matrices 
Correlation Matrixa 
  clear 
strategy 
sales 
organization leadership
Correlation clear strategy 1,000 ,760 ,626 
sales organization ,760 1,000 ,706 
leadership ,626 ,706 1,000 
team competence ,756 ,622 ,590 
incentive systems ,520 ,428 ,429 
team motivation ,664 ,521 ,536 
market knowledge ,543 ,588 ,425 
competition 
knowledge 
,610 ,396 ,395 
market trends ,619 ,522 ,344 
customer analysis ,595 ,573 ,477 
customer targeting ,522 ,495 ,379 
account planning ,482 ,456 ,345 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
clear strategy  ,000 ,000 
sales organization ,000  ,000 
leadership ,000 ,000  
team competence ,000 ,000 ,000 
incentive systems ,000 ,000 ,000 
team motivation ,000 ,000 ,000 
market knowledge ,000 ,000 ,000 
competition 
knowledge 
,000 ,000 ,000 
market trends ,000 ,000 ,000 
customer analysis ,000 ,000 ,000 
customer targeting ,000 ,000 ,000 
account planning ,000 ,000 ,000 
a. Determinant = 3,34E-005 
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Correlation Matrixa 
  team 
competence
incentive 
systems 
team 
motivation 
Correlation clear strategy ,756 ,520 ,664 
sales organization ,622 ,428 ,521 
leadership ,590 ,429 ,536 
team competence 1,000 ,414 ,644 
incentive systems ,414 1,000 ,275 
team motivation ,644 ,275 1,000 
market knowledge ,597 ,138 ,308 
competition 
knowledge 
,653 ,559 ,320 
market trends ,612 ,506 ,347 
customer analysis ,629 ,354 ,289 
customer targeting ,606 ,173 ,324 
account planning ,525 ,283 ,214 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
clear strategy ,000 ,000 ,000 
sales organization ,000 ,000 ,000 
leadership ,000 ,000 ,000 
team competence  ,000 ,000 
incentive systems ,000  ,000 
team motivation ,000 ,000  
market knowledge ,000 ,052 ,000 
competition 
knowledge 
,000 ,000 ,000 
market trends ,000 ,000 ,000 
customer analysis ,000 ,000 ,000 
customer targeting ,000 ,020 ,000 
account planning ,000 ,000 ,005 
a. Determinant = 3,34E-005 
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Correlation Matrixa 
  market 
knowledge 
competition 
knowledge 
market 
trends 
Correlation clear strategy ,543 ,610 ,619 
sales organization ,588 ,396 ,522 
leadership ,425 ,395 ,344 
team competence ,597 ,653 ,612 
incentive systems ,138 ,559 ,506 
team motivation ,308 ,320 ,347 
market knowledge 1,000 ,481 ,584 
competition 
knowledge 
,481 1,000 ,798 
market trends ,584 ,798 1,000 
customer analysis ,693 ,685 ,702 
customer targeting ,688 ,557 ,565 
account planning ,620 ,555 ,515 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
clear strategy ,000 ,000 ,000 
sales organization ,000 ,000 ,000 
leadership ,000 ,000 ,000 
team competence ,000 ,000 ,000 
incentive systems ,052 ,000 ,000 
team motivation ,000 ,000 ,000 
market knowledge  ,000 ,000 
competition 
knowledge 
,000  ,000 
market trends ,000 ,000  
customer analysis ,000 ,000 ,000 
customer targeting ,000 ,000 ,000 
account planning ,000 ,000 ,000 
a. Determinant = 3,34E-005 
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Correlation Matrixa 
  customer 
analysis 
customer 
targeting 
account 
planning 
Correlation clear strategy ,595 ,522 ,482 
sales organization ,573 ,495 ,456 
leadership ,477 ,379 ,345 
team competence ,629 ,606 ,525 
incentive systems ,354 ,173 ,283 
team motivation ,289 ,324 ,214 
market knowledge ,693 ,688 ,620 
competition 
knowledge 
,685 ,557 ,555 
market trends ,702 ,565 ,515 
customer analysis 1,000 ,851 ,769 
customer targeting ,851 1,000 ,778 
account planning ,769 ,778 1,000 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
clear strategy ,000 ,000 ,000 
sales organization ,000 ,000 ,000 
leadership ,000 ,000 ,000 
team competence ,000 ,000 ,000 
incentive systems ,000 ,020 ,000 
team motivation ,000 ,000 ,005 
market knowledge ,000 ,000 ,000 
competition 
knowledge 
,000 ,000 ,000 
market trends ,000 ,000 ,000 
customer analysis  ,000 ,000 
customer targeting ,000  ,000 
account planning ,000 ,000  
a. Determinant = 3,34E-005 
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Annex 2 SPSS Tables Headquarters Performance Survey 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2: KMO and Bartlett’s Test 
 
Table 3: Total Variance Explained by the Three Factor Model  
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation Analysis N 
oorganizationalsetup 1,5120 ,60397 125 
oclearstrategy 1,8800 ,61696 125 
oadequatestrategy 2,3520 ,79571 125 
ocompetitiveknowledge 2,0880 ,71860 125 
oproductknowledge 1,6560 ,71959 125 
omastools 2,4160 ,79498 125 
ocommunication 1,8240 ,73027 125 
oresponsetime 1,8080 ,77974 125 
osupportlevel 1,8400 ,75562 125 
otrainingstandards 2,0560 ,71057 125 
osupportlocallyadapted 1,8880 ,78510 125 
oproductquality 1,9840 ,78272 125 
odeliveryperf 1,9640 ,78847 125 
oinnovation 2,4560 ,82798 125 
oclinicalevidence 2,5780 ,79465 125 
 
organizational setup
clear strategy
adequate strategy
co titiv  kno ledge
product ledge
marketing & sales tools
co
respons  ti e
support l l
training t rds
support l ally adapted
product lit
delivery performance
innovation
clinical evidence
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure 
of Sampling Adequacy. 
,879 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 648,830 
df 105 
Sig. ,000 
 
Total Variance Explained
Compo
nent 
Initial 
Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 37,988 5,698 37,988 37,988 
2 47,123 1,370 9,135 47,123 
3 54,719 1,139 7,596 54,719 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Scale: Operational Support 
 
 
Case Processing Summary
  N % 
Cases Valid 125 71,0 
Excluded
a 
51 29,0 
Total 176 100,0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all 
variables in the procedure. 
 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
,835 7 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
communication 11,0080 9,411 ,659 ,801 
response time 11,0240 9,411 ,602 ,811 
organizational setup 11,3200 10,365 ,558 ,818 
support locally 
adapted 
10,9440 9,118 ,667 ,799 
competitive 
knowledge 
10,7440 9,660 ,610 ,809 
training standards 10,7760 10,175 ,489 ,828 
product knowledge 11,1760 10,017 ,519 ,823 
 
Table 4: Reliability Statistics Factor 1 ‘Operational Support’ 
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Scale: Strategic Support 
 
 
Case Processing Summary
  N % 
Cases Valid 125 71,0 
Excluded
a 
51 29,0 
Total 176 100,0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all 
variables in the procedure. 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
,725 3 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
adequate 
strategy 
3,7200 1,397 ,552 ,637 
clear strategy 4,1920 1,785 ,547 ,651 
support level 4,2320 1,470 ,560 ,621 
 
Table 5: Reliability Statistics Factor 2 ‘Strategic Support’ 
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Scale: Product Package 
 
 
 
 
 
Case Processing Summary
  N % 
Cases Valid 125 71,0 
Excluded
a 
51 29,0 
Total 176 100,0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all 
variables in the procedure. 
 
 
 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
,699 5 
 
 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
innovation 8,9420 4,870 ,457 ,649 
clinical 
evidence 
8,8200 4,824 ,507 ,628 
product quality 9,4140 4,894 ,496 ,633 
marketing and 
sales tools 
8,9820 5,047 ,433 ,659 
delivery 
performance 
9,4340 5,226 ,382 ,680 
 
 
Table 6: Reliability Statistics Factor 3 ‘Product Package’ 
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Correlation Matrices 
Correlation Matrixa 
  organizational 
setup 
clear 
strategy 
adequate 
strategy 
Correlation organizational setup 1,000 ,274 ,243 
clear strategy ,274 1,000 ,465 
adequate strategy ,243 ,465 1,000 
competit. knowledge ,434 ,370 ,411 
product knowledge ,427 ,342 ,312 
marketing/sales tools ,241 ,251 ,493 
communication ,444 ,329 ,232 
response time ,347 ,287 ,201 
support level ,393 ,477 ,483 
training standards ,308 ,236 ,336 
support loc. adapted ,462 ,372 ,438 
product quality ,137 ,146 ,320 
delivery performance ,208 ,323 ,361 
innovation ,336 ,250 ,256 
clinical evidence ,210 ,110 ,202 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
organizational setup  ,001 ,003 
clear strategy ,001  ,000 
adequate strategy ,003 ,000  
competit. knowledge ,000 ,000 ,000 
product knowledge ,000 ,000 ,000 
marketing/sales tools ,003 ,002 ,000 
communication ,000 ,000 ,005 
response time ,000 ,001 ,012 
support level ,000 ,000 ,000 
training standards ,000 ,004 ,000 
support loc. adapted ,000 ,000 ,000 
product quality ,064 ,052 ,000 
delivery performance ,010 ,000 ,000 
innovation ,000 ,002 ,002 
clinical evidence ,009 ,112 ,012 
a. Determinant = ,004 
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Correlation Matrixa 
  
competitive 
knowledge 
product 
knowledge
marketing 
and sales 
tools 
Correlation organizational setup ,434 ,427 ,241 
clear strategy ,370 ,342 ,251 
adequate strategy ,411 ,312 ,493 
competit. 
knowledge 
1,000 ,449 ,458 
product knowledge ,449 1,000 ,407 
marketing/sales 
tools 
,458 ,407 1,000 
communication ,429 ,344 ,349 
response time ,376 ,384 ,247 
support level ,531 ,328 ,380 
training standards ,385 ,290 ,358 
support loc. adapted ,547 ,388 ,385 
product quality ,261 ,362 ,361 
delivery 
performance 
,219 ,234 ,204 
innovation ,298 ,252 ,285 
clinical evidence ,253 ,336 ,369 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
organizational setup ,000 ,000 ,003 
clear strategy ,000 ,000 ,002 
adequate strategy ,000 ,000 ,000 
competit. 
knowledge  
,000 ,000 
product knowledge ,000  ,000 
marketing/sales 
tools 
,000 ,000  
communication ,000 ,000 ,000 
response time ,000 ,000 ,003 
support level ,000 ,000 ,000 
training standards ,000 ,001 ,000 
support loc. adapted ,000 ,000 ,000 
product quality ,002 ,000 ,000 
delivery 
performance 
,007 ,004 ,011 
innovation ,000 ,002 ,001 
clinical evidence ,002 ,000 ,000 
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Correlation Matrixa 
  
competitive 
knowledge 
product 
knowledge
marketing 
and sales 
tools 
Correlation organizational setup ,434 ,427 ,241 
clear strategy ,370 ,342 ,251 
adequate strategy ,411 ,312 ,493 
competit. 
knowledge 
1,000 ,449 ,458 
product knowledge ,449 1,000 ,407 
marketing/sales 
tools 
,458 ,407 1,000 
communication ,429 ,344 ,349 
response time ,376 ,384 ,247 
support level ,531 ,328 ,380 
training standards ,385 ,290 ,358 
support loc. adapted ,547 ,388 ,385 
product quality ,261 ,362 ,361 
delivery 
performance 
,219 ,234 ,204 
innovation ,298 ,252 ,285 
clinical evidence ,253 ,336 ,369 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
organizational setup ,000 ,000 ,003 
clear strategy ,000 ,000 ,002 
adequate strategy ,000 ,000 ,000 
competit. 
knowledge  
,000 ,000 
product knowledge ,000  ,000 
marketing/sales 
tools 
,000 ,000  
communication ,000 ,000 ,000 
response time ,000 ,000 ,003 
support level ,000 ,000 ,000 
training standards ,000 ,001 ,000 
support loc. adapted ,000 ,000 ,000 
product quality ,002 ,000 ,000 
delivery 
performance 
,007 ,004 ,011 
innovation ,000 ,002 ,001 
clinical evidence ,002 ,000 ,000 
a. Determinant = ,004 
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Correlation Matrixa 
  communica-
tion 
response 
time 
support 
level 
Correlation organizational setup ,444 ,347 ,393 
clear strategy ,329 ,287 ,477 
adequate strategy ,232 ,201 ,483 
competit. 
knowledge 
,429 ,376 ,531 
product knowledge ,344 ,384 ,328 
marketing/sales 
tools 
,349 ,247 ,380 
communication 1,000 ,648 ,416 
response time ,648 1,000 ,385 
support level ,416 ,385 1,000 
training standards ,377 ,354 ,407 
support loc. adapted ,542 ,465 ,636 
product quality ,122 ,167 ,255 
delivery 
performance 
,241 ,264 ,342 
innovation ,267 ,137 ,272 
clinical evidence ,347 ,216 ,249 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
organizational setup ,000 ,000 ,000 
clear strategy ,000 ,001 ,000 
adequate strategy ,005 ,012 ,000 
competit. 
knowledge 
,000 ,000 ,000 
product knowledge ,000 ,000 ,000 
marketing/sales 
tools 
,000 ,003 ,000 
communication  ,000 ,000 
response time ,000  ,000 
support level ,000 ,000  
training standards ,000 ,000 ,000 
support loc. adapted ,000 ,000 ,000 
product quality ,088 ,032 ,002 
delivery 
performance 
,003 ,001 ,000 
innovation ,001 ,064 ,001 
clinical evidence ,000 ,008 ,003 
a. Determinant = ,004 
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Correlation Matrixa 
  
training 
standards 
support 
locally 
adapted 
product 
quality 
Correlation organizational setup ,308 ,462 ,137 
clear strategy ,236 ,372 ,146 
adequate strategy ,336 ,438 ,320 
competit. 
knowledge 
,385 ,547 ,261 
product knowledge ,290 ,388 ,362 
marketing/sales 
tools 
,358 ,385 ,361 
communication ,377 ,542 ,122 
response time ,354 ,465 ,167 
support level ,407 ,636 ,255 
training standards 1,000 ,431 ,234 
support loc. adapted ,431 1,000 ,312 
product quality ,234 ,312 1,000 
delivery 
performance 
,263 ,267 ,313 
innovation ,176 ,278 ,347 
clinical evidence ,314 ,289 ,349 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
organizational setup ,000 ,000 ,064 
clear strategy ,004 ,000 ,052 
adequate strategy ,000 ,000 ,000 
competit. 
knowledge 
,000 ,000 ,002 
product knowledge ,001 ,000 ,000 
marketing/sales 
tools 
,000 ,000 ,000 
communication ,000 ,000 ,088 
response time ,000 ,000 ,032 
support level ,000 ,000 ,002 
training standards  ,000 ,004 
support loc. adapted ,000  ,000 
product quality ,004 ,000  
delivery 
performance 
,002 ,001 ,000 
innovation ,025 ,001 ,000 
clinical evidence ,000 ,001 ,000 
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Correlation Matrixa 
  
competitive 
knowledge 
product 
knowledge
marketing 
and sales 
tools 
Correlation organizational setup ,434 ,427 ,241 
clear strategy ,370 ,342 ,251 
adequate strategy ,411 ,312 ,493 
competit. 
knowledge 
1,000 ,449 ,458 
product knowledge ,449 1,000 ,407 
marketing/sales 
tools 
,458 ,407 1,000 
communication ,429 ,344 ,349 
response time ,376 ,384 ,247 
support level ,531 ,328 ,380 
training standards ,385 ,290 ,358 
support loc. adapted ,547 ,388 ,385 
product quality ,261 ,362 ,361 
delivery 
performance 
,219 ,234 ,204 
innovation ,298 ,252 ,285 
clinical evidence ,253 ,336 ,369 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
organizational setup ,000 ,000 ,003 
clear strategy ,000 ,000 ,002 
adequate strategy ,000 ,000 ,000 
competit. 
knowledge  
,000 ,000 
product knowledge ,000  ,000 
marketing/sales 
tools 
,000 ,000  
communication ,000 ,000 ,000 
response time ,000 ,000 ,003 
support level ,000 ,000 ,000 
training standards ,000 ,001 ,000 
support loc. adapted ,000 ,000 ,000 
product quality ,002 ,000 ,000 
delivery 
performance 
,007 ,004 ,011 
innovation ,000 ,002 ,001 
clinical evidence ,002 ,000 ,000 
a. Determinant = ,004 
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Correlation Matrixa 
  delivery 
perform. innovation
clinical 
evidence 
Correlation organizational setup ,208 ,336 ,210 
clear strategy ,323 ,250 ,110 
adequate strategy ,361 ,256 ,202 
competit. 
knowledge 
,219 ,298 ,253 
product knowledge ,234 ,252 ,336 
marketing/sales 
tools 
,204 ,285 ,369 
communication ,241 ,267 ,347 
response time ,264 ,137 ,216 
support level ,342 ,272 ,249 
training standards ,263 ,176 ,314 
support loc. adapted ,267 ,278 ,289 
product quality ,313 ,347 ,349 
delivery 
performance 
1,000 ,272 ,304 
innovation ,272 1,000 ,371 
clinical evidence ,304 ,371 1,000 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
organizational setup ,010 ,000 ,009 
clear strategy ,000 ,002 ,112 
adequate strategy ,000 ,002 ,012 
competit. 
knowledge 
,007 ,000 ,002 
product knowledge ,004 ,002 ,000 
marketing/sales 
tools 
,011 ,001 ,000 
communication ,003 ,001 ,000 
response time ,001 ,064 ,008 
support level ,000 ,001 ,003 
training standards ,002 ,025 ,000 
support loc. adapted ,001 ,001 ,001 
product quality ,000 ,000 ,000 
delivery 
performance  
,001 ,000 
innovation ,001  ,000 
clinical evidence ,000 ,000  
a. Determinant = ,004 
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Annex 3 Interview Data - Situational and Organizational Factors 
Annex 3.1 Country 1 
Annex 3.1.1 Situational Factors  
Subsidiary size and business priority 
Both total sales of country 1 and sales for SBU 1 are among the top 5 for 
SurgiSupplies. 
Max points out that he generally works mostly with the top 10 to 15 country 
organizations. The following 10 he follows ‘by the way’ and the rest he does 
not get involved with at all. 
Kevin states that, while smaller subsidiaries depend on central support 
particularly for marketing purposes as they have limited own marketing staff 
or none, larger subsidiaries often are self-sufficient. As they do not depend 
on central resources, they get more self-confident and see less need to 
strategically cooperate. ‘Now when we for example visited country (country 
name), which … considers itself … a big and important country, and so the 
situation was much more difficult on the level that we were talking with them, 
they thought basically of us as intruders. They did not want to talk about 
everything with us, they thought (of us) like an inspection from central and 
why do we need to tell them things?’. He points out that, particularly for the 
larger country organizations who have large resources themselves, the 
central managers need to develop value propositions in order to convince 
them to cooperate with them. In this example however the subsidiary even 
declined investing in a business opportunity with a local hospital group that 
central managers had developed for them.  
Local view point 
Luke thinks that the level of cooperation of the headquarters with the different 
local subsidiaries firstly depends, and should depend, of the respective 
priority of the subsidiary. 
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Traditional SBU orientation of the individual subsidiaries 
Subsidiaries that already have a well structured and professional 
organization for SBU 1, such as in country 1, in Max’s opinion they are 
obliged to succeed in this product area not only by central but also by local 
standards. Those countries are typically aware of the open potentials in their 
markets and they know that they need to cooperate with the central 
managers to exploit them. It is with those countries that extensive strategy 
workshops are systematically organized to define practices and activities for 
future development. Also these countries have more complex problems than 
others as they have already exploited a substantial part of their market 
potential with the existing product line and need to look for new market 
opportunities. Max believes that this is particularly true for the local 
organization in case 1.  
Local view point 
An important aspect in Luke’s opinion is the trust local managers have in the 
headquarters’ managers and what he calls the ‘religious confession’ of the 
country organization, meaning their allegiance to different central divisional 
and SBU organizations. 
As Peter usually does not have a single direct counterpart in the subsidiaries, 
he tries to get the individual and separate commitment to his ideas from all 
local stakeholders, usually the local division manager, the local sales 
manager and the local marketing manager if he wants to have a chance of 
successfully implementing them. Particular difficulties for him arise when a 
division manager does not have any personal practical experience with sales 
in this particular product group and when the local organization is very 
hierarchical. He finds the local sales managers on the other hand to be less 
difficult to deal with, as they usually share a common business understanding 
with him.  
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Cultural differences between the headquarters and the individual subsidiaries 
Max thinks that there is a relatively homogenous international culture in his 
company, as many people have been in the organization for a long time. He 
also believes that open conflicts between divisions have calmed down over 
the years. On the other hand he confirms that this common culture appears 
only at the top and middle management level but not within the local 
organizations themselves, where country specific culture elements are 
dominant. 
Peter finds that differences in the local subsidiaries concerning delegation 
levels have an impact on the complexity of his dealings with the subsidiaries. 
He states that while in case 1 the central sales manager and the central 
marketing manager are very independent in their decisions, in some Asian 
countries there are strict hierarchies that need to be followed where every 
decision always involves managers at least one hierarchy level up, hindering 
the decision making process and the speed of reaction. This is however not 
necessarily a top-down approach, as it often starts with convincing the lower 
hierarchy levels to prepare decision proposals for their superiors. Peter 
believes that these aspects are related to the general local mentality rather 
than a specific organizational culture. Many years ago he had spent some 
years in a local subsidiary himself and he found it a very important 
experience for his future dealings with subsidiaries. The most important 
things he learned was that the level of involvement of employees, or ‘team-
spirit’ as he puts it, varies in the different organizations, meaning that the 
individual employee is not, like in his company’s headquarters, always free to 
be critical, communicate every information to everyone, and to take or even 
be involved in decisions concerning their own field of activity. Most 
importantly he found that the information flow from the headquarters to the 
subsidiary was much more scarce than he had imagined and that he had to 
actually physically visit the headquarters regularly in order to obtain the level 
of information he thought necessary. ‘Also, in some countries the boss is ‘le 
Patron’ who presides on top while the others pay lip service and nod 
everything through. So critique is not a good thing in all subsidiaries.’xxxix xl He 
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gives another example from an Asian country, where, in the preparation of 
the initial launch of his groups products, a local marketing manager had done 
a country wide market research including market price levels. When the 
negotiations of transfer pricing, that largely depends on local market price 
information, started, this manager suddenly was no longer part of the 
meetings: ‘When the first telephone conference about pricing came, … 
(name of the marketing manager) already did not participate. Then I enquired 
and got no answer. On Friday I then got an email saying that only two people 
would be involved in pricing. Why? Because they fear he could now escape 
with his new knowledge.’ xli 
Innovation performance 
Local view point 
Clearly, Ian believes to be operating in a very short-lived market with very 
high constraints on time-to-market. He thinks that there is not enough 
investment in research and development capacity to meet this market’s 
standards. The local marketing manager who brought up the same topic 
independently added that when a product is launched too late, they will still 
be able to place it with their core customer base, but it will be impossible to 
use it for marketing activities and winning new customers. 
Justin explains, that sales planning data is used at the same time for the 
manufacturing planning for implant and instrumentation sets for product trials 
and new customers. Sales and profit planning must be aligned with this 
investment planning for sets. xlii  This direct linkage of the availabilities of 
implant and instrument sets to the development of new business represents 
a particular problem for him as there are often research and development or 
manufacturing related delays that compromise the implementation of the 
sales and marketing activity planning for months or even years. When asked 
how the team reacts to this kind of situation he answered laughing: ‘Serene, 
meanwhile serene. … I think we have somewhat grown used to it.’xliii 
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Privileging the domestic market 
Local view point 
Justin admits to having specific advantages as his team is operating in the 
domestic market of SurgiSupplies and products are often being developed in 
cooperation with local domestic key opinion leaders. He believes that US 
competitors have similar advantages in their US home market. 
Annex 3.1.2 Organizational Factors 
Local autonomy 
The only direct reporting line of the HospiMed’s subsidiaries to the central 
headquarters is the one between the local general managers and the central 
board of directors. Kevin believes that it is the explicit wish of the company’s 
CEO to totally delegate the sales responsibility to the local managing 
directors of the subsidiaries: ‘…(name of the CEO) installs these people and 
tells them: ‘I want you to run this company as if it were your own…’. This 
central manager sees the advantage of this total delegation in the strong 
incentive for the managing director of a subsidiary to optimally respond to the 
local situation and obtain the best possible financial results. It is left to them 
with which product groups to obtain their results.  
The central marketing head of this product group, Max, would strongly prefer 
a direct line organization to the current matrix organization, with a central 
business unit manager heading all relevant functions. ‘I believe that … 
creating business unit structures would help just to create simpler, clearer 
structures in the headquarters. And then also it’s impossible that even 
between Marketing and R&D consensus is weak and we do not pull together, 
while ultimately the (market) approach should be strongly driven by central. 
And if there really were a business unit or a business unit head he would 
have a totally different standing in the countries as well …’ xliv.  
He believes that the lack of direct control over the central functions has an 
indirect negative impact on the relationship with the local sales organizations: 
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‘And it continues versus production, versus supply-chain and into all the other 
functions. Here too, you actually need to constantly somehow gain good-will 
for your projects, so that purchasing will place the order and so on… I think 
that here, already, we’re not strong enough. And the countries out there 
sense that too. Because we cannot assert a strong position versus the 
countries.’ xlv 
While stating that he ‘can live with it’, Peter, the central business 
development manager describes the effects of the matrix organization as 
enhancing communication but hindering decision making. 
Local view point 
Interestingly Justin, the local product manager of country 1 seems to agree to 
Max’s view, as he would also prefer a direct line to the current matrix 
organization. Although he generally believes in the long-term better success 
of matrix organizations, he thinks that it does not work in a satisfactory way 
for his company as the necessary networking is not sufficient. He gives an 
example where the R&D department in SBU 1 had decided to develop their 
own instrument storage system, while there exists another department 
specialized in such kind of technology that might have done a better job, 
allowing the other department to focus on their own core competencies. Also 
he thinks that a direct line organization would allow the company to take 
quicker action and thus be more reactive to market needs.  
Delegation and sanctioning 
Max weighs advantages and disadvantages of SurgiSupplies’ culture against 
competitors’: ‘I think this depends on the organizational structure and of 
course also of the organizational culture. I mean this breadth and also this 
balancing (of product groups) has often made us successful in many areas. 
And it is sometimes positive as well, that there is not an immediate call to 
replace everyone just because it does not go so well for half a year in a 
country or in a product group. And this also gives us the opportunity to drive 
concepts calmly and with good reflection... I believe that we do have 
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advantages. On the other hand I do also believe that others have stronger 
mechanisms of defining and pursuing common goals and then also of 
drawing consequences.’ xlvi 
Peter also seems to prefer the culture in his company to ‘American’ corporate 
cultures as he states: ‘Well, there is no American ado here, but simply a 
good, decent culture, where people mutually respect each other but do 
communicate, sometimes in the positive sometimes in the negative.’xlvii He 
gives an example of Medtronic, a major American competitor, where he 
considers the regional sales directors to have a lot of power over the 
subsidiaries. Both, the local marketing director as well as the central 
Marketing head believe that in American companies the staff-turn over is very 
much higher than in their company. 
Max believes that the company has a special culture that is based on shared 
values, the long-lasting success of the company and people taking pride and 
enjoying to work there. On the other hand to him the company is very 
pardoning and it is very unusual for employees to be sanctioned, sometimes 
leading them to being less vibrant than they could.  
Also he believes the organization to be very bureaucratic: ‘Well I am certain 
that here at SurgiSupplies we have our own special company culture that is 
based on the yearlong success, on values shared between many employees, 
also a certain pride in working at (company name). We are however at the 
same time marked by a relatively pardoning company culture, the word 
‘sanction’ being more or less unknown, which makes working relatively 
convenient but does not necessarily push us to our highest levels of 
dynamism. On top we have an extremely developed bureaucratic jungle that 
becomes intransparent and sometimes even irrational.’xlviii 
Kevin believes that these differences are an important part of the company’s 
culture that should not be changed: ‘you always hear people talk about 
‘should we be more like the American companies?’ and so on. I think one 
thing that is very important is that you can change things and you can change 
the way the company works without changing the basic cultural values that 
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the company has. So I think, in whatever approach is taken, it needs to be 
made sure that the core company values stay the same. Because this is what 
keeps the company together and this is why people like to work where they 
work. … because we say we want to increase the influence on the local 
subsidiaries, we should have an approach, that keeps the local strength, but 
that gets everyone more aligned to the strategy.’ 
Kevin further believes that more mature subsidiaries can be allowed to act 
more independently as for example younger subsidiaries or ones with less 
experienced staff. He therefore thinks in order to provide the appropriate 
guidance or leadership level for subsidiary activities it is important to be able 
to measure the maturity level of a subsidiary.  
Concerning leadership styles all participants pointed out the strong difference 
of their company to American competitorsxlix. They believe that generally 
speaking, American companies have a much more centrally driven, directive 
approach to management control. Kevin gives an example from his former 
position at a major American multi-national corporation: ‘… my personal 
thinking is that this is sort of an American versus a European approach. … I 
think many of the American companies, they do have an approach that is 
very much central driven. And, for example from my experience working for 
IBM, there was a word which is ‘execute’, this was the word for every local 
subsidiary. So we had a central strategy defined in the US and then every 
local country had to implement it. … In the extreme, we said ‘do not think, 
execute’. … if we now look again to the medical market, if a company like 
Ethicon for example they do have a nice new product, they can roll it out 
much quicker to the world than we. Because, it’s not only because of this 
mentality but it’s also because someone centrally decides: ‘this is a high 
potential product and we’re going to roll it out world-wide and starting 
tomorrow everyone world-wide has to do it’ and they do it, because that’s the 
mentality that’s how this company works. So there is no question going to be 
asked if it is really appropriate or not in a local market, it’s going to be rolled 
out.’ 
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Peter finds that country organizations are generally successful if they trust in 
and agree on the proven strategies suggested by central instead of trying to 
invent their own. On the other hand successful countries need to have a 
consequent implementation culture.  
Local view point 
Another example for a high level of delegation at SurgiSupplies can be found 
in local sales management. Asked about the process of determining 
customer activities for his sales people Ian answered: ‘As long as the result is 
good, in my opinion it does not make a lot of sense to intervene. Everyone 
certainly has a different way of selling things. As long as he sells them, and 
sells them successfully, in my opinion there is no need for uniforming. To 
say, ‘you always need to wear a red tie and be at the customer at 9 am’, 
because the customers are also very different.’ l 
Impact of delegation on global strategy 
The disadvantage of strategy delegation for Kevin lies in the fact that all four 
central divisions want to develop their business according to a global strategy 
and therefore might all require engagement and resources from the same 
country organizations. ‘Now if we let everyone locally decide what they want 
to do, the effect is that our real implemented strategy is the sum of the local 
strategies because this is what we do in the real market.’ He believes that the 
cooperation and the participation to global strategies depends largely on the 
individual personality and likings of the respective general managers. 
A common theme among participants was that local subsidiaries were not 
forced to follow strategic guidelines as long as their overall sales and profits 
were satisfactory. He states: ‘… if you look at how we control the 
subsidiaries, it is still the, let me say ‘old way’ - they are good if they have 
growth, they are not so good if they have no growth, but we do not care 
where the growth comes from. Even if the growth comes from something that 
is absolutely non-strategic, that we do not really want to do the business 
from, …. Even if this is completely neglected and a local company has a 
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good yearly result, they are the heroes. And this is for me the still missing link 
that we need to not only measure a company’s result on numbers, but also 
on the level of strategic implementation. ….And then, of course this takes … 
the cultural change in the organization … So people do not only need to act 
like that, but they need to think like that and this is not something that you 
can change in a year or two.’  
In Kevin’s experience inconsequent communication and deployment of 
central guidelines by top-management can lead to difficulties in controlling 
the behavior of local subsidiaries. In his opinion the fact of allowing local 
exceptions or ‘adaptations’ is compromising the implementation of general 
guidelines. He gives the example of a company he formerly worked for, 
where he was charged with developing and implementing a strategic 
planning tool. When it was rolled out, some country managers who had good 
personal relationships with the owner convinced him to make exceptions for 
them not to use it, and the owner did. When this became known in other 
subsidiaries, the whole system was undermined and could not be 
successfully implemented. The lack of adherence to a global strategy in his 
opinion is also problematic because customers, in this case medical doctors, 
are visiting different countries for work, information or training events, so the 
brand image is not confined to individual countries. 
Fighting over resources 
The fact that four divisions, each of them with multiple product groups, are 
fighting for the same resources in every country without direct hierarchical 
power can be a source of conflict. As Kevin describes it for SurgiSupplies: ‘… 
if we look at one central product group visiting a subsidiary, what they will do 
is basically … try to sell their product to the local company in order to make 
them sell their products on the market. Now if we think about seven product 
groups and everyone is doing this it’s sort of a confusion that is left to the 
local country, because they were told seven times you have to do our stuff, 
and we are the best’.  
On the other hand, as Max points out, this puts the local managers in a 
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position where they can play the different central product groups against 
each other: 
‘And the countries also are quite savvy at playing this game, because they 
continue to pick, so to speak, ‘which product group is the most interesting for 
me right now’ and they like to jump from one topic to the other, and then 
sometimes there can be a gap in consequent goal achievement. If there are 
momentary obstacles in the market for product group x, well then maybe 
product group y has a cool new product or here in product group z they are 
launching some fairly good ones, they then sometimes shift very quickly and 
what counts for them is that the local result is ok. Well, I think we do feel it 
every day, it’s like that.’ li 
As Kevin puts it, the countries keep a lot of decisional freedom what product 
group to invest in. He points out however that nowadays, in order to address 
the above issues, if they want to invest, they need to make a business plan 
that needs to be approved by the divisional headquarters so that the return 
on investment can be measured according to their own commitments as the 
investment is rolled outlii.  
Local view point 
Ian, the local sales manager of country 1 points out that business mechanics 
are different from one product group to the other. In his opinion the 
requirement for the selection of sales people and also the leadership styles 
are very different from one product group to the other. The business 
development manager suggests that local managers often simply choose to 
invest in and work with the product groups they have prior experience with. 
Short-term and risk-averse local strategies 
Kevin seems to believe that sometimes strategic long-term investments in 
specific product groups can lead to inferior short term results and that local 
managers are reluctant to pursue such investments as they prefer short-term 
strategies. 
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The short-term orientation of subsidiaries sometimes can lead to 
opportunistic behavior. Max tells the story of a country where the products of 
his product group had not yet been launched. A local customer had the 
strong wish to use these products and convinced a local manager to provide 
him with them. The manager then simply confirmed in the planning system 
that he intended to invest in this product group. When they had received all 
necessary trainings, materials and instrumentation sets to satisfy the needs 
of this one single customer, they completely lost interest in the product group 
again. 
Global cost and profit issues 
Another related problem identified by both central marketing managers is 
difficulties with cost controlling. Max tells about his frustration with world-wide 
expenses in his product group exploding in spite of his long lasting own 
attempts to control cost within his central department. Even if high budget 
increases are not followed by substantial sales increases, in his opinion there 
are no sanctions against the responsible managers. He attributes this fact to 
a general lack of organizational power of the divisional headquarters. Peter 
gives another expense related example of certain smaller and comparably 
unsuccessful countries who tend to send more staff members to international 
events than their bigger and more successful counterparts, again without any 
well functioning control mechanism kicking in. 
Sales management practice 
Local view point 
Even within his own sales organization Luke thinks that the different SBU 
teams do not know about the service activities of the others. Generally 
speaking he believes that the decision making processes and the decision 
makers of hospitals are very much separate for each medical specialty and 
thus also for each product group. So there are limited possibilities of sales 
employees from different SBUs to develop individual customer related 
synergies, with the exception of passing along contacts and aside from large 
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scale Key-Account management for hospital group purchasing organizations. 
Ian thinks that leadership style depends largely on a manager’s personality. 
Another aspect he finds is that with an experienced team like his it is possible 
to work on the basis of mutual trust rather than control, the level of delegation 
increasing with the maturity of an employee in his job ‘If I have someone who 
has 30 years of sales experience I have to lead him in a different way than 
someone just out of college’liii. According to Ian sales management control in 
his organization is largely performed by direct personal communication, once 
or twice a week by phone, once or twice a month in person and every two or 
three months in team meetings. He considers the transparency of sales 
results and activities of all sales people as being very high, due to well 
performing sales statistics and customer relationship management tools. 
These tools, as well as the incentive system, are the same for all product 
groups’ sales teams in this country organization. He believes that, while local 
strategies in different countries can vary depending on the individual market 
situation, such tools could be standardized all over the world. Ian finds that 
modern communication and information systems have changed the 
communication with the sales reps. He describes how in earlier days the 
sales reps lined up at the post office every Friday to call their manager and 
received copies of the invoices once a week that the dutiful sales people 
recorded in filing systems and which the lazy ones just threw away. Today he 
says he has access to his people and the sales data 24/7 and his people 
have access to him. 
In the beginning of each year the sales goals and the product focus are 
defined. However the sales people are, within budgetary and legal 
constraints, free to decide how they intend to obtain their sales numbers. The 
sales manager states that in past years they used to have a top five priority 
list which customers to develop but they had abandoned this approach in the 
face of missing opportunities due to the lack of new products.  
When asked about how the sales people obtain their goals the local 
marketing managers says that this is primarily done during the annual 
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national sales meeting where the product focus is communicated and the 
corresponding training particularly for new products is performed. Then there 
is an official annual meeting with the responsible sales manager and the daily 
communication with them. The planning and objectives that are 
communicated at the national sales meeting are defined in the sales 
manager team meeting. 
Concerning sales management Luke believes that the situations of country 
organizations vary largely as to their distribution channel (direct, agents or 
dealers), breadth of product portfolio represented by individual sales people, 
existing sales volumes, product focus and competitive situation. This is why 
all sales force decisions in his opinion should be left with the local 
organizations. Even compensation and incentive schemes he thinks cannot 
be standardized, due to different mentalities and salary levels. On the other 
hand he is convinced that the different country organizations should be 
motivated to work more actively on the improvement of their sales and 
acquisition processes. For example he believes that the individual 
subsidiaries should be more active in developing value added services 
customized to their specific country needs, alongside the physical products 
whose differentiation potential is continuously diminishing. These services 
are typically organizing courses for medical professionals with key opinion 
leaders as trainers, services helping hospitals to improve their processes or 
clinical pathways. Luke thinks that the central organization has only limited 
possibilities to develop such activities for the countries in a standardized way. 
Also the legal restrictions with respect to such activities are very different 
from country to country. A first step for the headquarters could be to simply 
collect a best-practice list of possible services performed in all world-wide 
organizations. Another important issue to him lies in the self-conception of 
the sales people, who need to change from product sales people to service 
sales people.  
Also, Luke believes that CRM systems and sales reporting systems could be 
standardized.  
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Staff turn-over and loyalty 
A particular problem with cooperation and control of the local sales and 
marketing organization, mentioned independently by most participants in 
country 1 is staff turn-over. Peter points out that particularly in the BRIC 
countries and generally in Asia there is a high risk that sales and marketing 
people will leave the company once they have acquired new competencies. 
He tells the story of a country manager who made a sales rep sign a binding 
two year contract before even allowing her to attend product training at the 
headquarters as this represents an important expense for him. Another 
example he gives is from a small country that the central product team had 
targeted for its high price level and a good acceptance level of their product 
portfolio. They failed to develop the necessary contacts because of frequent 
turn-over of the responsible local staff. 
Max on the other hand regrets not having any influence on local staffing 
decisions. Sometimes sales people are taken out of the local team or sales 
people who become superfluous in other sales teams are attributed to his 
product group without prior notice to him. He also states that in many 
countries the teams are so small, sometimes only one or two people, that the 
departure of a single person represents a big problem: ‘Well, in the end we 
have a network of individual people that our business-model is based on, and 
if the people break out we feel it immediately.’liv He also believes that long-
term success in his business is strongly related to personal relationships 
between sales reps and doctors that can absorb temporary shortcomings for 
example in the product portfolio. 
Local view point 
Justin believes that the successful team-work in his team and generally in the 
country organization he works in, is due to the fact that the team has not lost 
a single member for the past eight years, only occasionally adding new ones. 
Justin believes that their team has grown tightly together over the years and 
that the control mechanisms now do not need to be as strict, as he believes 
them to be in other companies. He finds that the task distribution has grown 
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naturally over the years and that there is little need for codified procedures. 
With the growth of the department, people have adapted to the necessities 
and have developed the necessary skills. As opposed to competitors, there is 
a high loyalty to the company and a close to zero turn-over rate. In his 
opinion the team also has been more successful for many years than most 
competitors who he believes to have more rigid sales force control systems. 
The reason why they are now facing challenges in his opinion is solely the 
lack of innovative product launches.  
Ian remarks that in earlier days there had been a high voluntary fluctuation as 
the people they had hired did not fit the business. He believes that dealings 
are different with people he has worked with for a long time as with new-
comers and for example attributes his good relationship with central 
marketing to the fact that he has known the central marketing manager for 
many years. 
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Annex 3.2 Country 2 
Annex 3.2.1 Situational Factors 
Subsidiary size and business priority 
Both total country 2 sales and sales for SBU 2 are among the top 5 in country 
2. 
Local view point 
Albert believes that the country 2 subsidiary has a very good standing at the 
headquarters and is treated with priority because, even though it has a very 
complicated regulatory system, the market prices are very high and the 
company therefore is very profitable, contributing strongly to the global profits 
of SurgiSupplies. He believes that the subsidiaries in two of his neighboring 
countries are treated with more distance and do not get as much attention, as 
they have low prices and similarly complicated regulatory issues. 
Traditional SBU orientation of the individual subsidiaries 
Mike thinks that country 2 has a special situation because, other than in most 
countries, the local subsidiary is historically focused more on SBU 4 than on 
SBU 2. Fred states that different country organizations and geographical 
regions develop different beliefs concerning what are the ‘right’ SBUs, 
according to their past successes and according to their assumptions about 
the future market opportunities. Sometimes they simply tend to invest in the 
biggest market segments. 
Joe places the resource allocation problem even at a higher level, believing 
that general managers of subsidiaries that have a history of working more 
with other divisions of HospiMed than with SurgiSupplies, will continue to 
focus on these areas, potentially neglecting SurgiSupplies products over all. 
This can lead to difficulties for SurgiSupplies in rolling out world-wide product 
campaigns. He however points out that this is not the case in country 2, 
where SurgiSupplies has always had a strong position. He believes that a 
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problem lies in the lack of separation of the measurement of the results, as 
results from one division can be compensated by another. Also, concerning 
HR issues Joe finds it difficult to establish divisional strategies, because in 
different subsidiaries the organization might be too small or organized 
differently than the central headquarters and then there can be conflicting 
messages from different central divisions. 
Local view point 
Albert explains that his subsidiary historically has been focusing on the more 
implant related SBUs 1 and 5 rather than surgical process oriented fields like 
SBU 2. Every year they hired about 10 new people and allocated them 
mostly to these two focus areas and also did not pay too much attention to 
establishing a very strong management team for the others. They were often 
criticized for this from headquarters managers responsible for other product 
areas. At one point they started growing one of the newer and more 
innovative product lines of SBU 2, but that seemed to lead to even stronger 
neglect in the classical SBU 2 product lines, even sometimes declining sales 
in those particular product areas in certain years. Albert says that there is no 
real recognition in his organization for the classical SBA 2 product lines as 
there are many competitors, many country specific products that are difficult 
to supply, low SurgiSupplies market shares and in addition it is seen as a 
business area with low prestige. Albert concludes that the headquarters 
wishes are contradictory, as they cannot expect a subsidiary to produce 
excellent results and profits in one area and ask for investments into another, 
ignoring the local situation in pursuit of certain global visions. 
Brand awareness and market share 
Concerning the ‘total solution’ services concept, Fred believes it to be an 
important learning from recent years, that it might be more successful in 
countries with higher product market shares. The customers seem to be 
more confident in consulting services from perceived leading players, 
meaning the stronger the product brand is developed in a given country, the 
more successful the services concept will be.  
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Susan thinks that the brand awareness for SurgiSupplies is particularly low in 
country 2 and that SurgiSupplies does not have good contacts to the 
hospitals and need to rely on the customer relationships of their dealers. The 
‘total solution’ selling approach in her opinion however requires a direct 
customer contact and relationship and the organization needs to change in 
this direction. Joe, a central HR manager, independently describes the same 
problem with respect to country 2. He recalls that the situation of relying only 
on dealers for customer contacts was exactly the same for SurgiSupplies in 
their domestic market (country 1) in the 1970s. In his opinion, the business 
for SBU 2 is the same in the various countries, because it is based on 
relationship management. He however points out that the way relationships 
are built and maintained might differ from country to country. 
Local view point 
James says, although he understood the value of the ‘total solution’ project 
when it was presented to him by central marketing, he thought initially that it 
would be extremely difficult to implement, and that with their weak market 
position he wasn’t sure if they were able to alter the market in this direction. 
He says that the local marketing and sales team did not really understand the 
program at first. After they had learned about it they thought it was a very 
hard task to convince the hospital management to go forward with it. James 
believes that the most important error was in targeting the wrong hospital in 
this first pilot case. Once they had started the project, he believes that the 
initial targeting criteria were not clear enough for them. The customer had the 
intention to reorganize their stock but they had no intention to buy new 
products. Generally speaking James shares the opinion of his colleagues 
that all project efforts have lead to improved brand awareness in the 
hospitals and will eventually lead to additional future sales. He is however still 
not sure that this should be pursued on a nation-wide basis.  
Market life-cycle 
Mike gives an example of cultural difficulties that he has encountered in a 
large emerging country. He speculates that the fact that this country formerly 
 
275
had a communist economic system still shows in completely different 
mentalities, needs and behaviors on within their HospiMed subsidiary but 
also on the customer side: ‘We have the feeling that neither our own (local) 
organization nor the customer side is playing with open cards. 
Communication is always ominous and we haven’t deciphered the code …. 
We have the impression that our solutions that are focusing on a combination 
of safety, quality and increasing efficiency aren’t recognized, do not even find 
any interest whatsoever.’ lv  He and his team, after several unsuccessful 
attempts with the ‘total solution’ program are now speculating that the 
‘classical’ marketing strategy of participating in medical congresses and 
convincing large numbers of medical professionals one by one, which has 
been practiced in the domestic market 30 years ago, might be more 
appropriate for this country. 
Local view point 
Albert points out that when he took over from his predecessor only some 
years ago he had the feeling that the communication between the 
headquarters and the country 2 organization was not satisfactory. The local 
organization did not respond well to marketing and sales programs 
suggested by the different SBUs at the headquarters or simply ignored them. 
He believes that this was partially due to the fact that this subsidiary had 
been showing steady satisfactory growth rates for many years until it went 
into a phase of stagnation only recently.  
Cultural differences between the headquarters and the individual subsidiaries 
Susan believes that in the corporate headquarters office the staff receive 
more creative liberty than in the country 2 subsidiary. She also feels that in 
the subsidiary respecting formal rules is more important than goal 
achievement. Also, in her opinion, headquarters staff can more easily make 
use of resources while at the country 2 subsidiary for example employees do 
not have access to internet and they need top level approval for any own 
initiative, limiting the autonomy of the staff. She believes that the situation 
could be largely improved if the department heads had more autonomy 
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concerning their budgets and staff decisions. She points out that employment 
decisions are taken at such a high level, that sometimes the required skill set 
is not well adapted to the requirement of the position and the department 
concerned. Besides these cultural problems there is a strong language 
barrier as the staff in country 2 does not speak very good English, the quality 
declining steeply in the lower levels of hierarchy. This is why a central 
expatriate manager, Susan, was assigned, who speaks country 2’s language. 
She has helped a lot with communication. On the other hand Fred 
independently agrees with Mikes point of view, that country 2 is not well 
understood by the headquarters with respect to its mentality and market and 
customer needs. Susan on the other hand points out a certain level of 
commitment from country 2 to the ‘total solution’ approach, as they have 
however in the mean time created a local project team of five with two 
dedicated field positions.  
Susan thinks that there are a number of rather banal issues that hinder an 
easy flow of communication between the corporate office and the subsidiary. 
She for example points out that while a number of younger female 
employees speak reasonably good English, they are not assigned to deal 
with the corporate office or if they are, they prefer to write emails instead of 
calling on the phone in order to save on telephone expenses. She also sees 
a certain rivalry between the marketing and the sales department, but she 
believes this also to be the case in any other country. The hierarchical 
decision making process however she attributes to the general culture of 
country 2. 
Fred uses the terms ‚open‘ and ‚conservative‘ to describe the cultural 
difference leading to success or failure of the ‘total solution’ program in 
different countries. He believes that country 2 has a very conservative 
culture, where traditions and experience are of major importance. Generally 
speaking he believes that in his product markets there are too many different 
local needs and wants to cover and that the company therefore needs to be 
very restrictive with respect to customized country strategies. Also he thinks 
that due to the particular culture of country 2 it is difficult to interpret their true 
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level of interest. Although the general manager of country 2 had signaled 
high interest in the ‘total solution’ solution program, the implementation was 
very slow and limited resources were committed. 
Contextual differences between different SBUs 
Fred thinks that some SBUs represent special business models that are 
driven by implant sales rather than surgical processes. For these SBUs he 
thinks it is important to select the few most promising countries according to 
the individual competitive situation and invest over-proportionally. In the 
majority of others countries the company should simply not even be present 
with such products. However in the past decade the market has 
consolidated, forming giant ‘one-stop shop’ companies. In the long run 
therefore Fred believes, while the markets will continue to concentrate 
around surgical process related products on the one hand, and indication 
specific implant related products on the other hand, the company will need to 
limit the areas they want to participate in.  
Privileging the domestic market 
Interestingly Mike tells the story of having visited a convention about services 
management, at the occasion of which he had had the opportunity to speak 
to a number of managers from the same country but from different industries. 
He was surprised by the response from several of his fellow managers, who 
seem to apply innovative solutions exclusively in their domestic market. Mike 
summarizes their statements: ‘Abroad? You do not seriously believe that we 
would confront our local prima donnas with such highly complex topics (such 
as value added services)’.lvi  
Many years ago a first significant effort to improve sales results in country 2 
had been made by creating 120 line items specific to this market, in order to 
propose a locally adapted and competitive product portfolio. This did not turn 
out to be a success as sales results still stayed far behind expectations. 
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Local view point 
James feels that the central managers only see the huge market potential of 
country 2 and do not seem to understand that being in a follower position 
here requires different strategies than being in a leading position like in 
SurgiSupplies domestic market. 
Annex 3.2.2 Organizational Factors 
Delegation and sanctioning 
Mike recalls that the guideline of the former global head of Marketing and 
Sales at SurgiSupplies was: ‚all power to the countries‘, meaning that the 
countries were free to decide what strategies they wanted to pursue. But this 
has often lead to situations where countries did not see the bigger picture 
and did not let themselves be inspired by new solutions, many times with the 
simple argument ‘in our market, things are just different’. Mike thinks that 
many European companies are operating this way, while American and 
Japanese companies, such as Johnson & Johnson, Covedien or Olympus 
are more driven by corporate decisions that are rolled out rigorously 
worldwide. On the other hand, Mike is under the impression that the 
management of SurgiSupplies is currently trying to actively change this old 
doctrine of ‘all power to the countries’. 
Local view point 
Albert believes that as a general manager of a subsidiary at SurgiSupplies he 
has much more autonomy than if he were working with one of the major 
American competitors. He has a monthly telephone call with the global head 
of marketing, however he has the feeling that the objective is more to find out 
how he can be supported from the headquarters rather than to be pushed to 
certain objectives. He thinks this is mostly due to the fact that SurgiSupplies 
is a privately owned company. He believes that the obligation of showing 
quarterly profits to shareholders makes a big difference for the management 
system.  
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Although he needs to report monthly, at SurgiSupplies the planning period is 
12 months. Also he recalls being impressed by a conversation with a board 
member of SurgiSupplies. When Albert asked him why he had decided to 
work for SurgiSupplies he answered that he did not like the hire and fire 
attitude of American companies, cutting staff to ensure short-term profits for 
the shareholders, and enjoyed the fact that in the family-owned 
SurgiSupplies business taking good care of the employees was an important 
priority. Albert however points out that in his opinion reducing staff to ensure 
short-term profits to a certain extent was also practiced in publicly traded 
European MNCs.  
Impact of delegation on global strategy implementation 
Mike thinks that the matrix organization at SurgiSupplies leads to a situation 
where different central SBU managers develop solutions that they present to 
the local managers who pick and choose what they believe to be interesting 
in their countries. His experience in country 2 (and many other countries) 
however shows that the local managers do not actively pursue any of the 
headquarters’ propositions on their own initiative. While in country 2 there 
was a decision from the local general manager to pursue the ‘total solution’ 
program, there then were difficulties in enforcing it locally top-down. 
The creation of a central sales department in the headquarters separate from 
the marketing department, and headed by an executive team member, in 
Mike’s opinion was a good decision. On the other hand he thinks that the 
implementation after 2 years still is weak, with one major world region being 
exempt from the new organization and the different central sales managers 
having very different interpretations of their responsibilities. He says that this 
makes it difficult for him as a central marketing manager to work with this 
group. His expectations from this department are to ensure local sales 
efficiency and focus and to actively influence structural resource allocation in 
the subsidiaries, however he does not believe this to be implemented yet. ‘In 
manufacturing there is a guideline where every cross slot screwdriver needs 
to be placed and in sales it’s: ‘all power to the countries, just do what you 
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think you need to do’.lviiAlso he says that his level of involvement with the 
individual managers is very different, with some he has very frequent contact 
and with others hardly any contact at all. 
Fighting over resources 
When asked about resource allocation conflicts with other SBUs, Mike states 
that currently SBU 2 is so successful, even featuring the top-growing single 
product line of the entire corporation, and that therefore they currently do not 
have limitations with respect to resources. On the other hand he states that 
this has not always been true and also it is not true. One of the major, and 
extremely profitable product lines of SBU 2, for more than a decade had 
been defined as a cash-cow with hardly any investments. He believes, that 
the cash gained from these products has been used to build up other SBUs 
and therefore they did not have enough money to internationalize this 
product group that is most successful domestically and only in one other 
major international market. He thinks it might have retrospectively been a 
wrong decision to be active in too many fields. 
Fred believes that the company’s product focus generally is too large. While 
he believes that the company will be able to continue to grow, it’s presence in 
the individual segments will be too weak to generate over-proportional 
growth, the funds being allocated by giving everyone a slice of the cake. 
While Fred believes in the principle of the value oriented resource allocation 
process of the company, he thinks that it is well established on paper but 
implemented in an inconsequent manner, because the company is just not 
capable of disinvestments, accepting the loss of existing business. ‘…we do 
not work according to the American model, meaning I invest now and harvest 
later, but it is always a simultaneous investing and harvesting and harvesting 
and investing business model. Therefore moving forward in small steps 
means also moving backwards in small steps.’lviii 
  
 
281
Short-term and risk-averse local strategies 
Fred thinks that for the local general managers it is relatively easy to grow 
their business steadily with a wide portfolio from many or all SBUs‚’10 miles 
wide and 1 inch deep‘ as he cites a former colleague often saying. However 
this way their local company will have difficulties in becoming a visible player 
in any specific area, and if it does, there are not enough resources to 
continue to grow this particular business past a certain market share. And he 
believes the same to be true on a corporate level – a presence in too many 
major market segments does not allow the resources to allow a critical mass 
of innovations in all fields to become a big and successful player while in any 
given field there are much bigger companies who solely specialize in that 
particular area. 
Local view point 
David believes that the implementation of the ‘total solution’ selling program 
in country 2 suffers from lack of staff. He is one of only two persons who are 
responsible for all of the field work for this project and he also entirely 
manages one complete other product line on a nation-wide basis. David’s 
sales manager, Tom, independently agrees to these points. The cooperation 
with the headquarters for David is too time-consuming, as he needs to 
translate analyses and reports from English to Japanese for the customers. 
Tom who, much like David, does not speak English, admits never having 
received any training on the ‘total solution’ program, he just picked it up from 
his colleagues and his team. Tom believes that although the program can 
lead to brand building and can create long-term daily business there will be 
no initial big project sale, like in other countries. 
James is more optimistic. He thinks that the ‘total solution’ selling program 
will be successful in the long run, increasing the chances of winning major 
purchasing projects and, with all the available IT tools that come with it, will 
also improve the accuracy and the efficiency of the treatment of such large-
scale projects. This to him is important because the organization today 
spends too much time on such projects that can extend over a time period of 
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2 to 3 years. On the other hand he acknowledges that additional man-power 
will be needed to achieve this. 
Sales management practice 
Concerning the country sales organizations, Fred believes that they should 
be organized by market structures, or surgical disciplines rather than the 
internal company SBU structure: ‘And with this definition of points of sales we 
must not pick too many, but we need to say ok we want to be in the area of 
visceral surgery, or orthopedics, or in neuro surgery or in cardiac surgery or 
in spinal surgery or in cardiology. But we must not again try to be present in 
all surgical disciplines.’lix 
Local view point 
Concerning big purchasing projects, Tom’s organization sometimes receives 
information from their distributors, from specific journals or from their own 
customer visits about major hospital purchasing projects, for example when 
hospital are newly built or refurbished. They share an Excel File with all those 
projects but they need to prioritize them as such projects are very time-
consuming and involve up to three sales people simultaneously, taking away 
from their daily sales activity. Although these projects are time-consuming, if 
the products are delivered timely and properly and the hospital staff is trained 
well, there is an initial large project sale and daily follow-up business can be 
created from it. While Tom does not have any experience with other 
countries, he imagines the process of sales management to be more or less 
the same everywhere.  
He believes that this should be solved by having more strategic product 
discussions with headquarters managers how to win more market share. 
James says that local marketing plans are done entirely without the 
participation of headquarters managers. The local marketing managers 
usually present the finished plans to the central managers, and occasionally 
they modify them according to some feedback.  
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Annex 3.3 Country 3 
3.3.1 Situational Factors 
Number, size and business opportunity of subsidiaries 
While total sales for country 3 are among the top 10 for SurgiSupplies, sales 
for SBUs 3a and 3b are not. 
Adam and his team have grouped their countries into focus countries, 
extended focus countries and ‘nice to have’ countries. Aside of their 
quantitative business objectives, they have formulated qualitative goals, 
among which are to improve ‘alignment and communication’ with the 
subsidiaries and to develop a ‘culture of implementation’. 
Interestingly, the report that Adam uses to evaluate the performance of a 
country subsidiary with respect to their SBU 3a performance, is based on a 
ranking in comparison to the other SurgiSupplies SBUs. The objective thus 
can be interpreted as selling more SBU 3a products and being more 
profitable with them, as with products from other SBUs. 
Local view point 
George recalls that when he started a non-European country subsidiary 
many years ago, SurgiSupplies ‘had no know-how in terms of guiding and 
leading subsidiary companies, or consulting with or helping them. The 
subsidiary companies were more or less on their own and it was on the local 
management of the subsidiary companies to establish relationships within the 
headquarters. I think that has fundamentally changed in the time when we 
really expanded and built new subsidiary companies and when the 
internationalization process of SurgiSupplies took place.’ The SurgiSupplies 
organization had thus learned only with time how to manage dozens of 
subsidiaries. 
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Traditional SBU orientation of the individual subsidiaries 
Toni says that his involvement in the development of local strategies varies 
widely from country to country. While some countries are willing to accept his 
help, ‘other countries know it all better.’ or they haven’t even adopted SBU 3b 
products at all, yet. He believes that this has a lot to do with the general 
attitude of the top managers in the country towards the main office, and this 
he believes to be relatively independent of the different country cultures.  
Brand awareness and market share 
George points out that they had tried ‘so many avenues’ in particular with the 
main SBU 3b product range, but just could not compete successfully. As 
main reasons he gives organizational mistakes, product portfolio issues and 
product quality issues but also the excellent organization of the overpowering 
main competitor with 80 to 90% market share. Keith in his interview talks 
about an ‘uphill struggle’ to try to sell these products into the country 3 
market, that the SBU 3b headquarters insisted on them continuing.  
Marc believes that the organization for SBU 3a in country 3 simply had too 
few sales people to develop profound customer relationships and that one of 
the most populated areas could not even covered. He is happy to announce 
that after one year experience with the CombiTeam a dedicated sales person 
for this area had just been hired. Marc believes that top management should 
get more involved in defining, communicating and implementing top focus 
products. He points out that some even European countries are not getting 
into SBU 3b products at all. 
Marc would have wished in the past to have had an opportunity with country 
3 to discuss options to avoid constant price reductions or to achieve better 
binding of the customers. On the other hand he acknowledges that 
SurgiSupplies has low market shares with SBU 3a products in country 3 and 
therefore also little supplier power. He was also disappointed that even in 
situation where the margin was still acceptable, lowering transfer prices for 
country 3 never led to significant increases in sales, as had been promised 
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by the local managers. 
Cultural differences between the headquarters and the individual subsidiaries 
The cultural aspect in Toni’s experience with subsidiaries was rather that 
some country managers would pretend as if they intended to cooperate, and 
then acted differently, while others told him directly that for different reasons 
they could not engage in the projects presented. 
Contextual differences between SBUs 
Sean admits to having certain conflicts with the headquarters, as his market 
is very price sensitive and his team is not always capable of maintaining price 
levels and that has led to disagreement with the headquarters in the past. 
‘You know, they see that we have to hold a certain price, for particular 
products, and it’s not always for the good of the business. And often 
conveyed to the detriment of the business ... we’d have to lose business 
based on that. But often … we come to a mutual agreement whereby we will 
implement certain things in country 3 and they will support us in other areas 
to try and overcome that. So initial conflict is generally … sorted out.’  
‘So I have to overcome that and present rational as to why I’m not introducing 
that product at that particular time. And it may be that it’s not resource 
efficient, or it may be that just in the (country 3) market that’s going to be a 
very, very difficult product to introduce to the market for x,y and z reasons, 
not necessary relevant to resource. It could be pricing, it could be, you know, 
getting competitive strength over our particular products, and that can be met 
with conflict. But, again, I think it all comes down to an understanding of the 
(country 3) market and that, you know, we’re best placed to make the right 
decisions of products coming into our markets. So there is general conflicts 
like that.’ 
Sean was handed financial objectives for the CombiTeam, but was given the 
liberty to choose the products that he divided into ‘core products’ and ‘focus 
products’. He believes that, while he consulted with his central counter parts, 
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this decision could only be taken by him, as the country 3 ‘market may not 
necessarily operate in the same way as lots of other markets within Europe. 
And that was the reason why I was giving that particular product a back-seat 
as opposed to giving it a focus.’ This however also can be a source of 
conflict: ‘…this fall there’s a product that’s coming to the market, I believe is 
going to be resource and time intensive and is going to limit the potential 
sales of other products, I won’t introduce that product to the market… And 
that could be met with conflict.’ 
 
3.3.2 Organizational Factors 
Autonomous subsidiaries 
Adam points out that in his opinion the matrix organization works well for the 
coordination within the central functions of the organization, such as R&D, 
manufacturing, quality management etc., even across different sites in 
different countries, but it does not work in sales. Adam believes that the 
problem lies in the coordination of the interaction of the various people 
involved: ‘…to say it in business administration terms, there is division of 
work and there is unification of work. Division of work here means operational 
structures, there is SBU 3a … that is strategic marketing, and local structures 
… everyone has a little bit of responsibility, there is a division manager in the 
country, there is a general manager in the country, …then there is central 
sales, there are all kinds of groups, then there is the regional head. How is 
the interaction of these people, that is the unification of work. And I do not 
believe this has been solved yet.’lx 
Local view point 
George is given strategic targets by his board for overall sales and profits. It 
is his responsibility in what strategic areas he believes he can best achieve 
those goals and to define the necessary resources. ‘And, I think, not every 
organization can afford to have growth projects in every single SBU. There 
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are certain SBUs who are on stand-by. Who are cash-cows, more or less. 
And other SBAs who are really soaking up resources. And I think at the end 
you need to have this healthy mix, so at the end you need to grow and you 
need to deliver a reasonable result.’ 
Level of delegation and incidence of sanctioning at SurgiSupplies versus 
competition 
When asked about how SurgiSupplies compares to his competitors, Adam 
believes that these have much more central control, e.g. if they launch a 
product, every country needs to launch it, set aside regulatory constraints. He 
on the other hand needs to convince every country and eliminate all 
objections and ‘excuses’ individually and there is no pressure on the local 
managers. He is particularly upset about the fact that he cannot even initiate 
world-wide bonus or sales campaigns. Adam does not believe that the 
central sales department will be able to improve these issues. He thinks that 
the source of these issues lies in the fact that the company is divided into 
four divisions, and that a relatively small activity such as SBU 3a then needs 
to be attached to one of them.  
Local view point 
George believes that his American competitors are more financially 
orientated than HospiMed and SurgiSupplies. He thinks that, while the 
necessary resources will be made available, there will be a lot more pressure 
in attaining results. On the other hand he believes that the local managers 
there too (he gives the example of the general manager from the company 
Ethicon in country 3, who he knows personally) have a lot of autonomy in 
how to achieve the results. 
George recalls that in the period before the CombiTeam project, when his 
organization wasn’t performing well in SBUs 3a and 3b, the relationships with 
the respective headquarters managers degraded over time and the 
responsible teams became more and more frustrated and lost confidence. 
Keith equally perceived that the communication at the time could have been 
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better, but he believes this to be natural when results aren’t good. 
Importantly, George points out that all suggestions from central managers to 
improve the situation involved even more investments, that would have at 
least short-term worsened the financial situation. 
Impact of delegation on global strategy 
In Toni’s opinion the implementation of the divisional strategy is very 
inconsequent. For example, a divisional guideline that had been published 
more than 5 years ago, stating that all country organizations were obliged to 
pursue significant market shares in the designated core-business SBU 3b in 
order to generate cash that could then be reinvested in other SBUs, this 
guideline had never really been enforced. With the CombiTeam, country 3 
even took the decision to deliberately disinvest in this product group. 
When asked about the reasons, he says that the company was very much in 
need of harmony and eager not to frustrate particular individual interests. 
‘There is certainly not a second company of that size that is equally in need 
of harmony. And that leads to everyone being allowed to fiddle around a little 
bit…’.lxi 
He speculates that the concentrated, strong top leadership of family owned 
businesses might lead to a need of harmony in subordinate levels, as people 
help each other to have a good standing in front of the top managers. He 
points out that in the two publicly traded large corporations he had worked for 
earlier, the discussions had been much tougher and more factual. 
Adam gives the example of a country where he believes the responsible 
manager for SBU 3a to be incompetent. He considers another person in the 
same organization to have the capabilities of taking over this business in 
addition to his current activities, with a potential of producing better results at 
lower cost. He has told the managing director of this country his opinion 
several times, without success. Adam thinks that this manager and the 
general country culture there is ‘needy of harmony’ and therefore no 
measures are taken to resolve this issue. Adam also believes that the 
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international sales department will not be able to resolve such issues. 
Local view 
George makes it clear that his intent is to focus his investments on other 
SBUs than SBUs 3a and 3b and that the CombiTeam project really serves to 
cut losses to better serve these investments. He underlines that while, 
according to the central SurgiSupplies strategy, it is mandatory for all 
countries to push SBU 3b, it was also the wish of the headquarters to define 
a more focused product strategy. George convinced them that to really enter 
into the market for SBU 3b in his country would require an enormous 
investment with a questionable ROI, while there where much better 
opportunities with other SBUs, so in the end the headquarters agreed to the 
CombiTeam project. Keith points out the useful role of the senior vice 
presidents of marketing and sales in moderating these discussions and 
ensuring that the overall company perspective was taken into account. 
Concerning local marketing plans, George is convinced that they cannot be 
detached from global marketing concepts. On the other hand he thinks that it 
is the local responsibility to define priorities and allocate resources to the 
different activities to insure the overall achievement of the financial goals. 
‘And I think that autonomy, at least in the past I think SurgiSupplies had in 
country 3 … . And, at the end, you know, I think it’s also very important that 
you need to have a certain track record that head office has confidence that 
you will deliver what the overall strategy has set as an objective. And as long 
as they have the belief, that you operate within those parameters, I think the 
autonomy to drive local concepts, concepts and local strategies, …will be still 
there in the future.’ 
Much like George, Keith refers to the global marketing strategy in his own 
planning: ‘…we try to comply with all the basic requirements, the top 8 
requirements in fact, of the strategy internationally and distill it down to our 
local activities . So I think it has a very major impact on how we execute our 
plans here in country 3.’ 
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Inconsistencies between different divisional policies 
Toni has some ideas that would help improve the situation. For example in 
his opinion the 4 divisions should have the same geographic regional break-
down of their countries. Also, in the domestic country of HospiMed, for 
traditional reasons, HospiMed and SurgiSupplies are still two relatively 
independent companies, inconsistent with most other parts of the world, and 
with various different independent sales organizations, that are also 
confusing the end-customer. In particular he believes that the local 
surveillance boards should be trained and obliged to support planning 
systems such as the new value oriented resource allocation tool, in order to 
avoid contradicting messages. Toni believes that the company needs to 
decide if they want strong local entrepreneurs or strong central decision 
making. ‘I think responsibility is indivisible. Either the local person has it or 
the central. It’s that simple.‘lxii Toni is not sure if these inconsistencies are 
maintained deliberately by the top management as part of the overall 
philosophy of the company, in order to create diversification of the 
organization and diversification of risk or if they are just not really visible to 
the leaders. 
Global cost and profit issues 
Adam gives an example of his today limited control capabilities: ‘…when in 
country x the direct selling costs are too high, I can talk to … our controller, 
she writes them accordingly and we get a nebulous response and that’s it. 
And then we can repeat that and at some point we just do not get a response 
any more…’lxiii 
Local view point 
George points out that there is a conflict of interest between the headquarters 
and the local subsidiary concerning transfer pricing. They had significant 
transfer price increases sometimes exceeding 30% in the past years in 
another division of HospiMed. 
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While the headquarters always insist to consider only world-wide 
consolidated country results, the managing directors also have a local 
responsibility and legal obligations concerning the results of their legal entity 
in the country. For example if transfer prices are raised and profits are 
reduced in the country, the local tax authorities can claim that profits are 
deferred outside of the country. ‘…because in the end it’s the consolidated 
result that counts, which is true to some extent, and maybe the divisions look 
at the consolidated results, but at the same time we have a legal entity. And 
the legal entity has to fulfill certain legal reports, and at the end we do our 
final accounts for the legal entity…’.  
Also, changes in transfer pricing and cost allocation are often communicated 
on short notice, interfering with the financial planning of the subsidiaries. This 
is why George thinks that regular institutionalized meetings of the divisional 
board members and the managing directors of the leading countries would 
be beneficial. In his opinion, board members are not always aware of these 
problems. Individual cases of such issues can be resolved in the local board 
meetings, however the underlying causes are not addressed and similar 
problems will continue to arise.  
Pricing Policy 
Adam talks about how transfer pricing is an important point of discussion 
between central and local managers. Transfer prices are usually calculated 
on the basis of local market prices, ensuring satisfactory local and central 
margins. In the case of country 3, the market prices for certain SBU 3a 
products reported by the local organization were so low, profit margins fell 
below central minimum expectations. ‘When a market offers a price level that 
at SurgiSupplies cost rates lies below manufacturing cost, then there are only 
two options: either we can enforce a higher price in the market, or we get out 
of this business. But we have the ‘silver bullet’ (ironic): we reduce the 
margins for HospiMed. Just not to discourage the people, as long as there 
are no losses (globally).’lxiv 
He tells the story from another country with a similar situation where the local 
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managers of a low cost, low price market proposed to source local 
components instead of using the one’s proposed buy SurgiSupplies in order 
to be competitive, however Adam believes that such a solution might lead to 
quality problems. Generally speaking therefore Adam in the end appreciates 
the CombiTeam project, as it is a solution to such problems, even if 
compromises need to be accepted. 
Fighting Over Resources 
The fundamental problem of HospiMed for Toni lies in the fact, that there are 
not enough resources for investing in all different product areas in such a 
way that they can exploit their full potential. Toni believes that conflicts of 
interest are essentially concerning resources and that these conflicts are 
inherent in the divisionalized matrix organization. Earlier in his career, Toni 
was a general manager of a HospiMed subsidiary so he knows both sides of 
the coin: ‚we are just convinced, and we are also paid to see and feel it that 
way, that our product lines have a large future growth potential for the group. 
And obviously we need resources for that … And the poor general manager 
of a subsidiary, … he needs to choose where he puts his money.’lxv 
Toni points out the contradiction of SurgiSupplies in proclaiming the need to 
focus, but in reality continuing to further develop products into more and 
more segments and niches. He believes it would be a good idea to organize 
a strategic workshop on how to benefit from the breadth of the portfolio 
instead of pretending to have a focused market segment strategy. 
Adam thinks that managers responsible for multiple SBUs, due to the 
complexity of the entire product portfolio, often cannot evaluate or verify the 
‘excuses’ that are put forward by local managers why their particular markets 
do not lend themselves to particular products and then also fail to develop a 
real influence. Also, getting too involved might demotivate good local 
managers who might decide to join the competition if the pressure gets too 
high. Adam suggests to have a meeting moderated by an external consultant 
with representatives of different SBUs in order to find synergies. He points 
out that, while everybody should have the success of the company as a 
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whole in their minds, marketing people really only know about and work for 
their SBUs.  
Local view point 
George believes that the competition for resources is not only there on an 
SBU level, but on a higher level between the different divisions. 
Short-term and risk-averse local strategies 
Toni believes that subsidiary managers use the large product offering of 
HospiMed to diversify the risk of their investments. By establishing and 
maintaining sales channels for several or all SBUs, they can avoid to depend 
too much on the success of few. Also, by investing a little bit in every SBA 
they can be friends with all the central marketing managers who will then 
support them in difficult times.  
Marc states that in his opinion most country organizations do not even have 
an explicit strategy, but they either have leaders who direct the business 
according to their own ideas or they are just reacting to present business 
opportunities. 
Adam thinks that his relationships with the subsidiary managers is defined by 
HospiMed’s strategy of carrying a large product portfolio and leaving the local 
portfolio decision to the local managers. In most countries this is not a big 
issue for Adam, as the local managers usually have a lot of ‘good will’ to sell 
his products. 
On the other hand he gives the example of a country where communication 
is difficult in spite of comparably good results. 
Like Toni, Adam believes that the country managers are acting risk-averse, 
because they believe it to be risky to invest in a new technology that is not 
yet adopted in their country. He gives an example of a country general 
manager who is close to retirement and for whom in Adam’s opinion these 
investments have a too long payback period for him to reap the fruit. 
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Sales management practice 
Marc sees the objective of the CombiTeam in bundling man-power to be able 
to address a larger customer base and to reduce traveling time by covering 
different departments in the same hospital. 
Local view point 
In order to deal with the small sales force of only 4 individuals, Sean has 
asked all sales people to identify 4 geographic clusters of 4 to 5 target 
hospitals within their sales regions according to potential sales expectations. 
They are expected to visit each cluster on a bi-weekly basis and sell all focus 
products into the hospitals. They were granted some additional freedom to 
visit prior existing customers outside of these clusters to maintain sales there. 
Sean believes that this kind of customer planning and sales call rotation is a 
fairly standardized industry practice. He also believes that the reporting of 
sales figures could be standardized on a company-wide international scale. 
On the other hand he thinks that the lay-out of the activity reporting of sales 
people should be left to the individual sales managers, as the needs differ in 
the different product lines and situations. 
Keith believes that from a sales management point of view it was essential 
for the CombiTeam project to ensure proper education and motivation of the 
sales force.’ 
‘It was a culture change for them. Some of them maybe were in a comfort 
zone and maybe moved in a uncomfortable zone. With learning new products 
and customer groups. But I think it was important to reassure them that they 
had the intellect, they had the selling skills and they had the ability to move 
into new markets with new products because basically they’re good sales 
people, so it is important to get complete understanding from the local sales 
force. To get on board with the project early, otherwise early you are fighting 
an uphill battle.’ 
Keith believes that successful sales management depends on recruiting good 
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sales people, training them, motivating them with ambitious goals that are 
rewarding for them, once achieved and to retain them with long-term career 
opportunities.  
He thinks that in the business for implantable devices, only very experienced 
and highly specialized sales people will be successful, and that such sales 
people need a very low level of supervision and monitoring. They can be 
evaluated essentially according to their sales results. ‘I do not think it is 
appropriate with highly skilled, intellectual joint replacement sales people to 
microscope manage them. I do not think that’s required. People who do well 
in something like Orthopedics, it’s their life. And they live it and those who do 
not, do not. So I do not think you need to micro-manage these people. 
However those who are not performing accordingly, we can’t afford to keep 
them. So, we do not.’ 
He acknowledges though that lack of performance can have multiple reasons 
that need to be identified and addressed before taking the decision to 
separate from a sales person. 
On the other hand, Keith thinks that the required skill sets and experience for 
sales people differ largely between product groups. Generally speaking he 
believes that less qualified and experienced sales people require more 
monitoring. ‘The personal relationship skills and the long-term personal 
relationship partnerships with a knee replacement surgeon are radically 
different to somebody working with disinfectants and hygiene. Hand wash is 
a world away from spinal surgery. So it’s definitely different.’ 
The purchasing decision makers for implantable devices are surgeons as 
opposed to OR managers or hospital administrators. Keith believes that for 
this reason sales management for implantable devices, that is also the focus 
for the CombiTeam project, is different than for equipment or consumables, 
which he believes to rely ‘much more on CRM models and call-rates and 
frequencies, etc.’.  
‘I think some buzz words for the Orthopedic person would be expertise, 
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tenacity, intelligence, depth of experience in the subject, the ability to talk, 
just to talk conversational orthopedics is vital for an orthopedic implant 
person. I think for a person selling surgical instruments, they just need to be 
nice guys who is able to guide a customer through a conversation. They do 
not take time to be alongside the surgeon in surgery. Case coverage. 24 
hours a day, 7 days a week if need be. But the Orthopedic person has to be 
that, the instrument person does not have to be that. So it’s definitely 
different in terms of the skill base required, for sure.’ 
While he is quite happy with the project, acknowledging that it is still in an 
early stage, Sean sees a challenge with the diversity of the customer base 
with many different surgical and other medical specialties. ‘So you’d have to 
build a level of expertise in terms of product knowledge, anatomy and 
physiology and understanding of indications, in many different areas. And 
that’s the biggest challenge for the sales team. And I think, the biggest 
challenge as I found it as a national sales manager is keeping all the balls 
that we’re juggling up in the air. And it gets to a point, that you do lose a 
certain level of expertise if you like in a particular product area because you, 
you do have to spread yourself quite thinly..’  
Staff Turn-Over and loyalty 
Adam’s experience is that whenever there is a high staff-turn over the 
performance over the years will be difficult that is why he is running a turn-
over analysis for the top countries. He points out that one of the strategic 
guidelines of HospiMed is sustainability, meaning to have a long-term vision, 
that can in his opinion only be achieved with loyal staff. Therefore he thinks 
that long-term carrier development is key to a successful organization. On 
the other hand he gives the exception of a reasonably successful country for 
SBU 3a, where the local division manager has managed to personally 
maintain the key customer relationships over many years in spite of a 
notoriously high turn-over rate in his organization. In Adam’s experience, 
physicians who use a lot of implants want to have long-term reliable partners 
and they only develop trust if the sales force is stable and the division 
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managers are involved in the daily business. ‘Because a user who is 
responsible for a large budget in the hospital, …, wants to feel that he can 
work adequately, legally correct and long-term with a company … How 
should he get this feeling when the faces change all the time and on top 
there is a division manager who does not know the products and does not 
visit the customers… And when there is no trust, then we can talk for days 
about products or prices, it will not help’.lxvi 
Marc recalls that at one point the ‘dedicated sales force’ for SBU 3a in 
country 3 was reduced to the person of Sean, who later became the sales 
manager for the CombiTeam, and one single rep, trying to cover a major 
European country. He believes that the investment into this business was 
simply too small to achieve a critical mass. SBU 3b at the time had 5 people. 
Adam believes that the reason for the poor results of his SBU lies in the 
failure of the local managers to create and maintain a good sales team. He is 
convinced that with a steady and motivated sales team this activity could 
have been successful and that the most important strategic objective today 
was to stop people from leaving the company. Adam points out that the sales 
teams in the top 10 countries for his SBU are well organized and that there 
are only few countries with problems like in country 3. Generally speaking he 
believes that attractive products and qualified and motivated local staff are 
the key to success in countries, while he acknowledges also a strong 
influence of the local market situation. On the other hand he does not believe 
to have any influence on the selection of staff other than in the domestic 
country of SurgiSupplies, where the sales team is in the same legal entity as 
his own organization.  
Keith believes that aside discussions on transfer pricing and in-market pricing 
there are no particular conflicts with headquarters at present. There were 
more conflicts in the past but as the organizations and many of the people 
within these, have been dealing with each other for a long time, emotions 
have calmed down, people have found ways to communicated better and 
conflicts have been resolved. Keith believes that the SurgiSupplies team in 
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country 3 has focused on the more complex field of implantable devices as 
opposed to equipment and that has required to build higher skills and 
ultimately this has led to an improved quality of the personnel and a higher 
company loyalty. 
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Annex 3.4 Country 4 
Annex 3.4.1 Situational Factors 
Total sales for country 4 as well as sales in SBU 4 are within the top 15 of 
SurgiSupplies. Both are expected to be within the top ten within few more 
years. 
Traditional SBU orientation of the individual subsidiaries 
Also Daniel believes that more specialized Managers are needed for the 
Medical Device Business of SurgiSupplies than for the Pharmaceutical 
products from other divisions of HospiMed, and that the top management in 
country 4, coming from these other divisions, do not truly understand this. A 
much larger product variety and the necessity to have all implant sizes 
available daily in the hospital in his opinion puts much higher pressure on 
SurgiSupplies sales staff and customer service than in other divisions. 
Only in 2007 had this business been put under the control of the country 4 
subsidiary. And according to William, at this time this activity had not been 
successful. As opposed to all other SBAs it was decided to keep selling SBU 
4 products via distributors, even when this activity was moved to 
management by the subsidiary. This change however was not without 
difficulty as prior involved staff and distributors were confronted with new 
ideas and strategies, leading to certain power struggles and the new 
management did not have experience in the field of SBU 4.  
Local view point 
While William does not recall having had any major conflicts with headquarter 
managers, he believes them to have certain reservations towards the country 
4 organization because it’s original background is from selling 
pharmaceutical product lines rather than medical devices. While William 
understands these reservations and shares them when it comes to hiring 
candidates with a background in pharmaceutical sales and no prior 
experience with medical devices. On the other hand he points out that they 
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had always been selling certain medical devices in the past and so they did 
have some prior knowledge about the mechanics of these markets.  
Brand awareness and market share 
Oliver points out that the competitors are always the same world-wide 
oligopoly but that they each of them vary in competitive strength from country 
to country. To gain a substantial attractive new customer for SBU 4 products 
usually takes at least one to two years and a very proficient sales and 
marketing structure is necessary to present the offering in a way that the 
customers follow the differentiation argumentation.  
Market life-cycle 
The biggest difference of the individual markets to Oliver lies in the extremely 
different annual growth development, with a spectrum of high growth markets 
to even shrinking markets.  
As country 4 is marked by very large daily consumptions of implants and 
generally difficult logistics, a professional supply chain and local customer 
support are crucial success factors. HospiMed has run a very large world-
wide supply chain optimization and inventory reduction program in recent 
years. Oliver believes this program to be a big success, as inventories have 
decreased dramatically while product availability has rather increased in the 
same period. On the other hand in his opinion the supply chain is not capable 
of coping with the individual demand of emerging markets, particularly the 
BRIC countries, with annual growth rates beyond 30%. He does not believe 
this to be an inherent default of the matrix organization, with contradicting 
targets of different departments, but he sees it as a crucial job for the central 
sales department to identify and communicate such differences in local 
demand to the central supply chain managers in the form of financial 
planning, investment planning and inventory planning. 
William believes it to be a specific situation in country 4 that rather than 
entering existing markets, markets for complex medical products, be they 
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medical devices or pharmaceuticals, needed to be created from zero. He 
thinks that the creation of new product segments is a particular capability that 
his organization has developed over the years. 
‘… we create(d) this market and after that we created our sales. (It’s) the 
same situation with SurgiSupplies. … Without creating demands for our 
products it seems to me that (it would be) quite difficult to make any sales in 
country 4. Maybe (there is) a little bit more simple situation in other countries, 
(where) I can see that (it is) quite important … not create, but to find 
demand.’ 
Also he believes that there are very limited financial resources for the 
medical system of country 4 and that therefore the overall price levels were 
very low.  
Cultural differences between the headquarters and the individual subsidiaries 
Daniel thinks that the mentality of people in country 4 is very different, and is 
ill understood by central managers. Decision and communication processes 
are very hierarchical and people do not disclose information unless they are 
explicitly asked for it. He gives an example of an IT project, where a central 
software was supposed to be installed in the country 4 subsidiary and the 
local organization did everything in their power not to make it work, because 
they did not feel that their opinion had been considered enough. 
Daniel thinks that business models need to be different from country to 
country, for example be does not believe that direct patient marketing can 
work in country 4 because they are too old-fashioned. Also, even in their 
business dealings, country 4 people like their partners to be affectionate. 
Other contextual specifics 
Another particularity of the country 4 market is, that items are hardly ever 
purchased individually, but always in large tender biddings as a bulk with 
other products. The price level in country 4 for SBU 4 products is relatively 
low in international comparison and still diminishing.  
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Also, in country 4 is a lack of customer loyalty. Due to fluctuation in the 
surgical and in the administrative staff, hospitals can be very volatile in their 
selection of suppliers from one year to the other which makes the forecasting 
and business planning very difficult. This is very untypical for the SBU 4 
business, as in other countries, hospitals can be reliable customers for years 
or even decades. 
Due to customs regulations the delivery time from the central to the local 
warehouse is 3 weeks whereas in many other countries overnight shipping, 
frequently directly to the customers is possible. Also shipping within the 
country takes unusually long. In addition, the surgical departments in country 
4 are very concentrated and thus daily demands from large hospitals are 
unusually high. All of this results in a situation where the usual SurgiSupplies 
procedures for local stocking become inapplicable and even minor mistakes 
in shipping, that in other countries usually can be easily corrected in a 
reasonable time-frame, in country 4 can lead to disastrous delays on the 
customer side and a lot of frustration for the country 4 staff. This is why they 
have established an unusual and costly 100% control of incoming goods from 
the mother company. Harry thinks that improving logistic services for country 
4 would be the most beneficial activity the headquarters could pursue. On the 
other hand, in Harry’s experience it was difficult to convince the central 
supply chain management of these peculiarities: 
‘…we spent the whole day explaining this to them. But of course he has his 
guidelines and tries to implement them and he says, ‘I have 3 or 4 months of 
(monthly) demand on stock, that’s too much we need to cut this down to, say 
6 weeks.’ That’s illusory, illusory …’ 
Much like SBU 1, SBU 4 requires a lot of up-front investment in equipment 
and implants before a customer can even start to operate. The risk of this 
investment usually lies with the supplier, so the manufacturer and the dealer 
need to negotiate how they share this risk. Thomas summarizes that the 
customers usually approve of the high quality of SurgiSupplies products, but 
thinks that SurgiSupplies has poor overall service and logistics. The central 
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supply chain managers have analyzed the countries stock levels and come to 
the conclusion that the stock level is far too high and also ill distributed 
between the different product levels. This has led to a very defensive reaction 
by the local managers who believe that overall difficult logistics and 
transportation, long customs procedures and resulting import delays as well 
as volatile demand in country 4 require a much higher stock level than in 
other countries.  
Daniel points out that SBU 4 requires a high level on-site service support, in 
some countries sales people are even expected to attend every single 
surgery where their material is used, and that the subsidiary managers in 
country 4 in his opinion haven’t fully understood that, believing that a good 
relationship with the decision maker is sufficient, like it can be the case in 
other SBUs. 
Privileging the domestic market 
Local view point 
While William points out that there is a situation of trust between him and his 
counterparts from central, (‘…very good that we can rely on each other…’) he 
believes that the overall company vision is too much guided by the ideas of 
the domestic market of SurgiSupplies and that the country managers do not 
have enough possibilities to contribute their specific country needs. ‘The 
main idea (is) what is good for (the domestic market) should be good for 
everybody.’ 
William does understand that the domestic country has the biggest overall 
sales volume and that it requires special attention but he thinks this is 
hindering the company to develop a true global vision. He gives the example 
of a recent major product launch into a new market segment where the staff 
from country 4 had never been asked their opinion about their market 
requirements. ‘Nobody asked us, what will be the set of peculiarities, of 
advantages that we should have with such kind of product. It’s not a big deal 
to collect such kind of information and to send (the) answer about it. But we 
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did not send anything because there were no requests for that… This is quite 
(a) typical situation.’  
 
Annex 3.4.2 Organizational Factors 
Local autonomy 
Generally speaking Harry was somewhat disillusioned by his job as a central 
sales manager, as he realizes the limited vigor of the matrix organization at 
SurgiSupplies: ‘… naturally, I wasn’t aware that ultimately in our matrix 
organization everything is non-binding and without commitment.lxvii’ 
Local view 
Only 2 months before the interview with William there had been a series of 
meetings between top managers from country 4 and the headquarters to 
decide on what SBUs should be invested in. The result of the meeting was, 
that country 4 saw a lot of potential in many SBUs and wanted to invest in all 
of them, essentially reinvesting the entire annual profits. Headquarters did 
not agree to this and much to the frustration of all participants the final 
decision after a lengthy and time-consuming planning process was that the 
country 4 organization should invest in whatever SBU they liked as long as 
they assured a certain defined bottom-line profit. 
William states that it was the first time they had had such a discussion and 
his feeling was that it was a new experience for the headquarter managers 
as well. On the other hand he thinks that such a procedure was quite normal 
for other companies and he is quite ready to have such discussions in the 
future, even though he thinks that the process needs to be improved. 
Impact of delegation on global strategy 
A priority for the country 4 subsidiary for Harry would be to establish a 
subsidiary board including other senior managers than the two general 
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managers. These, in his opinion are too much driven by their own benefit (at 
the time of the interview each of them still owned a minority share of the 
subsidiary) and therefore sometimes controvert central goals. Only with such 
a change he believes could the world-wide company culture of HospiMed be 
established in the country 4 subsidiary. 
Fighting over resources 
Local view point 
William says that Thomas, a central business development manager usually 
proposes certain recommendations that they try to follow, concerning the 
development of their market. While he considers some of these 
recommendations helpful, others weren’t as they did not take into account 
the peculiarities of the country 4 market. For example he believes 
retrospectively that it was a mistake to concentrate on a single implant 
product line in SBU 4, as recommended by the headquarters, instead of 
introducing other products more quickly. On the other hand he admits that 
this is largely a problem of resource allocation, not only within SBU 4 but also 
concerning all the other SBUs.  
Short-term and risk-averse local strategies 
Harry was surprised to discover that in his opinion the subsidiary of country 4 
did not pursue any identifiable strategy, but drove business in an 
opportunistic way according to short term business opportunities. As the 
organization displays reasonable growth Harry now is no longer sure, if in a 
situation like in country 4 a strategic approach is even necessary. In any case 
he believes that the local organization is not mature enough to pursue a 
structured approach. 
Oliver, the central marketing head for SBU 4, believes that the cooperation 
with the subsidiaries is primarily marked by the autonomy of the subsidiaries 
to decide which of the SBUs to invest in, and to perform investments in a 
sustainable way. Whenever there is a commitment to invest in SBU 4, in his 
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opinion there will also usually be a good, while mutually challenging 
cooperation.  
In Oliver’s experience problems arise, when the market situation is difficult or 
the SurgiSupplies product line does not meet the local market requirements 
or when there are internal organizational restructurings. It is to him often not 
clear on which basis or arguments investment decisions are taken. 
In such situations the local organizations often behave in an erratic way, 
taking quick investment or disinvestment decisions that do not allow for the 
kind of continuity that Oliver believes to be of major importance for all 
medical device markets, but particularly for SBU 4. He usually accepts 
whatever local argumentation not to invest in SBU 4. On the other hand he 
has often encountered the situation, that a euphoric decision to invest in this 
SBU was taken, but the time to establish a solid market presence was 
underestimated and if the financial return could not be achieved within the 
original planning period, the project was abandoned all in all, a major mistake 
in Oliver’s opinion.  
‘In my opinion that’s the crucial point, yes, how much stamina they have.’lxviii 
Another aspect brought forward by Daniel that complicates strategic planning 
in country 4 is the fact that large projects can be decided and initiated 
spontaneously on a high political level. If the strategic plan of the subsidiary 
is focusing on one surgical specialty and the government decides to shift all 
funds to another, then the company might also need to quickly reconsider its 
strategic focus.  
Inconsistencies between different divisional policies 
Daniel believes that while the market for SBU 4 products is developing 
quickly in country 4, SurgiSupplies is not really participating in this growth 
due to lacking man-power. The local organization is claiming not to be able to 
find qualified staff. In this context Daniel speaks of what he calls a structural 
problem at HospiMed. The company is trying to have coherent salaries for 
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their sales people, but market based salaries are different in the different 
SBUs. As SBU has particularly high demands on qualification and experience 
of sales people and the products also have high margins, the salaries are 
higher than in other product segments. The company might find itself in a 
position where a newly hired experienced SBU 4 sales person with a non-
developed sales territory and low sales will gain substantially more than an 
experienced sales person of another SBU who has already developed 
substantial annual sales and profits. As in country 4, other than in some other 
countries, salary levels are openly discussed, such situations can cost social 
unrest, thus the company tries to avoid hiring of ‘expensive’ sales people, 
sometimes leading to a general staff shortage or low quality staff.  
‘…they try to recruit experienced SBU 4 people and probably try this with 
conditions at which nobody comes. …or you get 2nd or 3rd class staff that the 
others have discarded. We have always told them to hire and train young 
people. …But then they argue that once they have trained people and they 
perform, competition will take them away.’ lxix 
Sales Management Practice 
Another problem Thomas sees in a lack in specialized job descriptions. The 4 
local product managers each deal with all of the SBU 4 products and most of 
the about 20 sales reps with all of HospiMed’s products, only few of them 
having specialized knowledge of SBU 4 products. The marketing department 
is also split up in two offices in different towns and the coordination is 
sometimes complicated. And the same he says is true for the dealers. While 
some of the dealers in country 4 have specialized in SBU 4 products, and 
few also might have some young sales reps who can speak English, most 
others still see their job strictly in organizing the supply with medical products 
for the hospitals, but not in consulting about or servicing the products. This is 
difficult for SBU 4 products that require a high service and consulting level at 
the customer side, with sales people sometimes spending most of their time 
at a single hospital.  
Harry describes the situation of the sales organization in country 4 in a way 
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that every sales person is principally allowed to sell products from all 
divisions, that there is no clear separation of tasks between the different local 
marketing managers of the SBUs and also there is a high fluctuation. Also, 
their English language skills are very limited. He gives an example of a 
product complaint, where the local managers did not know who to address it 
to in the mother company, let alone the procedure how to do so. Harry is of 
the opinion that this subsidiary that has grown to a 100 million Euro business, 
is still managed like in the days when it was a small distributor by the same 
managers. Also it seems to him that all decisions are made by the top 
managers and there is little vertical delegation. For example unlike in many 
other large subsidiaries, there is no real subsidiary board, but only 2 general 
managers. And the marketing managers, some of which he considers very 
knowledgeable and professional, are charged with daily administrative tasks, 
such as filling in tender application forms, and thus have no time for strategic 
development of their brands. Concerning SBU 4 Harry has the impression 
that the local marketing and sales manager who hardly speaks English, is 
more involved in customer service and logistics that in selling activities. Also 
they do not seem to develop junior people as substitutes or successors for 
themselves. Harry believes that there will be a big know-how problem when 
one of the senior marketing managers will be retired in only few years.  
Daniel thinks that the activities of dealers are very different in country 4 than 
in most developed countries. While some of the dealers work with the 
customers in an autonomous way, providing professional customer service, 
many are simply managing purchases for their customer hospitals and do not 
promote individual suppliers or products. The promotion of products thus 
remains the responsibility of the subsidiary staff. 
‘…they have the relationship with the hospital and when the hospital says, 
ok, I want product x, they will buy product x, if they can get it. So they are not 
willing to actively convert a competitor to SurgiSupplies. Because they only 
see their margin, saying I do not care, I get it from anyone I buy from.’. lxx 
 
 
309
Annex 3.5 Country 5 
Annex 3.5.1 Situational Factors 
Number, size and business opportunity of subsidiaries 
Total sales in country 5 as well as sales for SBU 5a and 5b are among the 
top 10 for SurgiSupplies. 
Charlie points out that in order to understand and get involved in their 
planning, for the top-5 countries he tries to do at least annual personal 
business meetings. He thinks that in order to do this properly, to do it for 
more than 5 countries is impossible. 
Paul, the central sales manager for country 5, says that in the larger 
subsidiaries of HospiMed he only has a general sales management 
consulting function. The operative business in the sense of product launches 
and customer relationships is handled by the local organization together with 
the central marketing. Only in exceptional cases he gets involved in matters 
concerning the individual SBUs.  
It seems that Paul would prefer that the operative support also for large 
companies would be dealt with by regional management teams like the one 
he is responsible for, instead of the SBU marketing managers, also for the 
larger focus countries of SurgiSupplies. 
Local view point 
Generally speaking Patrick believes that an organization like the central sales 
department is more important for subsidiaries with smaller organizations. He 
does not seem to think it’s essential for his organization. On the other hand 
he states that by working with larger organizations like the one in country 5, 
central managers like Paul can learn and thus better serve and train the 
smaller organizations, by providing best practice examples.  
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Language barriers 
As customers, usually physicians, in countries 2 and 5 typically speak poor 
English and the sales reps mostly do not speak English at all, Brian says he 
cannot build his own impression of the situation in these countries and needs 
to fully rely on the information given by the sales and marketing managers, 
not knowing if it is true, or not. He does not believe that they would right out 
lie to him, but he can imagine them to whitewash certain problems or to omit 
informing him about important issues.  
Innovation performance 
Local view point 
Edward believes that the medical disciplines of product groups 5a and 5b 
suffer from a general lack of ground breaking innovation. Since about 2000 
none of the companies have launched a major innovation. The main problem 
for SurgiSupplies in his opinion are the frequent delays in product 
introductions. The new generation of the main product line for SBU 5b for 
example was launched 7 years later than the initial launch by the market 
leader and most customers were already equipped by this company or 
others. And similar situations are happening frequently. And then there are 
many product launches in a very short period of time – product launches thus 
happen more at random than in a structured way.  
Larry states that SBU 5b is a market where customers like to have 
‘fashionable’ products, and competitors are frequently launching new product 
generations. To Larry, SurgiSupplies central marketing does not seem to 
understand that and with comparably few product launches in large time 
intervals, some products being 25 years old, it is difficult for the sales force to 
stand its ground. He thinks that it might be easier in the domestic market of 
SurgiSupplies to get away with such a policy, as it is known to be very 
conservative. Larry on the other hand believes that country 5 is a more short-
lived market, customers in this respect being maybe more comparable to the 
United States ‘…they like new, they like stylish products.’ Generally speaking 
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he believes that SurgiSupplies is not very innovative, and one reason for this, 
in his opinion is, that a lot of the people in this company have been there for 
25 up-to 45 years. 
Other contextual difficulties 
Local view point 
Edward believes that the situation in the different countries is very different. 
He gives the example that in most major countries there are hundreds of 
surgeons specializing exclusively in Spinal surgery – in country 5 there are 
only 7. 
Excursus: A study on SBU 5b sales force management in 20 subsidiaries 
Claire is a central sales manager who has been assigned with analyzing the 
different organizational structures of the selling teams in the top 20 
subsidiaries for SBU 5b and to evaluate the impact of the structure on the 
sales performance. Some other countries were added due to their expected 
high future potential or particularly good sales performance. The local SBU 
5b managers were surveyed on topics such as, did they have a direct or a 
indirect sales channel, what other products the sales people responsible for 
SBU 5b were carrying and what was their incentive system, if there were 
local product managers and how much of their time they were dedicating to 
SBU 5b and to other SBUs, how good was the territorial coverage, how was 
the buying center of the customer structured etc. Also the same questions 
were asked about the major competitors. A first finding was, that the local 
managers typically had very little information about their competitors and 
often did not even bother to fill in this category of the survey. While most 
countries were satisfied with their organizational structure, some however 
thought that their structure was too weak. ‘The way we are structured today, 
it does not make any sense. Either we do it right or we leave it, …. But, the 
way it is now, it does not work out.’lxxi Interestingly, in Claire’s survey of SBU 
5b the structure of the buying centers for SBU 5b products seemed relatively 
similar in the different countries. There however were some few, large 
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countries, where group purchasing organizations (GPOs) got heavily involved 
in the procurement of SBU 5b products, while in most countries they either 
did not really exist or did not get involved. In these cases, key account 
managers played an important role. 
Some markets were defined by procurement in large tenders. Here it was 
important to build sufficient relationships and knowledge to be able to 
participate in these tenders. The public tendering process is very lengthy and 
requires a complete product portfolio and competitive pricing. Other markets 
are more marked by the alternative to public tendering, the regular capital 
equipment purchasing process of hospitals, that also takes about nine 
months on average and involves phases such as information gathering by 
the hospitals value analysis team, in-servicing and product trials and then 
decision making by decision making team at the hospital and eventually 
professional after sales service in the form of preventive maintenance and 
repairs. In all of these phases, proactive and knowledgeable sales people are 
necessary to ensure the sales success. The product qualities expected from 
SBU 5b products were reliability, safety and ease of use and cost reduction.  
Claire has identified 3 pure forms of different sales structures. The first one is 
an external sales force using dealers and or agents, such as in country 5. 
The second one is a direct sales force dedicated exclusively to SBU 5b 
products, that she really only found in one geographically very small country. 
The third form Claire refers to as a ‘cross SBU’ structure, where the SBU 5b 
products are sold by different selling teams in the different surgical sub-
specialties such as orthopedic, neuro or cardiac surgery. In most of the 
countries she found different combinations and variations of these three 
types. Also, in one country, SBU 5b products have been entirely licensed to 
another medical device manufacturer, a model that has worked well and 
might be extended to some other smaller countries in the future. She also 
points out, that the sales structure also depends on the after sales support 
structure of dedicated repair service staff, because having dedicated and 
performing after sales service teams with direct customer contacts relieves 
the sales force of having to deal with these activities. 
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,Cross-SBU’ sales teams have very good customer relationships, and a deep 
knowledge of their customer’s surgical indications and issues, and they visit 
the customers very often and can thus also quickly identify and take good 
care of any service issues. Also there is the advantage for the customers of 
having a single contact person to deal with. The problem with such teams 
however seems to be, that SBU 5b products are never their primary sales 
target and also not the focus of their incentive system, and they thus do not 
dedicate enough selling time to these products and tend to neglect the 
development of detailed knowledge about products and the related specific 
purchasing processes for capital equipment. While they might promote SBU 
5b products to their regular customers, they are most of the time reluctant to 
specifically engage in prospecting activities to gain new customers for these 
products. Also there is what Claire refers to as a ‘silo-effect’ where these 
sales teams are relatively isolated from each other and it seems difficult to 
work on larger projects that involve more than one department. As sales 
people from different SBUs often do not even know each other, even if they 
work in similar or identical territories, even simple activities like passing on 
sales leads only work well if there are personal relationships coincidentally. 
And since the vast majority of subsidiaries do not use CRM systems, let 
alone shared ones between different selling teams, inter-SBU information 
and communications can be really difficult. She gives the example of country 
1 where the marketing manager is highly convinced that ever since they have 
introduced a modern CRM system shared between all selling teams, sales 
leads concerning SBU 5b are being passed on in a satisfactory way. 
The local marketing persons dedicated to SBU 5b thus also often have 
difficulty in putting pressure on such sales teams or in motivating them to 
actively pursue promotional programs etc. 
Therefore, subsidiaries who can afford to do so, add some few product 
specialists dedicated exclusively to SBU 5b to the sales force who motivate 
and educate the different sales teams for these products and support and 
relieve them with some of their customer contacts. They can also accompany 
younger sales reps in their first selling cycles for 5b products until they are 
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self-sufficient. For indirect sales forces the necessity of such specialists is 
even higher, in order to gain some transparency and control over their 
activities. In some countries the marketing managers for SBU 5b spend part 
of their time for these sales support purposes, other countries have one or 
several such full-time positions. Claire points out that these people need to 
have a personality that ‘works well in a matrix-organization.’ She thinks that 
successful people on such a position always stay in touch and permanently 
try to find new ways of reminding sales reps to think about the SBU 5b 
business and of supporting them. Particularly they need to motivate sales 
people instead of trying to command them. And all of these qualities and 
activities need to be formalized in a very clear job description. Claire has an 
example from one larger country organization that has two of such positions. 
One of these people fits the description above very well and is very well 
respected by the sales force and successful. The other one has far less 
success because he cannot fulfill all of these requirements. 
They need to enjoy working in teams and interface with different departments 
such as different SBU heads, marketing, technical service etc. Claire also is 
convinced that such people need to report directly to a higher-ranking 
business manager who oversees all different SBUs involved, otherwise they 
will not be respected by all sales people and sales managers. 
To have a direct sales force only for SBU 5b would usually be too expensive, 
as the market for these products typically is relatively small. Also it is difficult 
to build excellent customer relationships solely based on this product group, 
as the purchases here usually are irregular and the customers do not pay so 
much attention to these products. It would also mean to neglect the very 
good customer relationships of the other sales forces.  
Claire points out that there are also reservations concerning the bundling of 
products, some sales people selling capital equipment products of SBU 5b 
out cheap in order to generate consumable business in e.g. in SBU 4. While 
such kinds of deals are used by other competitors quite proficiently, 
SurgiSupplies cannot seem to overcome SBU boundaries and jealousies.  
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From the little that was reported about the competition, it seems that they do 
not have dedicated sales teams for SBU 5b products, but sell them along 
with other selling teams. Claire is convinced that they put far more up-to-date 
and well-maintained demonstration equipment at the disposal of their sales 
teams than SurgiSupplies, who seem to be somewhat stingy with such 
investments. 
Privileging the domestic market 
Local view point 
Patrick believes the strategies of SurgiSupplies to be heavily biased by the 
domestic culture, most of the opinion leaders and reference hospitals also 
being from that country, even though they often did not have a high 
international reputation. 
Edward sometimes visits the headquarters to discuss product strategies. He 
describes these meetings as very friendly and without conflicts. In the past he 
had the feeling that particularly the 5a product line has received very little 
support from the headquarters, but since he took this product line in addition 
to product line 5b this has dramatically changed. They are now very 
responsive to requests from his side. In his opinion this is partially due to the 
fact that there are now more people working in SBU 5a than before and the 
mentality has changed. Before, he says the central product managers 
considered the headquarters and its domestic country were the center of the 
world, they did not travel much to other countries and their customer and 
sales contacts were mainly in their domestic country. Particularly he recalls 
that any request from domestic physicians, reasonable or not, was accepted 
and products were developed accordingly and made available world-wide. 
Annex 3.5.2 Organizational Factors 
Level of delegation and incidence of sanctioning at SurgiSupplies versus 
competition 
Brian knows from people he has hired from the major American competitors 
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over the years, that they are much more directive in their communication. ‘I 
know a case from Codman. …The headquarters in the US decides what to 
do and it needs to be implanted one-to-one. That sometimes means to not 
speak the local language and to adapt the American way and that leads to a 
lack of acceptance and understanding in the country. I know examples where 
they have rolled out their strategies radically in some countries. And in the 
end they weren’t successful, because the countries did not feel sufficiently 
considered. And I think we rather have the advantage to say, yes, locally it’s 
always somewhat different, but by this local coloring maybe our success is 
higher in the end.’ lxxii 
Charlie has information about competitors from colleagues who formerly 
worked there. Interestingly, he has heard about Synthes, a major European 
competitor, that they essentially had the same issues as SurgiSupplies, while 
Medtronic, the biggest US competitor, had a more rigorous and systematic 
approach of dealing with their local selling organizations. From an overall 
market bench-marking perspective Charlie believes that SurgiSupplies can 
be rated with an average performance with respect to these issues. 
Local view point 
The company he worked for before SurgiSupplies was a small family owned 
business and Edward says it was totally different to work there. At 
SurgiSupplies he receives an annual investment budget and he is relatively 
autonomous in his decision on what to spend it. In small companies every 
little expense needs to be approved by the boss and decision making was 
very centralized. On the other hand he had also worked in a family owned 
business that was very big and he had the perception that it was the same, 
with the owner taking all decisions by herself. 
Edward believes that there is a major difference between American and 
German companies. He thinks that in American companies, the people are 
constantly afraid that the company will be sold or merge with another one. 
Also they are very much afraid not to reach their target, as the appraisal is 
based very much on quantitative results and they can quickly lose their jobs. 
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At SurgiSupplies, Edward feels that even in a financially unsuccessful year, 
the employee’s are evaluated more in a qualitative way, how the quality of 
their work was. And when he has problems, he always receives support from 
his boss. 
Impact of delegation on global strategy 
Charlie points out that it is often unclear at SurgiSupplies who is in control, 
the headquarters or the subsidiary. ‘Well, I might be exaggerating a little, but 
in one country or another life can be pretty carefree for a regional manager. 
Because they know that really the people from the headquarters do what 
they want. And not the other way around.’ lxxiii Concerning strategic product 
decision this sometimes leads to decisions that Charlie disapproves of, 
sometimes categorically refusing to pursue certain product groups suggested 
by the headquarters or vice versa doing a little-bit of everything without any 
clear focus. The latter in his opinion is the result of short-sightedness – in 
order to reach selling targets they will follow any short-term business 
opportunity, introducing new product lines without having in mind the 
consequences, such as resources required for training and providing after-
sales service. In most countries, Charlie believes, SurgiSupplies simply does 
not have the manpower to follow up on too many product lines, so a clear 
focus on few, clearly defined market segments is indispensible. 
Concerning the product strategy, Charlie has made some very bad 
experiences, in particular with country 3 who had traditionally been very 
strong in a certain medical subspecialty with other products, and tried to sell 
SBU 5b products into this specialty instead of the ones recommended by 
Charlie and his team. Although SurgiSupplies products more or less cover 
this subspecialty, the strategic focus is on other areas, and so the product 
portfolio becomes more and more outdated over the years. This lead to 
conflicts, because country 5 keeps pushing for developments into their 
particular focus areas. Charlie had a very similar problem with another 
country that did not perform because it did not put the marketing and sales 
focus on the medical specialties recommended by the headquarters and thus 
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had problems to sell the newer product generations. 
Paul believes that the subsidiary in country 5 is implementing global 
strategies in an exemplary way as long as they believe in them, like with 
SBUs 2 and 5a. 5b they do not believe to require a specific strategy, as these 
products are simply sold along with products from other SBUs. 
In other SBUs, such as 3a, they are in total contradiction to the central 
strategy and in SBU 4 they do not consider the headquarters to have 
themselves a particular strategy. They do not respect the central marketing 
managers as real experts, they believe that they are not enough involved in 
country 5 affairs, only show up when there are problems and are very much 
oriented towards their domestic market. They really do not consider 
SurgiSupplies to be a company truly committed to SBU 4 products and they 
claim that their customers say the same. They also think that the central 
managers are not representative enough in front of customers: ‚…in their 
point of view the marketing manager from the head-quarters needs to be a 
real, say, show-man. He needs to be capable of Public Relations and they 
reproach our people with not being capable of that. The same goes for SBU 
3a, there they also say, ‚Man, we’re in competition to the big Americans!’’ lxxiv. 
Paul reports that for SBU 5a the country 5 managers believe that there is a 
large unique opportunity for them with the recent launch of a new ground-
breaking technology, but they currently do not have the resources to do the 
necessary investments and in view of the short-lived market they fear that in 
the near future the product might already be obsolete. 
Fighting over resources 
Typical conflicts of interest with the subsidiaries for Brian are local target 
agreements that are not communicated to him. Another conflict of interest 
can arise when the local SBU 5a team also sells products from other SBUs. 
This is typically the case with SBU 5b and sometimes with SBU 1. If that 
team starts focusing on some other products, naturally there will be less 
focus on Brian’s products. 
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Brian says he does not have a problem with that, as long as the general 
activity of the team is successful. Conflicts arise when the local performance 
of his SBU 5a suffers and when people start asking questions why the growth 
is to slow etc., because Brian of course is measured by the world-wide 
growth of his SBU and if local resources are sucked up by another SBU to 
the detriment of his own, he will discuss this with the country managers. If 
they argue that they do not have sufficient resources, manpower, or 
competency in 5a or the competitive situation or price level is too difficult, and 
they therefore will focus on other SBUS, he will typically respect that. He will 
then reallocate the resources of his own team to other countries. ‘Our job is 
like sports, sometimes you win, sometimes you lose. And if a country says, I 
won’t do anything in SBU 5a and I will not allocate any resources to it, then 
sometimes, or even most of the time, I am thankful for such a clear 
statement. Because I know, we on our end do not need to allocate any 
resources there either. And I have no problem with a country telling me: ‘I 
neither have the resources, nor the manpower, nor the competency, their 
competitive situation is too difficult or the price level is too low in my country.‘’ 
lxxv But he will discuss situations like these with his boss, the senior vice 
president of marketing for SurgiSupplies and explain to him that the focus on 
other product groups like 5b might lead to a neglect of 5a and an unfavorable 
sales development in this SBU. 
Brian is strongly in favor of SurgiSupplies investment allocation planning 
system. He believes that there are limited resources and not all SBUs can be 
simultaneously focused on in every country. ‘We have limited resources, we 
can’t do everything … and one SBU is always left out in the cold.’lxxvi 
In the past two years Charlie has observed a down-turn of sales in country 5. 
While he acknowledges that this is partly due to an economic crisis in the 
country, he is also convinced that it is at the same time a result of a change 
in product management. Historically the country 5 subsidiary had always had 
one person working full-time for SBU 5b. Two years ago, this person was 
additionally assigned the product group 5a, leaving only approximately 50% 
of his time for each of the two SBUs. He believes with a full-time resource in 
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place to push the dealers, the downturn might have been softer. Charlie 
believes that this decision had not been made in order to cut cost for SBU 5b, 
but to satisfy a pressure from headquarters to invest in SBU 5a. It was a 
quick, easy and cheap solution to simply add this product line to Edwards 
responsibilities, as he is very well familiar also with the SBU 5a environment. 
Patrick, the division manager in country 5, had initially announced that this 
would only be temporary and a better solution would be found later, but the 
current situation has been already lasting for two years. 
Charlie says that there is a systematic conflict of interest for SBU 5b in the 
fact that they hardly have any own sales teams, but their products are always 
sold by different sales teams who have a different SBU as their primary 
focus, so there is a permanent inherent struggle for resources in almost all 
subsidiaries. Sometimes he says it can be advantageous, because large 
sales teams start to focus on his product group when they struggle for any 
reason in their main focus product groups. As long as a certain balance can 
be maintained, Charlie believes this to be friendly competition. Often also in 
some countries it is only the sum of two products, e.g. SBUs 5a and 5b or 4 
and 5b that allows a critical mass of sales to justify a direct local sales team 
and then everybody in central marketing works together to achieve this. 
Interestingly, Charlie also tries to act as a service provider to other central 
marketing SBUs to increase their good-will towards SBU 5b, by participating 
in congress cost or sending staff from his team to help them in customer 
workshops, even if there’s no direct sales expectations of this event for SBU 
5b. ‘Where we try to make ourselves somewhat indispensable, also to 
somewhat always remind them that we are still there. lxxvii‘  
On the other hand Charlie sometimes encounters situations where other 
SBUs have very ambitious projects and the subsidiaries pursue their local 
implementation to the detriment of SBU 5b: ‘Where people simply told us: 
‘You do not have any interesting new products, we will now focus on another 
product group, because we see a chance there to achieve sales more 
quickly.’ If they saw it with a long-term perspective, this would be acceptable 
from a total company point of view. But their horizon is really only the 31. 
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December of the year. And they think in the future everything will continue 
like that. And they do not see that if they do not continue to work it, the other 
business will break away.’lxxviii 
Other examples for uncoordinated activities can be found in international 
SBU or product meetings. Local sales and marketing managers often are 
concerned by several SBUs and if there are several meetings in short 
succession with only some weeks between them, they can’t afford to attend 
them all, particularly if they are from distant countries. Charlie has observed 
that in such situations, central marketing managers also try to pressure the 
local managers to attend their meetings, instead of the other ones. 
Charlie would like the central sales department to assume a coordinating 
function between the different SBUs but so far he has had little experience, 
positive or negative, in that direction. He is not informed about the activities 
of central sales except for few positive experiences with individual regional 
central sales departments of smaller countries. For other bigger regional 
departments he sometimes has the feeling that the countries are trying to 
avoid getting them involved. ‘Well, we are not even going to inform them. 
They will only make a stupid comment or they will not allow us to do it.’ … 
And then they call us instead and I call the regional sales manager and ask if 
it makes sense. ‘That does not make any sense, horrible, we will do that 
under no circumstances.’ And then: silence.’ lxxix 
Local view point 
Patrick points out that for some highly specialized instrument sets, that are 
necessary for the customers but rarely used, they cannot even afford to buy 
and have them available locally, but perform short-term renting from the 
headquarters. Often no rental sets are available, resulting in frustration of the 
end-customers. Patrick suspects that the SurgiSupplies headquarters serves 
the domestic market first with sets and international markets only if there are 
still sets available. He thinks that there is a strong international competition 
between the subsidiaries for newly launched products and instrument sets. 
On the one hand he believes that this is a specific problem of SBU 4 and that 
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competitors are facing the same challenges. On the other hand they have 
hired staff who formerly worked at competitors who said that such procedure 
sets there were much less expensive or internally even distributed without 
charging the subsidiaries, so that the headquarters are sharing the 
investment in new customers with the subsidiaries. Such investments are 
more relevant in country 5 than in other countries, because the average 
usage rate per customer is lower and the return on investment thus slower. 
Patrick believes that the calculations for this return are based on the situation 
of the domestic market of SurgiSupplies and do not apply to country 5. He is 
certain that other subsidiaries must feel the same way. Generally speaking 
he believes that some SBUs require much higher investments than 
HospiMed is used to and willing to engage in. And the dealers, who in the 
past have been assuming these investments in country 5, as overall 
healthcare spending is declining due to an economic crisis in the country.  
Larry says that SBU 5b products really are sold along with either SBU 5a or 
SBU 4 products. So he believes it would be easier not to have different 
persons for these products in local and central marketing, in order to focus on 
internal and customer relationships. Larry also has the impression that 
central managers always try to sell their products to their country 
organization, obliging them to try to grow the business in all product groups 
simultaneously. Larry says that focusing on one product group and growing 
sales there, can lead to neglecting and losing sales in another one. He gives 
an example of a single sub-product group in SBU 4 that itself has 7 different 
implant systems to sell. He thinks that instead of actively driving certain 
product groups and developing the markets for them, SurgiSupplies has a 
catalog mentality where it is left to the customer to pick and choose from a 
giant portfolio. 
‘… in the sales force we have (the) sensation that we are like (a) 
supermarket company, no? And if I mention my sales organization for SBU 
5a and 5b: maybe 80% of our dealers sell products from SBUs 5b, 2, and 5a, 
maybe 3a etc. and this is for me a big problem. I think in the next future we 
must have (a) dedicated sales force.’ 
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Larry thinks, the decision what products to promote should be left strictly to 
the country managers, as they are the only ones who can judge the local 
attractiveness and profitability of a given product group. He thinks that at 
present, their sales force is reacting to short-term opportunities, such as 
tenders, leading to very volatile sales developments from one year to the 
other, so it is difficult for him to pursue any long-term strategy. 
Short-term and risk-averse local strategies 
Brian thinks that some country managers do not dare to tell him they do not 
want to continue to invest in SBU 5a, because traditionally all central SBU 
managers are traveling from country to country, promoting to invest in their 
respective product groups. And the country managers are in the difficult 
situation that they do not want to make enemies at the headquarters by 
neglecting their respective product groups and therefore they give everyone 
a little piece of the pie. Also Brian thinks that there is a general culture at 
SurgiSupplies not to make any negative announcements to each other, such 
as that there are no local resources for a certain business. With the new 
structure, a clear decision to focus on certain SBUs needs to be taken with 
the central sales managers, but the countries then sometimes build up 
pressure via the top management to keep certain non-focus areas alive 
anyway. 
SurgiSupplies’ difficulties to disinvest 
Paul thinks that the new resource allocation planning system is very 
reasonable, because he thinks at present a lot of resources are being 
wasted, by promoting too many SBUs in all major countries and often also in 
minor countries, even if they are not successful or profitable. On the other 
hand the tool itself is not sufficient to Paul, because no one dares to take the 
decision to decide to stop any of the activities, because it means an initial 
loss of sales. He thus believes that the tools and the idea are correct, but it is 
not being implemented in a consequent way. 
Even in some smaller countries they had intended to stop certain marginal 
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activities, but did not really do it in the end, because the country managers, 
but also the responsible central sales managers, were reluctant to lose the 
sales. He has also observed that this tool is never really critically discussed 
and questioned in the quarterly review meetings. Paul believes it would be 
necessary not only to decide to exit an SBU in a given country but to define a 
concrete exit strategy and action plan at the same time, including measures 
to compensate for the losses, and to force the country managers to actually 
implement it. Today, Paul finds, central managers only get involved with 
investments, not disinvestments. 
Global cost and profit issues 
Patrick thinks that conflicts of interest with the headquarters are mainly 
related to profit distribution. As the transfer prices for investments in surgical 
sets are very high and the investment budgets are limited, the possibilities to 
aggressively develop new customers are limited as well. Patrick believes that 
the legal entity of the headquarters is making a lot of profit from these inter-
company sales. 
Sales management practice 
Brian thinks that concerning the implementation of global strategies his 4 
major American competitors are even in a more difficult situation than his 
own team, because they have only dealers and no direct sales teams in all 
mid-sizes and small countries. Brian thinks that dealers are more difficult to 
manage than direct sales teams, as they are volatile in their business and in 
their focus.  
Local view point 
Edward is the local sales representative for product groups 5a and 5b in 
country 5. He has been working in this field for SurgiSupplies and two other 
companies for more than 20 years in country 5, always responsible for local 
marketing and sales. He describes the most important job for him is to keep 
the SurgiSupplies dealers motivated in selling their products. In the beginning 
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of the year a sales target is defined and a pricing policy is fixed. Since most 
of the business is based on publicly published tenders, Edward has a general 
idea what the sales potential for each dealer will be in any given year. For 
larger tenders during the year, pricing can be negotiated, but the dealers 
need to physically present the orders and invoices to him. Those dealers are 
having difficulties at the moment, as there is a financial crisis in the country 
and the hospital pay the dealers with a delay of about 300 days, sometimes 
more than 1000 days. In country 5, SurgiSupplies is working with about 10 of 
such dealers who all carry also product lines from other companies but 
usually do about 70-90% of their sales with SurgiSupplies products. Edward 
and his boss Larry visit the dealers regularly. Edward never takes any 
decisions without discussing them with Larry who then often has discussions 
with his boss and so on. The sales targets are distributed top-down. 
Patrick is now planning to change the sales channel for some SBUs from the 
traditional dealer system to sales agents. The dealers, who used to buy and 
resell the products, in the future will sell the products to the end-customers in 
the name of the manufacturer and receive commission payments in return. 
This modifies largely the financial structure of the business, as, while profits 
rise due to the elimination of the dealer margin, expenses rise at the same 
time due to the commission payments. Therefore this is a high priority project 
that has been developed together with the responsible central sales manager 
and the SurgiSupplies central controlling and was explicitly approved by 
HospiMed board members. 
Patrick believes that it is much more difficult to manage independent agents 
or dealers than employed sales people, because they can change to another 
manufacturer at any moment, if they are dissatisfied with the situation.  
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Annex 4 Topic List 
 
 Do you agree to participate in this research project of the University of 
Bradford? 
 How did you get involved in SBU … activity? 
 Describe the history of this activity from your point of view. 
 How successful is the activity so far in your opinion? 
 What was positive about the activity so far and what could have been 
improved concerning: 
* definition of goals: do local and central organizations have the same 
goals in this activity? 
* planning of activities 
* customer visits and customer activities 
* progress controlling and measurement of results 
* communication between all participants 
 What else is important concerning this activity? 
 How is the Marketing and Sales Strategy defined? How much are 
central managers involved?  
How deeply in the local hierarchy should central managers get 
involved with goal setting and control? (only at the management level 
or all the way to the individual local sales rep?) 
 What are typical conflicts of interest between central goals and local 
subsidiary goals? 
 Do you believe that other companies have similar situations / 
challenges? 
 Are there differences from one country subsidiary to another and what 
are the reasons for these differences? 
 How well accepted are new performance measurement tools such as 
resource allocation planning, business plans for focus SBUs, 
performance indicators in your organization and what are the influence 
factors? 
 What is your experience with the central sales department? 
 What measures can be taken to improve strategic alignment of sales 
and marketing strategies? 
 Do you believe that other companies have similar situations / 
problems? 
 Generally describe how management control of subsidiaries is 
achieved in your company concerning the sales and marketing 
function, what you believe works well and what you think does not 
work so well. 
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 How is your experience with implementing the central marketing 
strategy in local subsidiaries? 
 How does the matrix organization influence the relationships within the 
central organization and how does it influence the relationships with 
the subsidiaries? 
 Are there differences from country to country and what are the 
reasons for these differences? 
 What kind of improvements of management control is the country 
trying to establish? 
 How does the International Sales Department try to change 
management control? 
 How is performance measurement of subsidiaries achieved in your 
company traditionally and how is it being developed? 
 What kind of tools for performance measurements are being used? 
 How deep in the local hierarchy should central management control 
be? (only at the managing director level or all the way to the individual 
local sales rep?) 
 What conflicts of interest between the different functions and hierarchy 
levels concerning subsidiary control exist in the headquarters?  
 How well accepted are new performance measurement tools in the 
organization and what are the influence factors? 
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Annex 5 Cross-Case Analysis Tables 
 
SBU1 'The domestic team' 
Situational Factors influencing the Local Marketing and Sales Strategy 
Respondent Categories impact Comments concerning 
country 1 
General comments 
Geographical region   Western Europe   
Subsidiary size and 
business priority 
 + central managers can only 
follow top 10 to 15 countries; 
top 5 sales for total country 
and also for SBU 1 
 while large subsidiaries are 
self-sufficient, smaller 
subsidiaries depend on more 
on central knowledge and 
resources, increasing central 
influence 
Traditional SBU 
orientation of the 
individual subsidiaries 
 + country 1 historically deeply 
involved in all SBUs 
SBU choice depends largely 
on prior experience of top-
managers 
Brand awareness and 
market share 
 +     
Market life-cycle mature     
(Absence of) Language 
barriers 
 +     
(Absence of) Cultural 
differences between the 
headquarters and the 
individual subsidiaries 
 +   empowerment of local 
managers very different from 
country to country, difficult for 
central managers to 
understand, need personal 
experience working in 
subsidiaries 
(Absence of) other 
contextual difficulties 
 +     
Innovation performance  - Local dissatisfaction with 
innovation performance 
  
Privileging the domestic 
market 
 + most products are developed 
in the domestic market with 
domestic opinion leaders 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
329
SBU1 'The domestic team' 
Organizational Factors influencing the Local Marketing and Sales Strategy 
Respondent 
Categories 
impact Comments 
concerning country 1 
General comments 
Local autonomy 0 mutual agreement on 
local strategy in 
meetings, sometimes 
controversial 
discussions 
more autonomous subsidiaries than 
competition, entrepreneurial thinking, 
flexibility: changing local environment, 
individual product portfolio, sales channels, 
legal restrictions, output control: strong 
financial orientation; Managers frustrated by 
lacking control over subsidiaries and central 
functions, loss in credibility, sometimes 
would prefer direct line control 
Delegation and 
(absence of) 
sanctioning 
 +   common values, loyalty, complacency, 
bureaucracy at the headquarters 
Impact of 
delegation on 
global strategy  
0   Global strategy risks to become random sum 
of local strategies; global product roll out is 
challenging 
(Absence of) 
Fighting over 
resources 
n/a   competing central offerings put subsidiary in 
a powerful position 
(Absence of) 
Short-term and 
risk-averse local 
strategies 
n/a   (Absence of) Short-term and risk-averse 
local strategies 
Influence of 
central managers 
on local strategies 
 + central sales managers 
not implemented in 
country 1 
difficulties in managing large numbers of 
subsidiaries, difficulties in challenging local 
managers as long as global results meet the 
plan, local managers expect guidance on 
price and product positioning, relationship 
depends on cooperative personality of local 
general manager; lack of empowerment of 
central sales managers 
(Absence of) 
Inconsistencies 
between different 
divisional policies 
n/a     
Global cost and 
profit issues 
n/a   difficulties in controlling world-wide SBU 
expenses 
Sales 
management 
practice 
 + clan control, output 
control; very limited 
synergies between 
sales teams due to 
different purchasing 
decision making 
processes, except for 
key account managers 
More delegation for mature staff 
Staff turn-over 
and loyalty 
 + exemplary situation difficulty in emerging markets, particular 
difficulties when team sizes are very small 
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SBU1 'The domestic team' 
Successful Strategies, Activities and Attitudes to Improve Central Control 
Respondent Categories impact Comments concerning 
country 1 
General comments 
Central managers' 
credibility 
0 Doubts about operative 
market knowledge of central 
managers, lack of central 
planning reliability is 
undermining central 
managers credibility 
Lack of empowerment of 
central managers, also 
central sales department 
Motivating and 
committing all local 
hierarchy levels 
 +   Important for successful 
strategy promotion 
Local field support  + work with local customers, 
KOL 
  
Long-term personal 
relationships 
 + essential for strategy 
alignment, local and central 
managers need to physically 
meet frequently 
essential for strategy 
alignment 
Expatriate managers  -     
Communication of global 
strategic orientation 
 +     
Strategic meetings with 
multiple local and central 
hierarchy level 
involvement 
 + the local managers want to 
have an impact on global 
strategy 
  
Strategic sales 
development workshops 
0 not so high acceptance by 
local managers 
  
Strategic planning and 
reporting systems 
0 operational sales reporting 
system could be 
standardized, implementation 
culture is more important than 
planning system, difficult to 
replace existing local 
planning systems 
  
Geographical focus in 
order to deal with limited 
resources 
n/a   Central SBUs should 
coordinate their geographic 
foci 
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SBU2 'Launching complex solutions' 
Situational Factors influencing the Local Marketing and Sales Strategy 
Respondent Categories impact Comments concerning 
country 2 
General comments 
Geographical region   Asia   
Subsidiary size and 
business priority 
 + top 5 sales for total country 
and also for SBU 2; 
headquarters treat profitable 
companies more respectfully 
  
Traditional SBU 
orientation of the 
individual subsidiaries 
 -   local top managers focus on 
product lines they know from 
prior experience 
Brand awareness and 
market share 
 - Brand awareness and 
customer relationships to 
weak to get buy-in for new 
concepts 
  
Market life-cycle mature   Value-added services and 
process optimization more 
important in mature markets 
(Absence of) Language 
barriers 
 - strong language barriers on 
all hierarchy levels 
  
(Absence of) Cultural 
differences between the 
headquarters and the 
individual subsidiaries 
 - central managers have 
difficulty understanding the 
intentions of local managers 
due to different 
communication style 
  
(Absence of) other 
contextual difficulties 
n/a     
Innovation performance n/a     
Privileging the domestic 
market 
 - central managers don't 
understand that the high 
domestic market shares 
cannot be replicated in other 
countries without local 
product development; global 
strategy of world products, 
local adaptation hasn't 
brought success 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
other companies don't dare to 
launch complex services 
outside of their domestic 
country 
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SBU2 'Launching complex solutions' 
Organizational Factors influencing the Local Marketing and Sales Strategy 
Respondent Categories impact Comments concerning 
country 2 
General comments 
Local autonomy  + decision making is clearly local 
to the satisfaction of local 
managers; supplier dealer 
relationship instead of 
headquarters - subsidiary 
relationship 
  
Delegation and (absence 
of) sanctioning 
 + Less central authority, less short 
term profit orientation than 
publicly traded American 
competitors 
  
Impact of delegation on 
global strategy  
 - passive attitude towards the 
adoption of central strategies; 
little empowerment of the local 
lower hierarchy levels as 
compared to central managers; 
lower hierarchy resistance to 
central strategies 
  
(Absence of) Fighting over 
resources 
0     
(Absence of) Short-term 
and risk-averse local 
strategies 
 + positive example of strong 
product focus in country 2 - 
undermined by central 
managers? 
easier and risk-free to 
develop minor market 
shares in many product 
lines as opposed to strong 
market shares in few 
product lines 
Influence of central 
managers on local 
strategies 
0 central managers have 
succeeded in convincing local 
managers of the SBU2 global 
strategy with long-term 
persistence 
Good decision to create 
central sales management 
department, however 
results are behind 
expectations so far. 
(Absence of) 
Inconsistencies between 
different divisional policies 
n/a     
Global cost and profit 
issues 
n/a     
Sales management 
practice 
n/a     
Staff turn-over and loyalty 
 
 
 
 
 
n/a     
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SBU2 'Launching complex solutions' 
Successful Strategies, Activities and Attitudes to Improve Central Control 
Respondent Categories impact Comments concerning 
country 2 
General comments 
Central managers' 
credibility 
 - hidden arrogance towards 
and skepticism of the 
judgments of central 
managers; high level of 
international experience and 
self-confidence of central 
managers is crucial for their 
acceptance 
  
Motivating and 
committing all local 
hierarchy levels 
 +   working simultaneously on 
different hierarchy levels to 
get 'a foot in the door'; 
guerilla strategy by creating 
local 'light houses' 
Local field support  + collaborative approach 
between central and local in 
working to gain initial 
customer base highly 
successful 
  
Long-term personal 
relationships 
n/a   issue not really raised in case 
2 
Expatriate managers  + the deployment of an 
expatriate manager has 
contributed to the adoption of 
central strategy 
  
Communication of global 
strategic orientation 
 + top management 
communication of long term 
global strategy, powerful 
communication of 'total 
solution project' and centrally 
adding resources to SBU2 
positively impacts on local 
acceptance of SBU2 
  
Strategic meetings with 
multiple local and central 
hierarchy level 
involvement 
n/a Local team would like to be 
more involved in product 
development. 
  
Strategic sales 
development workshops 
n/a     
Strategic planning and 
reporting systems 
 - Central initiative concerning 
strategic planning tools are 
not understood and 
implemented. 
  
Geographical focus in 
order to deal with limited 
resources 
n/a     
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SBU 3a / 3b 'Combining sales teams' 
Situational Factors influencing the Local Marketing and Sales Strategy 
Respondent Categories impact Comments concerning 
country 3 
General comments 
Geographical region   Western Europe   
Subsidiary size and 
business priority 
 - top 10 sales for total country 
but not for SBU 3a and 3b 
in the early days of 
internationalization of 
SurgiSupplies the local 
subsidiaries were totally 
autonomous with no central 
knowledge about managing 
subsidiaries at the 
headquarters; attention of 
central managers for 
individual subsidiaries 
depends on the respective 
business opportunity 
Traditional SBU 
orientation of the 
individual subsidiaries 
 -   attitude towards certain SBUs 
depends largely on personal 
experiences and likings of 
general managers. 
Brand awareness and 
market share 
 - overall low competitive 
strength in country 3 
  
Market life-cycle mature     
(Absence of) Language 
barriers 
 +     
(Absence of) Cultural 
differences between the 
headquarters and the 
individual subsidiaries 
 + organizational culture in 
headquarters and subsidiary 
believed to be similar 
differences in country culture 
are not seen as having a 
major impact; sometimes 
used as an excuse to obscure 
hidden agendas 
(Absence of) other 
contextual difficulties 
 - generally low price level in 
country 3 
  
Innovation performance n/a     
Privileging the domestic 
market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n/a     
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SBU 3a / 3b 'Combining sales teams' 
Organizational Factors influencing the Local Marketing and Sales Strategy 
Respondent Categories impact Comments concerning 
country 3 
General comments 
Local autonomy  +   central managers have no 
influence on local staff 
decisions of subsidiaries; the 
way how international staff 
members should interact is 
not sufficiently clear; central 
managers would prefer direct 
line-control in larger 
countries; subsidiaries 
sometimes invest 
inappropriately in certain 
product areas, contrary to 
global strategy 
Delegation and (absence 
of) sanctioning 
 + more pressure at American 
competitors to achieve 
ambitious financial targets set 
by head-quarters 
non-performing sales people 
are not necessarily replaced 
in some subsidiaries; 'need 
for harmony' 
Impact of delegation on 
global strategy  
 - the central strategic guideline 
obliging all subsidiaries to 
invest in SBU3b is willingly 
not being implemented in 
country 3. 
inability to roll out global SBU 
campaigns 
(Absence of) Fighting 
over resources 
 - central managers always ask 
for more SBU related sales 
resources to overcome 
problems; central 
reservations against the 
CombiTeam project and 
strong wish for future re-
separation of CombiTeam 
into individual SBUs  
not enough resources to 
invest into all SBUs 
simultaneously; allocation 
conflicts inherent to the 
divisionalized matrix structure 
(Absence of) Short-term 
and risk-averse local 
strategies 
n/a   company pronounces 
willingness to focus, but every 
SBU continues further 
developments in more and 
more sub-segments; local 
managers have an incentive 
to add more and more 
product lines (risk reduction, 
relationships with central 
managers); central managers 
believe local strategies to be 
oriented towards short-term 
opportunities 
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Influence of central 
managers on local 
strategies 
 - very limited central control to 
enact global strategies is 
attributed to the high degree 
of divisionalization; 
relationships degraded in 
times of poor local 
performance; local managers 
understand need for global 
strategies but require a lot of 
local flexibility in the 
implementation; local country 
3 managers don't see the 
necessity for central sales 
managers for their country, 
but only for smaller countries; 
local managers prefer central 
sales support in exceptional 
situations ('business angels') 
than in every day life 
appreciation of the decision to 
create a central sales 
department, but lack of 
success so far and skepticism 
of the capabilities of central 
sales managers to overcome 
lack of central control  
(Absence of) 
Inconsistencies between 
different divisional 
policies 
 - importance of expatriate 
manager exchange different 
in divisions 
inconsistent geographical 
breakdown of the sales 
regions is hindering central 
control 
Global cost and profit 
issues 
 -   difficulties of central 
managers to control global 
cost, due to lack of control 
over subsidiary expenses; 
changing transfer prices can 
create problems with local tax 
authorities 
Sales management 
practice 
0 output control for mature 
sales people, behavior control 
for less mature sales people; 
failure to establish 
sustainable sales teams with 
critical mass in a disciplined 
way; maturity, skill level and 
control style required is 
different between SBUs; 
conflict between detailed 
knowledge of sales people 
and critical team size; 
necessity to reduce product 
portfolio; focusing on 
products with quick return on 
investment 
customer planning, sales call 
rotation and sales figure 
reporting could be 
standardized globally; activity 
reporting should be locally 
adapted 
Staff turn-over and 
loyalty 
 - staff loyalty seen as key 
factor to success; high 
fluctuation rate in sales team 
in the past 
product requiring higher skill 
levels have higher staff 
loyalty in sales teams; this is 
also related to the customer 
side contact persons 
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SBU 3a / 3b 'Combining sales teams' 
Successful Strategies, Activities and Attitudes to Improve Central Control 
Respondent Categories impact Comments concerning country 3 General 
comments 
Central managers' 
credibility 
n/a     
Motivating and 
committing all local 
hierarchy levels 
 + local top management used a lot of 
energy to get 'buy-in' from all central 
and local people involved; reassuring 
and educating sales team was crucial 
  
Local field support  +     
Long-term personal 
relationships 
 + successful cooperation attributed to the 
fact that local and central managers on 
different hierarchy levels have worked 
with each other for a long period of time 
  
Expatriate managers  - expatriate exchange underdeveloped at 
SurgiSupplies with respect to other 
divisions; local managers encourage 
more expatriate exchange 
  
Communication of global 
strategic orientation 
 +     
Strategic meetings with 
multiple local and central 
hierarchy level 
involvement 
 + local managers dissatisfied with their 
possibilities to influence global strategy; 
current meetings don't allow to 
sufficiently express local needs; true 
exchange being compromized by too 
high number of subsidiaries; one recent 
example of an adequate meeting set-
up; current meeting concepts on 
different levels; strategy meetings 
initiated by local top management 
strategic meetings 
suggested between 
central managers to 
create portfolio 
synergies between 
SBUs 
Strategic sales 
development workshops 
n/a   different 
experiences of 
central SBU3a 
managers in 
different countries; 
too little staff to 
deal consequently 
with such activities 
Strategic planning and 
reporting systems 
 - strategic planning and reporting tools 
are not understood and used in country 
3; fear of too much bureaucracy 
planning systems 
are good as a 
'common language' 
but not so helpful 
for operative 
business; 
subsidiary board 
members need to 
be educated to 
apply and discuss 
the strategic tools 
in their meetings 
Geographical focus in 
order to deal with limited 
resources 
 + idea to concentrate on geographical 
clusters, certain products and capable 
team members initiated by central 
managers 
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SBU 4 'The emerging market' 
Situational Factors influencing the Local Marketing and Sales Strategy 
Respondent Categories impact Comments concerning 
country 4 
General comments 
Geographical region   Eastern Europe   
Subsidiary size and 
business priority 
 + top 15 sales for total country 
and also for SBU 4, but both 
expected to be top 10 soon 
  
Traditional SBU 
orientation of the 
individual subsidiaries 
 - the country 4 subsidiary has 
traditionally sold more 
products from another 
division and the local top 
managers are more familiar 
with these products 
  
Brand awareness and 
market share 
0 average market shares world-wide oligopoly for SBU 
4 products -> always the 
same competitors with 
varying market shares in 
each country 
Market life-cycle emerging emerging market with high 
growth-rates 
  
(Absence of) Language 
barriers 
 - limited English skills of sales 
and marketing staff 
  
(Absence of) Cultural 
differences between the 
headquarters and the 
individual subsidiaries 
 - central managers have 
difficulty understanding the 
communication and decision 
making culture in country 4; 
the orientation of country 4 
physicians towards the 
domestic country of 
SurgiSupplies is seen as an 
advantage; the local 
subsidiary still is perceived by 
central managers as having 
the culture of a small dealer; 
the fact of being a fellow-
country man was ambiguous 
for the central sales manager  
  
(Absence of) other 
contextual difficulties 
 - infrastructural problems, 
logistic difficulties; former 
dealer was transformed into a 
subsidiary; volatile market 
strongly influenced by politics 
  
Innovation performance n/a     
Privileging the domestic 
market 
 - the local manager believes 
that SurgiSupplies focuses 
their product development on 
the requirements of their 
domestic market 
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SBU 4 'The emerging market' 
Organizational Factors influencing the Local Marketing and Sales Strategy 
Respondent Categories impact Comments concerning 
country 4 
General comments 
Local autonomy  + the impact of central 
managers on operative local 
strategy is minor; incapacity 
of local and central managers 
to agree on appropriate 
investment level, let alone 
allocation to SBUs; overall 
budget determined by central, 
allocation freely managed by 
local managers 
  
Delegation and (absence 
of) sanctioning 
n/a     
Impact of delegation on 
global strategy  
n/a     
(Absence of) Fighting 
over resources 
 -   local investment decisions 
are crucial for the global 
success of central SBUs; the 
local decision making 
process and reasoning is 
ominous to the central 
managers 
(Absence of) Short-term 
and risk-averse local 
strategies 
 - no real strategic focus; 
reacting to short term market 
opportunities; is strategic 
focus a priority in emerging 
markets? 
local investments are 
sometimes abandoned too 
quickly, not leaving enough 
time for return on investment 
Influence of central 
managers on local 
strategies 
 -   high expectations towards 
the central sales managers to 
coordinate central and local 
strategies, but unclear real 
contribution so far 
(Absence of) 
Inconsistencies between 
different divisional 
policies 
 - there are different sectoral 
salary levels in different 
SBUs; difficult to recruit for 
high-salary SBUs 
  
Global cost and profit 
issues 
 -     
Sales management 
practice 
 - sales and marketing team for 
SBU4 too small; main 
objective is to establish 
professional sales and logistic 
infrastructure 
  
Staff turn-over and 
loyalty 
 
 
 
 
 
 -     
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SBU 4 'The emerging market' 
Successful Strategies, Activities and Attitudes to Improve Central Control 
Respondent Categories impact Comments concerning country 4 General comments 
Central managers' 
credibility 
0 the local manager didn't have or 
take the time to discuss strategic 
issues with central sales manager; 
local attitude of pretending to be 
cooperative towards the central 
managers but pursuing different 
agendas in reality 
  
Motivating and 
committing all local 
hierarchy levels 
n/a     
Local field support  + connecting local and domestic key 
opinion leaders is a successful 
strategy; involving local opinion 
leaders in design of local products; 
local staff doesn't efficiently use 
contacts established by central 
managers 
  
Long-term personal 
relationships 
 + personal relationships are of 
particular importance in country 4 
  
Expatriate managers n/a     
Communication of global 
strategic orientation 
 + divisional meeting with global 
strategy communication very much 
appreciated 
  
Strategic meetings with 
multiple local and central 
hierarchy level 
involvement 
 + the local manager doesn't feel that 
their specific country requirements 
are sufficiently understood and that 
they have a platform to 
communicate them and influence 
central strategy accordingly; a 
regular strategy meeting with the 
responsible central managers and 
other country representatives with 
similar issues could resolve this 
  
Strategic sales 
development workshops 
n/a     
Strategic planning and 
reporting systems 
 - the local manager believes there 
needs to be more feed-back 
concerning central inquiries 
a central manager 
believes that local 
managers do not report 
their true beliefs and 
intentions in the 
planning tools 
Geographical focus in 
order to deal with limited 
resources 
n/a     
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SBU 5a / 5b 'The dealer market' 
Situational Factors influencing the Local Marketing and Sales Strategy 
Respondent Categories impact Comments concerning 
country 5 
General comments 
Geographical region   Western Europe   
Subsidiary size and 
business priority 
 + top 10 sales for total country 
and also for SBUs 5a and 5b; 
central managers can only 
organize regular meetings 
professionally with the top 5 
countries 
  
Traditional SBU 
orientation of the 
individual subsidiaries 
0 products are treated as cash 
cows in country 5 
  
Brand awareness and 
market share 
 + relatively high market shares   
Market life-cycle mature     
(Absence of) Language 
barriers 
 - there are significant language 
barriers with limited English 
capabilities at intermediate 
and lower hierarchy levels in 
country 5 
  
(Absence of) Cultural 
differences between the 
headquarters and the 
individual subsidiaries 
0 Cultural closeness such as 
speaking the native language 
is seen as a major advantage 
  
(Absence of) other 
contextual difficulties 
 - economic crisis; long credit 
period of hospitals 
  
Innovation performance  - local managers are 
dissatisfied with the speed of 
innovation at SurgiSupplies 
  
Privileging the domestic 
market 
 - there is a strong belief in 
country 5 that the domestic 
country of SurgiSupplies is 
favored concerning 
development of products and 
the use of key opinion leaders 
as consultants 
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SBU 5a / 5b 'The dealer market' 
Organizational Factors influencing the Local Marketing and Sales Strategy 
Respondent Categories impact Comments concerning 
country 5 
General comments 
Local autonomy  + central managers manage by 
persuasion, not by direction 
high local autonomy to define 
strategy; sometimes strategic 
decisions are contradicting 
global strategy by focusing on 
non-focus products 
Delegation and (absence 
of) sanctioning 
 + high delegation level at 
SurgiSupplies is appreciated 
as motivating factor for the 
sales force; central managers 
appreciate the fact that they 
are not held responsible for 
local results 
American companies are 
much more directive with their 
subsidiaries; quick separation 
from sales people who do not 
reach their targets; more 
long-term evaluation of staff 
at SurgiSupplies; sometimes 
local failure due to unadapted 
local strategy; only European 
competitor seems to be more 
like SurgiSupplies; one 
example is given, where the 
local management team was 
replaced after non-
conforming strategic behavior 
Impact of delegation on 
global strategy  
n/a     
(Absence of) Fighting 
over resources 
 - strong competition between 
central managers for sales 
resources in country 5 
country competition for 
central resources, such as 
visits from managers, loan 
sets, development of local 
products; neither central nor 
local managers are willing to 
abandon existing sales 
volumes in order to focus the 
activities 
(Absence of) Short-term 
and risk-averse local 
strategies 
n/a local managers are 
introducing too many product 
lines in order to satisfy central 
managers; 'super-market 
portfolios' are then 
overwhelming for the sales 
force 
local managers quickly 
reallocate sales resources to 
different product groups when 
there are promising 
innovations; this can be to the 
detriment of long-term market 
development strategies 
Influence of central 
managers on local 
strategies 
 - in country 5 central sales 
managers are not seen as 
having an impact on the 
operative business but they 
are a good communication 
platform with headquarters 
central sales managers act 
solely as consultants to the 
local top management in 
large countries; in small 
countries they have 
operational duties 
(Absence of) Inconsis-
tencies between different 
divisional policies 
 - uncoordinated central SBU 
events 
 
Global cost and profit 
issues 
 - conflicts about transfer pricing 
and resulting profit allocation 
  
Sales management 
practice 
 - 100% independent sales 
force; small number of sales 
managers; difficult to control 
sales force 
  
Staff turn-over and 
loyalty 
n/a   
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SBU 5a / 5b 'The dealer market' 
Successful Strategies, Activities and Attitudes to Improve Central Control 
Respondent Categories impa
ct 
Comments concerning country 
5 
General comments 
Central managers' 
credibility 
0 the trust in the competency of 
central managers in country 5 
varies widely from one SBU to 
the other; both local and central 
managers are generally satisfied 
with the cooperation 
cooperation process of local 
and central managers is not 
defined or formalized; some 
local managers cannot accept 
their role as subsidiary and 
come up with their own 
product strategy, sometimes 
contradicting global strategy 
Motivating and 
committing all local 
hierarchy levels 
n/a     
Local field support  - local managers strongly request 
the visit from central managers to 
their market and to get involved 
with their customers; this also 
helps the local feeling of 
'belongingness' and 
consideration 
direct interaction with local 
sales people and customers 
is crucial for central 
managers to get 'unfiltered' 
market information; 'arms 
race' between certain SBUs 
to get local attention 
Long-term personal 
relationships 
 + Cooperation between central and 
local managers depends on long-
term personal relationships and 
on the individual's cooperative 
personality 
the quick and truthful 
communication of negative 
news is seen as crucial for 
the relationship 
Expatriate managers  + local managers appreciate 
sending expatriates to the 
headquarters to establish 
contacts 
  
Communication of global 
strategic orientation 
n/a   subsidiaries tend to follow 
global strategies if they are 
easy to understand, clearly 
communicated and supported 
by central top-management 
Strategic meetings with 
multiple local and central 
hierarchy level 
involvement 
 + local managers want to get more 
involved in the central strategy; 
current meetings are too big for 
real exchange; smaller strategy 
meetings involving a small 
number of countries are 
requested 
  
Strategic sales 
development workshops 
n/a     
Strategic planning and 
reporting systems 
 - the new systems are not 
implemented in the local 
organization; fear of too much 
bureaucracy; the indirect sales 
force leads to different reporting 
requirements than a direct sales 
force; filling in tools together with 
central and local managers 
largely improved the acceptance; 
local self-appraisal then was 
surprisingly open 
no standardized planning 
process but individual local 
solutions; documented 
planning is often not followed; 
new strategic planning and 
reporting systems are aimed 
at increasing the 
accountability of local 
managers; lacking control 
mechanisms and lacking 
consequences are 
undermining these tools 
Geographical focus in 
order to deal with limited 
resources 
n/a     
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Annex 6 Original Citations 
                                                     
i ‘Au final, les relations siège-filiales oscillent entre une volonté de contrôle du siège et une recherche 
de connaissances des filiales.’ 
ii ‘On est sollicité par des gens avec lesquels on n’a aucun lien. On nous demande de participer à des 
projets qui n’ont pas de répercussions immédiates sur ce qu’on fait au jour le jour. […] Votre équipe, 
elle peut parfois reporter fonctionnellement à des gens qui ne dépendent pas de vous, parfois vous êtes 
informé, parfois vous n’êtes pas informé, parfois vous connaissez le résultat, parfois vous ne 
connaissez pas le résultat.’ 
iii ‘Et tout le rôle de la direction générale est de faire fonctionner la matrice.’ (directeur de filiale). 
iv ‚…wenn der mir dann hilft hier mal einen Kunden zu gewinnen, dann ist das gut und dann kann er 
wieder wegbleiben, und rede mir bitte auch sonst nicht rein.‘ 
v ‚… ein Land wie X, die wachsen schön mit 10-15%, die sind praktisch unantastbar. Obwohl man 
genau sieht, das machen die mit einem neuen Account. … und dann fragst Du, und wo sind 5 andere 
Accounts? Die gibt’s einfach gar nicht. Und da sind die Länder einfach sehr schnell zufrieden, happy 
und da hat man keinen Durchgriff. Und das ist ärgerlich.‘ 
vi ‚… da hätte ich mir … ehrlicherweise mehr erhofft. Ich hoffe, dass wir über die … Workshops jetzt 
… eine bessere Vorgehensweise gefunden haben… bisher ist für mich … das was International Sales 
da draußen macht, noch nicht irgendwie zurückgespiegelt worden aus den Ländern, als 
erfolgsbringend, … Also ich glaube da fehlt halt auch der Zugriff, letztendlich ist auch International 
Sales … ein zahnloser Tiger.‘ 
vii ‚…wir entscheiden zentral ein Produkt zu machen, für das wir drei Jahre oder länger brauchen. Und 
da ist der Markt für das Produkt nicht mehr da. Wenn wir’s dann haben, … meine ich. Der Markt 
entscheidet. … je zentraler das entschieden wird, umso abstrakter ist es manchmal.‘ 
viii ‚Da kommt’s also zuerst mal darauf an, dass man gut kommuniziert miteinander. …,dass man 
ihnen auch zeigt, dass man dahinter ist, dass man also auch den Spaß daran hat und den Spaß auch 
weiterträgt ... um das Ganze zu beleben muss man denen also auch Ideen liefern, und sagen, probiert’s 
doch mal so, oder wir sollten mal wieder dahingehend was machen, einen Workshop, was weiß ich, 
um die Leute wieder an den Tisch zu kriegen, dass sie sich gewahr werden, dass (Firmenname) da ist, 
(Firmenname, BU Name).‘ 
ix ‚…da kämpfe ich auch seit Jahren dafür, da sehe ich in der Kommunikation einfach auch das größte 
Potential mit dem wir besser werden können.‘ 
x ‚… ich lege eine Schablone hin, und fülle die mit Sand auf, das ist viel, viel leichter als, ich habe 
schon meine Sandburgen und drücke jetzt die Schablone rein.‘ 
xi ‘Ich glaube das ist, gewissermassen ein Paradigmenwechsel. Denn, im, wenn ich das sonst so 
beobachte, auch in anderen SBUs, ist es doch eher so, wir entwickeln hier ein Produkt und sagen, das 
sind die Features, und jetzt verkauft mal, hier ist noch ein Prospekt…. , das wird schon klappen, …. 
Und es klappt eben nicht! … was wir hier machen ist, wir gehen tatsächlich in die Verantwortung und 
wir sagen, gemeinsam mit Dir, lieber Kollege im Land, nehmen wir uns gegenseitig bei der Hand und 
gehen direkt auf den Kunden zu und setzen dort um, was wir schon in anderen Ländern bewiesen 
haben, dass es funktioniert.‘ 
xii ‚…Heimatmarkt, wir’s mit einer höchst selbstbewussten Vertriebsmannschaft zu tun hatten, die uns 
zu verstehen gegeben hatten, wir wissen wie’s funktioniert, wir brauchen nicht aus dem in 
Anführungszeichen Elfenbeinturm äh, irgendwelche theoretischen Lösungen übertragen bekommen, 
so wurde das nie ausgesprochen, aber so war das Verhalten über Jahre.‘ 
xiii ‘Und da kann man sich schon denken, dass die, die Länder auch sich so ein bisschen zurücklehnen 
und sagen na ja, jetzt warten wir erst mal ab, bis das Produkt wirklich da ist und dann können wir 
immer noch überlegen was wir tun.‘ 
xiv ‚Ich denke wir haben in der Vergangenheit die Kollegen in (Land2) einfach zu bestimmten Dingen 
gezwungen (lacht) - sie zu tun, um einfach das zu tun was die Zentrale will.‘ 
xv ‘… er fand die so interessant, dass er sich vom Marketingleiter … am Montag danach nen Anruf 
bekam, der sich da jetzt schlau machen wollte, was wir eigentlich da treiben. … das meine ich mit 
positivem Guerilla-Marketing, ich muss meine Wege mir selber bahnen. Und, das wäre ja schön, 
wenn’s irgendeinen Ablauf gäbe, wo ich dann komme und sage ‚das sind die Lösungen, sagt mir, ob 
Ihr’s haben wollt‘, ähm, aber so läuft’s nicht, also so lern ich das nicht kennen, bei uns im Haus. ‘ 
xvi ‘…leb ich natürlich in einer relativ komfortablen Situation.‘ 
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xvii ‚Wir sind relativ emotionslos an die Sache herangegangen, weil England hat zur damaligen Zeit, 
Zeitpunkt ja keinen positiven Einfluss auf unser Ergebnis gehabt. … Und die Gefahr, dass das jetzt 
ein Erfolgsrezept für andere Länder wird, ist relativ wenig ausgeprägt.‘ 
xviii ‚Ich fange da wieder von vorne an, das deckt sich einfach nicht, das passt nicht richtig zusammen. 
Das kann man sich schön reden, aber eigentlich passt es nicht zusammen.‘ 
xix ‚…man kennt ja die Leute in diesem Land …, nur … hat man, was die Struktur angeht, kaum 
Einfluss … Auf einmal sind drei Leute mehr da. Weil man irgendwo in (ein bestimmtes 
Produktsegment) rein will. Was bei uns gar keine Strategie ist. … Es geht gar nicht darum, jetzt zu 
gucken, wer morgens früh um 8 Uhr oder um 9 kommt. Das ist nicht unsere Aufgabe.‘ 
 
xx ‚Also wenn, die VORA und die Radar Screens usw. etwas ergeben, aber dann in den lokalen 
Aufsichtsräten Leute drinsitzen, die diese Dinge nicht kennen, oder in eine andere Richtung gerne 
gedreht haben wollen, dann wird das nicht funktionieren. Weil letztendlich der lokale Verantwortliche 
muss seinem Rat da eben halt die Rechnung präsentieren. Das ist das Entscheidende. Ja, da können 
alle VORAs dann auf dem Tisch liegen, … wenn er vor seinen Rat tritt, … und die sagen ok, die 
Ergebnisse sind nicht zufriedenstellend, machen sie was, dann wird jede VORA da über den Haufen 
geworfen werden.‘ 
xxi ‚… man muss natürlich örtliche und zeitliche Schwerpunkte bilden. Und dort, wo man reingeht, 
muss man zumindest die gleiche Schlagkraft haben wie die Konkurrenz, ansonsten wird man sich 
schwertun. … Man ist reingegangen, man hat Erfolg gehabt, zunächst einmal in der Nähe von 
(Firmensitz). Das hat dazu geführt, dass man von anderen Teilen des Landes dann Anfragen 
bekommen hat, und dann ist man überall hin gesprungen wo man eben halt angerufen wurde, anstatt 
zu sagen, nein, es tut uns Leid, das können wir halt jetzt nicht bearbeiten, wir haben hier so viel zu 
tun. Und sich wirklich konzentriert und diszipliniert in einem Cluster aufhält. Dass man dieses Cluster 
dann erfolgreich macht, und dann dieses Modell dann multipliziert. Ja, aber das ist eben halt immer 
ein bisschen das Problem, das wir auch mit anderen Subsidiaries haben, dass sie sehr stark vom 
Tagesgeschäft und Ausnutzen von irgendwelchen aufkommenden Opportunities geleitet werden.‘ 
xxii ‚…zum Schluss muss es so sein, dass das Krankenhaus sagt, ja, ich will SurgiSupplies und ich will 
auch von Dir, Händler, SurgiSupplies geliefert.‘ 
xxiii ‚ …ich glaube dass die wirklich Unterstützung aus international sales wirklich ausschließlich darin 
liegen kann, dass eben diese Entscheidungen für oder gegen eine SBU, oder für oder gegen eine 
Investition, zu einem gegebenen Zeitpunkt wirklich begleitet, überprüft, nachvollziehbar oder eben 
auch kritisiert wird. Das würde bedeuten, dass eben die lokalen Herren ihre Karten offenlegen, dass 
das überprüft wird im Hinblick auf die strategische Linie und dass dann eben international sales 
betätigt wird, denn nur die sind es, die eigentlich in der Lage sind über alle sieben SBUs zu urteilen, 
während, sag mal einer aus der Sicht SBU 4 oder 5 lediglich eigentlich etwas beklagen kann, und 
eigentlich kaum die Möglichkeit hat, unmittelbar Einfluss zu nehmen.‘ 
xxiv ‚…ich glaube das ist eigentlich die Expertise, die von Sales kommen muss, ja wie seit ihr 
aufgestellt, ja, wie ist eure Kostenstruktur, wie verteilt ihr eure, gegebenenfalls auch eure Expenses, 
auch da gibt’s ja zu Teil ganz erratische Entwicklungen. Und da erwarte ich eigentlich, dass, äh, 
Global Sales so eine Art kritischer Sparringspartner ist für die lokale Organisation, ja, und weniger, 
warum verkaufst Du jetzt die Hüfte und jene Hüfte nicht, äh, oder warum lässt Du das zu und jenes 
nicht, ja. Aber ich glaube, es ist schwierig angesichts der Autonomie, die die ja haben vor Ort, äh, und 
es hängt eigentlich davon ab, äh, von der Akzeptanz und vom diplomatischen Geschickt letzten Endes 
auch von Global Sales da wirklich tätig zu sein. … ‚Habt ihr ne ordentliche Abwicklung intern? Habt 
ihr einen Kundenservice, der wirklich den Namen verdient‘?‘ 
xxv ‚er … meinte dann, er sei jetzt quasi der … Neuerfinder des Fahrrads in (Land 4). Und da kommt 
er natürlich auch auf eine Konfrontation, das ist klar. Weil, die lassen sich einfach … von vorne herein 
nicht so genau in die Karten schauen aber sie sagen natürlich auch, wir brauchen nicht einen eigenen 
ehemaligen Landsmann, der uns quasi das Rechnen beibringt, oder verkaufen, oder das Einmaleins. 
Wobei der Sergej schon von den Ansätzen das alles schon richtig gesehen hat. Aber du kannst einfach 
nicht sowas von einem Tag auf den anderen ändern.‘ 
 
xxvi ‚…das ist doch eigentlich auch einer von uns. Und jetzt will der uns so besserwisserisch alles 
sagen.‘ 
xxvii ‚… habe ich den Eindruck, dass der eine das initiiert, und dass es lokal dann nicht nachverfolgt 
wird, weil es vielleicht von (Land der Zentrale) aus initiiert wurde und … sie sehen’s nicht als ihr 
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Baby. Aber dass wir ihnen quasi einen Kunden … auf dem Silbertablett bringen, … der müsste nur 
noch gepflegt werden.‘ 
xxviii , …die globale Strategie, soll eine Rahmenbedingung sein, so eine linke, rechte Leitplanke, wo 
ich sage, also in dem Bereich sollten wir uns bewegen. Dass da natürlich durchaus unterschiedliche 
Varianten dann da entstehen an lokalen Strategien, ist ja logisch und sinnvoll. Ich erwarte aber, dass 
die Länder diesen Rahmen … nicht durchbrechen und überschreiten. Also so praktisches Beispiel, wir 
wollen nicht in gewisse Technologie oder Produktsegmente rein und wenn dann Länder diskutieren, 
sie wollen’s trotzdem aufnehmen und es trotzdem verkaufen, dann versuche ich natürlich schon 
deutlich zu machen, dass das nicht in unserem Interesse ist.‘ 
xxix ‚Weil a) so möchte ich nicht arbeiten, also sprich, ich möchte nicht das Gegenüber sein, dem alles 
nur befohlen wird, was er zu tun hat und ähm, b) ist auch ein Stück weit Bequemlichkeit, wenn’s 
nachher schiefgeht können die sich ganz entspannt zurücklehnen und sagen, der Ingo hat’s aber so 
gesagt, und deswegen ist es auch schiefgegangen. … Es gibt gewisse lokale Abweichungen, aber die 
…muss man auch mal tolerieren. …Wenn’s erfolgreich ist, dann klopfen wir uns alle auf die 
Schultern …. Wenn’s in die Hose geht, kann ich draufhauen und sagen, ‚ja, ich hab’s euch doch 
gleich gesagt‘ …Also von daher habe ich da eine sehr komfortable Position.‘ ‘. ‘ 
xxx ‚Wenn ich zu den Kollegen in Land 5 käme und sage: ‚Edward, zeig mir mal Deinen Business Plan 
und Deinen Marketing Plan.‘, da wären die wahrscheinlich ziemlich pikiert und sagen: ‚Was will den 
der da jetzt. Das geht die doch gar nichts an.‘ Das ist das Problem was wir haben.‘‘ 
 
xxxi ‚Was wollen die Länder? Die wollen letztendlich, so wie sie’s mir erzählen, sie wollen einfach die 
Begleitung in ihren Aktivitäten. Sie wollen nicht unbedingt, dass man bei allem dabei ist, aber man 
sollte zumindest ein paar mal im Jahr anwesend sein, mal ein paar Key-Kunden besuchen und einfach 
sich austauschen, über die Aktivitäten im Markt, über die Pläne im Markt und dann halt das ok geben, 
oder halt Verbesserungen einzufordern. Das ist eigentlich das was die Länder am ehesten möchten.‘ 
xxxii ‚…dieses eine Meeting, (wird) mir heute noch als das Paradebeispiel präsentiert, was sie von uns 
erwarten. … und sie sagen, mit diesem Support haben sie dann letztendlich dieses Wagnis begonnen, 
was dann letztendlich ein Erfolg war.‘ 
xxxiii ‚Stell Dir vor SurgiSupplies wäre ne Amerikanische Firma und das Headquarter wäre in den 
USA, dann muss ich mich einfach auf diesen Partner dort drüben einstellen. Und wenn ich da halt 
immer nur die Position vertrete, ja aber in Deutschland ist das anders, und ihr müsst dann halt auch 
mal an Deutschland denken, da muss man einfach offen sein, und da muss man das Glas mehr 
halbvoll sehen als halbleer und das sind Einstellungsdinge, wo ich heute einfach sagen kann, manche 
haben die und manche haben sie nicht. Und die, die’s haben, die tun sich wesentlich einfacher und 
sind in der Regel mittel- bis langfristig auch erfolgreicher, als diejenigen, die’s nicht haben.‘ 
xxxiv ‚Vertriebssupport ist z.B. 5a, wie organisier ich mich , um 5a Produkte verkaufen zu können. Wie 
kann das aussehen, welche Best Practices gibt es usw.‘ 
xxxv ‚Das würde wirklich dazu führen: ‚Ok, 5b macht einmal im Monat eine Telefonkonferenz, wir 
fliegen einmal im Quartal rüber. Dann würden wir sagen: ‚Ok, wenn die einmal im Quartal 
rüberfliegen, machen wir das auch.‘, dann wird der andere alle zwei Monate, und irgendwie war’s 
wirklich so, dann wurde sich die Türklinke … in die Hand geben, und jeder würde der 
Tochtergesellschaft: ‚Meins ist wichtig, das ist am wichtigsten.‘, und ich glaub, da haben wir wirklich 
noch lange keine wirklich gute Struktur gefunden bei SurgiSupplies. Das ist noch lange so, bisschen 
sehr, dem Egoismus des Einzelnen überlassen, …‘ 
xxxvi ‚…für mich ist Ehrlichkeit auch ganz wichtig … Wir haben andere Länder, das ist klare ABC 
Abgrenzung, da gibt’s die A Länder und für die sind wir da. B Länder, die können wir bedienen, wenn 
wir die Ressourcen dazu haben und C Länder, da werden wir, bis auf wenn ein Kongress stattfindet 
wahrscheinlich nie persönlich vor Ort sein.‘ 
xxxvii ‚Man geht da auch über einen gewissen Zeitraum einen gemeinsamen Weg, man hat Erfolge, 
man hat Misserfolge, das schweißt auch ein Stück weit zusammen, aber da würde ich einfach sagen, 
über die Jahre ist man sich dann auch näher gekommen und man entwickelt mehr Verständnis für 
einander.‘ 
xxxviii ‚Weil letztenendes, das ist so, glaube ich, das große SurgiSupplies Problem, wir wollen immer 
alles machen, und dafür nichts bleiben lassen. Und das funktioniert nicht. Wenn ich gewisse Dinge 
einfach konsequent betreiben will, dann müssen andere Dinge vernachlässigt werden oder auch 
ignoriert werden.‘ 
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xxxix ‚…dann ist es halt auch so, der Chef ist in manchen (Ländern) ‚le Patron‘. Der steht halt oben vor 
und alle anderen nicken brav ab und sagen schön ist’s. Also Kritik ist nicht in jeder 
Tochtergesellschaft gut.‘ 
xl The author could agree to this view from his own long lasting experience in two different local 
subsidiaries. 
xli ‚Dann war die erste Telefonkonferenz über das Pricing, da war der … (Name des Produkt 
Managers) schon nicht mehr dabei. Dann habe ich nachgefragt, bekam ich keine Antwort. OK. Bekam 
ich am Freitag ein Email, dass die Preise nur über 2 Personen gehen werden. Warum? Weil sie Angst 
haben, der könnte jetzt mit dem Wissen … flüchten…‘ 
xlii It is common business practice that the ‚starter kit‘ necessary for performing the surgical procedure 
for implant systems is provided as a permanent or case-by-case loan set to every customer, usually 
free of charge. This often represents an important up-front investment for companies in this field 
before actually doing business with a customer. 
xliii ‚Gelassen, mittlerweile gelassen. …, ich denke wir haben uns ein Stück weit daran gewöhnt.‘ 
xliv ‚Ich glaube, dass … Business Unit … Strukturen schaffen helfen würde, … in der Zentrale einfach 
einfacherer, klarere Strukturen schaffen, klarere Strategie. Und dann eben auch kann’s nicht sein, dass 
zwischen Marketing und R&D das schon weich wird und wir dort nicht so richtig an einem Strang 
ziehen, und letztendlich müsste der Ansatz sehr stark aus der Zentrale kommen. Und wenn’s dann 
wirklich … ein Business Unit Leiter oder einen Business Unit Leiter … geben würde, dann hätte der 
einen ganz anderes Standing auch im Land…‘ 
xlv ‚Und das geht dann weiter Richtung Produktion, Richtung Supply Chain, in die ganzen anderen 
Funktionen herein. Auch dort musst Du hier intern ständig eigentlich versuchen für Deine Projekte, 
irgendwie good-will zu bekommen, dass der im Einkauf was bestellt, und, und, und, und… Ich glaub, 
also da sind wir schon mal nicht stark genug. Und das spüren die Länder auch draußen. Weil wir ja 
auch gegenüber den Ländern gar nicht mit dieser starken Position auftreten können.‘ 
xlvi ‚Ich denke, das ist Organisationsform abhängig und natürlich auch Unternehmenskultur abhängig. 
Ich meine diese Bandbreite und auch dieses Ausbalancieren hat uns ja auch in vielen Bereichen oft 
auch sehr erfolgreich gemacht. Und es ist ja auch manchmal gut, dass dann nicht, nur weil’s mal ein 
halbes Jahr in einem Land, in einem Produktbereich nicht so läuft sozusagen der Ruf kommt alle 
auszutauschen. Und da gibt es uns ja auch die Möglichkeit dann, gewisse Konzepte in Ruhe und … 
mit guter Überlegung, nicht dem blinden Aktionismus weiterzutreiben. Ich glaub, da haben wir schon 
auch Vorteile, aber … ich glaube schon, dass da andere Organisationen einen stärkeren Mechanismus 
… haben, gemeinsame Ziele zu definieren und nachzuverfolgen und dann auch Konsequenzen draus 
zu ziehen.‘ 
xlvii ‚Also, es ist kein amerikanisches Treiben hier, sondern es ist einfach eine gute, anständige Kultur, 
wo man sich gegenseitig respektiert, und aber doch kommuniziert, mal im plus und einmal im minus.‘ 
xlviii ‚Also ich glaube auf jeden Fall, dass wir hier bei SurgiSupplies hier eine besondere, eine eigene 
Unternehmenskultur haben, die aus dem langjährigen Erfolg, aus dem dann auch von vielen 
Mitarbeitern mitgetragenen Werteverständnis, auch aus einem gewissen Stolz bei SurgiSupplies zu 
arbeiten basiert. Wir sind aber auch geprägt davon, dass eben wir letztendlich eine relativ gutmütige 
Unternehmenskultur haben, das Wort Sanktion ist mehr oder weniger eigentlich unbekannt, was das 
Arbeiten ja auch zu einem gewissen Grad angenehm macht, aber uns auch nicht gerade zu höchster 
Dynamik treibt. Dazu kommt eben ein extrem gewachsener, bürokratischer Dschungel, der nicht mehr 
ganz klar manchmal ist und in unseren Prozesswelten ja dann auch fast schon 
schildbürgerstreichartige Ausmaße annimmt.‘ 
xlix The medical device market is strongly dominated by American companies. In 2010 American 
companies held a market share of x% in this field. 
l ‚Solange das Ergebnis stimmt macht, macht es aus meiner Sicht nicht so viel Sinn da groß 
einzugreifen. Da hat sicher jeder ne andere Art und Weise Dinge zu verkaufen. Solange er sie 
verkauft, und erfolgreich verkauft, macht es aus meiner … Ansicht keinen Sinn, das zu uniformieren. 
Zu sagen Du musst immer mit roter Krawatte und immer morgens um 9 Uhr zum Kunden, weil die 
Kunden sind auch sehr unterschiedlich.‘ 
li ‚Und die Länder spielen das ja auch ganz geschickt mit, dieses Spiel, weil die suchen sich ja nach 
wie vor eben auch aus, sozusagen, welche Produktgruppe ist gerade für mich die interessanteste und 
springen da ja auch gern mal von einem Thema auf’s andere und da fehlt dann eben vielleicht auch 
mal die Konsequenz in der Zielerreichung. Wenn’s dann halt bei Produktgruppe x Widerstände gerade 
im Markt gibt, ach, dann hat gerade aber Produktgruppe y ein tolles neues Produkt oder hier in 
Produktgruppe z kommen die gerade mit ganz guten, dann shiftet man da mal ganz schnell rum und 
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Hauptsache das gesamt lokale Ergebnis stimmt dann wieder. Also das spüren wir glaube ich schon 
jeden Tag, dass das so ist.‘ 
lii An investment planning system has been recently established within this company. For each five 
year planning period each of the 25 strategically most important countries needs to define the product 
groups in which it intends to invest over-proportionally and this planning needs to be agreed on by the 
central divisional headquarters. 
liii ‚… wenn ich einen hab, der 30 Jahre Vertriebserfahrung hat, den … muss ich anders steuern als 
einen der gerade frisch von der Uni oder von der Schule kommt.‘ 
liv ‚Also letztendlich haben wir ein Netzwerk von einzelnen Leuten, … unser Geschäftsmodell, auf 
dem das basiert und wenn die Leute uns rausbrechen, spüren wir das sofort.‘ 
lv ‘Wir haben das Gefühl, dass weder in der eigenen Organisation, noch äh auf Kundenseite mit 
offenen Karten gespielt wird. Sondern es ist alles verklausuliert und wir haben den Code nicht 
geknackt hier aus Tuttlingen. Ähm, wir haben wahrscheinlich auch mit unseren Lösungen, die wir im, 
im Rucksack haben, die sehr stark auf Effizienzsteigerung, auf Sicherheit, auf Qualität abzielen in 
Kombination, haben wir noch nicht den Eindruck, dass das tatsächlich auf Kundenseite in (Name des 
Landes) tatsächlich wahrgenommen wird, überhaupt interessiert.‘ 
lvi ‚Ausland? Sie denken doch nicht, dass wir uns mit den Landesfürsten anlegen, mit diesen 
hochkomplexen Themen!‘ 
lvii ‚In der Produktion ist definiert, wo der Kreuzschlitzschraubenzieher weltweit zu hängen hat, und 
im Vertrieb, ‚alle Macht den Ländern‘, macht halt mal, wie ihr’s denkt.‘ 
lviii ‚… dass man nicht nach dem amerikanischen Geschäftsmodell arbeitet, also ich investiere jetzt 
und ernte nachher. Sondern das ist ja immer so ein gleichzeitiges investieren und ernten und 
investieren und ernten Geschäftsmodell.‘ 
lix ‘ Und bei dieser Definition der Points of Sales, dürfen wir eben dann nicht zu viele nehmen, 
sondern wir müssen sagen ok wir wollen eben im Bereich der Viszeralchirugie, oder in der Orthpädie, 
oder in der Neurochirurgie oder in der Herzchirurgie oder in der Wirbelsäulenchirurgie oder in der 
Kardiologie was machen. Aber wir dürfen nicht überall in jeder chirurgischen Disziplin dann wieder 
präsent sein.‘ 
lx ‚… jetzt könnte ich betriebswirtschaftlich werden, es gibt ja Arbeitsteilung und Arbeitseinung. 
Arbeitsteilung heißt da in dem Falle Ablaufstrukturen, es gibt SBU 3a …, also strategisches 
Marketing, und lokale Strukturen, … jeder hat so ein bisschen Verantwortung, es gibt einen 
Divisionmanager im Land, es gibt den Geschäftsführer im Land, … dann gibt’s eben Global Sales, es 
gibt eben alle möglichen Gruppen, … dann gibt’s den Regional Head, wie ist die Interaktion dieser 
Leute? Das ist dann die Arbeitseinung. Und ich glaub, das ist noch nicht gelöst. ‘ 
lxi ‚…in der Größe gibt es kaum ein Zweites, das so harmoniedürftig ist, wie unser Unternehmen. … 
und dann führt das eben dazu, dass jeder ein bisschen vor sich rumwerkeln darf… ‘ 
lxii ‚Ich meine Verantwortung ist unteilbar. Und entweder hat sie der vor Ort, oder der in der Zentrale. 
Ganz einfach.‘ 
lxiii ‚…wenn in Südkorea die Vertriebskosten zu hoch sind, dann spreche ich … Controlling an, die 
schreibt das Land an, dann kriegen wir eine Nebelgranate zurück und dann war’s das. Und das können 
wir‘s nochmal machen, dann kriegen wir halt irgendwann keine Antwort mehr..‘ 
lxiv ‚ …wenn ein Markt ein Preisniveau bietet, das dann mit den SurgiSupplies Costrates etc. zu einem 
Preis führt, der unter unseren Herstellkosten liegt, dann gibt’s nur zwei Möglichkeiten. Entweder man 
kann einen höheren Preis im Markt positionieren, oder man steigt aus dem Geschäft aus. Wir machen 
den Königsweg, wir reduzieren die Spanne für HospiMed. Um einfach die Leute nicht zu 
demotivieren und es wird auch kein Verlust generiert.‘ 
lxv ‚…wir sind einfach davon überzeugt, und ich glaube, wir werden auch dafür bezahlt, dass wir auch 
das so sehen … und auch so fühlen, dass unsere Produktlinien ein großes Wachstumspotential für die 
Gruppe in Zukunft haben. So, und dafür brauchen wir natürlich Ressourcen, … Und der arme 
Geschäftsführer in einem Tochterunternehmen, … der muss natürlich aussuchen wo er sein Geld 
hinsteckt, ja?‘ 
lxvi ‚ Weil ein Anwender, der ein relativ großes Budget im Krankenhaus verwaltet …, der möchte 
einfach Weil ein Anwender, der ein relativ großes Budget im Krankenhaus verwaltet, … der möchte 
das Gefühl haben, dass er mit der Firma … langfristig adäquat und legal natürlich auch kooperieren 
kann. Wenn da laufend andere Gesichter kommen, wie soll der das Gefühl haben, und wenn’s dann 
noch ein Division Management gibt, im Land, die Produkte gar nicht kennen, und gar nicht zum 
Kunden gehen… Und wenn kein Vertrauen … ,dann können wir uns tagelang über Produkte 
unterhalten, oder über Preise, das hilft nicht.‘ 
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lxvii ‚…mir war das natürlich nicht bewusst, dass das in unserer Matrix Organisation alles 
unverbindlich ist, letztendlich.‘ 
lxviii ‚Das ist auch aus meiner Sicht eigentlich der wirklich entscheidende Punkt, ja, wie groß ist das 
Durchhaltevermögen?‘ 
 
lxix ‚… die versuchen zu rekrutieren erfahrene Orthopädieleute und versuchen das wahrscheinlich zu 
Konditionen, über die eh niemand kommt. … oder Du kriegst dann eben nur zweit oder drittklassiges 
Personal, was die anderen aussortieren. Wir haben das … schon immer zu ihnen gesagt sie sollen 
junge Leute nehmen und die ausbilden. … Dann kommt aber von ihnen das Argument, … wir bilden 
die Leute aus und wenn sie gut sind, dann holt sie der Wettbewerb.‘ 
lxx ‚… die haben die Beziehung ins Krankenhaus und wenn das Krankenhaus heute sagt, ja ok, ich will 
Produkt x, dann kaufen die halt Produkt x wenn sie’s bekommen, also sie sind also nicht aktiv bereit 
unbedingt jetzt auch einen Wettbewerber auf SurgiSupplies umzustellen. … Weil die eben ihre Marge 
sehen, das ist mir egal, ich hab die von jedem wo ich kaufe.‘ 
lxxi  
lxxii ‚Ich kenne jetzt einen Fall von Codman. … Da sagt die Zentrale in der USA was zu tun ist. Und da 
muss eins zu eins das aber auch so umgesetzt werden. Das führt manchmal dann dazu, dass nicht die 
Landessprache gesprochen wird, sondern die amerikanische Art und Weise dann in dem Land 
adaptiert wird und das stößt im Land oft auf entweder geringe Akzeptanz oder auf Unverständnis. 
Also ich kenne einige Beispiele wo Codman auch die Strategie knallhart über die Länder ausgerollt 
hat. Und im Endeffekt sind sie nicht erfolgreich gewesen, weil einfach die Länder sich dann auch zu 
wenig berücksichtigt sehen. Und ich denk da haben wir dann eher den Vorteil zu sagen, ja, sieht lokal 
immer ein bisschen anders aus, aber durch diese lokale Färbung wird vielleicht auch unser Erfolg in 
der Summe höher.‘ 
lxxiii ‚Also ich, ich überspitz es mal so, in dem einen oder anderen Land, lebt sich’s als Regional Head 
von SurgiSupplies relativ sorgenfrei. Weil man genau weiß, also eigentlich, die in der Zentrale, die 
machen eigentlich was ich sag. Und nicht andersrum.‘ 
 
lxxiv ‚…aus ihrer Sicht, der Marketing Manager … von der Zentrale im Bereich der SBU 4, der muss 
ein richtiger, sagen wir mal Show-man sein. Der muss Public Relations machen können und sie 
werfen einfach vor, dass das unsere Leute nicht können. Genau das gleiche bei SBU 3a, da sagen sie 
auch, Mensch, … wir stehen … in der Konkurrenz zu großen Amerikanern!‘ 
lxxv ‚Unser Job ist wie Sport, man gewinnt mal, man verliert mal, und wenn man dann in einem Land 
sagt, ich mach in SBU 5a gar nichts, und ich setz da auch keine Ressourcen dafür frei, da bin ich für 
so eine klare Aussage manchmal auch dankbar, oder meistens dankbar. Weil da weiß ich ganz genau, 
wir müssen auch keine Ressourcen da reinstecken. Aber ich habe null Problem damit, wenn ein Land 
zu mir sagt, ich habe weder Ressourcen, noch die Manpower, noch die Kompetenz, das 
Wettbewerbsumfeld ist zu schwierig, oder die Preissituation ist so schlecht bei mir im Land. ‘ 
lxxvi ‚…wir haben begrenzte Ressourcen, wir können nicht alles machen, …und eine SBU guckt immer 
in die Röhre.‘ 
lxxvii ‚Wobei wir versuchen uns ein bisschen unentbehrlich zu machen, ein bisschen auch immer sogar 
uns immer wieder in Erinnerung zu rufen.‘ 
lxxviii ‚Wo uns dann einfach mal Länder gesagt haben, ihr habt keine neuen interessanten Produkte, wir 
Fokussieren uns jetzt auf die Endoskopie, da sehen wir ne Chance, dass wir schneller einen Euro 
Umsatz machen können. Was aber, wenn das langfristig gesehen würde, ja ok wäre, aus 
Unternehmenssicht. Das ist aber wirklich nur auf den 31.12. gesehen. Und man meint dann, ok, in 
Zukunft wird’s so weiter gehen. Und man sieht nicht, wenn ich da nichts mehr tu, bricht das andere 
weg.‘ 
lxxix ‚So, den informieren wir gar nicht, sonst hat der nur einen blöden Kommentar. Oder verbietet uns 
was. …. Und dann geht man auf uns zu und dann ruf ich dem Regionenleiter an und sag: ‚Macht das 
Sinn?‘ ,Nee, das macht keinen, furchtbar schrecklich, machen wir auf gar keinen Fall!‘ Zack, 
Funkstille.‘ 
